Snap Shot
- The question: When a person with a mental illness, intellectual or developmental disability, or another special-population characteristic is accused of a sexual offense, what alternatives to ordinary prosecution exist, who is eligible, and what does the research show about outcomes?
- What the research shows: A meta-analysis of 17 studies found that mental health court participation had a small effect on recidivism (d = −0.20) compared with ordinary processing, with weaker effects in higher-quality studies. A 2012 federal census found that about two-thirds of U.S. problem-solving courts did not accept applicants with a history of sex offenses. One Arizona evaluation of prosecutor-referred restorative conferencing for adult sexual offenses (22 cases, 2003 to 2007) reported high satisfaction among victims who consented and attended and no observed safety incidents, but half of the victims who completed ratings doubted the offender’s sincerity, and the study could not test recidivism.
- What it does not show: Almost no outcome research isolates people charged with sexual offenses in mental health, veterans, or disability-based programs, because most programs exclude them. No study shows that diversion is safer or riskier than prosecution for a particular person charged with a contact or online sexual offense.
- The law: Under Justice Manual § 9-22.100, federal pretrial diversion programs must exclude people accused of child exploitation, child pornography, sexual abuse, or sexual assault offenses absent approval by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. Arizona county attorneys hold sole discretion over diversion (A.R.S. §§ 11-361, 11-365), and victims may confer with the prosecutor about diversion (A.R.S. § 13-4419; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1). Federal and military victims have rights to be informed of deferred prosecution, non-prosecution, and separation-in-lieu agreements.
- Issues for each side: For prosecutors, the recurring issues are the victim’s views, the offense, and the evidence on risk and treatment, as distinct from diagnosis alone. For the defense, they are whether a program actually accepts the charge and offers concrete treatment and supervision, since general specialty-court outcome data come mostly from nonsexual cases.
Most people charged with crimes are prosecuted in the ordinary way: charge, plea or trial, and sentence. A smaller number are diverted. Diversion can occur before arrest, when police refer a person to treatment instead of booking; before charging or before trial, when a prosecutor defers or suspends prosecution on conditions; or after a plea, when a problem-solving court such as a mental health court or veterans treatment court supervises treatment and may dismiss or reduce charges on completion. Deferred prosecution, deferred disposition, and pretrial diversion overlap in meaning and differ by jurisdiction. The common feature is that the formal criminal outcome depends on what the person does during a period of supervision.
For people accused of sexual offenses, these options are more limited than for most other groups. Many programs exclude sexual offenses by rule, federal policy requires high-level approval, and the views of the person harmed carry particular weight. At the same time, defendants with serious mental illness, intellectual disability, or other conditions raise real questions about culpability, competency, and what disposition best protects the public. This paper covers diversion and specialty courts across special populations and for both contact and online offenses. Autism-specific charging and diversion issues are addressed in “Charging, Diversion and Plea Options in Autism Cases” in the Autism and Online Sexual Offense hub.
Two premises frame the paper. First, sexual offenses harm the people against whom they are committed, including the children depicted in child sexual abuse material (CSAM), and a diagnosis or disability is not a defense. Second, diversion is a decision about how the justice system responds, not a finding that an offense was minor or that the accused poses no risk. Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography”; this paper uses CSAM except when discussing the law.
Forms of Diversion and Specialty Courts
Pre-arrest diversion places discretion with police officers and crisis teams, who may take a person in a mental health crisis to treatment instead of jail. It is designed mainly for low-level conduct and rarely reaches sexual offenses, which usually require a report, an investigation, and a referral to the prosecutor.
Prosecutor-led pretrial diversion and deferred prosecution suspend the case while the person completes conditions such as treatment, restitution, or supervision; charges are dismissed or never filed on completion and may be reinstated on failure. Eligibility and terms are set by the prosecuting office.
Mental health courts are criminal dockets for defendants with serious mental illness. A national survey of all 90 adult mental health courts then operating found that they had spread to 34 states and that 92% used jail as a sanction for noncompliance, at least occasionally (Redlich et al., 2006). Veterans treatment courts follow a similar model with peer mentors and links to Department of Veterans Affairs services; a national analysis of 7,931 participants found that they spent nearly a year in the program on average and that 14% had a new incarceration (Tsai et al., 2018). Disability-specific dockets for intellectual or developmental disability are uncommon. Some states have instead enacted disability-based deferred-disposition statutes; Virginia, for example, allows a court to defer proceedings for a person with autism or an intellectual or developmental disability if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct was caused by, or directly and substantially related to, the condition, after considering the views of the prosecutor and the victim (Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-303.6). That statute excludes capital murder and “acts of violence,” a category that includes felony criminal sexual assault (Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-297.1), so it does not reach felony contact sexual assault charges.
Who Is Eligible: Sexual Offense Exclusions
Exclusion of sexual offenses is the most common pattern. The Bureau of Justice Statistics census of 3,052 problem-solving courts operating in 2012 found that 65% did not accept applicants with a history of sex offenses and 56% did not accept applicants with a history of violent crime (Strong et al., 2016). Domestic violence courts were the exception, and most veterans courts accepted participants with a history of violence; the census did not report sex-offense eligibility separately for mental health courts. Local criteria often go further than prior history and exclude current sexual charges. In Arizona, the Pima County Superior Court’s criminal mental health court excludes defendants charged with murder, sexual assault, child molestation, and some domestic violence offenses (Pima County Superior Court, n.d.).
Exclusion is not universal. Some programs consider sexual offenses case by case, some accept misdemeanor offenses such as indecent exposure, and some prosecutors’ offices divert selected cases with victim agreement. Eligibility for a given defendant therefore depends on the written criteria of the specific court or office.
For people with intellectual and developmental disabilities, informal diversion has long been common. A review of assessment practice notes that sexual behavior by people with these disabilities, particularly in hospital settings, often led to no charge, and that charged cases were more likely to be diverted from the justice system, so official records can understate prior sexual behavior used in risk assessment (Steptoe & Michie, 2020). Informal diversion therefore cuts two ways: it spares some people prosecution, and it can leave behavior unaddressed and undocumented. This point is developed in “Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples.”
What Outcome Research Shows
The strongest evidence concerns mental health courts generally, not sexual offenses. A meta-analysis of 17 studies (N = 16,129) published from 2004 to 2015 found a small effect of mental health court participation on recidivism compared with traditional processing (d = −0.20). Effects were larger for jail time and new charges than for arrests and convictions, larger when recidivism was measured after program exit, and larger in lower-quality studies; heterogeneity was substantial (Lowder et al., 2018). A prospective four-site study of 447 mental health court participants and 600 comparison defendants found lower rearrest rates and fewer incarceration days over 18 months for participants, with graduates doing better than those terminated (Steadman et al., 2011). That comparison was not randomized, and graduation itself reflects selection.
For veterans treatment courts, national Veterans Justice Outreach data show gains in housing and benefits, little change in employment, and more jail sanctions and new incarcerations than among veterans who did not enter a treatment court; property offenses, probation or parole violations, substance use disorders, and prior incarceration predicted poorer outcomes (Tsai et al., 2017, 2018). The national studies included sexual assault within a broader violent-offense category and did not report results for sexual offenses.
Program design appears to matter. A chapter on people with intellectual disability leaving prison notes that specialist mental health courts depend on access to effective rehabilitation programs (Ellem et al., 2020), and a chapter on rights in correctional settings reports an Australian court diversion evaluation in which participants with unstable housing at referral were almost twice as likely to reoffend within a year as those with stable housing (Lambrick et al., 2020).
Research on diversion specifically for sexual offenses is thin. The most often cited evaluation is of a restorative justice program for adults rather than a specialty court, and it is small.
Case Example: From 2003 to 2007, the RESTORE program in Pima County, Arizona, accepted prosecutor-referred adult misdemeanor and felony sexual offenses, mostly before charging (Koss, 2014). Prosecutors excluded repeat sexual offenders and people with domestic violence or physical assault histories; people who denied responsibility were not offered the program; and the program was offered to the responsible person only after the victim consented. Of 66 referrals, 22 cases enrolled. Among victims who were reached, 63% in felony cases and 70% in misdemeanor cases consented; the most common choice among those who declined was ordinary prosecution. Of 20 conferences held, 16 responsible persons completed a year of supervised redress, and one was rearrested during monitoring. For victims, the results were mixed. Observers recorded no physical safety incidents; the share of victims meeting PTSD criteria fell from 82% at intake to 66% after the conference, although symptom changes were not statistically significant in the few victims measured; and victims who attended their conferences were highly satisfied with the process. Yet half of victims disagreed that the responsible person was sincerely sorry, a third disagreed that he had accepted responsibility, and 17% disagreed that justice was done. The article also notes long-standing concerns among commentators about power imbalance, safety, and accountability in restorative processes for sexual offenses. All responsible persons in enrolled cases were men; felony victims were women, and half of misdemeanor victims were men. The evaluation illustrates feasibility, victim choice, and divided victim views, not reduced recidivism, which it could not test.
Online offenses raise a separate public-safety question. A meta-analysis found that 2.0% of online offenders committed a new contact sexual offense and 3.4% a new CSAM offense over 1.5 to 6 years of detected follow-up; it also found that about 12% had an officially known contact offense history and about 55% admitted one in studies with self-report data (Seto et al., 2011). Those figures describe convicted offenders, not diversion participants, and detected recidivism undercounts offending. Advocates for people with autism and developmental disabilities have argued for supervised pretrial diversion that includes explicit education about the law and its consequences (Dubin & Horowitz, 2017); no outcome study of such programs for online offenses was located.
Victims’ Rights and Public Safety
For sexual offenses, victims are a third party with legal rights and practical stakes. In the RESTORE evaluation, about a third of victims who were reached declined restorative conferencing, with ordinary prosecution the most common alternative chosen (Koss, 2014). Some victims want accountability without a trial and the ordeal of testimony; others regard diversion as minimizing the offense. Neither can be assumed. Victims of offenses committed by people with disabilities are often themselves people with disabilities or residents of the same group home or program, which complicates both safety planning and the decision to divert.
Public-safety questions include whether treatment is available and evidence-based, whether supervision is long and close enough, whether the program can respond quickly to noncompliance, and how a case that fails diversion is handled. Diversion without treatment or supervision may simply defer the response, while prosecution of a person with serious impairment may produce a conviction without a workable treatment plan.
Limits of the Evidence
The mental health and veterans court studies mostly excluded people with sexual charges, used nonrandomized comparisons, and measured detected rearrest or reincarceration over one to two years. The meta-analysis found smaller effects in better-designed studies. The restorative justice evaluation enrolled 22 cases, excluded deniers and repeat offenders, and could not test recidivism. No study located for this paper compares diversion with prosecution for people with intellectual disability, serious mental illness, or other special-population characteristics who are charged with sexual offenses. Sex and gender were rarely analyzed: the meta-analysis’s moderator analyses did not include sex, women were about 5% of veterans treatment court participants in national data (Tsai et al., 2017), and in RESTORE all enrolled responsible persons were men. Group findings cannot establish whether diversion would be safe or effective for a particular person.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a mental health court meta-analysis is offered to support diversion in a sexual offense case, ask who was studied: mostly people charged with nonsexual offenses, often in courts that excluded sexual charges. When graduate outcomes are cited, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: graduates are self-selected, and terminated participants are the comparison that matters. When online-offense recidivism rates are cited, ask what was counted and over how long: detected offenses over a few years in convicted samples, alongside self-reported histories that are much higher. When RESTORE is cited, ask how many cases, what exclusions, and whether recidivism was measured. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Diversion and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Federal pretrial diversion is governed by Justice Manual § 9-22.000; the eligibility criteria are in § 9-22.100 (updated February 2023), which permits each U.S. Attorney to give priority to young offenders, people with substance abuse or mental health challenges, and veterans. Absent approval by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, any diversion program a U.S. Attorney’s Office creates must exclude a person accused of an offense related to “child exploitation or child pornography” or involving “sexual abuse or sexual assault,” along with other listed categories. Prosecutors may not divert a person in those categories through any other program without the U.S. Attorney’s approval and consultation with the victims, and may not divert anyone the office judges would pose a danger to the community. The section reminds prosecutors of their obligations under victims’ rights statutes. Time under a deferred prosecution agreement is excluded from Speedy Trial Act calculations (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, victims have the reasonable right to confer with the government’s attorney and the right to timely notice of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement (18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5), (a)(9)).
In the military, initial disposition of offenses not handled by a special trial counsel includes no action, administrative action such as separation, nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, disposition of charges (including preferral), or forwarding to another authority (R.C.M. 306(c)). Sexual offenses under Articles 120, 120b, and 120c are among the covered offenses within the special trial counsel’s authority (Article 1(17), UCMJ); if that counsel defers, the offense returns to the command for disposition under R.C.M. 306 (R.C.M. 306A). Nonjudicial punishment is limited to minor offenses, ordinarily those whose maximum punishment would not include a dishonorable discharge or more than one year of confinement (Manual for Courts-Martial, pt. V, para. 1), which most sexual offenses exceed. Administrative separation in lieu of trial by court-martial is governed by service regulations; a statement made solely to request it is treated as a statement made during plea discussions (Mil. R. Evid. 410(c)). For sex-related offenses committed in the United States, the victim must be given an opportunity to express a preference between court-martial and civilian prosecution, and that preference must be considered (R.C.M. 306(e), which applies to offenses on or before Dec. 27, 2023; R.C.M. 306A(d) for special trial counsel). Article 6b, UCMJ, gives victims the right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea agreement, separation-in-lieu-of-trial agreement, or non-prosecution agreement. These rules are from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; later amendments should be checked.
Arizona
Arizona county attorneys may operate diversion programs that divert or defer prosecution before trial or before a plea (A.R.S. § 11-361), administered under guidelines of the Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys’ Advisory Council, with annual reporting that includes, where available, later felony convictions of enrollees (A.R.S. § 11-362). The county attorney has sole discretion whether to divert or defer (A.R.S. § 11-365). The current statutes list no excluded offenses. An earlier version of § 11-361 barred diversion or deferral for a person previously convicted of a serious offense under § 13-706, an offense in title 13, chapter 14, a dangerous offense, or a dangerous crime against children, or convicted three or more times of personal possession of a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia; the 2021 amendment (H.B. 2186) removed those bars. Each county attorney’s program is administered under the Council’s guidelines, which the Council posts on its website; this paper does not state what the guidelines exclude, so counsel should consult the guidelines and the county attorney’s written criteria. Juvenile diversion is barred for dangerous offenses, for chronic felony offenders, and for any offense listed in § 13-501 (A.R.S. § 8-321(B)); that list includes forcible sexual assault and, more broadly, class 1 and 2 felonies and class 3 felonies in the chapters that include sexual offenses (A.R.S. § 13-501(A)–(B)), so whether a juvenile sexual charge is barred depends on its class. Community-based alternative programs under the statute must give the victim the right to participate, and the victim’s participation is voluntary (A.R.S. § 8-321(I)).
Superior court judges may establish mental health and veterans courts that hear limited-jurisdiction cases referred from justice and municipal courts, with eligibility set by the presiding judge (A.R.S. § 22-601); county superior courts also run their own mental health and veterans dockets under local criteria. The Arizona Constitution gives victims the rights to be present at criminal proceedings, to be heard at proceedings involving release, negotiated pleas, and sentencing, and to confer with the prosecution after charges are filed (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(3), (4), (6)). By statute, on request the prosecutor must confer with the victim about the disposition of the case, including the victim’s views on a decision not to proceed, dismissal, plea negotiations, and pretrial diversion, although the victim cannot direct the prosecution (A.R.S. § 13-4419).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports treating diversion as a structured decision rather than a reward for diagnosis. Mental health courts show modest average effects on recidivism, and outcomes depend on treatment, housing, and substance use. Prosecutors are often best positioned to obtain the victim’s views early, to learn whether a program accepts sexual charges and what treatment and supervision it provides, and to weigh an evaluation’s findings on risk and on the connection between the condition and the conduct. Where diversion is considered, clear written conditions, a defined supervision period, and a plan for noncompliance protect both victims and the integrity of the decision.
The research also counsels caution. Exclusions are policy choices, not findings that every person with a sexual charge is high risk; online offenders as a group showed low detected contact recidivism (2.0% over 1.5 to 6 years of follow-up in Seto et al., 2011), although about 12% had an officially known contact history and about 55% admitted one in self-report studies (detected rates are a floor), and for some people with intellectual disability or serious mental illness a structured program with treatment may extend supervision beyond the end of a short sentence, though a custodial sentence provides more immediate containment; which is better depends on the program and the person. Treating diagnosis as either an automatic bar or an automatic qualification goes beyond the evidence. Low recidivism figures from convicted samples, and high self-reported histories, are group data and do not settle any individual case.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports judging any diversion proposal by its concrete content: a named program that accepts the charge, an evaluation addressing risk and treatment needs, adapted sex-offense-specific treatment, housing, and supervision at least comparable to what probation would provide. Defense counsel are often best positioned to gather the records showing a long-standing condition, to identify programs and their written criteria, and to show how the person’s condition bears on the conduct. Evidence that housing instability and substance use predict poorer program outcomes bears on whether a proposed plan is realistic.
The research also counsels caution. General mental health and veterans court outcome data come largely from people charged with nonsexual offenses and do not show that diversion works for sexual offenses. Victims’ views are legally relevant under federal, military, and Arizona law, and in RESTORE many victims declined or doubted the offender’s sincerity. Informal diversion of earlier behavior may appear in records and bear on risk. Where diversion is unavailable, the same evidence may still inform charging, plea terms, and mitigation, discussed in “Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation.”
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Dubin, L. A., & Horowitz, E. (Eds.). (2017). Caught in the web of the criminal justice system: Autism, developmental disabilities, and sex offenses. Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Ellem, K., Denton, M., & Davidson, D. (2020). Supporting people with intellectual and developmental disabilities leaving prison. In W. R. Lindsay, L. A. Craig, & D. Griffiths (Eds.), The Wiley handbook on what works for offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities: An evidence-based approach to theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 261–281). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316268.ch13
Koss, M. P. (2014). The RESTORE program of restorative justice for sex crimes: Vision, process, and outcomes. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 29(9), 1623–1660. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260513511537
Lambrick, F., Birgden, A., Troutman, C., & McLeod, D. (2020). Protecting the rights of people with intellectual disabilities in correctional settings. In W. R. Lindsay, L. A. Craig, & D. Griffiths (Eds.), The Wiley handbook on what works for offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities: An evidence-based approach to theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 41–66). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316268.ch3
Lowder, E. M., Rade, C. B., & Desmarais, S. L. (2018). Effectiveness of mental health courts in reducing recidivism: A meta-analysis. Psychiatric Services, 69(1), 15–22. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.201700107
Pima County Superior Court. (n.d.). Mental health court (criminal): Eligibility. Retrieved November 6, 2026, from https://www.sc.pima.gov/judges-courts/mental-health-court-criminal/eligibility
Redlich, A. D., Steadman, H. J., Monahan, J., Robbins, P. C., & Petrila, J. (2006). Patterns of practice in mental health courts: A national survey. Law and Human Behavior, 30(3), 347–362. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9036-x
Seto, M. C., Hanson, R. K., & Babchishin, K. M. (2011). Contact sexual offending by men with online sexual offenses. Sexual Abuse, 23(1), 124–145. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063210369013
Steadman, H. J., Redlich, A., Callahan, L., Robbins, P. C., & Vesselinov, R. (2011). Effect of mental health courts on arrests and jail days: A multisite study. Archives of General Psychiatry, 68(2), 167–172. https://doi.org/10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2010.134
Steptoe, L. R., & Michie, A. M. (2020). Psychological assessment procedures for sex offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities. In W. R. Lindsay, L. A. Craig, & D. Griffiths (Eds.), The Wiley handbook on what works for offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities: An evidence-based approach to theory, assessment, and treatment (pp. 133–166). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316268.ch7
Strong, S. M., Rantala, R. R., & Kyckelhahn, T. (2016). Census of problem-solving courts, 2012 (NCJ 249803). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpsc12.pdf
Tsai, J., Finlay, A., Flatley, B., Kasprow, W. J., & Clark, S. (2018). A national study of veterans treatment court participants: Who benefits and who recidivates. Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research, 45(2), 236–244. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10488-017-0816-z
Tsai, J., Flatley, B., Kasprow, W. J., Clark, S., & Finlay, A. (2017). Diversion of veterans with criminal justice involvement to treatment courts: Participant characteristics and outcomes. Psychiatric Services, 68(4), 375–383. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.201600233
Legal Authorities
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1.
10 U.S.C. § 801(17) (Article 1(17), Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 806b (Article 6b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 815 (Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 824a (Article 24a, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 3771.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-321.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-361, 11-362, 11-365; 2021 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 103 (H.B. 2186).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-501.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4419.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-601.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-297.1.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-303.6.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. V, para. 1 (2024 ed.).
Mil. R. Evid. 410.
Rule for Courts-Martial 306.
Rule for Courts-Martial 306A.
U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Manual §§ 9-22.000, 9-22.100 (Pretrial Diversion Program; Selection Criteria) (updated Feb. 2023).
Related topic papers: Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation · Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Plea Comprehension, Probation Conditions, and Supervision for Defendants With Cognitive Impairments · Treatment and Community Supervision for Offenders With Intellectual Disability · Psychosis, Mania, and Other Serious Mental Illness in Sex Offense Cases · Special Populations in Courts-Martial
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Online Sex Offense · Courts-Martial