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Psychosis, Mania, and Other Serious Mental Illness in Sex Offense Cases

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How common are schizophrenia-spectrum and bipolar disorders among people who sexually offend, when can psychosis or mania be connected to an offense, and how does serious mental illness bear on risk, competency, insanity, and victimization?
  • What the research shows: In Swedish registers, men convicted of sexual offenses had about five times the odds of other men of a past hospitalization for schizophrenia or another psychosis and about three times the odds for bipolar disorder. Among men with schizophrenia hospitalized after serious sexual offenses, most were psychotic at the time, but a direct symptom-driven motive was found in a minority. People with serious mental illness are at much higher risk of sexual victimization.
  • What it does not show: Most people with serious mental illness never commit a sexual offense. No study can show that a particular defendant’s illness caused an offense, and in one Canadian study, mood, anxiety, and most personality diagnoses did not add to Static-99R scores in predicting sexual recidivism; psychotic disorders were not analyzed, and the evidence on psychotic disorders specifically is limited and mixed (higher reconviction after prior psychosis hospitalization in an earlier Swedish study, lower reconviction in the psychotic subgroup of another Swedish cohort), so neither a higher nor a lower rating should rest on the diagnosis alone.
  • The law: Federal (18 U.S.C. § 17), military (R.C.M. 916(k)), and Arizona (A.R.S. § 13-502) insanity standards require a severe mental disease or defect proved by clear and convincing evidence; Arizona excludes psychosexual and impulse control disorders and asks only whether the person knew the act was wrong.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should ask whether symptoms were active at the time and whether the conduct shows planning or awareness of wrongfulness; defense counsel should document the illness and its relation to the offense without implying that a diagnosis explains the offense or ends the risk.

Serious mental illness, a term usually applied to schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders and to bipolar disorder, surfaces in sex offense cases in several ways. A defendant may have been psychotic or manic when the offense occurred, may be too ill to stand trial, or may raise an insanity defense; an evaluator may need to decide whether a risk tool applies; and a complainant may have a serious mental illness.

Two premises frame this paper. First, most people with serious mental illness never commit a sexual offense, and statements suggesting otherwise add to stigma the research does not support. Second, the elevated relative risks found in population studies are real, and when an offense occurs the illness may help explain it, may be incidental to it, or may coexist with paraphilic interests, substance use, and antisocial traits that may be the stronger explanation. Sexual offenses cause serious harm whatever the offender’s mental state.

Evaluation standards and competency procedures are addressed in “Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods” and “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations.”

How Common Serious Mental Illness Is Among People Who Sexually Offend

The largest study compared all 8,495 men convicted of sexual offenses in Sweden from 1988 through 2000 with 19,935 men from the general population, using national hospital discharge records (Fazel et al., 2007). After adjustment for demographic and socioeconomic factors, odds ratios were 4.8 for schizophrenia, 5.2 for other psychoses, and 3.4 for bipolar disorder. The authors estimated that about 20% of sexual crimes in the period were committed by men with a history of psychiatric hospitalization. The study counted only hospitalized illness, could not say whether illness was active at the time of the offense, and included only men.

A meta-analysis of 24 studies from 15 countries (51,309 people with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders) found increased odds of violence perpetration in men (4.5) and women (10.2) and an odds ratio of 5.1 for sexual offenses (Whiting et al., 2022). In register studies, fewer than 1 in 20 women and fewer than 1 in 4 men with these disorders had a violent outcome over about 35 years. Relative risks compare groups; they do not mean that sexual offending is common among people with schizophrenia, and the higher figure for women partly reflects the lower base rate of violence among women in the comparison population. An earlier meta-analysis found that much of the excess violence risk in schizophrenia was associated with co-occurring substance use (Fazel et al., 2009).

Mania, Hypersexuality, and the Limits of Attribution

Increased sexual interest and risky sexual behavior are recognized features of manic episodes. A review of 27 articles found more risky sexual behavior in patients with bipolar disorder during mania than in patients with other diagnoses, but noted that hypersexuality has no consistent definition and that much of the literature is old and drawn from mixed samples (Kopeykina et al., 2016). No study located measured how often manic hypersexuality leads to a sexual offense.

Attributing an offense to mania therefore requires more than a bipolar diagnosis. An evaluator would look for contemporaneous evidence that an episode was under way (records and observations by family or clinicians); whether the sexual behavior was new or continued a pattern seen when the person was well; whether it was impulsive or planned and concealed; and whether alcohol or drugs played a role. Increased sexual drive is not the same as an inability to know that sexual contact with a child or a nonconsenting adult is wrong. Mania may lower inhibition while leaving that knowledge intact; in such cases the evidence may bear more on mitigation than on insanity.

Hypothetical Example: Consider a hypothetical 30-year-old woman with bipolar I disorder and no prior arrests who is charged after exposing herself to strangers in a parking lot during a week in which her family sought emergency help because she had stopped sleeping and stopped her medication. The records support an inference that the conduct occurred during a manic episode and was out of character, and they bear on mitigation, treatment, and supervision. They do not by themselves establish that she did not know the conduct was wrong.

Psychotic Symptoms and Sexual Offending

In a study of all 84 men with schizophrenia held in English and Welsh hospitals under restriction orders in 1997 after contact sexual offenses against women, 80 were psychotic at the time of the index offense and half had delusions or hallucinations related to it (Smith & Taylor, 1999). A specific delusional or hallucinatory drive to offend was identified in only 18; the authors concluded that the illness was usually relevant even though a direct symptom link was unusual. The study is dated and highly selected.

A Swiss study applied machine learning to the records of 296 men with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders in forensic inpatient care from 1982 to 2016 (Lau et al., 2024). The features that best distinguished men who had committed sexual offenses from men who had committed nonsexual violent offenses included sexual behaviors and interests, psychopathology, and offense characteristics. The authors concluded that assessment and treatment should address atypical sexual interests and sexual preoccupation as well as the psychotic disorder.

Medications occasionally bear on sexual behavior. Among 3,090 patients with Parkinson disease, impulse control disorders (compulsive sexual behavior in 3.5% overall) were more common with dopamine agonist treatment (17.1% vs. 6.9%) (Weintraub et al., 2010). A review of 59 cases in 35 published reports linked the antipsychotic aripiprazole to impulsive or compulsive behavior, including hypersexuality, usually beginning within a month of starting the drug and ending within a month of stopping it or lowering the dose (Akbari et al., 2024). Case reports cannot establish incidence or causation, and neither literature addresses criminal conduct directly.

Case Example: In People v. Marlett (2021), a New York man was convicted of eight counts of predatory sexual assault, kidnapping, and robbery after robbing one woman at knifepoint and abducting and repeatedly raping another. He raised New York’s defense of lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect. New York’s test asks whether the defendant lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate the nature and consequences of the conduct or that it was wrong, proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The defense expert diagnosed schizoaffective disorder, testified that decompensation, heavy alcohol use, and stopping medication and counseling had increased his paranoia, and concluded that he lacked that capacity. The prosecution expert diagnosed bipolar I disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and alcohol use disorder, testified that the reported symptoms were feigned, and relied on the defendant’s statements to the victims and his behavior during the investigation. The jury rejected the defense. The Appellate Division held that conflicting expert testimony was for the jury to weigh, found the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, and affirmed. The case illustrates that a serious mental illness acknowledged by both sides did not settle the legal question; it does not show that such defenses fail when evidence of incapacity at the time is stronger.

Risk Assessment

Older register data suggested that psychosis adds to risk: among 1,215 men released from Swedish prisons after sexual offenses, prior hospitalization for alcohol or drug use disorders, personality disorder, or psychosis each increased the risk of sexual reconviction over five years (Långström et al., 2004). In a Swedish cohort of 146 men with mental disorders sentenced for sexual offenses in 1993 to 1997, the Static-99R discriminated adequately (AUC 0.73 to 0.79 over 5 to 20 years), calibration was acceptable, and the routine-sample norms fit best (Baudin et al., 2021). In that cohort of 146 men, 17.1% were reconvicted of a sexual offense over 24 years, compared with 7.9% of the subgroup with psychotic disorders (the subgroup’s size is not given in the published abstract); the authors reported that the subgroup showed the same recidivism pattern as the other men, although those with psychotic disorders reoffended significantly later in general offenses (Baudin et al., 2020).

In a Canadian sample of 409 men with contact sexual offenses followed for an average of 11 years, mood disorders, ADHD, anxiety disorders, traumatic brain injury, and most personality disorders did not predict sexual recidivism once Static-99R scores and substance misuse were considered; histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders were exceptions (Aelick et al., 2020). Psychotic disorders were not analyzed, and the sample was weighted toward higher scores. The authors cautioned that adding a serious mental illness diagnosis to established risk factors may overestimate risk. The implication cuts both ways: the diagnosis alone is not a reason to rate risk higher, nor a reason to discount sexual interests, antisocial traits, or substance use, and an offense driven by symptoms may recur if treatment lapses.

Competency and Restoration

A meta-analysis of 68 studies found that defendants with a psychotic disorder were about eight times as likely to be found incompetent as those without one (Pirelli et al., 2011). Most are restored: an attempted meta-analysis of 51 restoration samples (12,781 defendants, 1975 to 2013) found an overall restoration rate of about 81% and a median stay of about 147 days, although the authors concluded that differences in methods prevented a valid pooled estimate (Pirelli & Zapf, 2020). Some defendants with chronic psychosis, cognitive impairment, or treatment refusal are not restored within statutory limits. Competency concerns present abilities, not mental state at the time of the offense.

Treatment, Supervision, and Victimization

Treatment for people with serious mental illness who sexually offend usually combines psychiatric care, medication adherence, and substance use treatment with sex-offense-specific treatment adapted to concentration and symptom level. No group study located shows that treating the psychosis alone reduces sexual recidivism.

People with serious mental illness are also frequent victims. A meta-analysis of 30 studies (16,140 participants) found a median past-year sexual violence prevalence of 9.9% among women and 3.1% among men with serious mental illness, about six times the odds of the general population (Khalifeh et al., 2016). In a London sample of 303 community patients, past-year sexual violence was reported by 10% of women, compared with 2% of women in a national survey, and among women who had experienced serious sexual assault in adulthood, patients had attempted suicide far more often than women victims in the general population (Khalifeh et al., 2015). The reliability of a complainant’s account depends on evidence about that account, including whether symptoms were active and whether it is corroborated, not on the diagnosis; related principles are discussed in “Complainants and Witnesses With Intellectual Disability.”

Limits of the Evidence

Much of this research comes from national registers that count hospital diagnoses and convictions; they miss untreated illness and undetected offending. Studies of offense-related symptoms are small, old, or drawn from forensic hospitals, and evidence on medication effects consists largely of case reports. Risk-tool studies in mentally disordered samples come mainly from Sweden and Canada. Nearly all offender studies involved men; no study located examined women with serious mental illness who sexually offend, while the victimization studies show a particularly high burden on women with serious mental illness. Group findings cannot establish whether a particular defendant’s illness caused an offense, whether he or she is competent, or what his or her risk is.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the Swedish odds ratios (Fazel et al., 2007) are offered to suggest that a defendant’s schizophrenia makes offending likely, ask what was counted: past hospitalization among men convicted, not the proportion of people with schizophrenia who offend, which is small. When a bipolar diagnosis is offered to explain an offense, ask whether records show an episode at that time and whether the conduct differed from the person’s behavior when well; the review on mania (Kopeykina et al., 2016) does not measure offending. When serious mental illness is cited as raising risk, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since in one Canadian study most diagnoses did not add to Static-99R scores and psychotic disorders were not analyzed (Aelick et al., 2020). When it is offered to show that psychosis is irrelevant to risk, ask who was studied: psychotic disorders were not analyzed. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Serious Mental Illness and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (amended December 1, 2023, to clarify that the proponent must show reliability by a preponderance of the evidence), Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). Competency is governed by Dusky v. United States (1960) and 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Under § 4241(d), a defendant found incompetent may be hospitalized for up to four months to determine whether there is a substantial probability of restoration in the foreseeable future, and for an additional reasonable period only if the court finds such a probability. Sell v. United States (2003) permits involuntary antipsychotic medication to restore competency for trial on serious charges only under strict conditions, including medical appropriateness and necessity to further important trial-related interests.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 17, insanity is an affirmative defense if, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the defendant was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her acts; the defendant must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. After an insanity acquittal for an offense involving bodily injury or a substantial risk of it, 18 U.S.C. § 4243 requires the person to prove by clear and convincing evidence that release would not create a substantial risk of such harm due to a present mental disease or defect.

In courts-martial, R.C.M. 916(k)(1) uses the same severe-mental-disease-or-defect standard, and Article 50a, UCMJ, places the burden on the accused by clear and convincing evidence. A lesser mental condition is not an affirmative defense under R.C.M. 916(k)(2), although the Discussion notes that such evidence may bear on whether the accused had a required state of mind. R.C.M. 706 excludes from “severe mental disease or defect” abnormalities shown only by repeated criminal or antisocial conduct and minor disorders such as nonpsychotic behavior disorders and personality defects. Article 76b applies 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(d) and 4243 to an accused who lacks capacity or is found not guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsibility. These rules are from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; check later amendments.

Arizona

Under A.R.S. § 13-502(A), a person is guilty except insane if, at the time of the offense, he or she had a mental disease or defect so severe that he or she did not know the act was wrong. The statute excludes disorders resulting from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal, character defects, psychosexual disorders, impulse control disorders, and momentary conditions or passions, and the defendant must prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence. A paraphilic disorder therefore cannot support the defense; a psychotic or bipolar disorder can, but only if it prevented the person from knowing the act was wrong. Clark v. Arizona (2006), involving a defendant with paranoid schizophrenia, upheld Arizona’s narrowed test and the rule of State v. Mott (1997) that expert evidence of mental disease and capacity may be considered on insanity but generally not to negate the mental state element, while leaving room for observation evidence; how those decisions apply to a particular case is a question for counsel and the court and should be verified before testimony.

After a guilty except insane verdict, the court determines the sentence the person could have received, suspends it, and commits the person to a secure state mental health facility for that term (§§ 13-502(D), 13-3992). If the offense did not involve death, serious physical injury, or a threat of either, the court holds a release hearing within 75 days; otherwise the superior court retains jurisdiction for the full term. Under § 13-3994, the court may continue commitment, order conditional release with a supervised treatment plan, order supervised probation, or, for certain offenses, transfer a dangerous person who no longer needs treatment to prison; public safety is the primary consideration, and the party seeking a change bears the burden by clear and convincing evidence. These decisions formerly belonged to the Psychiatric Security Review Board; Laws 2021, ch. 390 (S.B. 1839) repealed the board’s enabling chapter and gave the superior court exclusive supervisory jurisdiction after June 30, 2023 (as of November 2026; verify before testimony).

Competency is governed by Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and A.R.S. §§ 13-4501 to 13-4517; a restoration order may not exceed 21 months or the maximum sentence, whichever is less (§ 13-4515). A.R.S. § 13-701(E) lists as mitigating a significant impairment of the capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or conform conduct to the law that falls short of a defense. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to the same effect, effective January 1, 2024 (Order R-23-0004).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports asking whether symptoms were active at the time of the offense and how they connected to it. In the English hospital study a direct symptom-driven motive was found in about one in five men, and the Swiss data suggest that sexual interests and preoccupation distinguish men with schizophrenia who offend sexually. Planning, victim selection, concealment, flight, and statements during the offense or investigation may bear on whether the person knew the act was wrong, and Arizona’s exclusion of psychosexual disorders keeps a paraphilic disorder from serving as the basis of the defense.

The research also counsels caution. In one Canadian study, mood, anxiety, and most personality diagnoses did not add to Static-99R scores in predicting sexual recidivism; psychotic disorders were not analyzed, and the evidence on psychotic disorders specifically is limited and mixed (higher reconviction after prior psychosis hospitalization in an earlier Swedish study, lower reconviction in the psychotic subgroup of another Swedish cohort), so neither a higher nor a lower rating should rest on the diagnosis alone. Planning and concealment do not by themselves rule out psychosis, since a person may act deliberately on delusional beliefs. A finding of feigning should rest on validated methods and records, not on the presence of antisocial traits or alcohol use, which often co-occur with genuine illness. When a complainant has a serious mental illness, the diagnosis alone neither undermines nor confirms the account; the evidence about that account controls.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports documenting the illness thoroughly: hospitalizations, medication history, observations by family and clinicians before the offense, and any medication change that coincided with new sexual behavior. In Swedish register data, men convicted of sexual offenses had higher odds of a past hospitalization for psychosis or bipolar disorder than men in the general population (Fazel et al., 2007; hospitalized illness only), and the authors of the English hospital study considered the illness usually relevant to the offense even though a direct symptom link was unusual (Smith & Taylor, 1999; 84 selected men). The evidence on psychotic disorders and sexual recidivism is limited and mixed, so neither a higher nor a lower rating should rest on the diagnosis alone (psychotic disorders were not analyzed in the Canadian study in which other diagnoses did not add to Static-99R scores). Defense counsel are often best positioned to raise competency early, present a concrete treatment and supervision plan, and develop impaired-capacity evidence for mitigation under A.R.S. § 13-701(E) or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when it falls short of insanity.

The research also counsels caution. Mania and psychotic symptoms are associated with sexual behavior in group studies, but neither shows that a particular offense was caused by the illness or that the person did not know the act was wrong, which is all Arizona’s test asks. Co-occurring paraphilic interests, substance use, and antisocial traits may be the stronger explanation, and an evaluation addressing only the psychosis may be open to challenge under Rule 702. A complainant’s diagnosis is likewise not by itself evidence that an account is unreliable. An offense linked to symptoms may recur if treatment lapses, and release decisions give public safety primary weight.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Aelick, C. A., Babchishin, K. M., & Harris, A. J. R. (2020). Severe mental illness diagnoses and their association with reoffending in a sample of men adjudicated for sexual offences. Sexual Offending: Theory, Research, and Prevention, 15(1), Article e3123. https://doi.org/10.5964/sotrap.3123

Akbari, M., Jamshidi, S., Sheikhi, S., Alijani, F., Kafshchi, P., & Taylor, D. (2024). Aripiprazole and its adverse effects in the form of impulsive–compulsive behaviors: A systematic review of case reports. Psychopharmacology, 241(2), 209–223. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-024-06529-5

Baudin, C., Nilsson, T., Sturup, J., Wallinius, M., & Andiné, P. (2021). A Static-99R validation study on individuals with mental disorders: 5 to 20 years of fixed follow-up after sexual offenses. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, Article 625996. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.625996

Baudin, C., Nilsson, T., Wallinius, M., Sturup, J., & Andiné, P. (2020). A 24-year follow-up study on recidivism in male mentally disordered sexual offenders with and without psychotic disorders. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 65(5), 1610–1618. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.14327

Fazel, S., Gulati, G., Linsell, L., Geddes, J. R., & Grann, M. (2009). Schizophrenia and violence: Systematic review and meta-analysis. PLoS Medicine, 6(8), Article e1000120. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000120

Fazel, S., Sjöstedt, G., Långström, N., & Grann, M. (2007). Severe mental illness and risk of sexual offending in men: A case-control study based on Swedish national registers. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 68(4), 588–596. https://doi.org/10.4088/jcp.v68n0415

Khalifeh, H., Moran, P., Borschmann, R., Dean, K., Hart, C., Hogg, J., Osborn, D., Johnson, S., & Howard, L. M. (2015). Domestic and sexual violence against patients with severe mental illness. Psychological Medicine, 45(4), 875–886. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291714001962

Khalifeh, H., Oram, S., Osborn, D., Howard, L. M., & Johnson, S. (2016). Recent physical and sexual violence against adults with severe mental illness: A systematic review and meta-analysis. International Review of Psychiatry, 28(5), 433–451. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540261.2016.1223608

Kopeykina, I., Kim, H.-J., Khatun, T., Boland, J., Haeri, S., Cohen, L. J., & Galynker, I. I. (2016). Hypersexuality and couple relationships in bipolar disorder: A review. Journal of Affective Disorders, 195, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2016.01.035

Långström, N., Sjöstedt, G., & Grann, M. (2004). Psychiatric disorders and recidivism in sexual offenders. Sexual Abuse, 16(2), 139–150. https://doi.org/10.1177/107906320401600204

Lau, S., Habermeyer, E., Hill, A., Günther, M. P., Machetanz, L. A., Kirchebner, J., & Huber, D. (2024). Differentiating between sexual offending and violent non-sexual offending in men with schizophrenia spectrum disorders using machine learning. Sexual Abuse, 36(7), 821–847. https://doi.org/10.1177/10790632231200838

Pirelli, G., Gottdiener, W. H., & Zapf, P. A. (2011). A meta-analytic review of competency to stand trial research. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 17(1), 1–53. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021713

Pirelli, G., & Zapf, P. A. (2020). An attempted meta-analysis of the competency restoration research: Important findings for future directions. Journal of Forensic Psychology Research and Practice, 20(2), 134–162. https://doi.org/10.1080/24732850.2020.1714398

Smith, A. D., & Taylor, P. J. (1999). Serious sex offending against women by men with schizophrenia: Relationship of illness and psychotic symptoms to offending. British Journal of Psychiatry, 174(3), 233–237. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.174.3.233

Weintraub, D., Koester, J., Potenza, M. N., Siderowf, A. D., Stacy, M., Voon, V., Whetteckey, J., Wunderlich, G. R., & Lang, A. E. (2010). Impulse control disorders in Parkinson disease: A cross-sectional study of 3090 patients. Archives of Neurology, 67(5), 589–595. https://doi.org/10.1001/archneurol.2010.65

Whiting, D., Gulati, G., Geddes, J. R., & Fazel, S. (2022). Association of schizophrenia spectrum disorders and violence perpetration in adults and adolescents from 15 countries: A systematic review and meta-analysis. JAMA Psychiatry, 79(2), 120–132. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2021.3721

Legal Authorities

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

People v. Marlett, No. 111487 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t Feb. 25, 2021) (mem.).

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).

10 U.S.C. § 850a (Article 50a, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 876b (Article 76b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. § 17.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

18 U.S.C. § 4241.

18 U.S.C. § 4243.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-502, 13-701(E), 13-3992, 13-3994, 13-4501 to 13-4517.

2021 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 390 (S.B. 1839) (Psychiatric Security Review Board; superior court jurisdiction).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Rule for Courts-Martial 706, 916(k).

Related topic papers: Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples · Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation · Older Adults, Dementia, and Neurocognitive Disorders in Sex Offense Cases · Diversion, Mental Health Courts, and Alternatives to Prosecution · Sexually Violent Person Commitment and Special Populations

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial