Snap Shot
- The question: When may an expert testify about interrogations, confessions, and the risk of false confession, and what may that expert say?
- What the research shows: A substantial body of laboratory, field, and case research identifies interrogation tactics and personal characteristics associated with false confessions, and in a 2018 survey of 87 confession researchers, at least 80% agreed that several core findings were reliable enough to present in court, a survey that reflects the views of the researchers who do this work. Some surveys have found that jurors hold beliefs that differ from those findings, although more recent studies suggest jurors know more about risk factors than earlier surveys implied.
- What it does not show: No general false-confession rate is known, risk factors appear in true confessions as well as false ones, and no expert, test, or method can determine whether a particular confession is true or false.
- The law: Admissibility turns on Rule 702 (Fed. R. Evid. 702 as amended Dec. 1, 2023; Ariz. R. Evid. 702 as amended Jan. 1, 2024; Mil. R. Evid. 702, which took on the 2023 amendment in 2025 under Mil. R. Evid. 1102), Daubert, and Kumho Tire. Decisions vary by jurisdiction and judge: courts that have admitted testimony have often done so where it was connected to the defendant’s documented condition or the specific features of the interrogation, some have held exclusion to be error (United States v. Hall, 1996), and others have upheld exclusion, especially of general testimony not tied to the defendant (State v. Carlson, 2015; United States v. Griffin, 1999). Published decisions are a selected sample. Experts may not tell the jury whether a confession or a witness is truthful.
- Issues for each side: For prosecutors, the case law confines experts to general education and documented characteristics of the defendant, while recognizing that exclusion without proper analysis can be error; for defense counsel, courts that have admitted testimony have often done so where it was connected to specific facts of the interrogation and the defendant, although general educational testimony that satisfies Rule 702 has also been admitted, as in Arizona (State v. Salazar-Mercado), and decisions vary.
A confession is among the most persuasive kinds of evidence a jury hears, and most people find it hard to believe that someone would admit to a serious crime he or she did not commit. Expert testimony on interrogations and confessions is offered to explain what research shows about how interrogations work, which tactics and personal characteristics are associated with false confessions, and how the content of a confession can be compared with the known facts. It is usually offered by the defense, sometimes answered by a prosecution expert, and frequently challenged.
The issue reaches court in three ways: at a suppression hearing, where an expert may address a defendant’s capacity to understand warnings or susceptibility to pressure; at trial, where the expert addresses the weight of an admitted confession; and in a request by an indigent defendant for funding or appointment of an expert. This paper describes what such experts testify about, the legal standards, the decisions admitting and excluding the testimony, the main criticisms of it and the responses, and the limits the courts have placed on its scope.
Related topics are treated in Forensic Evaluation of a Disputed Confession or Miranda Waiver, How Jurors Respond to Confession Evidence, and, for courts-martial, Confessions in Courts-Martial: Article 31(b), Mil. R. Evid. 304 and 305, and Expert Assistance.
What Confession Experts Testify About
Two kinds of testimony are offered, and courts often treat them differently. The first is general, educational testimony, usually by a social psychologist or criminologist, describing the research: the stages of accusatorial interrogation, the use of minimization and false-evidence ploys, the effects of long sessions and sleep loss, the risk factors identified in proven false confessions, the role of contamination, and why innocent people sometimes waive their rights. The second is person-specific clinical testimony, usually by a psychologist or psychiatrist who has evaluated the defendant, describing intellectual functioning, language ability, interrogative suggestibility and compliance, mental illness, or another condition and how that condition bears on the defendant’s understanding and responses during questioning.
Leading researchers describe the proper role of the general expert as educational. One account states that the expert’s purpose is to inform jurors about relevant research and risk factors, not to declare a confession false or a defendant innocent, a role summarized as to “educate, not advocate” (Kassin, 2022, p. 179). Another describes the expert as explaining the literature on police-induced false confessions, how particular methods can produce them, the conditions associated with them, and how the post-admission narrative can be compared with the facts, so that jurors can evaluate the confession for themselves (Leo, 2008, p. 157). Clinical experts are similarly limited: an evaluation can describe a person’s characteristics, but it cannot establish how the person responded in a past interrogation or whether the resulting statement was true. Evaluation methods are described in the forensic evaluation paper.
The scientific basis for the general testimony has been assessed directly. In a 2018 survey of 87 confession researchers, at least 80% agreed that several findings, including that false-evidence ploys and minimization implying leniency increase the risk of false confession, were reliable enough to present in court; the survey reflects the views of the researchers who do this work (Kassin et al., 2018). The 2025 scientific review rests its conclusions on converging evidence from case studies, field observations, and experiments (Kassin et al., 2025). These findings bear on reliability and general acceptance. They do not resolve whether the testimony will help the jury in a particular case, which is the question on which many courts divide.
The Legal Framework
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, permits expert testimony only if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that the expert’s specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact, the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data and reliable principles and methods, and the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of those methods to the facts of the case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) made the trial judge a gatekeeper for scientific testimony, General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) allowed exclusion when there is too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended gatekeeping to all expert testimony, including the social and behavioral sciences. Rule 403 permits exclusion where unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time substantially outweighs probative value. Rule 704(a) permits opinions on an ultimate issue, but courts generally bar experts from vouching for or against a witness’s credibility.
Arizona adopted the Daubert standard in its Rule 702 in 2012 and amended it effective January 1, 2024 (Order R-23-0004) to track the 2023 federal amendment. Under Mil. R. Evid. 1102(a), federal amendments reach the military rules 18 months after they take effect unless the President acts otherwise, so the December 1, 2023 amendment to Rule 702 applies to Mil. R. Evid. 702 from June 1, 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). Military judges also apply the factors of United States v. Houser (1993). States that do not follow Daubert apply their own standards; New Jersey, for example, adopted a Daubert-type standard for criminal cases in State v. Olenowski (2023).
The constitutional right to present a defense also bears on the issue. In Crane v. Kentucky (1986), the Supreme Court held that a defendant may present evidence about the physical and psychological environment in which a confession was obtained, because those circumstances bear on its credibility even after the judge has found it voluntary. Crane concerned lay testimony about the interrogation, not experts, and courts have generally held that ordinary evidentiary rules may limit expert testimony without violating the right so long as the rules are not applied arbitrarily (Carlson, 2015).
Decisions Admitting the Testimony
Courts that admit the testimony generally reason that the research is reliable and that the phenomenon of false confession runs contrary to ordinary intuition, so jurors benefit from learning about it. One author’s review of American case law concluded that most published decisions permit such testimony and that exclusions are the exception, while noting that many admissions occur at trial without a written opinion (Leo, 2008, pp. 156–157). Another described the courts as divided, with some judges admitting experts routinely and others excluding them on the ground that the subject is within jurors’ common knowledge or lacks consensus (Kassin, 2022, pp. 178–180).
Case Example. In United States v. Hall (1996), the defendant offered a social psychologist to testify about interrogation techniques and false confessions. The district court excluded the testimony without a full Daubert inquiry, and the Seventh Circuit vacated the conviction, holding that the proffer had to be assessed under Daubert and Rule 702. On remand, the district court found the social psychologist’s testimony reliable and admitted it. A jury convicted the defendant again, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, approving the government’s rebuttal expert. The case illustrates both that exclusion without analysis can be reversible error and that admission of the testimony does not determine the verdict.
Courts that have admitted testimony have often done so where it was connected to the defendant’s documented condition or the specific features of the interrogation, but decisions vary by jurisdiction and judge, and published decisions are a selected sample. The First Circuit held that testimony about a defendant’s diagnosed psychiatric condition bearing on the reliability of his statements was not excludable as within common knowledge (United States v. Shay, 1995). The Arizona Supreme Court later read Shay and Hall as involving a diagnosed condition or an examination of the defendant (Carlson, 2015). The Michigan Supreme Court has held that its earlier decision upholding exclusion of a particular expert after a Daubert hearing did not create a categorical bar to false-confession testimony, and that denying an indigent defendant funds for such an expert was fundamentally unfair where the truth of the confession was central to the trial (People v. Warner, 2024, discussing People v. Kowalski, 2012).
Decisions Limiting or Excluding the Testimony
Many decisions uphold exclusion or limitation, usually on one of four grounds: the testimony is too general to fit the case, it would not help jurors because the subject is within common understanding, it would invade the jury’s role in judging credibility, or the expert’s basis is unreliable. In Carlson (2015), the Arizona Supreme Court upheld exclusion of risk-factor testimony by an expert who had not examined the defendant, whose experience concerned police interrogations rather than the defendant’s statement to a reporter, and whose testimony went to a general propensity to lie rather than to mental or physical circumstances affecting the statement; the court also held that an expert may not relay the defendant’s own claim that the confession was false. The Tenth Circuit upheld exclusion of general testimony on whether and why false confessions occur where the expert had not examined the defendant and would not discuss his interrogation, reasoning that the testimony would intrude on the jury’s credibility role and that its limited probative value was outweighed under Rule 403 (United States v. Benally, 2008). A New Jersey appellate court reversed the admission of general social-psychological testimony under that state’s former standard (State v. Free, 2002, as described in Watson et al., 2010), and New York’s highest court, applying that state’s Frye standard, held that such testimony may be admissible in a proper case but upheld exclusion where the proffer was not relevant to the defendant or her interrogation (People v. Bedessie, 2012).
Case Example. In United States v. Griffin (1999), the defense offered a psychologist to support a claim that the accused’s confession was involuntary. The military judge excluded the testimony, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed. The court noted that the expert could not testify that the confession was false or coerced, only that it was consistent with a coerced-compliant type; that his conclusions rested in part on the accused’s account of the questioning, which the judge had found not credible; that he expressed reservations about the normative data underlying his conclusions; and that the testimony shed little light on whether this confession was coerced. The case illustrates how courts examine the fit between the research, the expert’s basis, and the facts, rather than the general validity of the field.
The Main Criticisms and the Responses
The first criticism concerns general versus specific testimony. General testimony describes risk factors and research without saying anything about the confession at issue, and courts have questioned whether it helps the jury decide the case before it (Benally, 2008; Carlson, 2015). Specific testimony, applying the research to the defendant and the interrogation, comes closer to helping but also closer to an opinion that the confession is false, which courts do not allow (Griffin, 1999). Researchers respond that the expert’s task is to explain the factors and leave their application to the jury, as with other educational testimony (Kassin, 2022; Leo, 2008), and the 2023 amendment to Rule 702 makes clear that the proponent must show, more likely than not, that each requirement is met, including that the opinion reflects a reliable application of the method to the facts of the case.
The second criticism is that the testimony invades the jury’s role in assessing credibility. Courts consistently hold that no witness may tell the jury that another person is or is not telling the truth (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; Carlson, 2015), and an expert who describes the risk factors present in a case may be heard as implying that the confession is false. The response is that the testimony concerns conditions known to affect the reliability of statements, as eyewitness testimony concerns conditions affecting identification, and that courts can enforce the line through limiting rulings and instructions rather than exclusion.
The third criticism is the base-rate problem. No general rate of false confession is known. Exoneration data show that about 13% of known exonerations involve a false confession by the exoneree (Kassin et al., 2025; National Registry of Exonerations, 2025), but that is a share of known wrongful convictions, not a rate among confessions. Risk factors such as long sessions, minimization, and youth also occur in interrogations producing true confessions, so their presence does not distinguish a false confession from a true one. A 2026 analysis using inverse probability estimated that the risk that lawful tactics produce a false-confession wrongful conviction clusters near 1% (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026a), and a 2026 meta-analysis argued that laboratory confession rates vary widely, are largely unexplained by tactics, and cannot be generalized to the field (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b); an integrative review raised similar concerns about ecological validity (Welner et al., 2025). Investigator trainers make a related point from practice: the firm that publishes the most widely used American interrogation manual (Inbau et al., 2013) takes the position that false confessions result from conduct outside the method, such as threats, promises of leniency, long isolation, or questioning vulnerable people without appropriate support (John E. Reid and Associates, 2026; see Accusatorial Interrogation and the Reid Technique). Researchers respond that the experiments are used to compare conditions, not to estimate field rates, that the conclusions rest on converging evidence including proven cases, and that experts can and should tell jurors that risk factors raise risk without classifying a confession (Kassin et al., 2025). An expert who presents the research accurately will acknowledge each of these limits.
The fourth criticism is that jurors already understand the issues. Survey and experimental evidence is mixed. Jury-eligible adults in one survey believed that police are better than ordinary people at detecting lies and that they themselves could tell true from false confessions by watching a recording, and most said expert testimony would be helpful (Costanzo et al., 2010). More recent experiments with 1,319 participants found that mock jurors had appropriate knowledge of risk factors, but asking them to elaborate their reasons did not reduce bias in their evaluations of confession evidence (Perry et al., 2024). A meta-analysis of mock-juror studies found that expert testimony reduced the likelihood of conviction whether or not the confession was coerced, which the authors described as a skepticism effect, whereas jury instructions reduced convictions for coerced but not uncoerced confessions, and the authors call for more research on the most effective instructions and expert testimony (Mindthoff et al., 2024); one study found that expert testimony increased mock jurors’ sensitivity to whether a confession’s content fit the facts (Henderson & Levett, 2016). Neither result describes real juries. These findings support neither the claim that jurors need no help nor the claim that expert testimony reliably improves accuracy.
What Such Experts May and May Not Say
Across jurisdictions, decisions that admit testimony tend to permit an expert to describe the research on interrogation methods and false confessions; to explain recognized risk factors and how they operate; to describe how a confession’s details can be compared with independently known facts and with what was disclosed during questioning; and, where the expert has evaluated the defendant with appropriate methods, to describe the defendant’s documented characteristics and their relevance to understanding warnings or responding to pressure. Decisions across jurisdictions tend not to permit an expert to say that a confession is true or false, that the defendant or an officer is credible, or that the defendant is innocent; to relay the defendant’s account of the interrogation as substantive evidence (Carlson, 2015); or to rest conclusions on the defendant’s version of disputed facts that the court has rejected (Griffin, 1999). Experts called by the prosecution, for example to address whether a defendant’s test results reflect genuine impairment or to rebut a defense expert, are subject to the same limits.
Limits of the Evidence
The research behind expert testimony has the limits described in Confession Research Methods and Their Limits: laboratory studies mostly use students accused of minor rule-breaking; field data on false confessions come from selected samples of proven cases; and survey data on expert consensus reflect the views of researchers in the field. The juror studies on expert testimony mostly used written or video summaries and few involved deliberation. Published case law is itself a selected sample, because rulings admitting testimony at trial are rarely reported (Leo, 2008). No research shows that a risk factor, an evaluation, or an expert can classify a particular confession. In the juror studies cited here, juror sex was not analyzed or was not reported as affecting responses to expert testimony; one large survey found no significant gender differences in beliefs about interrogations (Costanzo et al., 2010).
Questions to Ask About This Research
When an expert proffer is made, ask which findings the expert will describe, what the evidence is for each, and whether the expert will acknowledge the base-rate problem and the critiques of laboratory paradigms. Ask how each risk factor described is connected to a documented fact in this interrogation or this defendant, and whether the expert examined the defendant with validated methods. Ask whether any part of the testimony would amount to an opinion on truthfulness or would relay the defendant’s own account. When the juror research is cited for or against admission, ask whether the studies used deliberating juries and whether expert testimony improved discrimination or only increased general skepticism. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Expert Testimony and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Fed. R. Evid. 702 as amended December 1, 2023, Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire govern federal admissibility, with Rules 403 and 704. The federal circuits are divided in result rather than in rule: Hall (7th Cir.) and Shay (1st Cir.) found error in exclusion without proper analysis or of testimony about a diagnosed condition, while Benally (10th Cir.) upheld exclusion of general testimony not tied to the defendant. Federal law also entitles an indigent defendant to expert assistance when the defendant’s mental condition is a significant factor (Ake v. Oklahoma, 1985), and some states apply Ake to false-confession experts when the reliability of the confession is central (Warner, 2024). In courts-martial, Mil. R. Evid. 702 and Houser govern testimony, Griffin upheld exclusion, and expert assistance turns on the necessity test of United States v. Gonzalez (1994), applied in United States v. Bresnahan (2005) and United States v. Freeman (2008) to uphold denials of interrogation consultants.
Arizona
Ariz. R. Evid. 702, as amended effective January 1, 2024, governs. Experts may not opine on a particular person’s truthfulness (Lindsey, 1986; State v. Moran, 1986), but general educational testimony that satisfies Rule 702(a)-(c) and is not barred by Rule 403 may be admitted (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014, which involved a State expert on child sexual abuse behaviors and did not hold such testimony always admissible). Carlson (2015) upheld exclusion of a defendant’s statements relayed through an expert and of risk-factor testimony addressing propensity to lie rather than the defendant’s mental or physical condition, and noted earlier cases evaluating testimony about a defendant’s mental condition at the time of his statements. Arizona law is described in Arizona Confession Law.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The research described above is the same whichever party relies on it. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The case law supports limiting expert testimony to its proper scope. Most confessions are presumed to be true; the proportion that are false is unknown, and no study measures it directly. Courts have upheld exclusion of general testimony not connected to the defendant (Benally; Carlson), of opinions resting on the defendant’s rejected account (Griffin), and of any statement that a confession is false or that a witness is truthful. The base-rate problem and the critiques of laboratory paradigms (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026a, 2026b; Welner et al., 2025) bear on the judge’s Rule 702 and 403 assessment, and the juror meta-analysis found that expert testimony lowered convictions regardless of coercion, and its authors call for more research on the most effective expert testimony, so it does not show that such testimony improves jurors’ accuracy (Mindthoff et al., 2024). Accurate, independently verified, non-public details in a recorded confession are evidence of reliability that the factfinder can weigh alongside any expert testimony.
The research also counsels caution. Exclusion without a proper Rule 702 analysis has been held to be error (Hall), and courts have recognized that testimony about a defendant’s diagnosed condition can be outside jurors’ common knowledge (Shay). In a survey of 87 researchers, most of the listed findings drew agreement from at least 80% of respondents (Kassin et al., 2018), and the 2023 amendment to Rule 702 makes clear that the proponent must show, more likely than not, that each requirement is met, including a reliable application of the method to the facts of the case, which does not displace the judge’s assessment of the reliability of the underlying method. Where a confession is central and the defendant has a documented vulnerability, courts have found that denying an expert or expert funding can be error (Warner), and the C.A.A.F. described the denial it upheld in Bresnahan as a close call. Prosecution experts are held to the same Rule 702 standard and the same limits on opinions about truthfulness.
Special Issues for Defense
The research and the case law support admission of testimony with a sound basis that fits the case. In the 2018 survey of 87 confession researchers, at least 80% agreed that several core findings on minimization and false-evidence ploys were reliable enough to present in court, a survey that reflects the views of the researchers who do the work (Kassin et al., 2018; see also Kassin et al., 2025); some surveys have found that jurors hold beliefs that differ from those findings (Costanzo et al., 2010), although more recent studies suggest jurors know more about risk factors than earlier surveys implied (Perry et al., 2024); and courts have found error in excluding testimony without analysis (Hall) or in excluding testimony about a diagnosed condition (Shay). Crane protects the right to present the circumstances of the interrogation, and Ake and Warner support expert assistance when the reliability of a confession is central.
The research also counsels caution. Many courts exclude general testimony not tied to the defendant (Benally; Carlson), testimony that rests on the defendant’s own disputed account (Griffin; Carlson), and anything resembling an opinion on credibility. The base-rate problem is real: risk factors appear in true confessions, no false-confession rate is known, and the laboratory paradigms are contested (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026a, 2026b; Welner et al., 2025). In a meta-analysis of mock-juror studies, expert testimony reduced convictions whether or not the confession was coerced (Mindthoff et al., 2024), which a court may weigh under Rule 403; that result does not show that the testimony improves discrimination between true and false confessions, and it concerns mock jurors, not real juries. No risk factor or evaluation shows that a particular confession is false, and testimony tied to specific features of the recording, the defendant’s documented characteristics, and an evaluation using validated methods has often been admitted, although decisions vary by jurisdiction and judge, one review of published decisions found that most permit such testimony (Leo, 2008) while another describes courts as divided (Kassin, 2022), published decisions are a selected sample, and general educational testimony that satisfies Rule 702 is also admitted in some courts, including in Arizona (Salazar-Mercado, 2014).
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Costanzo, M., Shaked-Schroer, N., & Vinson, K. (2010). Juror beliefs about police interrogations, false confessions, and expert testimony. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 7(2), 231–247. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01177.x
Henderson, K. S., & Levett, L. M. (2016). Can expert testimony sensitize jurors to variations in confession evidence? Law and Human Behavior, 40(6), 638–649. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000204
Inbau, F. E., Reid, J. E., Buckley, J. P., & Jayne, B. C. (2013). Criminal interrogation and confessions (5th ed.). Jones & Bartlett Learning.
John E. Reid and Associates. (2026, May 14). False confessions: Causes and remedies [Investigator tip]. https://reid.com/resources/investigator-tips/false-confessions-causes-and-remedies
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Kassin, S. M. (2022). Duped: Why innocent people confess—and why we believe their confessions. Prometheus Books.
Kassin, S. M., Cleary, H. M. D., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., Meissner, C. A., Redlich, A. D., & Scherr, K. C. (2025). Police-induced confessions, 2.0: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 49(1), 7–53. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000593
Kassin, S. M., Redlich, A. D., Alceste, F., & Luke, T. J. (2018). On the general acceptance of confessions research: Opinions of the scientific community. American Psychologist, 73(1), 63–80. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000141
Leo, R. A. (2008). Police interrogation and American justice. Harvard University Press.
Mindthoff, A., Ferreira, P. A., & Meissner, C. A. (2024). The effect of confession evidence on jurors’ verdict decisions: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 48(3), 163–181. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000563
Mourtgos, S. M., & Adams, I. T. (2026a). Recalibrating the risk of false confession wrongful convictions: Interrogation tactics and inverse probability. Journal of Criminal Justice, 103, Article 102600. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2026.102600
Mourtgos, S. M., & Adams, I. T. (2026b). What do laboratory false confession paradigms measure? A calibration meta-analysis. Journal of Quantitative Criminology. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-026-09687-1
National Registry of Exonerations. (2025). 2024 annual report. https://exonerationregistry.org/sites/exonerationregistry.org/files/documents/2024_Annual_Report.pdf
Perry, A. D., Mindthoff, A., Woestehoff, S. A., & Meissner, C. A. (2024). Does engaging in reason elaboration mitigate bias in mock jurors’ evaluations of confession evidence? Law and Human Behavior, 48(5–6), 456–473. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000595
Watson, C., Weiss, K. J., & Pouncey, C. (2010). False confessions, expert testimony, and admissibility. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 38(2), 174–186. https://jaapl.org/content/38/2/174
Welner, M., DeLisi, M., & Janusewski, T. (2025). False confessions: An integrative review of the phenomenon. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 43(2), 185–202. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2707
Legal Authorities
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
United States v. Benally, 541 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999).
United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995).
United States v. Bresnahan, 62 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
United States v. Freeman, 65 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
United States v. Gonzalez, 39 M.J. 459 (C.M.A. 1994).
United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
People v. Bedessie, 19 N.Y.3d 147, 970 N.E.2d 380 (2012).
People v. Kowalski, 492 Mich. 106, 821 N.W.2d 14 (2012).
People v. Warner, 514 Mich. 41, 22 N.W.3d 1 (2024).
State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 351 P.3d 1079 (2015).
State v. Free, 351 N.J. Super. 203, 798 A.2d 83 (App. Div. 2002).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133 (2023).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
Fed. R. Evid. 403, 702 (as amended Dec. 1, 2023), 704.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702 (amended effective Jan. 1, 2024, Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004).
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Mil. R. Evid. 702, 1102 (2024 ed.); R.C.M. 703(d) (2024 ed.).
Related topic papers: Forensic Evaluation of a Disputed Confession or Miranda Waiver · How Jurors Respond to Confession Evidence · Confession Research Methods and Their Limits · How Often False Confessions Occur: Exoneration Data and the Base-Rate Problem · Arizona Confession Law · Confessions in Courts-Martial: Article 31(b), Mil. R. Evid. 304 and 305, and Expert Assistance
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Jurors and Jury Decision-Making · Memory in the Courtroom · Courts-Martial