Snap Shot
- The question: What can English and Australian sentencing practice offer American courts sentencing an autistic defendant for a CSAM offense?
- What the comparative material shows: The English Sentencing Council guideline and the Australian Verdins framework treat a diagnosis as the start of the inquiry, require a demonstrated connection between the condition and the offending, and treat culpability and the burden of punishment as separate questions. In nine Australian cases studied, judicial discussion of the autism-offending connection had little bearing on liability or alternative dispositions, and in at least one case the court found the causal connection inadequate.
- What it does not show: The guideline and CPS guidance are policy documents, not research, and the case studies are small. No study shows that autistic CSAM offenders differ from others in reoffending risk, response to deterrence, or experience of custody in a way that can be applied to an individual.
- The law: Foreign authority is persuasive only. After the 2025 amendments, autism evidence is presented mainly in support of a § 3553(a) variance, and Zuk and Crosby reject sentences that rely on the diagnosis without adequately accounting for the other purposes of sentencing. The same questions arise under R.C.M. 1001 and A.R.S. § 13-701(E).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should test the claimed connection against the digital evidence while recognizing that custody may weigh more heavily even without reduced culpability; defense counsel should tie specific characteristics to specific aspects of the offense and support claims about custody with individual evidence.
American courts that sentence an autistic defendant for an offense involving child sexual abuse material (CSAM) have little domestic guidance. Federal law supplies the general purposes of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Arizona supplies a list of mitigating circumstances in A.R.S. § 13-701(E), and military judges sentence within parameters set by executive order, but none of these sources says anything specific about autism. The appellate decisions that do exist, principally United States v. Zuk (4th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Crosby (10th Cir. 2024), tell courts what not to do: a sentence that relies on the diagnosis without adequately accounting for the seriousness of the offense, deterrence, and just punishment will not survive review. They say much less about how autism evidence should be weighed when it is relevant.
England and Wales and Australia have addressed the question more directly. Since October 1, 2020, courts in England and Wales have applied a Sentencing Council guideline on sentencing offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments, which names autism among the conditions it covers; the Council published a research review of that guideline in February 2026. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has published guidance for prosecutors on suspects and defendants with mental health conditions and disorders, including autism, last updated in October 2024. Researchers have also examined how English appellate courts and Australian sentencing courts have actually treated autism evidence in sexual-offense and online cases (Creaby-Attwood & Allely, 2017; Allely et al., 2019).
This paper summarizes that material and identifies what it can and cannot contribute to sentencing in American federal, military, and Arizona courts. None of it is binding in the United States. It is offered as persuasive comparative material: a structured way of asking the questions American law already permits. Two premises apply throughout. CSAM offenses involve real harm to the children depicted, and autism is not a defense; the diagnosis opens questions about culpability, risk, and the effect of a sentence, but it does not answer them. American statutes and courts generally use “child pornography,” English law speaks of “indecent photographs” or “indecent images” of children, and Australian Commonwealth law has used “child abuse material” since 2019, with some states using “child exploitation material”; this paper uses CSAM except when describing a particular legal source. Many autistic adults prefer identity-first language (“autistic person”), while many clinicians and courts use person-first language (“person with autism”); this paper uses both.
Why Comparative Material Is Useful
The difficulty American courts face is less a shortage of evidence about autism than a shortage of structure for using it. What the sentencing court must decide is whether, and how much, a defendant’s autistic characteristics bear on the defendant’s blameworthiness for the particular offense, on the risk he presents, on what punishment is needed to deter others, and on how a given sentence will affect him. Without a framework, the evidence tends to be presented and received in all-or-nothing terms. The defense may present the diagnosis as explaining the offense; the prosecution may present it as irrelevant to an offense that harmed children regardless of the offender’s condition. Zuk and Crosby show the consequences of the first approach, and the second is equally inconsistent with the individualized sentencing that § 3553(a) requires.
The English guideline and the comparative case research separate those questions. They ask whether there is a connection between the condition and the offending rather than assuming one, treat the effect of a condition on culpability and its effect on the burden of punishment as distinct issues, and keep the seriousness of the offense and the protection of the public in view throughout. That structure favors neither side.
The Sentencing Council Guideline in England and Wales
The Sentencing Council for England and Wales issues guidelines that courts in that jurisdiction must follow unless the court is satisfied that doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice (Sentencing Act 2020, s. 59(1)). Its overarching guideline on sentencing offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments came into force on October 1, 2020 (Sentencing Council, 2020). It applies across offense types, so it is used together with the offense-specific guidelines, including those for indecent images of children (Sentencing Council, 2020, paras. 10, 16). It applies to impairments and disorders such as those listed in Annex A (para. 1), and Annex A, which gives general information and does not form part of the guideline, names autism as an example of a developmental disorder.
In substance, the guideline does four things. First, it treats a diagnosis as the beginning of the inquiry rather than its end. A condition must always be considered but will not necessarily affect the sentence, and a formal diagnosis is not always required (Sentencing Council, 2020, paras. 2, 4). Second, it directs the court to make an initial assessment of culpability under the offense-specific guideline and then consider whether the impairment reduced it (para. 10). Its suggested starting questions, which it says are not a checklist, ask whether at the time of the offense the condition impaired the offender’s ability to exercise appropriate judgment, to make rational choices, or to understand the nature and consequences of the actions, and whether it caused disinhibited behavior (para. 15). Culpability will be reduced only if there is a sufficient connection between the condition and the offending; in some cases the reduction may be significant, and in others the condition has no relevance to culpability (paras. 11–12). Third, it separates the question of culpability from the question of the sentence’s effect. A condition linked to the offense is considered at Step 1, and one not linked to it at Step 2, and it may bear on the type of sentence, including mental health disposals (para. 16). Before passing a custodial sentence on an offender who is or appears to be mentally disordered, the court must consider the likely effect of that sentence on the condition and on available treatment (Annex B, setting out Sentencing Code s. 232), and a mental health treatment requirement is among the community disposals described in Annex C. Fourth, it emphasizes obtaining reliable expert reports and reading them critically: relevant expert evidence must always be considered, but the sentencer makes the decision and need not follow an expert opinion if there are compelling reasons to set it aside (paras. 6, 13–14).
For an autistic defendant convicted of a CSAM offense, that structure yields concrete questions. Did autistic characteristics affect what he understood about the legality of the material or the harm to the children depicted, or does the digital evidence of searching, organizing, and concealing show that he understood both? Would custody affect him differently, and is there reliable evidence that it would? Is there a realistic treatment and supervision plan? Each question can be answered for or against the defendant, and each requires evidence about him rather than about autistic people in general.
The 2026 Research Review
On February 11, 2026, the Sentencing Council published a research review of the overarching guideline, undertaken as part of its statutory duty to monitor its guidelines, with the stated aims of understanding how sentencers use and apply the guideline and what effect it may have had on sentencing practice (Sentencing Council, 2026). The review drew on a survey of 311 sentencers, 161 Crown Court sentencing remarks, a subset of 20 Court of Appeal cases, focus groups, and interviews. It found that use of the guideline varies: 59% of surveyed sentencers reported referring to it in every or some relevant cases and 41% rarely or never, and Crown Court judges used it more than magistrates; that the culpability section is the part most used; that sentencing remarks often mention the guideline briefly or not at all; that report quality varies and reports often do not address how a condition affected culpability; and that many cases involve no formal diagnosis. Sentencers found it inherently difficult to judge how far a condition reduces culpability. The Council made immediate formatting changes and added a revision of the guideline to its workplan. The review did not report measured effects on sentencing outcomes and did not address autism separately. A party relying on the guideline as persuasive authority should account for what the review found about how the guideline operates in practice.
Prosecution Guidance from the Crown Prosecution Service
The CPS legal guidance on suspects and defendants with mental health conditions or disorders was first published on October 14, 2019, and updated on May 11, 2023, and October 15, 2024 (Crown Prosecution Service, 2024). It expressly covers autism spectrum disorder along with learning disabilities, acquired brain injury, and other cognitive and neurodevelopmental conditions, and it notes that conditions overlap and that a person’s presentation at the time of the offense may differ from his presentation during proceedings.
The guidance is notable for its balance. It states that a condition may have a bearing on the decision to prosecute, but it may not, and it requires an individual assessment in every case. At the public-interest stage, prosecutors are directed to consider the nature and degree of the condition and how it relates to the conduct, to form a preliminary view about culpability, and to weigh that view against the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect the public, the likelihood of reoffending, the effect of prosecution on the suspect’s health, and the views and circumstances of any victim. It cautions that a likely nominal penalty does not by itself decide the matter, because deterrence, justice for victims, and public confidence also count. It provides that diversion should be as available to people with mental health conditions as to others, while warning that diversion is inappropriate where there is doubt about the reliability of admissions or the person cannot understand its terms, and that rehabilitative conditions must be defined clearly enough that compliance can be understood. It also addresses reasonable adjustments and procedural accommodations to secure effective participation.
For American prosecutors, the CPS guidance is a neutral model that comes from a prosecuting authority rather than an advocacy organization. It treats autism as relevant to culpability and to how proceedings are conducted without treating it as a reason to decline prosecution of serious offenses, and its approach is consistent with the charging discretion American prosecutors already exercise. Charging and diversion in American practice are discussed in the paper on charging, diversion, and plea options in this resource.
Autism in English Appellate Decisions
Creaby-Attwood and Allely (2017) examined English appellate decisions involving defendants with autism charged with sexual offenses. They described cases in which convictions were found unsafe because the trial judge’s summing-up did not adequately explain the defendant’s autism to the jury and its possible effect on his thinking and behavior, particularly where the prosecution had to prove that the conduct was sexually motivated. They also discussed whether impaired social cognition, and the resulting difficulty in developing appropriate, consenting relationships, may be one of the factors that increases the risk of sexual offending in some autistic people, drawing on Higgs and Carter (2015).
The analysis concerns trials and sexual offenses generally rather than CSAM sentencing, but its relevance is real: the same concern about accurate explanation of autism applies when a sentencing judge interprets flat affect, literal answers, or an apparent absence of remorse.
Australian Sentencing in Online Cases
Allely, Kennedy, and Warren (2019) searched the Australian LexisNexis database for decisions mentioning autism and identified nine cases, producing ten rulings, between January 2017 and May 2018 in which defendants who raised an autism diagnosis were charged with online sexual offenses, including access to, possession of, and dissemination of child exploitation material and online communications with children (pp. 2–3). The authors examined how autism evidence was presented in expert reports and how the courts treated it.
Their central finding, which the study set out to support, was that judicial discussion of the connection between autism and online offending had little bearing on overall questions of criminal liability or on the use of alternative dispositions (p. 1). The authors wrote that expert reports on autism were seldom given credence in decisions on liability or non-custodial sentences (p. 8). In one case the court found an inadequate causal link between the defendant’s condition and his offending, and in others the prosecution disputed the connection; in some, expert evidence was divided on the diagnosis itself or on whether it was related to the offenses (pp. 4–6). Several courts accepted that custody would weigh more heavily on an autistic defendant (p. 9), which is judicial acceptance rather than data; the custody research itself is limited, mostly qualitative, and mixed. Non-custodial outcomes were rare: one court ordered an assessment for a community-based intensive correction order, and in a review of a breached supervision order the defendant was released under the existing order (pp. 3, 6–7). Prosecutors emphasized deterrence and the seriousness of the offending, and courts weighed the usual considerations of guilty pleas, prior records, cooperation, and prospects of rehabilitation alongside the autism evidence.
The authors made recommendations that are best understood as advocacy for reform rather than findings: that courts show more sensitivity to clinical factors associated with autism in shaping non-custodial and supervisory dispositions, that the weight given to the number of images and the length of time they were held be reconsidered for autistic defendants (pp. 2–3, 9), that risk assessment account for autistic characteristics, and that diversion and community-based treatment be expanded. They also called for further research, noting that clear empirical research is lacking (pp. 1, 11). Their discussion of image counts is relevant to American practice because the federal guideline for non-production offenses increases the offense level according to the number of images. Whether a large collection reflects compulsive accumulation associated with a restricted interest or reflects the strength of sexual interest in children is a question about the individual defendant that must be answered from the digital evidence, as discussed in the paper on distinguishing autism-related conduct from sexual interest in children in this resource. Steel (2016), a practitioner framework rather than an empirical test, argued that selective concealment, such as encrypting, privately browsing for, or renaming only the illicit material, bears on awareness that the conduct is wrong, though it is not decisive alone (Digital Forensics section).
Australian sentencing law supplies a general framework for mental impairment, which Allely et al. (2019) did not discuss by name. Under the principles set out in R v Verdins (2007) in Victoria, which have been adopted in every Australian jurisdiction (Walvisch, 2023), an impairment may be relevant in six distinct ways: it may reduce moral culpability, affect the kind of sentence imposed, reduce or eliminate the weight given to general deterrence or to specific deterrence, mean that a given sentence weighs more heavily on the offender, or create a serious risk that imprisonment will harm the offender’s mental health. Each requires evidence, and the impairment must be connected to the relevant consideration rather than merely present. That framework parallels the English guideline and offers the same discipline: it identifies separate questions instead of treating the diagnosis as a single mitigating fact.
Common Lessons
The English and Australian material agrees on four points: a diagnosis is necessary but not sufficient, and what matters is a demonstrated connection between particular characteristics and particular aspects of the offense; an effect on culpability and an effect on the burden of punishment are separate, and a court may find one without the other; deterrence and seriousness remain central even where culpability is reduced, the same lesson drawn in Zuk and Crosby; and outcomes other than custody depend on credible plans for treatment and supervision.
The comparative material also shows how much procedure matters. A survey of 93 defense lawyers, most in the United Kingdom, reporting on autistic clients they had represented between 2015 and 2020 found that most of those clients had not received reasonable adjustments during the process and that lawyers were considerably more concerned about effective participation for autistic clients than for non-autistic clients charged with similar offenses; the lawyers also reported concerns that prosecutors and judges did not adequately understand autism (Slavny-Cross et al., 2022). These are lawyers’ reports, not observations of proceedings, but they suggest that a sound framework in a guideline does not guarantee its consistent application.
Limits of the Evidence
The comparative material has substantial limits. The Sentencing Council has added a revision of its guideline to its workplan, so the 2020 text discussed here may change. The guideline and the CPS guidance are policy documents, not research; they describe how courts and prosecutors should reason, not whether the reasoning produces accurate or consistent outcomes. The case research is small. Creaby-Attwood and Allely (2017) analyzed a selection of English appellate decisions, and Allely et al. (2019) analyzed nine Australian cases from a 16-month period, identified through one database and limited to reported decisions. Reported cases are not representative of all sentencings, and the analyses describe judicial reasoning rather than measuring outcomes against a comparison group of non-autistic defendants. The lawyer survey relied on self-selected respondents describing cases from memory.
More fundamentally, no study shows that autistic people who commit CSAM offenses differ from other offenders in their risk of reoffending, their response to deterrence, or their experience of custody in a way that can be measured and applied to an individual. Research does not show that autistic people are more or less likely to offend. The English and Australian frameworks do not resolve that gap; they ask courts to make individualized findings on evidence about the particular defendant. Whether autism affected a given defendant’s understanding, choices, or self-control, and whether custody would affect him differently, can be answered only by evaluation of that person, including his history, informants, testing, and the digital evidence.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the defense offers the Sentencing Council (2020) guideline as a model, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: it is a policy document, and the research review (Sentencing Council, 2026), drawing on a survey of 311 sentencers, found that 41% rarely or never referred to it and did not measure effects on outcomes. When the prosecution cites Allely et al. (2019) for the point that Australian courts gave autism evidence little weight, the question is how much evidence the finding rests on: nine cases from a 16-month period, drawn from one database of reported decisions, with no comparison group of non-autistic defendants. The same question applies when the defense relies on those authors’ recommendations about the weight given to image counts, which are advocacy for reform rather than findings. When the lawyer survey (Slavny-Cross et al., 2022) is cited, counsel can ask what exactly was counted: self-selected respondents describing cases from memory, not observations of proceedings. Whether any of it applies to this person requires evaluation of the individual. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Comparative Sentencing Principles and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Foreign guidelines and decisions have no binding force in American courts, but nothing prevents a party from drawing on them to organize evidence and argument within American law. In federal court, the sentencing judge must consider the § 3553(a) factors, including the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and provide just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, needed treatment, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities. Gall v. United States (2007) requires the court to explain its sentence and permits variances justified by the individual facts, and Pepper v. United States (2011) confirms that the court may consider the widest possible range of information about the defendant. The 2025 amendments to the Guidelines Manual, effective November 1, 2025, removed the departure provisions and policy statements relating to specific offender characteristics, including the former § 5H1.3 on mental and emotional conditions, and preserved them in Appendix B as they appeared in the 2024 edition; the Commission stated that the change does not limit the information courts may consider. Autism evidence is therefore now presented primarily in support of a variance under § 3553(a). The English and Australian distinctions between culpability, the burden of punishment, deterrence, and treatment map directly onto those statutory factors, and a record that addresses each separately is more likely to withstand the scrutiny applied in Zuk and Crosby.
In courts-martial, for offenses committed after December 27, 2023, the military judge determines the sentence for non-capital offenses under the sentencing parameters implemented by Executive Order 14103, and presentencing evidence in mitigation and on rehabilitative potential is governed by R.C.M. 1001. The Article 134 child pornography offense is a covered offense within the authority of the Offices of Special Trial Counsel. A military judge weighing autism evidence faces the same questions as a civilian judge, and the comparative framework can help structure a presentencing case or a response to one. Its use in this setting is persuasive only. Autism evaluations in the military setting are addressed in the paper on autism evaluations in courts-martial in this resource.
Arizona
Arizona sentencing for sexual exploitation of a minor under A.R.S. § 13-3553 involving a child under 15 proceeds under the dangerous-crimes-against-children provisions of A.R.S. § 13-705, which prescribe sentencing ranges and consecutive sentences, and State v. Berger (2006) upheld a lengthy aggregate sentence under that scheme against an Eighth Amendment challenge. Within the ranges the statutes allow, A.R.S. § 13-701(E) permits the court to consider mitigating circumstances, including significantly impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct or to conform conduct to the law that falls short of a defense, and any other factor relevant to the defendant’s character or background. The English guideline’s focus on whether an impairment affected understanding, rational choice, or self-control at the time of the offense closely parallels that statutory language and can help an Arizona court and the parties frame the factual inquiry. Because the statutory structure leaves limited room at sentencing, the CPS guidance’s approach to culpability is often more useful at the charging and plea stage, where the most consequential decisions in Arizona cases are made.
Use of Foreign Authority
Foreign guidelines and decisions are best cited for their reasoning, with an accurate description of their status: a guideline that binds English courts is a policy statement from another jurisdiction when cited in Arizona, and an Australian decision illustrates a method rather than establishing a rule.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The comparative material supports a prosecution position that a diagnosis, by itself, does not reduce culpability. Both the English guideline and the Australian decisions require a demonstrated connection between the condition and the offending, and in the Australian cases studied, courts gave autism evidence little weight on liability or non-custodial dispositions, and in at least one case found the causal link inadequate. Prosecutors are often best positioned to test that connection with the digital evidence of searching, organization, concealment, and selective deletion; to keep deterrence, the seriousness of the material, and the harm to the children depicted before the court; and to ask whether any proposed community disposition includes a concrete, enforceable plan for treatment and supervision. The CPS guidance also offers a prosecutor-authored model for considering a defendant’s condition at the charging stage without treating it as a reason to forgo prosecution, and supporting reasonable accommodations during proceedings helps protect the resulting judgment.
The comparative material also counsels caution. The same frameworks recognize that an impairment can reduce culpability where it affected understanding or self-control, and that custody can weigh more heavily on an autistic person even when culpability is not reduced; those are distinct questions, and denying the second because the first is not established misreads the frameworks. Australian researchers have questioned reliance on image counts and offending duration for autistic defendants, and an argument that rests heavily on collection size should be supported by evidence about what the particular defendant’s collecting reflects. Atypical demeanor should not be presented as a lack of remorse without accounting for how autism affects presentation, a concern English appellate courts have taken seriously at trial.
Special Issues for Defense
The comparative material supports presenting autism evidence in a structured way rather than as a single mitigating fact. Defense counsel are often best positioned to show, through an evaluator who has reviewed the digital evidence, which autistic characteristics bore on which aspects of the offense, and to address separately the effect of custody on the defendant and the treatment and supervision available as an alternative. The English guideline and the Verdins framework offer persuasive models for organizing that presentation under § 3553(a), R.C.M. 1001, or A.R.S. § 13-701(E), and the CPS guidance can support a request that a prosecutor consider culpability at the charging stage.
The comparative material also counsels caution. The Australian study found that judicial discussion of autism had little bearing on liability or the use of alternative dispositions, and the American appellate decisions vacated sentences that relied on the diagnosis without addressing the other purposes of sentencing. Foreign authority should be described accurately as persuasive, recommendations in research articles should not be presented as findings, and claims that custody would be unusually harmful should be supported by evidence about the individual rather than by generalization. A presentation that acknowledges the harm to the children depicted, addresses deterrence and seriousness directly, and offers a plan for treatment and supervision addresses what the appellate decisions required.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Allely, C. S., Kennedy, S., & Warren, I. (2019). A legal analysis of Australian criminal cases involving defendants with autism spectrum disorder charged with online sexual offending. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 66, Article 101456. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2019.101456
Creaby-Attwood, A., & Allely, C. S. (2017). A psycho-legal perspective on sexual offending in individuals with autism spectrum disorder. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 55, 72–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2017.10.009
Crown Prosecution Service. (2024, October 15). Mental health: Suspects and defendants with mental health conditions or disorders [Legal guidance]. https://www.cps.gov.uk/prosecution-guidance/mental-health-suspects-and-defendants
Higgs, T., & Carter, A. J. (2015). Autism spectrum disorder and sexual offending: Responsivity in forensic interventions. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 22, 112–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2015.04.003
Sentencing Council. (2020). Sentencing offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments [Overarching guideline]. https://sentencingcouncil.org.uk/guidelines/sentencing-offenders-with-mental-disorders-developmental-disorders-or-neurological-impairments/
Sentencing Council. (2026). Research review of the overarching guideline for sentencing offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments. https://sentencingcouncil.org.uk/publications/guideline-evaluations/research-review-of-the-overarching-guideline-for-sentencing-offenders-with-mental-disorders-developmental-disorders-or-neurological-impairments
Slavny-Cross, R., Allison, C., Griffiths, S., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2022). Autism and the criminal justice system: An analysis of 93 cases. Autism Research, 15(5), 904–914. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.2690
Steel, C. (2016). The Asperger’s defence in digital child pornography investigations. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 23(3), 473–482. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2015.1080150
Walvisch, J. (2023). Sentencing offenders with self-induced mental disorders: Towards a theory of meta-culpability. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 30(1), 12–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2022.2112100
Legal Authorities
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011).
R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; [2007] VSCA 102.
Sentencing Act 2020 (UK), c. 17, s. 59.
Combatting Child Sexual Exploitation Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (Cth).
State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 134 P.3d 378 (2006).
United States v. Crosby, 119 F.4th 1239 (10th Cir. 2024).
United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398 (4th Cir. 2017).
10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-701(E).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553.
Exec. Order No. 14103, 88 Fed. Reg. 50535 (July 28, 2023).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, introductory commentary, and app. B (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2025).
Rule for Courts-Martial 1001.
Related topic papers: Federal Sentencing of Autistic Defendants After the 2025 Guidelines Amendments · Charging, Diversion, and Plea Options in Autism Cases · Treatment, Supervision, and Custody for Autistic Offenders · Distinguishing Autism-Related Conduct from Sexual Interest in Children · Risk Assessment for Autistic Men Charged with CSAM Offenses
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Online Sex Offense · Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial