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False Confessions

How Often False Confessions Occur: Exoneration Data and the Base-Rate Problem

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How common are false confessions, and what can exoneration registries, DNA cases, self-report surveys, police estimates, and laboratory studies tell a court about that question?
  • What the research shows: About 13% of exonerees in the National Registry of Exonerations had themselves falsely confessed (as reported in Kassin et al., 2025; Leo & Bazelon, 2026), and the Innocence Project reports that about 29% of the 375 DNA exonerations it counted through 2020 involved false confessions (Innocence Project, n.d.). The two figures come from different databases, definitions, and years, and both are shares of known wrongful convictions, not rates among confessions or interrogations. The shares are higher in homicide cases. Self-report surveys and police estimates, which are unverified and vary widely, suggest that some innocent people confess; they do not establish a rate.
  • What it does not show: No general false-confession rate among confessions or interrogations is known. Exoneration shares are shares of known wrongful convictions, self-reports are unverified, and laboratory rates reflect low-stakes tasks; the three measure different things and cannot be combined into a single rate.
  • The law: Courts decide the reliability of a particular confession case by case, and the law’s response to an unknown base rate is procedural: voluntariness review, corroboration requirements, the defendant’s right to present the circumstances of the confession, and limits on statistical testimony that amounts to vouching.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can legitimately point out that exoneration shares are not false-confession rates and that the proportion of confessions that are false is unknown; defense counsel can legitimately point out that known cases are a floor rather than a count, but neither side can use group statistics to show that a particular confession is true or false.

Attorneys and experts on both sides often cite percentages about false confessions: the share of exonerations that involved a false confession, the share of students who signed a false confession in an experiment, or the share of prisoners who say they once confessed falsely. Each figure answers a different question, and none answers the question a court most wants answered, which is how likely it is that this confession is false.

The gap matters because the meaning of a statistic depends on what it measures. A figure presented as “the false confession rate” may be a share of wrongful convictions, a rate in a laboratory task, or a self-reported lifetime experience, and treating any of them as a rate among all confessions overstates or understates the problem.

This paper describes the main sources of data on the frequency of false confessions, what each can and cannot show, the base-rate problem and the 2026 critiques that rely on it, and the law governing prevalence evidence. The parallel problem for false allegation rates is discussed in “False, Unfounded, and Unresolved Reports: What the Research Shows” in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource.

Exoneration Registries

The largest source of data on false confessions is the record of wrongful convictions later overturned. The National Registry of Exonerations, founded in 2012, collects U.S. exonerations since 1989 from all sources of evidence, not only DNA. Its 2024 annual report recorded 147 exonerations in that year, 22 (15%) of which involved false confessions, and 3,646 exonerations from 1989 through the end of 2024 (National Registry of Exonerations, 2025). Across the full registry, about 13% of exonerees had themselves falsely confessed (Kassin et al., 2025; Leo & Bazelon, 2026); the 2024 annual report cited above does not state this overall share, and it changes as cases are added. The Innocence Project, which works on cases in which DNA testing can establish innocence, reports that about 29% of the 375 DNA exonerations it counted through 2020 involved false confessions (Innocence Project, n.d.). The two tallies use different databases, definitions, and dates, and should not be read as the same measure. In both datasets the share is higher among homicide cases, about 61% of DNA homicide exonerations and 23% of registry homicide exonerations (Kassin et al., 2025). A European registry launched in 2024 had recorded 136 exonerations in 20 countries, 37% involving false confessions (Kassin et al., 2025).

Earlier case collections reached similar conclusions. An early study of 340 exonerations from 1989 through 2003 found false confessions in about 15% of the cases, and found that 42% of exonerated juveniles (14 of 33) and 69% of exonerees with mental disabilities, meaning mental illness or intellectual disability (18 of 26), had falsely confessed, compared with 8% of adults without known mental disabilities; these are shares of exonerees in each group, not rates among all juveniles or all people with mental disabilities (Gross et al., 2005). An analysis of 125 proven false confessions from 1971 to 2002 defined a confession as proven false only when no crime had occurred, the confessor could not have committed it, the true perpetrator was identified, or scientific evidence established innocence (Drizin & Leo, 2004).

These are counts and shares of known wrongful convictions. They show that false confessions occur, that they contribute to a meaningful share of the wrongful convictions that are discovered, and that they are concentrated in the most serious cases. They do not show how often confessions in general are false.

Why Exoneration Shares Are Not False-Confession Rates

The denominator of an exoneration share is the number of exonerations, not the number of confessions. To turn the share into a rate, one would need to know how many confessions are obtained, how many of those are false, and how many false confessions lead to convictions that are later discovered. None of these numbers is known.

Exoneration data are also selective in several directions. They omit false confessions discovered before trial, cases resolved by guilty plea that were not later reviewed, confessions given outside the criminal justice system, and convictions that remain uncorrected (Kassin et al., 2025). Homicide and sexual assault cases, where biological evidence exists and the stakes justify years of review, are overrepresented. On the other side, the registry’s definition requires official action after new evidence of innocence without specifying how much, and one review notes both the critique that it may include some guilty people and the converse critique that it excludes some innocent ones (Leo & Bazelon, 2026). An earlier analysis argued that some published collections of “proven” false confessions included cases in which the evidence of guilt remained substantial (Cassell, 1999). For these reasons the known cases are often described as a floor on false confessions that led to wrongful conviction, not an estimate of their frequency, and some cases in any collection may be disputed.

A related caution comes from a 2026 study of all 339 known child sexual abuse exonerations, which found that their case features were similar in many ways to those of substantiated cases (Denne et al., 2026). The same reasoning applies to confessions: features that appear in known false confessions may also be common in true ones.

Self-Report Surveys

A second method asks people whether they have ever confessed falsely. In two Icelandic surveys of prison inmates, 12% said they had made a false confession to police at some point; among college and university students in Iceland and Denmark who had been interrogated, self-reported false-confession rates ranged from about 3.7% to 7% (as reviewed in Kassin et al., 2010). In interviews with 193 incarcerated 14- to 17-year-old boys, 17.1% said they had falsely confessed to police and 18.1% that they had entered a false guilty plea; about half of the false confessors said they did so to protect someone else (Malloy et al., 2014; Kassin et al., 2025). A later review put the self-reported rate at about 20% among Icelandic prisoners and suspects questioned at police stations and 33.4% among Scottish prisoners, and reported that 13.8% of 2,726 adolescents in seven European countries who had been interrogated at a police station said they had confessed falsely (Gudjonsson, 2021). In a U.S. survey of 1,249 offenders with mental disorders, self-reported false confessions ranged from 9% to 28% across six sites, and false admissions to murder or rape were rarely reported (Redlich et al., 2010). Among 153 forensic psychiatric patients in Germany, 95 reported having been interviewed by police at least once when innocent, and 25% of those reported a false confession on at least one occasion (Volbert et al., 2019).

Self-reports have the advantage of reaching cases that did not come to official attention. Their weaknesses are equally clear: the claims are not verified, respondents may misremember or exaggerate, the samples (prisoners, detained youth, psychiatric patients) are not representative of suspects generally, and some “false confessions” were given to protect another person rather than in response to pressure. The authors of the 2010 scientific review cautioned that retrospective self-reports should be treated with caution as measures of a false-confession rate (Kassin et al., 2010). The German study also illustrates a design point: a rate should be computed only among people who were ever interviewed when innocent, since only they could have confessed falsely (Volbert et al., 2019).

Police Estimates

Investigators have been asked directly. In a 2007 survey of 631 North American investigators, respondents estimated that 4.78% of innocent suspects confess during interrogation (Kassin et al., 2007). In a 2024 national survey of 526 U.S. officers, respondents estimated that 26.2% of innocent suspects at least partially falsely confess (Brimbal et al., 2024). Neither figure is a measurement; both are experience-based estimates by people who rarely learn the ground truth, and the difference between them may reflect the question wording, the inclusion of partial admissions, or greater awareness of the issue. They show that investigators themselves regard false confessions as something that occurs, not how often it occurs.

Laboratory Rates

Laboratory studies report false-confession rates that are much higher than any field estimate. In the original computer-crash experiment, with 79 college students (75 analyzed), 69% signed a false confession to pressing a forbidden key, and all 17 in the single condition combining a fast pace and a false witness did so, a very small cell in a low-stakes task (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). A meta-analysis of laboratory studies reported pooled rates that varied by paradigm and found that false evidence increased false confessions (Stewart et al., 2018). In the cheating paradigm, 6% of innocent participants confessed with no tactic and 43% with both minimization and an implied deal (Russano et al., 2005).

These rates measure what happens when students are accused of a plausible, low-cost mistake under controlled conditions. A 2026 calibration meta-analysis of 99 conditions from 41 studies reported a pooled laboratory rate of 41%, with a 95% prediction interval from 3% to 93%; tactics explained less than 1% of the variation, and the no-tactic baseline in the most common paradigm (37%) would, if taken as a field rate, imply more than a quarter-million false confessions a year in the United States (the authors’ calculation, not an observed figure; Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b). The authors concluded that the absolute laboratory rates are incompatible with plausible field rates and that the paradigms capture low-stakes compliance more than interrogation-induced confession. The original cheating-paradigm researchers had themselves cautioned that overall confession rates would likely be lower in the real world than in the laboratory because real accusations are more severe, and presented the paradigm as a first step toward studying how tactics affect true and false confessions (Russano et al., 2005). The value and limits of these paradigms are discussed in “Confession Research Methods and Their Limits.”

The Base-Rate Problem

How informative a confession is depends on two things: how often guilty and innocent suspects confess under the conditions used, and how many of the suspects questioned are in fact innocent. The second number, the base rate of innocence among interrogated suspects, is unknown and probably varies widely by jurisdiction, offense, and how suspects are selected.

A simple illustration, using invented numbers chosen only to show the arithmetic, makes the point. Suppose that in some setting 10% of the suspects interrogated are innocent, that 60% of the guilty confess, and that 5% of the innocent confess. Out of 1,000 suspects, 540 of the 900 guilty and 5 of the 100 innocent would confess, so about 1% of the confessions would be false. If instead 30% of the suspects were innocent, the same confession rates would yield 420 true and 15 false confessions, about 3% false. If a tactic doubled the innocent confession rate while raising the guilty rate only modestly, the false share would rise further. The illustration shows why the same laboratory effect can mean very different things in the field, and why neither a high laboratory rate nor a low exoneration share settles how often confessions are false.

Two 2026 analyses apply this reasoning. Both are journal articles by the same authors. One argued that once base rates are considered, the probability of a false-confession wrongful conviction is much lower than laboratory odds ratios might suggest: a 2026 simulation under stated base-rate assumptions estimated the probability that an interrogation using a lawful tactic ends in a false-confession wrongful conviction at about 1% (medians of roughly 0.6% to 1.3% across the assumptions tested); the figure cannot be checked directly and does not describe a particular suspect (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026a). The other, described above, argued that laboratory baselines are too high to be field estimates (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b). An integrative review made related points about student samples and staged tasks, and recounted an older exchange in which one scholar estimated from system-wide parameters that about 1 in 30,000 convictions results from a false confession and others responded that no such estimate is feasible because interrogations were rarely recorded and false confessions often go unreported (Welner et al., 2025). These analyses do not show that false confessions are rare in any specific setting, because they too depend on assumptions about unknown base rates. As of November 2026, a search located no published reply to the 2026 analyses. Kassin et al. (2010, 2025), writing before those analyses, state that an incidence rate is not knowable but that exoneration, field, and experimental evidence converge on the conclusion that some innocent people confess under some conditions.

Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical aggravated-assault trial in which a defense witness tells the jury that about 13% of exonerations involve a false confession, and the prosecutor responds in closing that “well over 99% of confessions are true.” Neither figure answers the question before the jury. The first is a share of known wrongful convictions, not a rate among confessions; the second is not a measured rate at all, because no general false-confession rate is known. A court could limit either statement under the rules on expert testimony, argument, and unfair prejudice, and the jury’s task would still turn on the recording, the circumstances of the interrogation, and whether independent evidence corroborates what the defendant said.

Limits of the Evidence

Each source measures something different. Exoneration shares count known wrongful convictions; self-reports count unverified recollections in selected samples; police estimates are impressions; laboratory rates come from minor accusations against students. Combining them into one figure, or using one as if it were another, produces a number without a defined meaning.

Effect sizes from experiments are better evidence about direction than about magnitude. The finding that accusatorial conditions produced more false confessions than information-gathering conditions in laboratory experiments (Catlin et al., 2024) is a comparison between conditions; it does not supply the absolute rate in a particular police department. Field data have the opposite problem: they reflect real stakes but rarely establish ground truth.

Sex and gender bear on these data mainly through sampling. Most known false-confession exonerees are men (Drizin & Leo, 2004), the inmate samples in the Icelandic surveys were drawn from prisons, and the youth study cited above interviewed 193 incarcerated adolescent boys (Malloy et al., 2014); sex differences in self-reported false confession were not examined in the studies relied on here. Laboratory samples are mostly mixed groups of students, and the original computer-crash study found no sex differences (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996).

None of these sources can say whether a particular confession is true or false. A population statistic, whether high or low, is not evidence about one suspect. The reliability of a specific confession depends on how it was obtained, who gave it, and whether independent evidence corroborates it.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When an exoneration share is cited, ask what the denominator is (exonerations, not confessions), which database and date it comes from, and whether the cases are homicides, DNA cases, or all exonerations. When a self-report figure is cited, ask who was surveyed, whether the claims were verified, whether the rate was computed among people who had ever been questioned when innocent, and what reasons respondents gave. When a laboratory rate is cited, ask what participants were accused of, what confessing cost them, and whether the study estimated prevalence or compared conditions. When a published critique is cited to show that false confessions are rare, ask what base rate it assumed and where that number came from. When any figure is offered about a particular confession, ask how the statistic could bear on this person and what the case-specific evidence of corroboration shows. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Prevalence Evidence and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

The law does not require proof of a base rate. It addresses the risk of unreliable confessions through process: voluntariness review (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986; Lego v. Twomey, 1972), Miranda warnings, the defendant’s right to present evidence about the circumstances of the confession (Crane v. Kentucky, 1986), and corroboration requirements (Opper v. United States, 1954). In Crane, the Court observed that a confession may be unworthy of belief even when it is voluntary, and that the defendant must be allowed to show the jury why. Expert testimony about the frequency of false confessions is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, and to Rule 403; the question of fit, whether a general finding helps the fact-finder evaluate the confession in the case, is often decisive (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993; United States v. Hall, 1996).

Courts-martial apply Military Rule of Evidence 702 together with the factors in United States v. Houser (1993); the 2023 federal amendment to Rule 702 applies to the military rule from June 1, 2025, 18 months after its December 1, 2023 effective date, under Mil. R. Evid. 1102(a) unless the President acts otherwise (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has treated expert testimony expressing the statistical probability that a witness is truthful as impermissible vouching (United States v. Brooks, 2007), a principle that applies equally to statistics offered to suggest that a confession is true or false. Military Rule of Evidence 304(c) requires independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of a confession before it may be considered on guilt.

Arizona

Arizona applies Rule 702 as amended effective January 1, 2024 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004), and its courts bar expert testimony that quantifies the likelihood that a particular witness or class of witnesses is truthful (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475–76; State v. Moran, 1986). Educational testimony about general principles, without opinion about the particular person, is permitted under State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), subject to Rules 702 and 403. The corpus delicti rule (State v. Carlson, 2015) and the voluntariness instruction under A.R.S. § 13-3988 (RAJI (Criminal) Standard 19, 2022) supply case-specific safeguards. After conviction, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(e) (newly discovered material facts) and 32.1(h) (actual innocence shown by clear and convincing evidence) are the principal routes by which a confession case may become an exoneration, and how they are used affects which cases enter exoneration data.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The research described above is the same whichever party relies on it. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately make. Exoneration shares are shares of known wrongful convictions, not rates of false confession; no general rate is known; and laboratory rates come from low-stakes tasks whose absolute values do not transfer to felony investigations (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b; Welner et al., 2025). Police estimates and self-reports are impressions and unverified recollections, and published case collections have been questioned (Cassell, 1999; Leo & Bazelon, 2026). When a witness presents any percentage as “the false confession rate,” it is fair to ask what the figure measures, and statistical testimony that implies a particular confession is false is subject to the vouching limits in Brooks and Lindsey.

The research also counsels caution. The same arguments limit claims that false confessions are rare: the base-rate analyses rest on assumptions about unknown rates, and the known cases are generally regarded as a floor (Kassin et al., 2025). False confessions are concentrated in the most serious cases, including homicides, and exoneration studies show that they can be persuasive and detailed. A prosecutor relying on the rarity of false confessions in general still needs case-specific corroboration, and a confession from a juvenile or a person with a mental disability comes from groups in which false confessions were far more common among exonerees in one early sample of 340 exonerations through 2003 (Gross et al., 2005).

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several points defense counsel can legitimately make. False confessions contribute to a meaningful share of known wrongful convictions: about 13% of registry exonerees had themselves falsely confessed and about 29% of the 375 DNA exonerations counted through 2020 involved false confessions, with higher shares in homicide cases (Kassin et al., 2025; Innocence Project, n.d.). Known cases omit those resolved before trial, by unreviewed plea, or not corrected, and police and suspect surveys, though unverified, suggest that some innocent people confess (Brimbal et al., 2024; Kassin et al., 2010). In one early exoneration sample (340 exonerations through 2003), false confessions were far more common among juveniles (14 of 33) and exonerees with mental disabilities (18 of 26) than among adults without known mental disabilities (Gross et al., 2005). These points respond to an argument that a false confession is too rare to consider.

The research also counsels caution. The same figures cannot show that confessions in general, or this confession, are likely to be false. Exoneration shares are not rates, self-reports are unverified, the police estimates differ more than fivefold between surveys, and laboratory rates have been sharply criticized as field estimates (Mourtgos & Adams, 2026b). An argument that treats a 13%, 29%, or 69% figure as the probability that a defendant’s confession is false misstates the research. In a disputed-confession case the more informative evidence is the record of the interrogation and the corroboration analysis, not population statistics.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Brimbal, L., Roche, S. P., & Martaindale, M. H. (2024). Interviewing and interrogation practices and beliefs, 20 years later: A national self-report survey of American police. Law and Human Behavior, 48(4), 247–261. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000570

Cassell, P. G. (1999). The guilty and the “innocent”: An examination of alleged cases of wrongful conviction from false confessions. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 22(2), 523–603. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.161470

Catlin, M., Wilson, D. B., Redlich, A. D., Bettens, T., Meissner, C. A., Bhatt, S., & Brandon, S. E. (2024). Interview and interrogation methods and their effects on true and false confessions: A systematic review update and extension. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 20(4), Article e1441. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1441

Denne, E., Sullivan, C. E., & Neal, T. M. S. (2026). Characteristics of exonerated cases of child sexual abuse. Frontiers in Psychology, 17, Article 1794898. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1794898

Drizin, S. A., & Leo, R. A. (2004). The problem of false confessions in the post-DNA world. North Carolina Law Review, 82(3), 891–1007.

Gross, S. R., Jacoby, K., Matheson, D. J., Montgomery, N., & Patil, S. (2005). Exonerations in the United States, 1989 through 2003. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 95(2), 523–560.

Gudjonsson, G. H. (2021). The science-based pathways to understanding false confessions and wrongful convictions. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, Article 633936. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.633936

Innocence Project. (n.d.). DNA exonerations in the United States (1989–2020) [Data through 2020]. https://innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Kassin, S. M., Cleary, H. M. D., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., Meissner, C. A., Redlich, A. D., & Scherr, K. C. (2025). Police-induced confessions, 2.0: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 49(1), 7–53. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000593

Kassin, S. M., Drizin, S. A., Grisso, T., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., & Redlich, A. D. (2010). Police-induced confessions: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 34(1), 3–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-009-9188-6

Kassin, S. M., & Kiechel, K. L. (1996). The social psychology of false confessions: Compliance, internalization, and confabulation. Psychological Science, 7(3), 125–128. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1996.tb00344.x

Kassin, S. M., Leo, R. A., Meissner, C. A., Richman, K. D., Colwell, L. H., Leach, A.-M., & La Fon, D. (2007). Police interviewing and interrogation: A self-report survey of police practices and beliefs. Law and Human Behavior, 31(4), 381–400. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9073-5

Leo, R. A., & Bazelon, L. (2026). Exonerations: Causes, consequences, and reforms. Annual Review of Criminology, 9, 317–342. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-criminol-032924-035031

Malloy, L. C., Shulman, E. P., & Cauffman, E. (2014). Interrogations, confessions, and guilty pleas among serious adolescent offenders. Law and Human Behavior, 38(2), 181–193. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000065

Mourtgos, S. M., & Adams, I. T. (2026a). Recalibrating the risk of false confession wrongful convictions: Interrogation tactics and inverse probability. Journal of Criminal Justice, 103, Article 102600. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2026.102600

Mourtgos, S. M., & Adams, I. T. (2026b). What do laboratory false confession paradigms measure? A calibration meta-analysis. Journal of Quantitative Criminology. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-026-09687-1

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Legal Authorities

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954).

State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 351 P.3d 1079 (2015).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3988.

Fed. R. Evid. 403, 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 304(c), 702.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e), (h).

Ariz. R. Evid. 403, 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 19 (State Bar of Arizona 2022).

Related topic papers: Introduction to False Confessions and Police Interrogation · Confession Research Methods and Their Limits · Types of False Confessions · Risk Factors for False Confessions: An Overview · Expert Testimony on Interrogations and False Confessions · Confessions at Trial and After Conviction

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony · Child Abuse Allegations