Snap Shot
- The question: When does autism bear on a defendant’s competency, and what accommodations help a competent autistic defendant participate effectively?
- What the research shows: In one small British study (15 autistic men in secure hospitals and 15 community comparison adults), the autistic group scored lower on fitness-to-plead questions, especially about courtroom procedure. In one American study of juveniles referred for competence evaluation, an autism-related diagnosis predicted an opinion of incompetence among youth charged with sexual offenses but not in the full sample. In a survey of 93 defense lawyers, mostly in the UK, lawyers reported that 75% of autistic clients received no reasonable adjustments. Effects of literal interpretation, rigid thinking, stress, and masking are clinical observations, not tested findings.
- What it does not show: A diagnosis does not establish incompetence, and many autistic defendants are competent. No study was found on competency restoration in autistic defendants or on the effect of specific accommodations on outcomes, and studies of developmental disability should not be applied to intellectually able autistic adults.
- The law: Dusky governs, with a continuing duty of inquiry (Drope, Pate); federal, military, and Arizona standards are equivalent, and Arizona states that a diagnosis alone is not enough (A.R.S. § 13-4501). Title II of the ADA and Lane reach state courts, and Rule 611(a) supports control over the mode of questioning.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should require competency opinions tied to the actual case and consider feigning, while supporting accommodations and plain-language colloquies; defense counsel should document specific needs and request specific adjustments rather than rely on the diagnosis alone.
An autistic defendant may understand the charges and the roles of the judge and lawyers but still have difficulty following rapid testimony, understanding figurative or ambiguous questions, tolerating a noisy or crowded courtroom, or telling counsel what he needs. Those difficulties raise three related legal questions. The first is competency: whether the defendant has the present ability to understand the proceedings and to assist in his defense. The second, broader question is whether a competent defendant can participate effectively in practice. The third is what accommodations the court and the parties can provide so that he can. In the online cases this hub addresses, most involving child sexual abuse material (CSAM), these questions arise at arraignment, in plea negotiations, during trial, and at sentencing. Statutes and courts use the term “child pornography”; this paper uses CSAM except when discussing the law.
Two premises frame the paper. First, CSAM offenses involve real harm to the children depicted, and an autism diagnosis is not a defense. The diagnosis opens questions about understanding and participation; it does not answer them, and research does not show that autistic people are more or less likely than others to offend. Second, autism does not by itself establish incompetence, and many autistic defendants are competent to stand trial. In those cases the question is not whether the case can proceed but how it can proceed fairly and in a way that will survive appellate review.
The paper separates the legal question of competency from the clinical question of autism, reviews the limited research, describes evaluation and accommodations, and summarizes federal, military, Arizona, and English law. Many autistic adults prefer identity-first language (“autistic person”), and many clinicians use person-first language (“person with autism”); this paper uses both.
Competency Is a Legal Question, Not a Diagnosis
The constitutional standard comes from Dusky v. United States (1960). The question is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. The federal statute, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and Arizona law express the same standard in their own words. Each also requires that the incapacity result from a mental disease, defect, or disability. Arizona states expressly that the presence of a mental illness, defect, or disability alone is not grounds for a finding of incompetence (A.R.S. § 13-4501(3)).
Autism can satisfy the threshold requirement of a disorder. Arizona defines a qualifying condition to include psychiatric or neurological disorders, including congenital conditions (A.R.S. § 13-4501), and autism is a neurodevelopmental condition. But the diagnosis does not answer the functional question. An autistic defendant of average or above-average intelligence may have an excellent factual understanding of the proceedings, sometimes better than other defendants because he has researched the law in detail. Whether he has a rational understanding, and whether he can assist counsel, depends on how his particular characteristics interact with the demands of his particular case.
Competency is also case-specific and time-specific: a negotiated plea to a single possession count demands less than a multi-day trial with forensic computer testimony and a decision whether to testify, and capacity can vary over time. An autistic defendant who functions well in a quiet consultation room may become overwhelmed, shut down, or unable to communicate under the stress of a courtroom. Courts have recognized that the duty to attend to competency continues throughout the proceedings and that a defendant’s behavior and demeanor at trial bear on whether further inquiry is needed (Drope v. Missouri, 1975).
How Autistic Traits May Bear on Understanding and Assistance
The research specific to autism and competency is small. The most direct study is a British study of fitness to plead, the English counterpart of competency. Brewer et al. (2016) compared 15 autistic men, recruited from two secure hospitals and most with previous court experience as defendants, with 15 non-autistic adults recruited from the community. Participants watched a 15-minute filmed depiction of Crown Court proceedings and answered questions designed to assess the abilities fitness to plead requires. The autistic group scored significantly lower overall, and the largest differences involved questions about courtroom procedure. The authors called for larger samples. The comparison group differed from the autistic group in setting and in sex (11 of its 15 members were women), so the difference may not reflect autism alone. The study shows that autistic adults as a group may have more difficulty following court process. It does not show that any particular autistic defendant is unfit, and the samples were too small to identify which autistic adults are most affected.
Evidence from American competency evaluations is sparser still. Cunningham et al. (2021) examined juveniles referred for adjudicative competence evaluations at a Washington state psychiatric hospital for children and adolescents, comparing youth with and without sexual offense charges. Among youth with current or prior sexual offense charges, a primary diagnosis of an autism-related disorder was a unique predictor of an evaluator’s opinion that the youth was not competent, but it did not predict competence opinions in the sample as a whole. The study concerned juveniles at a single hospital, measured evaluators’ opinions rather than court findings, and cannot show why the autistic youth were opined incompetent or whether the pattern extends to adults. Read together, the two results suggest that autism may be associated with incompetence opinions in some referred groups while cautioning against treating the diagnosis as a marker of incompetence. A systematic review of research since 2013 on autistic people in the criminal justice system likewise found little good-quality research and noted methodological limitations that make comparisons between autistic and non-autistic groups difficult (Collins et al., 2023).
A study frequently cited on this point concerns a different population. Ericson and Perlman (2001) compared 40 Canadian adults with mild developmental disabilities with 40 adults without delays on their understanding of 34 legal terms. The participants without delays defined most terms well. Only 8 of the 34 terms, such as judge, lawyer, and witness, were reasonably understood by at least 75% of the participants with developmental disabilities. Self-reported familiarity with a term did not reliably indicate actual understanding. The study concerned intellectual and developmental disability, not autism, and its findings should not be applied to intellectually able autistic adults without evidence that they fit the individual.
Clinical and practitioner literature describes several ways autistic characteristics may affect competency-related abilities (Allely, 2022; Cooper & Allely, 2017). These are clinical observations and hypotheses, not tested findings. Literal interpretation can lead a defendant to misunderstand figurative or compound questions, legal terms with everyday meanings (“charge,” “count,” “sentence”), or a lawyer’s hedged advice. Difficulty taking another person’s perspective can make it hard to anticipate how a judge or jury will view evidence. That difficulty bears on decisions about pleas and testimony, although whether it bears on competency is a legal question under the Dusky abilities (see United States v. Marks, discussed below). Rigid thinking or a strong preference for rules may produce fixed beliefs about the case (“I did nothing wrong because the files were freely available”). These beliefs can resemble irrational beliefs, but they may instead reflect a misunderstanding that explicit explanation can correct. Anxiety, sensory overload, and changes in routine can impair communication in stressful settings. Some autistic adults also mask their difficulties, giving answers they think are expected or saying they understand when they do not.
These features cut in more than one direction. Masking and fluent language can make a defendant appear more capable than he is, which is why understanding should be checked by having him explain matters in his own words. A defendant may also appear confused for reasons unrelated to incapacity, including anxiety, distrust of counsel, or an attempt to appear impaired. Neither presentation answers the competency question without evaluation.
Evaluating Competency in an Autistic Defendant
A competency evaluation answers the legal question. It is not an autism evaluation, although an evaluator who does not understand autism may misread what he observes. A useful evaluation of an autistic defendant combines several sources: the diagnostic history, including whether autism was established by a qualified evaluator using developmental history and structured observation or is merely suspected; interviews with counsel about how the defendant communicates and makes decisions; collateral information from family members and records; and a structured assessment of the competency-related abilities.
Commonly used structured competency instruments were not developed for autistic examinees, and questions built on hypothetical scenarios can disadvantage some autistic defendants for reasons unrelated to their grasp of their own case. Evaluators can supplement them with case-specific questions, check understanding by teach-back, and observe the defendant across more than one session.
The evaluation should also separate deficits that education can remedy, such as unfamiliarity with court procedure, from those it cannot, such as an inability to weigh options or to communicate under stress; the evaluator can teach and then re-assess. An evaluation that identifies which accommodations would allow the defendant to participate, and tests whether they help, is more useful to the court than a bare conclusion.
Feigning and exaggeration must be considered in every competency evaluation, including evaluations of autistic defendants. Evaluators should be aware, however, that atypical response styles, literal answers, and inconsistent engagement can be features of autism. Performance and symptom validity measures should be interpreted with that in mind.
Effective Participation Beyond Competency
Even when competency is not in doubt, autistic defendants may have difficulty participating fully. In an international survey of 93 defense lawyers, most practicing in the United Kingdom, each lawyer reported on one autistic client defended between 2015 and 2020, and 53 also reported on a comparable non-autistic client (Slavny-Cross et al., 2022). Lawyers reported that 75% of the autistic clients received no reasonable adjustments during the process. Lawyers were 7.58 times more likely to be concerned about effective participation in court for autistic clients than for non-autistic clients, and they reported that prosecuting barristers in 59% of the autistic cases, and judges in 46%, had said or done something suggesting an inadequate understanding of autism. A companion study of autistic people’s own accounts found that many did not receive the support they felt they needed and reported more difficulty coping with stress, including meltdowns and shutdowns (Slavny-Cross et al., 2023). An earlier survey in England and Wales found that judges and lawyers understood some suitable adjustments but reported constraints from others’ limited understanding, and that autistic adults with court experience were largely dissatisfied (Maras et al., 2017).
These studies rely on self-selected respondents and self-reports rather than court records, were conducted mostly in the United Kingdom, and cannot show whether different handling would have changed any outcome. They do consistently suggest that autism may go unrecognized or unaddressed in court and that many participation problems arise from process rather than from capacity.
Research on how autistic adults present in interviews suggests caution about assuming any fixed set of behaviors. In a study of 43 autistic and 41 non-autistic adults interviewed online about a simulated chatroom, diagnosis had a strong effect on overall behavioral presentation, but only a few individual behaviors differed between the groups: difficulty with figurative language, longer hesitations, and differences in intonation (Logos et al., 2026). Behaviors varied widely within each group and were not consistently displayed together. Accommodations should therefore be planned around the individual defendant’s documented needs, not around a list of traits assumed to apply to everyone with the diagnosis.
Accommodations in Practice
Accommodations fall into four groups. Familiarization can include a visit to the empty courtroom, a written or visual outline of the hearing, and advance notice of schedule changes. Communication supports can include plain language from the bench, one question at a time, avoidance of compound questions, tag questions, and figurative expressions, checks for understanding, written summaries of rulings and options, and extra time for counsel to explain developments. Environmental adjustments can include scheduled breaks, a quiet waiting area, attention to lighting and noise, and permission to use a fidget or comfort item or to take notes. Testimonial supports can include agreed limits on the form of questioning, a support person in the courtroom, and, where law permits, testimony by remote link.
If the defendant testifies, adjustments to the form of questioning do not limit legitimate cross-examination. A prosecutor can test an autistic defendant’s account fully with short, direct, and unambiguous questions. Such questions may produce more reliable answers than compound or rhetorical ones, and agreed ground rules protect both parties. The court’s ordinary authority to control the mode of questioning supports such arrangements (Fed. R. Evid. 611(a); Ariz. R. Evid. 611(a); Mil. R. Evid. 611(a)).
Restraints, crowded holding cells, and abrupt transport schedules can increase distress in some autistic defendants, and reactions to flat expression or limited eye contact can misfire; the companion paper “Demeanor, Voir Dire, and Educating the Fact-Finder” addresses how such behaviors may be perceived and explained.
Accommodations should be documented. A short written request identifying the defendant’s diagnosis, the specific difficulty, and the specific adjustment requested, supported by a clinician’s letter, gives the court a basis for its ruling and creates a record. The court’s findings on the request and on the defendant’s understanding at key points, such as a plea colloquy or a waiver of the right to testify, protect the proceeding on appeal.
Limits of the Evidence
Research on autism and competency is limited to a few small studies, mostly from the United Kingdom, using simulated court materials or surveys rather than actual competency evaluations. The one American study located that examined actual evaluations concerned juveniles at a single hospital and reported evaluators’ opinions, not court findings (Cunningham et al., 2021). This review found no study of competency restoration in autistic defendants or of the effect of specific courtroom accommodations on outcomes. Studies frequently cited on legal comprehension, such as Ericson and Perlman (2001), concern intellectual disability rather than autism. Practitioner literature describing how autistic traits may affect court participation is valuable for generating hypotheses, but it is not evidence that a particular trait affects a particular defendant. No test determines competency. That determination is for the court, informed by evaluation of the individual defendant in the context of his case, and group findings do not establish that any particular autistic defendant is or is not competent or able to participate.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the defense cites Brewer et al. (2016) to show that autistic adults have difficulty following court process, counsel can ask how much evidence the finding rests on: 15 autistic men in secure hospitals and 15 community volunteers, most of them women, watching a filmed hearing, which the authors said needed larger samples. When Cunningham et al. (2021) is cited for or against an association between autism and incompetence, the question is which result applies: the association appeared only among juveniles charged with sexual offenses at one hospital, not in the full sample, and it concerned evaluators’ opinions rather than court findings. When either side cites Ericson and Perlman (2001), the question is who was studied: adults with mild developmental disabilities, not intellectually able autistic adults, so the finding that only 8 of 34 legal terms were widely understood may not describe this defendant. When the 75% figure from Slavny-Cross et al. (2022) is offered, counsel can ask what exactly was counted: self-selected lawyers’ reports about one client each, not court records, so it describes reported adjustments, not measured outcomes. When the prosecution treats fluent answers as showing that a defendant understands, or the defense treats a list of autistic traits as showing that he does not, the question is whether group findings apply to this person; Logos et al. (2026) found that behaviors varied widely within each group and were not consistently displayed together. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Competency, Participation, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Dusky supplies the standard, and Drope v. Missouri (1975) and Pate v. Robinson (1966) require an inquiry when the evidence raises a bona fide doubt. The same standard governs competency to plead guilty or to waive counsel (Godinez v. Moran, 1993). States may, however, insist on representation for a defendant who is competent to stand trial but too impaired to conduct the trial himself (Indiana v. Edwards, 2008). In United States v. Marks (2025), a federal prosecution for enticing a minor to produce sexually explicit images in which all experts agreed the defendant was autistic, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that Dusky includes a separate requirement of decisional competency, meaning the ability to weigh options such as a plea offer rationally. The court held, based on binding precedent, that the district court had correctly applied the established Dusky test, and it affirmed the finding of competency. It found it unnecessary to decide which party bears the burden of proof under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 because the evidence was not evenly balanced. A state may not require a defendant to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence (Cooper v. Oklahoma, 1996). In federal court, 18 U.S.C. § 4241 requires a hearing when there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect that renders him unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings or to assist properly in his defense. A finding of incompetence must rest on a preponderance of the evidence.
In courts-martial, Article 76b, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 909 apply an equivalent test. The question is whether the accused is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect that renders him unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or to conduct or cooperate intelligently in the defense. An accused found incompetent is committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). The inquiry is ordinarily conducted by a board under R.C.M. 706, and Military Rule of Evidence 302 limits use of the accused’s statements to the board. The military judge’s authority to exercise reasonable control over the proceedings (R.C.M. 801(a)(3)) and to control the mode of questioning (Mil. R. Evid. 611(a)) supports accommodations at trial.
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits public entities from excluding qualified individuals with disabilities from, or denying them the benefits of, their services, programs, or activities (42 U.S.C. § 12132). Implementing regulations require reasonable modifications of policies, practices, and procedures unless the modification would fundamentally alter the program (28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i)). They also require effective communication (28 C.F.R. § 35.160). In Tennessee v. Lane (2004), the Supreme Court held that Title II validly applies to cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts. Title II reaches state and local courts. It does not by its terms govern federal courts or courts-martial, where accommodations rest on the court’s authority over its proceedings and on due process.
Expert testimony on competency and on the need for accommodations is subject to Rule 702 as amended December 1, 2023, under which the proponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that each admissibility requirement is met. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) apply to clinical expertise. Military Rule of Evidence 702 incorporated the federal amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025).
Arizona
Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and A.R.S. §§ 13-4501 to 13-4517 govern competency. Any party or the court may request an examination at any time after charges are filed, and the request must state facts in writing. The examination may address competency to stand trial, to enter a plea, or to assist counsel (A.R.S. § 13-4503). A defendant is incompetent if, as a result of a mental illness, defect, or disability, he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceeding or to assist in his defense. The statute defines mental illness, defect, or disability to include developmental disabilities as defined in A.R.S. § 36-551, a definition that includes autism. The presence of such a condition alone is not enough (A.R.S. § 13-4501). If the superior court finds a defendant incompetent, it must either dismiss the charges on the State’s motion or order restoration treatment, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that he will not regain competence within 15 months. The court may extend treatment for up to six months beyond the 15-month limit if the defendant is progressing toward competence, but not beyond the maximum sentence for the offense under A.R.S. § 13-4515 (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.5(b)(2)(A), (C)). Restoration typically combines treatment with education about court proceedings. For an autistic defendant whose difficulty is unfamiliarity with court process, education may restore competency. For one whose difficulties stem from enduring communication or reasoning differences, the court may need to consider whether accommodations would make him competent and what happens if he cannot be restored. If the court finds no substantial probability that he will regain competence within 21 months of the original finding, any party may ask the court to remand for civil commitment proceedings under title 36, chapter 5, to release him and dismiss the charges without prejudice, or, for a serious offense, to order a trial on dangerousness and commitment under A.R.S. § 13-4521 (A.R.S. § 13-4517(A)). Statements made in a Rule 11 examination generally may not be used on the issue of guilt (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.7; A.R.S. § 13-4508).
Title II and Lane apply to Arizona courts, and Arizona Rule of Evidence 611(a) permits reasonable control over the mode of questioning. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004). Under State v. Mott (1997) and Clark v. Arizona (2006), Arizona does not allow expert evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the mental-state element; the scope of evidence about behavioral tendencies is for counsel and the court. An evaluation that addresses competency or accommodations therefore should not be presented as evidence on intent.
England and Wales (Persuasive Authority)
The Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance on suspects and defendants with mental health conditions or disorders, last updated in October 2024, lists autism within its scope and asks prosecutors to recognize neurodiversity. It treats effective participation as the starting point. A defendant should, wherever possible, face trial, with reasonable adjustments so that he can participate. The guidance notes that modifications to the trial process may meet a defendant’s needs without a finding of unfitness. An adult defendant with a mental disorder or significant impairment may give evidence by live link when that would improve his participation (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s. 33A). The statutory provision for defendant intermediaries (s. 33BA) is not in force, but courts may appoint intermediaries under their inherent powers where necessary for a fair trial. There is no presumption that one will be appointed, and the guidance treats ground rules hearings on questioning as good practice where a defendant has communication needs (Crown Prosecution Service, 2024). These sources do not bind American courts, but they offer a neutral, prosecution-authored model for identifying needs early and recording adjustments.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The law and the research support a firm position that an autism diagnosis alone does not establish incompetence, and that many autistic defendants can be tried fairly with appropriate adjustments. Prosecutors are well positioned to insist that a competency opinion address the Dusky abilities in the context of the actual case, rest on more than self-report or a screening measure, and consider feigning and exaggeration. They can also support reasonable accommodations, such as plain-language colloquies, breaks, agreed questioning rules, and written summaries, rather than opposing them. A record showing that the defendant understood his plea or his choice whether to testify, after accommodations designed for him, is one of the strongest protections against a later claim that he did not.
The research also counsels caution. Fluent speech, high intelligence, or detailed knowledge of the law can coexist with significant difficulty in rational decision-making or communication under stress, and masking can conceal it. Evaluators who are unfamiliar with autism may misread literal answers, flat affect, or rigid beliefs as either malingering or irrationality. A competency finding obtained without addressing those issues, or a plea taken through a standard colloquy that the defendant could answer only with “yes,” invites postconviction litigation. Questioning an autistic defendant with short, direct, unambiguous questions protects the reliability of the answers and does not weaken legitimate cross-examination.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports raising participation needs early and specifically. Defense counsel are often best positioned to observe how the client actually communicates. They can document misunderstandings, obtain records and informant history establishing the diagnosis, and ask the evaluator not only whether the client is competent but what adjustments would allow him to participate. A written accommodation request tied to documented needs, supported by a clinician, is more likely to be granted and to preserve the issue than a general reference to autism. Where the client’s difficulties stem from unfamiliarity with court process, structured education by counsel or a clinician, tested by teach-back, may resolve the issue without a contested competency proceeding.
The research also counsels caution. A competency motion based on the diagnosis alone is unlikely to succeed and may delay the case without benefit. Arizona law expressly provides that a diagnosis alone does not establish incompetence, and restoration may involve hospitalization. Studies of developmental disability, such as Ericson and Perlman (2001), should not be presented as if they described intellectually able autistic adults. In Marks, a case involving an autistic defendant, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that Dusky requires a separate capacity to weigh plea options; evaluations should describe the client’s difficulties in terms of the established Dusky abilities, with concrete examples, and should avoid overstating impairment. In Arizona, evidence developed for competency or accommodations cannot be used to negate intent under Mott.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Allely, C. S. (2022). Autism spectrum disorder in the criminal justice system. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003212195
Brewer, R. J., Davies, G. M., & Blackwood, N. J. (2016). Fitness to plead: The impact of autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 16(3), 182–197. https://doi.org/10.1080/15228932.2016.1177285
Collins, J., Horton, K., Gale-St Ives, E., Murphy, G., & Barnoux, M. (2023). A systematic review of autistic people and the criminal justice system: An update of King and Murphy (2014). Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 53(8), 3151–3179. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-022-05590-3
Cooper, P., & Allely, C. (2017). You can’t judge a book by its cover: Evolving professional responsibilities, liabilities and “judgecraft” when a party has Asperger’s syndrome. Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 68(1), 35–58. https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v68i1.21
Crown Prosecution Service. (2024, October 15). Mental health: Suspects and defendants with mental health conditions or disorders [Legal guidance]. https://www.cps.gov.uk/prosecution-guidance/mental-health-suspects-and-defendants
Cunningham, K. A., Edyburn, K. L., & Lexcen, F. (2021). Profiles of juveniles with sex offense charges referred for competence evaluations. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 66(5), 1829–1840. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.14737
Ericson, K. I., & Perlman, N. B. (2001). Knowledge of legal terminology and court proceedings in adults with developmental disabilities. Law and Human Behavior, 25(5), 529–545. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012896916825
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Logos, K., Lim, A., Brewer, N., & Young, R. L. (2026). The behavioral presentation of autistic adults in a forensic interview. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 56(9), 3503–3522. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-025-06805-z
Maras, K. L., Crane, L., Mulcahy, S., Hawken, T., Cooper, P., Wurtzel, D., & Memon, A. (2017). Brief report: Autism in the courtroom: Experiences of legal professionals and the autism community. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 47(8), 2610–2620. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-017-3162-9
Slavny-Cross, R., Allison, C., Griffiths, S., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2022). Autism and the criminal justice system: An analysis of 93 cases. Autism Research, 15(5), 904–914. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.2690
Slavny-Cross, R., Allison, C., Griffiths, S., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2023). Are autistic people disadvantaged by the criminal justice system? A case comparison. Autism, 27(5), 1438–1448. https://doi.org/10.1177/13623613221140284
Legal Authorities
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
United States v. Marks, 156 F.4th 1169 (11th Cir. 2025).
10 U.S.C. § 876b (Article 76b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
18 U.S.C. § 4241.
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
28 C.F.R. § 35.160.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4501, 13-4503, 13-4508, 13-4510, 13-4515, 13-4517, 13-4521, 36-551.
Fed. R. Evid. 611(a), 702.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11, 11.5.
Ariz. R. Evid. 611(a), 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 302, 611(a), 702.
Rule for Courts-Martial 706, 801(a)(3), 909.
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, c. 23, ss. 33A, 33BA (England and Wales).
Related topic papers: Screening and Diagnosing Autism in an Adult Defendant · Police Interviews, Miranda, Compliance, and Suggestibility in Autism · Demeanor, Voir Dire, and Educating the Fact-Finder · Autism Evaluations in Courts-Martial · Autism and Sentencing: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Australia
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial · False Confessions: Suggestibility