Snap Shot
- The question: How do jurors weigh a defendant’s confession, can they tell when it was obtained under conditions that make it less reliable, and what helps them do so?
- What the research shows: In mock-jury studies, confessions are among the most persuasive evidence. A 2024 meta-analysis of 83 samples found that coerced confessions raised convictions about half as much as non-coerced ones, so mock jurors discounted them partly but not fully. Jurors gave more weight to exculpatory DNA than to a confession, and recent experiments find that jurors know more about false-confession risk factors than older surveys suggested.
- What it does not show: Nearly all the research uses written case summaries read by students or online participants without deliberation, and almost none uses a recorded interrogation. It cannot show whether a particular confession is true, whether a particular jury erred, or how court-martial members respond.
- The law: A reliable voluntariness determination by someone other than the guilt jury, ordinarily the judge, comes first (Jackson v. Denno), but the defendant may present the circumstances of the confession to the jury (Crane v. Kentucky), and the jury gives it the weight it deserves (18 U.S.C. § 3501(a); Mil. R. Evid. 304(g); A.R.S. § 13-3988). Arizona jurors must also find a statement to law enforcement voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt (RAJI Standard Criminal 19). Arizona v. Fulminante treats an erroneously admitted coerced confession as subject to harmless-error review while describing a confession as “like no other evidence.”
- Issues for each side: For prosecutors, the research bears on the value of a complete recording and of independent evidence that corroborates the confession; for defense counsel, on the interrogation’s circumstances and the source of its details. The research shows partial, not absent, discounting, and expert testimony lowered convictions without improving discrimination.
A confession is often the most important evidence in a criminal case. When it is true, it can resolve doubt that no other evidence could; when it is false, it can lead to the conviction of an innocent person. Whether a jury can tell the difference is a central question in the law of confessions. Courts rely on jurors to weigh confessions after a judge has found them voluntary, and the Supreme Court’s harmless-error rule for coerced confessions rests on assumptions about how much influence a confession has.
The research comes mainly from mock-jury experiments, surveys of jury-eligible adults, and archival studies of proven false confessions that went to trial. It reaches court when parties seek or oppose expert testimony on interrogations, when courts consider jury instructions on confessions, and when appellate courts assess the prejudice of an erroneously admitted statement. In courts-martial, the members serve the jury’s function.
This paper reviews what the research shows about the weight jurors give confessions, how they respond to coercion, confession content, recordings, expert testimony, and instructions, and what jurors believe about interrogations. It then summarizes the federal, military, and Arizona law that relies on juror judgment. Broader research on juror beliefs about memory and eyewitnesses is reviewed in “Juror Beliefs About Memory, Eyewitnesses, and Confessions” in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource; this paper concentrates on confessions.
The Weight Jurors Give a Confession
In three mock-juror experiments using trial summaries, confessions produced the highest conviction rates compared with eyewitness identification and character testimony, and were rated the most incriminating of the three when all appeared in the same trial (Kassin & Neumann, 1997). A 2024 meta-analysis of 83 independent samples (N = 24,860) confirmed the general pattern: compared with no confession, confessions obtained without coercion substantially increased convictions (g = 0.70), and coerced confessions increased them less (g = 0.34) (Mindthoff et al., 2024). Giving a confession great weight is not itself an error: most confessions are presumed to be true and many are corroborated, although the proportion that are false is unknown and no study measures it directly. The research question is whether jurors adjust that weight when the conditions of a particular confession call for it.
Confessions are not treated as conclusive. In three experiments in which a defendant confessed but DNA evidence excluded him, mock jurors relied far more on the DNA, with conviction rates of 10% and 15% in two studies; conviction rates rose to 33% and 45% when the prosecutor offered a theory reconciling the confession with the DNA (Appleby & Kassin, 2016). The same is true of secondhand confessions: in two experiments, a confession reported by an accomplice or jailhouse informant increased guilty verdicts compared with no confession, and telling participants that the witness had received an incentive did not reduce that effect (Neuschatz et al., 2008).
A confession may also shape other evidence. In DNA exoneration files, false-confession cases were more likely than eyewitness cases to contain additional evidentiary errors, and in cases with multiple errors the confession usually came first (Kassin et al., 2012); the design is correlational and concerns wrongful convictions only.
Coerced Confessions and Partial Discounting
Early experiments suggested that jurors do not discount coerced confessions at all: mock jurors who judged a high-pressure confession involuntary and said it did not affect them were still more likely to vote guilty than a no-confession group, even when the judge ruled it inadmissible (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). The 2024 meta-analysis refines that conclusion: coerced confessions produced fewer convictions than non-coerced ones (g = −0.36), so jurors did recognize coercion, but still more convictions than no confession at all (Mindthoff et al., 2024). Mock jurors discounted a coerced confession more for a juvenile defendant than for an adult (Mindthoff et al., 2024). In one experiment, adding a false-evidence ploy to an otherwise identical interrogation transcript led to fewer convictions and shorter recommended sentences, and participants rated the ploy interrogations as more deceptive and coercive (Woody & Forrest, 2009).
Deliberation does not necessarily correct the pattern. In a study of 253 jury-eligible adults who watched an actual coerced false confession and then deliberated in groups, 53% voted guilty, and deliberations rarely mentioned police coercion, contamination, promises of leniency, or interrogation length; statements attributing the confession to the defendant’s guilt predicted guilty verdicts, and statements attributing it to the interrogation predicted lower guilt (Stevenson et al., 2023). Researchers explain the residual weight of coerced confessions partly by the tendency to attribute behavior to character rather than situation (Kassin, 2012), an account consistent with the findings but not shown to be the only explanation.
What Jurors Believe About Interrogations and False Confessions
Surveys show that most jury-eligible adults know false confessions occur but understand their causes incompletely. Respondents in a 2008 survey recognized that a confession is not absolute proof of guilt but strongly believed they personally would not confess falsely (Henkel et al., 2008); potential jurors in another survey saw common interrogation techniques as psychologically coercive but unlikely to produce false confessions (Leo & Liu, 2009); and in a survey of 461 jury-eligible adults, respondents believed that interrogators detect lies better than ordinary people, that they could tell a true from a false confession on video, and that expert testimony would help (Costanzo et al., 2010). In a 2025 online survey of 377 Canadian potential jurors, 84.9% agreed that suspects might confess falsely, yet 56.0% also agreed that suspects who have confessed are probably guilty, and 85% thought expert testimony on false confessions would be beneficial; the sample was self-selected and younger and more educated than the national population (Hynes & Snook, 2025).
Newer work suggests more knowledge. In a multisite survey of 825 students and community members, respondents’ views were generally consistent with the research: they saw psychologically coercive tactics as more likely to produce false than true confessions, but did not fully appreciate the risk youth poses and misjudged interrogation length (Mindthoff et al., 2018). Across four experiments with 1,319 jury-eligible participants, mock jurors showed appropriate knowledge of false-confession risk factors and distinguished coercive from noncoercive interrogations fairly well (Perry et al., 2024). Knowledge measured on a questionnaire is not the same as its use in deciding a case, as the deliberation study shows (Stevenson et al., 2023).
Confession Content, Contamination, and Corroboration
Detail persuades. In a content analysis of 20 confessions later shown to be false, all contained details about the time, place, and scene of the crime, and most included a motive and the confessor’s own account of his thoughts and feelings; in a companion experiment, adding crime details or a motive to a bare admission increased mock jurors’ confidence in guilt (Appleby et al., 2013). Accurate, non-public detail is legitimately persuasive when the suspect supplied it. The difficulty arises when the source is disputed, because details disclosed during questioning can appear in a false confession as easily as in a true one.
Showing jurors where the details came from appears to matter. In a 2026 online experiment, 181 jury-eligible adults read a case including a false confession; 37.8% voted guilty when they had neither interrogation questions revealing that the detective disclosed the details nor a short expert video on contamination, compared with 17% to 22% in each of the other three conditions, and the two had no additional effect when combined (Vornhagen & Hart, 2026). The study used a written vignette and a single case and did not test confessions whose details originated with the suspect. Like the DNA studies, it suggests that jurors discount a confession when shown a specific, evidence-based reason to doubt it.
Recordings and the Camera’s Point of View
Jurors in most current cases see or hear a recorded interrogation, yet only about 2.4% of the samples in the 2024 meta-analysis used recorded interrogations, and 10.8% used transcripts (Mindthoff et al., 2024). A complete recording lets the factfinder evaluate the questioning directly rather than relying on competing accounts. How it is made also matters. In mock-trial experiments, a video focused on the suspect led participants to rate the confession as more voluntary, and affected verdicts, compared with a video showing the suspect and interrogator equally or focusing on the interrogator, and a judicial instruction did not remove the effect (Lassiter et al., 2002). In a follow-up, 21 judges and 24 law-enforcement officers showed the same bias (Lassiter et al., 2007).
In one laboratory study, confidence in judging confessions was not matched by accuracy. When college students and police investigators watched or listened to male prison inmates giving true confessions and false confessions invented for the study, neither group was highly accurate; students were generally more accurate than investigators, who were more confident and more prone to judge confessors guilty (Kassin et al., 2005). Group results from one laboratory task do not describe how any particular investigator performs. These findings bear on any factfinder, judge or juror, asked to assess a confession from its demeanor rather than its content and its fit with other evidence.
Expert Testimony and Jury Instructions
The research distinguishes sensitivity, in which a safeguard helps jurors discount unreliable confessions without discounting reliable ones, from skepticism, in which it lowers convictions across the board. In the 2024 meta-analysis, jury instructions reduced convictions for coerced but not for noncoerced confessions, a pattern the authors call a sensitivity effect, while expert testimony reduced convictions whether or not the confession was coerced, a skepticism effect (Mindthoff et al., 2024). The comparison is between coerced and noncoerced confessions; it does not measure how well jurors told true confessions from false ones. The instruction analysis rested on 8 samples and the expert analysis on 19, and the authors conclude that educational safeguards are needed but that more research is needed to identify the most effective jury instructions and expert testimony. They also suggest that science-based interviewing could give jurors more reliable statement evidence (Mindthoff et al., 2024). Individual studies differ: expert testimony lowered convictions and raised ratings of coercion in the false-evidence experiment (Woody & Forrest, 2009), and an expert video lowered guilt ratings in the contamination study (Vornhagen & Hart, 2026). Asking mock jurors to list reasons why a person might confess did not improve their sensitivity (Perry et al., 2024).
These results matter to both sides: education can change how jurors weigh confessions, but testimony that makes jurors doubtful of confessions in general does not make verdicts more accurate. Testimony tied to specific features of the case, such as the source of the details, is closer to the conditions under which jurors discounted appropriately.
False Confessors at Trial
Among proven false confessors whose cases went to trial, 73% were convicted in one sample (Leo & Ofshe, 1998) and 81% in another, 30 of 37 (Drizin & Leo, 2004). These figures describe a selected group, false confessions that were later proven false, mostly in serious cases, and they do not show how juries treat confessions in general, most of which are presumed to be true. They do show that a false confession, once in evidence, frequently led to conviction.
Limits of the Evidence
Most of the research uses mock jurors, often students or online participants: 44.6% of the samples in the 2024 meta-analysis were students, 37.4% community members, and 16.9% both, and most read written summaries without deliberation (Mindthoff et al., 2024). Coercion in the experiments was often overt, such as threats or a displayed weapon, unlike the subtler tactics at issue in many trials. Few studies used recordings, and there are no data on court-martial members. Field data on actual juries are limited to proven false confessions, a selected sample.
Research on sex or gender of mock jurors is sparse. In the deliberation study, women made more statements favoring the defense and attributing the confession to the interrogation, which predicted lower guilt (Stevenson et al., 2023); a large survey found no significant gender differences in beliefs about interrogations (Costanzo et al., 2010); the meta-analysis and the contamination study did not analyze juror sex. These are group-level findings and say nothing about any particular juror. No study can determine whether a particular confession is true or whether a particular jury weighed one correctly.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the meta-analysis (Mindthoff et al., 2024) is cited to show that jurors cannot discount coerced confessions, ask what was found: coerced confessions had about half the effect of non-coerced ones, so discounting was partial, not absent. When it is cited to support expert testimony, note that experts lowered convictions regardless of coercion. When the trial conviction rates of proven false confessors (Leo & Ofshe, 1998; Drizin & Leo, 2004) are cited, ask who was studied: false confessions later proven false, not confessions generally. When recent findings that jurors understand risk factors (Perry et al., 2024) are cited to argue that expert testimony is unnecessary, ask whether knowledge on a questionnaire translates to deliberation (Stevenson et al., 2023). For any of these studies, ask whether written summaries read by students fit a trial with a recorded interrogation. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Juror Responses to Confessions and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
A jury may not be the sole judge of whether a confession was voluntary; the defendant is entitled to a reliable determination of voluntariness, made by a decisionmaker other than the guilt jury (ordinarily the judge), before the confession is heard (Jackson v. Denno, 1964), and the prosecution must prove voluntariness at that hearing by a preponderance of the evidence, although states may adopt higher standards (Lego v. Twomey, 1972). Once a confession is admitted, the defendant has a constitutional right to present evidence about the physical and psychological circumstances in which it was obtained, because they bear on its credibility (Crane v. Kentucky, 1986), and federal law requires that the jury hear relevant evidence on voluntariness and be instructed to give the confession such weight as it deserves (18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)).
Case Example. In Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), a prison inmate confessed to a murder to a fellow inmate who was an FBI informant and who offered protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. The Supreme Court held the confession coerced and held that admitting a coerced confession is subject to harmless-error review. It also stated that a confession “is like no other evidence,” quoted Justice White’s description of it as “probably the most probative and damaging evidence” (499 U.S. at 296, quoting Bruton v. United States, 1968, White, J., dissenting), called for extreme caution before finding such an error harmless, and found the error not harmless in that case. The juror research bears directly on that judgment.
Expert testimony on interrogations is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, and Daubert (1993). The Seventh Circuit vacated a conviction where the trial court excluded a social psychologist’s testimony on false confessions without adequately assessing it (United States v. Hall, 1996), and the First Circuit held that the district court erred under Rule 702 in excluding a psychiatrist’s testimony that a mental disorder (pseudologia fantastica) could explain the defendant’s false self-incriminating statements, but remanded for the district court to decide the government’s fit and Rule 403 objections (United States v. Shay, 1995). In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 304(g) requires the judge to permit defense evidence on voluntariness and to instruct members to give the statement the weight it deserves, Rule 304(h) permits introduction of the remainder of a partly introduced statement, and Rule 304(c) requires independent evidence tending to establish the statement’s trustworthiness. Expert testimony must satisfy Military Rule of Evidence 702 and United States v. Houser (1993). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld exclusion of a defense expert’s testimony about a particular confession where its reliability had not been shown, in part because it rested on the accused’s own account (United States v. Griffin, 1999), and upheld denial of expert assistance where the defense did not show necessity (United States v. Bresnahan, 2005).
Arizona
A.R.S. § 13-3988(A) requires the judge to determine voluntariness outside the jury’s presence and, if the confession is admitted, to permit the jury to hear evidence on voluntariness and to instruct it to give the confession the weight it deserves. Arizona adds a second safeguard: jurors may not consider a defendant’s statements to a law-enforcement officer unless they find beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary, and a statement induced by “any direct or implied promise, however slight” is involuntary (RAJI (Criminal) Standard 19, 2022). That instruction asks jurors to make precisely the judgment the research examines. Expert testimony is governed by Arizona Rule of Evidence 702; general, educational testimony is permitted (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), but experts may not opine on a particular person’s credibility (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986). In State v. Carlson (2015), the Arizona Supreme Court upheld exclusion of a proposed expert whose testimony would have conveyed the defendant’s own claim that his confession was false.
Other Jurisdictions
Some courts address the absence of a recording through instructions. In Massachusetts, a defendant whose custodial interrogation was not completely recorded is entitled on request to an instruction that the state’s highest court prefers recording and that the jury should weigh the unrecorded statement with great caution and care (Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 2004).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The research described above is the same whichever party relies on it. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately make. Jurors in recent studies know more about false-confession risk factors than older surveys suggested and distinguish coercive from noncoercive interrogations (Perry et al., 2024); they partly discount coerced confessions, though not fully, and give greater weight to strong scientific evidence than to a confession (Mindthoff et al., 2024; Appleby & Kassin, 2016); and accurate details that the suspect supplied and that independent evidence confirms are legitimately persuasive. A complete recording that shows both parties, a record of which details the suspect volunteered, and corroborating evidence are the features jurors in the contamination and DNA studies relied on. In the meta-analysis, instructions reduced convictions for coerced but not noncoerced confessions; the authors call for more research to identify the most effective instructions, and science-based interviewing could give jurors more reliable statement evidence, which both sides can support.
The research also counsels caution. Jurors discount coerced confessions only partly, deliberation does not reliably correct that, and a detailed confession can persuade even when the details came from questioning (Stevenson et al., 2023; Appleby et al., 2013). A suspect-focused camera makes a confession look more voluntary (Lassiter et al., 2002), and in one laboratory study investigators’ confidence in judging confessions exceeded their accuracy (Kassin et al., 2005). Federal appellate courts have found error where expert testimony bearing on a confession’s reliability was excluded without adequate analysis (Hall; Shay), and the research identifies matters jurors may misjudge, such as the source of details and camera perspective.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports presenting the full circumstances of an interrogation under Crane, Military Rule of Evidence 304(g), and A.R.S. § 13-3988. Confessions are highly persuasive and coerced confessions are discounted only partly (Kassin & Neumann, 1997; Mindthoff et al., 2024); jurors in deliberation seldom discussed coercion or contamination (Stevenson et al., 2023); and in one online experiment using a written vignette, showing jurors that interrogators supplied the details was associated with lower guilt judgments (Vornhagen & Hart, 2026). The recording itself can show which facts the interrogator introduced and whether the camera focused on the suspect (Lassiter et al., 2002), and in Arizona the standard instruction asks jurors to decide voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.
The research also counsels caution. Expert testimony in the meta-analysis lowered convictions regardless of coercion, which the authors describe as a skepticism effect and which does not show better discrimination between true and false confessions (Mindthoff et al., 2024), and testimony not tied to the facts of the case may be excluded for lack of reliability or fit (Griffin) or as an opinion on credibility (Lindsey; Moran; Carlson). Recent studies show jurors understand many risk factors, so testimony on matters they already know may be found unhelpful (Perry et al., 2024). Conviction rates of proven false confessors do not show that any particular confession is false, and where independent evidence confirms details the defendant supplied, the research offers little basis for discounting the confession.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Appleby, S. C., Hasel, L. E., & Kassin, S. M. (2013). Police-induced confessions: An empirical analysis of their content and impact. Psychology, Crime & Law, 19(2), 111–128. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2011.613389
Appleby, S. C., & Kassin, S. M. (2016). When self-report trumps science: Effects of confessions, DNA, and prosecutorial theories on perceptions of guilt. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 22(2), 127–140. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000080
Costanzo, M., Shaked-Schroer, N., & Vinson, K. (2010). Juror beliefs about police interrogations, false confessions, and expert testimony. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 7(2), 231–247. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01177.x
Drizin, S. A., & Leo, R. A. (2004). The problem of false confessions in the post-DNA world. North Carolina Law Review, 82(3), 891–1007.
Henkel, L. A., Coffman, K. A. J., & Dailey, E. M. (2008). A survey of people’s attitudes and beliefs about false confessions. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 26(5), 555–584. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.826
Hynes, M., & Snook, B. (2025). Potential jurors’ perceptions of interrogations and confessions in Canada. Psychology, Crime & Law. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2025.2563645
Kassin, S. M. (2012). Why confessions trump innocence. American Psychologist, 67(6), 431–445. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028212
Kassin, S. M., Bogart, D., & Kerner, J. (2012). Confessions that corrupt: Evidence from the DNA exoneration case files. Psychological Science, 23(1), 41–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611422918
Kassin, S. M., Meissner, C. A., & Norwick, R. J. (2005). “I’d know a false confession if I saw one”: A comparative study of college students and police investigators. Law and Human Behavior, 29(2), 211–227. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-005-2416-9
Kassin, S. M., & Neumann, K. (1997). On the power of confession evidence: An experimental test of the fundamental difference hypothesis. Law and Human Behavior, 21(5), 469–484. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024871622490
Kassin, S. M., & Sukel, H. (1997). Coerced confessions and the jury: An experimental test of the “harmless error” rule. Law and Human Behavior, 21(1), 27–46. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024814009769
Lassiter, G. D., Diamond, S. S., Schmidt, H. C., & Elek, J. K. (2007). Evaluating videotaped confessions: Expertise provides no defense against the camera-perspective effect. Psychological Science, 18(3), 224–226. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01879.x
Lassiter, G. D., Geers, A. L., Handley, I. M., Weiland, P. E., & Munhall, P. J. (2002). Videotaped interrogations and confessions: A simple change in camera perspective alters verdicts in simulated trials. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(5), 867–874. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.5.867
Leo, R. A., & Liu, B. (2009). What do potential jurors know about police interrogation techniques and false confessions? Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 27(3), 381–399. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.872
Leo, R. A., & Ofshe, R. J. (1998). The consequences of false confessions: Deprivations of liberty and miscarriages of justice in the age of psychological interrogation. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 88(2), 429–496. https://doi.org/10.2307/1144288
Mindthoff, A., Evans, J. R., Perez, G., Woestehoff, S. A., Olaguez, A. P., Klemfuss, J. Z., Normile, C. J., Scherr, K. C., Carlucci, M. E., Carol, R. N., Meissner, C. A., Michael, S. W., Russano, M. B., Stocks, E. L., Vallano, J. P., & Woody, W. D. (2018). A survey of potential jurors’ perceptions of interrogations and confessions. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 24(4), 430–448. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000182
Mindthoff, A., Ferreira, P. A., & Meissner, C. A. (2024). The effect of confession evidence on jurors’ verdict decisions: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 48(3), 163–181. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000563
Neuschatz, J. S., Lawson, D. S., Swanner, J. K., Meissner, C. A., & Neuschatz, J. S. (2008). The effects of accomplice witnesses and jailhouse informants on jury decision making. Law and Human Behavior, 32(2), 137–149. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-007-9100-1
Perry, A. D., Mindthoff, A., Woestehoff, S. A., & Meissner, C. A. (2024). Does engaging in reason elaboration mitigate bias in mock jurors’ evaluations of confession evidence? Law and Human Behavior, 48(5–6), 456–473. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000595
Stevenson, M. C., McCracken, E., Watson, A., Petty, T., & Plogher, T. (2023). An attribution theory-based content analysis of mock jurors’ deliberations regarding coerced confessions. Law and Human Behavior, 47(2), 348–366. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000529
Vornhagen, J., & Hart, K. J. (2026). How evidence of confession contamination affects perceptions and judgments in a mock case. Psychology, Crime & Law. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2026.2647334
Woody, W. D., & Forrest, K. D. (2009). Effects of false-evidence ploys and expert testimony on jurors’ verdicts, recommended sentences, and perceptions of confession evidence. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 27(3), 333–360. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.865
Legal Authorities
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995).
United States v. Bresnahan, 62 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 351 P.3d 1079 (2015).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 813 N.E.2d 516 (2004).
18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3988.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Mil. R. Evid. 304, 702 (2024 ed.).
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 19 (State Bar of Arizona 2022).
Related topic papers: Confessions at Trial and After Conviction · Expert Testimony on Interrogations and False Confessions · Electronic Recording of Interrogations · Contamination: Non-Public Details and Post-Admission Narratives · Secondary Confessions: Informants, Co-Accused, and Jailhouse Statements · Pretext Phone Calls and Recorded Confrontations
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Jurors and Jury Decision-Making · Courts-Martial