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Autism Sex Offense

Demeanor, Voir Dire, and Educating the Fact-Finder

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How do fact-finders perceive an autistic defendant’s demeanor, and how can voir dire and testimony address it?
  • What the research shows: Observers who do not know a person is autistic tend to form less favorable first impressions, driven by presentation rather than content. In one study, truthful autistic interviewees were judged more deceptive and less credible than non-autistic interviewees. Disclosing the diagnosis generally improved impressions but worsened them for observers high in autism stigma.
  • What it does not show: Most studies used online or student observers, scripted portrayals, or vignettes; none involved real juries or CSAM cases. A diagnostic label shifted mock-juror judgments but was not shown to make them more accurate. No expert can determine truthfulness or remorse from demeanor.
  • The law: Experts must satisfy amended Rule 702 and may not vouch for credibility (Lindsey, Moran; Brooks, Kasper in courts-martial), and Knapp bars an investigator’s reading of nonverbal cues as deception. Arizona permits “cold” educational testimony (Salazar-Mercado) but cautions against categorical claims (Haskie), and since 2022 has no peremptory challenges, so cause-based voir dire matters more.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors may consider resting the case on the digital evidence rather than demeanor and objecting to vouching; defense counsel may consider documenting the client’s actual presentation and exploring juror attitudes before disclosure, without inviting jurors to excuse the conduct because of the diagnosis.

Jurors, members, and judges watch defendants. They notice whether a defendant looks at them, reacts to testimony, appears remorseful, or seems evasive, and they form impressions from what they see. Many autistic adults communicate in ways that differ from what observers expect: limited or unusual eye contact, flat or unexpected facial expression, monotone or unusual intonation, literal answers, long pauses, repetitive movements, or reactions that seem out of step with the moment. In an ordinary conversation those differences may lead to an awkward first impression. In a courtroom, where demeanor is often treated as a window onto credibility and character, they can be read as indifference, deceit, or a lack of remorse.

These questions arise most often in the cases this hub addresses, prosecutions involving child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography”; this paper uses CSAM except when discussing the law. CSAM offenses involve real harm to the children depicted, and an autism diagnosis is not a defense. The diagnosis opens questions; it does not answer them. Research does not show that autistic people are more or less likely than others to offend, and autism can co-occur with sexual interest in children but does not establish or rule it out, and it does not show lower or higher risk. The research summarized here concerns how observers perceive autistic people, not whether any autistic defendant committed an offense.

This paper reviews research on first impressions of autistic adults, on judgments of credibility and guilt, and on perceptions of remorse at sentencing. It then considers voir dire about autism and the role and limits of expert testimony in explaining demeanor. It closes with the governing law in federal, military, and Arizona courts. Many autistic adults prefer identity-first language (“autistic person”), and many clinicians use person-first language (“person with autism”); this paper uses both.

First Impressions of Autistic Adults

The most consistent finding in this literature is that observers who do not know a person is autistic tend to form less favorable first impressions of autistic adults than of non-autistic adults. In three studies, Sasson et al. (2017) showed observers brief “thin slices” of real-world social behavior by autistic and non-autistic children and adults. Observers rated the autistic participants less favorably across a range of traits and reported less interest in interacting with them. The impressions formed within seconds and did not improve with longer exposure. When observers rated only the transcribed content of what participants said, without audio or video, the difference disappeared. The authors concluded that style of presentation, not the substance of what was said, drove the less favorable impressions.

Later studies by the same group examined what changes those impressions. In a study of 40 adults rated by 215 observers, first impressions of autistic adults were more favorable when observers were accurately told the person was autistic than when no diagnosis was given, and observers with greater knowledge about autism rated autistic adults more favorably (Sasson & Morrison, 2019). A larger study, in which 505 observers rated 20 autistic adults, found that differences in ratings depended more on the observers than on the autistic adults. Observers’ autism knowledge and their stigma toward autism mattered most. Telling observers about the diagnosis generally improved impressions, but for observers with high stigma toward autism it made impressions worse (Morrison et al., 2019). Autistic observers also rated autistic adults less favorably than non-autistic adults, but those judgments did not reduce their interest in interacting with them (DeBrabander et al., 2019).

These findings have two direct implications for court. First, unfavorable impressions of an autistic defendant may arise from presentation rather than from anything he says or does that bears on the case. Second, explaining the diagnosis helps most observers but not all, and observers’ attitudes toward autism, which voir dire can explore, shape the effect.

Demeanor, Credibility, and Judgments of Guilt

Several studies have examined whether autistic presentation affects judgments of honesty and guilt. Lim et al. (2022) video-recorded interviews with 30 autistic and 29 non-autistic adults, coded behaviors such as gaze aversion, repetitive movements, literal interpretation, limited reciprocity, and flat affect, and had 1,410 observers rate the interviewees’ truthfulness and credibility. When telling the truth, autistic interviewees were judged more deceptive and less credible than non-autistic interviewees. The effect was not explained by any single coded behavior, but by the individual’s overall presentation.

Logos et al. (2021) studied the question in a forensic setting. Across two experiments with a combined 3,342 participants, observers watched a scripted police interrogation of a suspect who either displayed autism-related behaviors or did not. The autism-related behaviors biased evaluations of deception and guilt, whether the other evidence pointed toward guilt or innocence. Giving observers a brief autism information card reduced the bias. The suspect was portrayed by an actor following a script. The study therefore shows how specific behaviors are interpreted, not how real autistic suspects are perceived.

The behaviors themselves vary. In a later study of 43 autistic and 41 non-autistic adults interviewed online, diagnosis had a strong effect on overall presentation. Only three individual behaviors differed reliably between groups: difficulty with figurative language, longer hesitations, and differences in intonation (Logos et al., 2026). The behaviors were neither universal nor consistently displayed together. A list of “autistic behaviors” therefore cannot be assumed to describe a particular defendant. What matters is how that person actually presents, which an evaluator can observe and document.

Two mock-juror studies bear directly on trials. Maras et al. (2019) gave 160 jury-eligible participants a written vignette describing a man who came to police attention for suspicious and aggressive behavior and who behaved atypically in court. Half were told he was autistic and given background information about autism; half were not. The label and information increased ratings of his honesty and likeability, reduced ratings of blameworthiness, and produced fewer guilty verdicts and more lenient sentences. Participants without the label more often described him as deceitful, unremorseful, and rude. In a survey of 623 jury-eligible U.S. adults, most respondents said a diagnosis of autism should not generally affect legal responsibility, but many viewed it as mitigating moral responsibility and legal consequences (Berryessa et al., 2015). Research with child witnesses suggests that the effect of providing a diagnosis and general information can differ from one autistic individual to another (Crane et al., 2020).

These results cut in two directions. They support the concern that autistic demeanor, unexplained, can lead fact-finders to infer deceit or callousness that the evidence does not show. They also show that a diagnostic label and sympathetic information can move verdicts and sentences, not only correct a misreading. Maras et al. (2019) did not ask whether the label made jurors more accurate, and the vignette did not involve a CSAM offense or any evidence about what the defendant knew or intended. Explanation that corrects a demeanor-based inference is legitimate. Information that invites jurors to excuse the conduct because of the diagnosis is a different matter, and courts are entitled to limit it.

Remorse, Affect, and Sentencing

Perceived remorse matters at sentencing, and it is judged largely from demeanor. Bandes (2016) observed that a defendant’s failure to show remorse is among the most powerful factors in sentencing. She also noted that there is no evidence that remorse can be accurately evaluated in a courtroom, and little evidence that displayed remorse predicts future law-abiding behavior. An early experiment, often cited on this point, asked undergraduates to sentence offenders after reading statements in which the offender and victim expressed sadness or unconcern. Its results were consistent with affect control theory, under which displayed emotion shapes inferences about a person’s identity (Tsoudis, 2000). That study did not involve autistic defendants, and its student sample and written materials limit its application to courtrooms.

For an autistic defendant, flat expression, literal or rehearsed-sounding allocution, and an apparent focus on details rather than on the harm caused can be read as indifference. They may reflect remorse expressed differently, an absence of remorse, or both. Judges are not immune to this question. In interviews with 21 California trial judges, the judges described autism as potentially both mitigating and aggravating at sentencing, and many wanted sentencing options that would provide treatment (Berryessa, 2016). An evaluator can describe how a particular defendant typically expresses emotion and whether his presentation at sentencing is consistent with that pattern. An evaluator cannot determine from demeanor whether a defendant is remorseful.

Voir Dire About Autism

Because observers’ knowledge and attitudes shape how they perceive autistic people (Morrison et al., 2019; Sasson & Morrison, 2019), voir dire on those subjects is relevant where autism will be raised. Useful areas include personal or professional experience with autistic people; beliefs about what autism is and what autistic people can understand; reactions to eye contact and facial expression as signs of honesty or remorse; and whether a juror would treat a diagnosis as an excuse or, conversely, discount it as an invention for litigation. In CSAM cases these questions sit alongside questions about the offense itself, about the harm to children, and about the juror’s ability to follow instructions on knowledge and intent.

Written questionnaires and individual questioning are commonly used for sensitive subjects, and open-ended questions tend to reveal more than questions inviting agreement. A juror who says autism “explains everything,” and a juror who says a diagnosis raised after arrest is “always an excuse,” may each have difficulty following the evidence and the instructions. Research on voir dire generally indicates that prospective jurors’ self-reports about their own impartiality are imperfect, and that attitude measures predict group tendencies better than individual verdicts. The Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource on this site addresses those limits in detail.

Educating the Fact-Finder: Expert Testimony and Its Limits

Expert testimony on autistic demeanor is a form of social-framework or educational testimony: it gives the fact-finder general information to use in evaluating case-specific evidence. A properly qualified expert can explain how autism is diagnosed; how autistic communication commonly differs in eye contact, facial expression, intonation, and literal interpretation; that these features vary widely among individuals; and that research shows observers often misread them as signs of deceit or indifference. An expert who has evaluated the defendant can describe how he presents and whether his behavior in court or in a recorded interview resembles his presentation during the evaluation and his developmental history, without offering an opinion on truthfulness, remorse, or what he knew.

The limits are as important. An expert may not tell the fact-finder that the defendant is telling the truth, that his account is credible, or that his demeanor shows he is innocent. The research shows only that autistic demeanor is a poor guide to credibility. It does not show that a particular autistic person is honest. Nor does it show that observers can never detect deceit in autistic people, since those studies did not examine deceptive autistic speakers in realistic conditions. Testimony that autistic people are “more honest” or “cannot lie” goes beyond the research and is vulnerable under Rule 702 and the rules against vouching. The same limits apply to the prosecution. A detective’s or agent’s testimony that the defendant was “evasive,” “showed no emotion,” or “would not make eye contact,” offered as evidence of guilty knowledge, invites the same misinterpretation and may be improper opinion on credibility.

Other forms of explanation may be available alongside or instead of expert testimony. Where the parties agree, a short stipulated statement or a limiting instruction can tell jurors that the defendant has a diagnosed condition that may affect his facial expressions, eye contact, and manner, and that they should not draw conclusions from his courtroom demeanor. The information-card studies suggest that brief, accurate information can reduce demeanor-based bias (Logos et al., 2021). Whether courts will give such instructions, and in what words, varies.

Limits of the Evidence

Most of this research uses observers recruited online or from student pools who rate short video clips, scripted portrayals, or written vignettes. None involves real jurors deliberating in real cases, and none involves CSAM prosecutions, in which the central evidence is usually digital rather than testimonial. The thin-slice studies measured first impressions and social interest, not verdicts. The mock-juror studies used single scenarios that may not generalize, and the remorse research cited on this point predates current autism research and did not involve autistic defendants. Studies show that a label and information shift judgments, but not whether they make judgments more accurate. No research tells a court whether a particular juror will misread a particular defendant, and no expert can determine from demeanor whether a defendant is truthful, remorseful, or guilty.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the defense cites Lim et al. (2022) for the finding that truthful autistic interviewees seemed more deceptive, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: only truthful speakers were rated, so it shows that autistic demeanor is a poor guide to credibility, not that a particular defendant is honest. When Logos et al. (2021) is offered, the question is who was studied: its 3,342 participants watched an actor following a script, not a real autistic suspect. When the defense relies on Maras et al. (2019), counsel can ask what exactly was counted: the label produced fewer guilty verdicts among 160 participants reading one vignette, but the study did not measure whether judgments became more accurate. When the prosecution offers a defendant’s flat affect or limited eye contact as a sign of guilty knowledge or absent remorse, the question is how much evidence supports that reading; Bandes (2016) noted that there is no evidence that remorse can be accurately evaluated in a courtroom, and Tsoudis (2000) studied students reading written statements, not autistic defendants. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Demeanor, Voir Dire, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

The Supreme Court has recognized that how a defendant appears to the jury can affect a fair trial. Compelled prison clothing (Estelle v. Williams, 1976) and visible restraints without case-specific justification (Deck v. Missouri, 2005) impair the presumption of innocence. In Riggins v. Nevada (1992), the Court considered how forced medication could affect a defendant’s demeanor at trial. These cases do not address autism, but they reflect the law’s recognition that demeanor shapes perception. Voir dire is conducted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a). Trial courts have broad discretion over its scope, and questions about specific biases are required only in limited circumstances (Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 1981; Mu’Min v. Virginia, 1991). A request for autism-specific questions is more likely to be granted when it explains why autism will be at issue.

Expert testimony explaining demeanor must satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as amended December 1, 2023, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), and remains subject to Rule 403. Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars an expert from stating an opinion on whether the defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the crime. An expert may describe autism and how it affects presentation, but may not tell jurors what the defendant knew.

In courts-martial, members are examined and challenged under R.C.M. 912, and the military judge must liberally grant defense challenges for cause (United States v. Clay, 2007). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces prohibits “human lie detector” testimony: no witness may opine that a person is or is not telling the truth (United States v. Brooks, 2007; United States v. Kasper, 2003). In United States v. Knapp (2014), the court held that an investigator’s testimony interpreting an accused’s nonverbal behavior during an interview as indicating deception was impermissible. That holding bears directly on testimony about an autistic accused’s eye contact or affect. Military Rule of Evidence 702 incorporated the 2023 federal amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). For covered offenses committed after December 27, 2023, including the Article 134 child pornography offense, a military judge determines the sentence, so explanation of demeanor at presentencing, including during the accused’s unsworn statement under R.C.M. 1001, is now directed to a judge rather than to members.

Arizona

Since January 1, 2022, Arizona has had no peremptory challenges (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020). Prospective jurors may be removed only for cause, by good-faith stipulation, or for statutory disqualification. Rule 18.4(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure requires excusal when there is a reasonable ground to believe a juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict, and Rule 18.5 governs oral examination of prospective jurors. Because cause challenges are now the only means of removing a biased juror, voir dire that develops a specific record about attitudes toward autism matters more in Arizona than in jurisdictions that retain peremptories.

Arizona permits “cold” educational expert testimony that explains general principles without applying them to the parties, if it satisfies Rule 702 and Rule 403 (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014). The Arizona Supreme Court has cautioned that experts should not speak in broad, categorical terms without empirical support (State v. Haskie, 2017). An expert may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular witness or a class of witnesses (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986). These decisions arose from testimony about complainants, but their reasoning applies to testimony about a defendant’s demeanor: an expert may explain that autistic presentation is a poor guide to credibility, but may not tell jurors that the defendant is credible. Under State v. Mott (1997) and Clark v. Arizona (2006), Arizona does not allow expert evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the mental-state element; the scope of evidence about behavioral tendencies is for counsel and the court. Testimony about demeanor therefore must not become a vehicle for arguing that the defendant lacked knowledge or intent. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They describe how each side commonly uses this research and where its limits lie, for orientation only; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports a prosecution case that rests on what the defendant did, as shown by the digital evidence, rather than on how he appears. Search terms, file organization, concealment, sharing, and communications are not affected by demeanor, and keeping the case focused there avoids the inferential problems this research describes. Prosecutors are also well positioned to keep defense testimony within its supported scope. An expert may explain autistic presentation but may not vouch for the defendant’s honesty, claim that autistic people cannot lie, or use demeanor testimony to argue lack of knowledge where the law forbids it. Arizona’s anti-vouching cases, Rule 704(b), and the military human-lie-detector cases provide the framework for objection. Voir dire that identifies jurors who would treat a diagnosis as an excuse is as legitimate as voir dire that identifies jurors hostile to it.

The research also counsels caution. Testimony or argument that the defendant was “cold,” “emotionless,” “evasive,” or “unremorseful,” whether from an investigator or in closing, invites exactly the misinterpretation the studies document. Knapp shows that an investigator’s reading of nonverbal cues as deception is impermissible. Where the defendant’s autism is established, a neutral instruction about courtroom demeanor protects the verdict rather than weakening it. At sentencing, arguments about lack of remorse should rest on what the defendant has said and done, not on his facial expression.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports explaining an autistic defendant’s presentation to the fact-finder, because unexplained autistic demeanor is likely to be misread as deceit or indifference, and because brief, accurate information reduces that effect for most observers. Defense counsel are often best positioned to document how the client actually presents, through an evaluator’s observations, records, and informants, rather than relying on a generic list of traits. They may consider requesting questionnaire and individual voir dire on autism attitudes, a neutral instruction or stipulation, and help for the client in understanding courtroom procedures. In Arizona, where cause challenges are the only means of removing a juror, a specific record of a juror’s attitudes is what a challenge for cause depends on.

The research also counsels caution. Studies showing that a diagnostic label produces fewer guilty verdicts do not show that it produces more accurate ones, and testimony that invites jurors to excuse the conduct because of the diagnosis is likely to be limited or excluded. Expert testimony must stay within the research. It may say that demeanor is a poor guide to an autistic person’s credibility, not that the client is honest, and it may not be used in Arizona to negate intent under Mott. Disclosing the diagnosis can worsen impressions among jurors with high stigma toward autism, so juror attitudes toward the subject are a question both sides may wish to explore in voir dire. At sentencing, an explanation of how the client expresses emotion is better supported when it accompanies, rather than substitutes for, an acknowledgment of the harm to the children depicted.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bandes, S. A. (2016). Remorse and criminal justice. Emotion Review, 8(1), 14–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073915601222

Berryessa, C. M. (2016). Brief report: Judicial attitudes regarding the sentencing of offenders with high functioning autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 46(8), 2770–2773. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-016-2798-1

Berryessa, C. M., Milner, L. C., Garrison, N. A., & Cho, M. K. (2015). Impact of psychiatric information on potential jurors in evaluating high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (hfASD). Journal of Mental Health Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 8(3–4), 140–167. https://doi.org/10.1080/19315864.2015.1040176

Crane, L., Wilcock, R., Maras, K. L., Chui, W., Marti-Sanchez, C., & Henry, L. A. (2020). Mock juror perceptions of child witnesses on the autism spectrum: The impact of providing diagnostic labels and information about autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 50(5), 1509–1519. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-018-3700-0

DeBrabander, K. M., Morrison, K. E., Jones, D. R., Faso, D. J., Chmielewski, M., & Sasson, N. J. (2019). Do first impressions of autistic adults differ between autistic and nonautistic observers? Autism in Adulthood, 1(4), 250–257. https://doi.org/10.1089/aut.2019.0018

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Lim, A., Young, R. L., & Brewer, N. (2022). Autistic adults may be erroneously perceived as deceptive and lacking credibility. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 52(2), 490–507. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-021-04963-4

Logos, K., Brewer, N., & Young, R. L. (2021). Countering biased judgments of individuals who display autism-characteristic behavior in forensic settings. Human Communication Research, 47(3), 215–247. https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqab002

Logos, K., Lim, A., Brewer, N., & Young, R. L. (2026). The behavioral presentation of autistic adults in a forensic interview. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 56(9), 3503–3522. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-025-06805-z

Maras, K., Marshall, I., & Sands, C. (2019). Mock juror perceptions of credibility and culpability in an autistic defendant. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 49(3), 996–1010. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-018-3803-7

Morrison, K. E., DeBrabander, K. M., Faso, D. J., & Sasson, N. J. (2019). Variability in first impressions of autistic adults made by neurotypical raters is driven more by characteristics of the rater than by characteristics of autistic adults. Autism, 23(7), 1817–1829. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361318824104

Sasson, N. J., Faso, D. J., Nugent, J., Lovell, S., Kennedy, D. P., & Grossman, R. B. (2017). Neurotypical peers are less willing to interact with those with autism based on thin slice judgments. Scientific Reports, 7, Article 40700. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep40700

Sasson, N. J., & Morrison, K. E. (2019). First impressions of adults with autism improve with diagnostic disclosure and increased autism knowledge of peers. Autism, 23(1), 50–59. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361317729526

Tsoudis, O. (2000). Relation of affect control theory to the sentencing of criminals. The Journal of Social Psychology, 140(4), 473–485. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224540009600486

Legal Authorities

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005).

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991).

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).

Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

U.S. Const. amends. V, VI.

10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a).

Fed. R. Evid. 403, 702, 704(b).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4, 18.5.

Ariz. R. Evid. 403, 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2022).

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Rule for Courts-Martial 912, 1001.

Related topic papers: Autism in Adults: Diagnosis, Terminology, and Common Misunderstandings · Police Interviews, Miranda, Compliance, and Suggestibility in Autism · Knowledge and Intent in Online Cases Involving Autistic Defendants · Competency, Effective Participation, and Accommodations · Federal Sentencing of Autistic Defendants After the 2025 Guidelines Amendments

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · False Confessions