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Autism Sex Offense

Federal Sentencing of Autistic Defendants After the 2025 Guidelines Amendments

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How is autism evidence presented and weighed in federal CSAM sentencing after the November 1, 2025 Guidelines amendments?
  • What changed: The amendments removed most departures, including former § 5H1.3, to Appendix B, and the Commission stated that courts may still consider the same information. Because § 5K2.13 already excluded child pornography offenses, autism had reached these sentences mainly through variances; autism evidence is now argued principally as a basis for a variance under § 3553(a).
  • What the data show: The Commission found that most § 2G2.2 enhancements apply in most cases and do not distinguish among offenders, while aggravating sexual conduct and online community involvement do track culpability. The data do not identify autism, and no recidivism data or sentencing-outcome studies specific to autistic CSAM offenders were located.
  • What the cases hold: Zuk and Crosby vacated sentences resting largely on autism because the courts gave too little weight to, or did not address, just punishment, deterrence, and disparities; Welshans and Morais affirmed measured consideration. None treats autism as irrelevant, and supervised release cannot serve retribution (Crosby).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors may insist that every § 3553(a) purpose be addressed and test evaluations against the digital evidence, without arguing the diagnosis is a pretext; defense counsel should build a record addressing each factor, including harm to the children depicted and general deterrence, with a specific treatment and supervision plan and no claim that autistic defendants are lower risk.

Autism is raised most often in federal child sexual abuse material (CSAM) cases at sentencing. Defense counsel offer evaluations describing how the defendant’s autism relates to the offense, his risk, his treatment needs, and the effect of incarceration on him; prosecutors respond that the offense harmed real children and that the purposes of sentencing other than rehabilitation must be served. Federal statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines use the term “child pornography.” This paper uses CSAM except when discussing the law. Many autistic adults prefer identity-first language (“autistic defendant”), while many clinicians and courts use person-first language (“defendant with autism”); this paper uses both.

The legal setting changed on November 1, 2025, when amendments to the Guidelines removed most departures, including the policy statements on specific offender characteristics such as mental and emotional conditions, and moved them to an appendix. Amendment 836 moved departures, including Chapter 5H, to Appendix B, and the same facts may be considered for variances under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); autism evidence is now argued principally as a basis for a variance. The appellate decisions most often cited in these cases, United States v. Zuk (2017) and United States v. Crosby (2024), both vacated sentences that rested largely on autism, and they show what a record must contain to survive review.

This paper describes the current framework, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s data on non-production sentencing, how autism evidence relates to each statutory purpose of sentencing, what the appellate cases hold, and how both parties can build a record that is accurate and durable. Throughout, three premises apply. CSAM offenses involve real harm to the children depicted. An autism diagnosis opens questions; it does not answer them, and research does not show that autistic people are more or less likely than others to offend. And group research cannot by itself establish what sentence is appropriate for a particular defendant.

The Framework After November 1, 2025

Before 2025, the Guidelines described a three-step process: calculate the guideline range, consider departures authorized by the Guidelines, and then consider the § 3553(a) factors to decide whether a variance was warranted. The 2025 amendment removed the second step. Most departure provisions were deleted from the Guidelines Manual and compiled in Appendix B as they appeared in the 2024 edition, including the departures and policy statements relating to specific personal characteristics in Chapter Five, Part H, and the departures in Part K (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2025a, 2025b). The Commission described the change as intended to be outcome neutral and stated that removal of the departures does not limit the information courts may consider in imposing a sentence (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2025b). Section 1B1.1 now directs the court to calculate the range and then to consider the § 3553(a) factors to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary. Section 1B1.4 continues to permit consideration of any information concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant unless the law prohibits it.

For autism in CSAM cases, the practical change is smaller than it may appear. The former policy statement on mental and emotional conditions, § 5H1.3, permitted such conditions to be considered for a departure only when present to an unusual degree and distinguishing the case from the typical case, and the former diminished-capacity departure, § 5K2.13, was unavailable to defendants convicted of offenses under chapters 71, 109A, 110, or 117 of title 18, which include the child pornography offenses (U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.3, 5K2.13 (2024)). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) restricts departures in cases under chapter 110 of title 18 to grounds affirmatively identified in the Guidelines, a provision the courts of appeals have treated as advisory after Booker (United States v. Hecht, 2006). For years, therefore, autism has reached CSAM sentences mainly through variances rather than departures. After 2025, autism evidence is argued principally as a basis for a variance.

Variances are reviewed for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard (Gall v. United States, 2007). A sentencing court may consider the widest possible range of information about the defendant (Pepper v. United States, 2011) and may vary based on a policy disagreement with a guideline (Kimbrough v. United States, 2007), but a major variance should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one (Gall, 2007), and the court must state its specific reasons for a sentence outside the range (18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)).

What the Commission’s Data Show

The Commission’s 2012 report to Congress concluded that the non-production guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, warranted revision because its enhancements related to collecting behavior had become outdated and disproportionate, and it recommended that the guideline more fully account for the offender’s collecting behavior, involvement in an offender community, and history of sexually dangerous behavior (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012). Its 2021 follow-up study found that the problem had grown. In fiscal year 2019, four of the six enhancements, together worth 13 offense levels, applied in most cases: use of a computer and a victim under 12 in more than 95% of cases, sadistic or masochistic content or abuse of an infant or toddler in 84.0%, and 600 or more images in 77.2%. The median case involved 4,265 images; 99.4% included prepubescent children and 52.2% included infants or toddlers. Only 30.0% of offenders received a within-range sentence, and 59.0% received a below-range sentence (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2021).

The 2021 study also identified factors that track culpability and that courts already appear to weigh. Of non-production offenders, 43.7% had participated in an online CSAM community and 48.0% had engaged in aggravating sexual conduct before or alongside the offense; average sentences were 71 months for offenders with neither factor and 134 months for those with aggravating sexual conduct. In the 2015 release cohort, 27.6% were rearrested for any offense within three years and 4.3% for a sex offense (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2021). These are rearrest figures over a short window, and they do not distinguish autistic offenders.

These data cut both ways in an autism case. They support the argument that the enhancements do not distinguish among offenders, which is a legitimate basis for a policy-based variance under Kimbrough, and they identify the factors that do appear to matter. They also show that the content in nearly every case depicts the abuse of very young children, and that wide variation among similar offenders is itself an unwarranted disparity that § 3553(a)(6) directs courts to avoid.

How Autism Evidence Relates to the Statutory Purposes

Section 3553(a)(1) directs attention to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. An autism evaluation is most often offered here. It can describe a developmental history, social isolation, limited sex education, intense or repetitive interests, and difficulty understanding social and legal rules, and it can explain how, if at all, those features relate to the conduct. In interviews with 12 UK-based practitioners, the authors described recurring vulnerabilities, including late diagnosis, limited sex and online-safety education, and online naivety, that practitioners saw among autistic people who had offended, and they cautioned that the research cannot establish causation (Davy et al., 2025). These are case-based practitioner reports from a small sample, not tested findings; naivety is a hypothesis to examine in the individual case, not an assumption. The digital evidence matters here as well: a practitioner framework rather than an empirical test proposed that selective concealment, such as encrypting, privately browsing for, or renaming only the illicit material, bears on awareness that the conduct is wrong, though it is not decisive alone (Steel, 2016, Digital Forensics section), and in one case a defense expert agreed on cross-examination that autism did not necessarily dictate what the defendant collected, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed a within-Guidelines sentence (United States v. Morais, 2012).

Section 3553(a)(2)(A) requires a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, and provides just punishment. Autism evidence may bear on culpability by showing what the defendant understood, but it does not alter the harm to the children depicted. The Supreme Court has described the continuing and grievous harm that victims suffer from knowing that images of their abuse are viewed by others (Paroline v. United States, 2014). A sentencing argument that addresses autism without addressing the seriousness of the offense leaves this purpose unaddressed, and that omission was decisive in Crosby.

Section 3553(a)(2)(B) requires adequate deterrence, both specific and general. Autism evidence may bear on specific deterrence, for example by showing that the defendant has responded to explicit instruction and treatment. It has little bearing on general deterrence, which concerns the effect of the sentence on others. In Crosby the defendant offered research questioning whether long sentences deter CSAM offending; the Tenth Circuit did not decide that question but held that the district court erred by not addressing general deterrence at all.

Section 3553(a)(2)(C) requires protection of the public. Risk evidence for autistic defendants is subject to the limits described in “Risk Assessment for Autistic Men Charged with CSAM Offenses” in this resource: no recidivism studies specific to autistic CSAM offenders were located, several items on standard instruments may overlap with autistic traits, and group base rates for CSAM-only offenders are the available reference point, applied with attention to those limits; they have not been validated for autistic men. A 2025 meta-analysis of 30 samples (N = 25,978; average follow-up about 4.7 years) reported official contact sexual recidivism of about 0.6% among people with CSAM-only histories, with self-reported reoffending substantially higher than official rates (Baskurt et al., 2025). Official records capture only detected offending, so the official figure is a minimum estimate. Neither finding is specific to autistic people. In intellectual-disability service samples without a control group, men with autism showed more further harmful sexual behavior than men without autism; the outcome was behavior rather than conviction, and the findings may not describe intellectually able autistic adults (Murphy et al., 2023).

Section 3553(a)(2)(D) requires consideration of needed treatment in the most effective manner. Here autism evidence is most directly relevant. Qualitative research with autistic men in prison-based sexual offense programs and staff found that group formats, the demands of the prison environment, and some program content can be hard for autistic participants and suggested that programs may not be adequately adapted (Vinter et al., 2025). A related qualitative study by the same group examined autistic people’s experiences of imprisonment more broadly (Vinter et al., 2023). This research is qualitative, involves small samples in the United Kingdom, and does not show that any particular federal facility or program is unsuitable, but it supports an evaluator’s specific account of what treatment the defendant needs and where it can be delivered.

Sections 3553(a)(4) and (a)(6) direct attention to the Guidelines range and to unwarranted disparities. These factors are frequently unaddressed in autism arguments, and both Zuk and Crosby turned partly on them.

What the Appellate Cases Show

In United States v. Zuk (2017), the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession; his collection included more than 13,000 images and 472 videos, many with sadistic or masochistic content; he had also directed a 16-year-old’s sexual abuse of a 5-year-old cousin. Evaluators diagnosed mild autism along with pedophilic disorder and other conditions. The Guidelines range exceeded the 240-month statutory maximum, and the district court imposed time served of 26 months with lifetime supervised release and residential treatment, calling autism the primary driver of the sentence. The Fourth Circuit found no procedural error but held the sentence substantively unreasonable because the court gave excessive weight to autism and rehabilitation and too little to just punishment, deterrence, respect for the law, and the disparity with similar defendants, and it vacated and remanded for resentencing (Zuk, slip op. at 3–8, 14, 21–26; Farris & Chien, 2018).

In United States v. Crosby (2024), the defendant pleaded guilty to two possession offenses involving more than 4,000 files in one search and further material, including depictions of very young children, in a later search. The Guidelines range was 78 to 97 months. The district court accepted a forensic psychiatric evaluation linking the offense to long-standing untreated autism and depression, found that he did not have pedophilia, that he was at lower risk, and that he was a good candidate for community treatment, and imposed five days or time served, 15 years of supervised release, and restitution. The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable because the district court focused almost entirely on the defendant’s history and characteristics and did not address retribution, general deterrence, unwarranted disparities, or why a sentence below even the range it considered appropriate absent the enhancements was justified. The court held that supervised release cannot be imposed for retributive purposes (18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)). It found no indication that the restitution had been imposed for that purpose, and it noted that a fuller explanation on remand might support a substantively reasonable sentence. Crosby followed United States v. Cookson (2019), an earlier Tenth Circuit decision in a child pornography possession case that vacated a sentence of five years’ probation imposed against a guideline range of 97 to 121 months, because the district court relied almost exclusively on the defendant’s rehabilitation before sentencing and gave a limited, inconsistent explanation for the variance; the court declined to direct a particular sentence on remand.

In United States v. Welshans (2020), a non-precedential decision, the district court granted a five-level variance because two enhancements did not make the conduct more serious, sentenced the defendant to 121 months for possession and distribution, and declined a further variance based on a recent diagnosis of Level 1 autism. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the court had found the diagnosis relevant, considered the difficulty of incarceration for autistic people, and weighed it against the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public. In United States v. Morais (2012), the Eighth Circuit affirmed a within-Guidelines sentence of 97 months for receipt. On cross-examination, the defense neuropsychologist had agreed that autism was related to the defendant’s collecting tendencies but did not necessarily dictate what he chose to collect, and the appellate court held that the district court was not required to address each autism argument specifically.

Read together, the cases do not hold that autism is irrelevant. Each appellate court accepted that autism could be relevant. They hold that a sentence far below the range must rest on an explanation that addresses every purpose of sentencing, that autism evidence cannot substitute for that explanation, and that a district court’s measured consideration of autism will generally be affirmed in either direction.

Building a Record That Survives Review

A durable record begins with a sound evaluation: a diagnosis established by developmental history from informants, records, standardized observation and measures, and an evaluator experienced with autistic adults; attention to co-occurring conditions, including any sexual interest in children; and a specific account, tied to the digital evidence, of how autistic features did or did not relate to the conduct. An evaluation that infers naivety or collecting from the diagnosis alone is vulnerable to the reasoning in Morais.

The record should address each § 3553(a) factor expressly. For seriousness and just punishment, it should acknowledge the harm to the children depicted and explain why the proposed sentence, including any custody, supervision conditions, and restitution, reflects it. For deterrence, it should address both the defendant and the public. For protection of the public, risk evidence should be presented with its definitions and limits. For treatment, it should identify specific needs and where they can be met, including Bureau of Prisons programming if custody is imposed. For the Guidelines and disparities, it should explain where the proposed sentence falls relative to the range, whether a policy disagreement with § 2G2.2 is asserted and on what basis, and how the sentence compares with those of similar defendants, which the Commission’s sentencing data can inform.

Supervision conditions deserve the same specificity. Conditions written as explicit, concrete rules about devices, monitoring, treatment, and contact with minors are easier for an autistic supervisee to follow and easier for a court to enforce. In Crosby the district court imposed 15 years of supervised release, including five years of GPS monitoring, and computer monitoring among the conditions, and the Tenth Circuit’s holding that supervision cannot serve retribution means that a long supervision term is a complement to, not a substitute for, an explanation of the custodial sentence.

Limits of the Evidence

No controlled studies of autistic CSAM offenders, recidivism data specific to them, or outcome studies of sentencing alternatives for autistic defendants were located; a 2018 review likewise found no empirical studies of autism and online child pornography offending (Allely & Dubin, 2018). The Commission’s data describe federal non-production offenders generally and do not identify autism. Risk figures are based on official records that undercount offending and on limited follow-up periods. Prison research on autistic people is qualitative, involves small samples, and comes largely from the United Kingdom. The appellate cases are few, fact-specific, and mostly concern sentences of time served; they do not set a floor or a ceiling for any case. Group findings cannot establish what a particular defendant understood, whether he has sexual interest in children, or what sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary for him.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the defense cites the Commission’s finding that four enhancements applied in most cases, such as 600 or more images in 77.2% (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2021), counsel can ask who was studied: federal non-production offenders generally, with no identification of autism, so the data speak to the guideline, not to this defendant’s culpability. Risk figures call for asking what exactly was counted, and the answer cuts both ways. The 4.3% sex-offense rearrest rate and the 0.6% official contact recidivism figure (Baskurt et al., 2025) rest on official records over limited follow-up periods, while the 27.6% figure the prosecution may cite counts rearrest for any offense within three years; none distinguishes autistic offenders. When Vinter et al. (2025) is offered on the difficulty of prison treatment, the question is how much evidence it rests on: it is qualitative, involves small UK samples, and does not show that any particular federal facility is unsuitable. When the prosecution relies on the outcomes in Zuk and Crosby, the question is whether they apply to this defendant; the cases are few, fact-specific, and mostly concern sentences of time served. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Federal Sentencing and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Sentences are imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), with the Guidelines as the starting point and initial benchmark (Gall v. United States, 2007; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1). The Guidelines have been advisory since United States v. Booker (2005). The 2025 amendments removed departures for specific offender characteristics, including the former § 5H1.3, and preserved their text in Appendix B, while stating that courts may still consider the same information. Possession of CSAM under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) has no mandatory minimum and a maximum of 10 years, or 20 years where a depiction involved a prepubescent minor or a minor under 12; receipt and distribution carry a five-year minimum and a 20-year maximum (18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)), so a variance cannot go below the statutory minimum in a receipt or distribution case. Restitution is mandatory for these offenses and is measured by the defendant’s relative role in the victim’s losses (Paroline v. United States, 2014); 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2), as amended in 2018, codifies that relative-role approach for child pornography trafficking offenses, a term that includes possession, receipt, and distribution, and sets a minimum of $3,000 per victim.

Expert evidence at sentencing is not governed by the rules of evidence, but information must have sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy (U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3). Where autism evidence is offered at trial or at a hearing governed by the rules, Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data and reliably applies reliable methods, consistent with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). An evaluation meeting that standard is also more reliable at sentencing.

In courts-martial, the Guidelines do not apply. For offenses committed after December 27, 2023, the military judge sentences in non-capital cases using the sentencing parameters implemented by Executive Order 14103, and autism evidence in an Article 134 child pornography case is presented in presentencing under Rule for Courts-Martial 1001. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2023 federal amendment became part of the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). The federal appellate decisions discussed in this paper are not binding in courts-martial but illustrate how reviewing courts evaluate sentences that rest largely on autism.

Arizona

Arizona sentencing leaves far less room for autism evidence than federal sentencing does. Sexual exploitation of a minor under A.R.S. § 13-3553 is a class 2 felony, and when the minor depicted is under 15 it is a dangerous crime against children sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-705: a first completed offense carries 10 to 24 years (presumptive 17), without probation, and each sentence must run consecutively to other sentences for dangerous crimes against children. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld an aggregate 200-year sentence under this scheme against an Eighth Amendment challenge in State v. Berger (2006). Mitigating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13-701(E), including significantly impaired capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or to conform conduct to the law and any other factor relevant to character and background, may move a sentence within the statutory range but cannot avoid the mandatory consecutive structure. In Arizona, therefore, the weight given to autism evidence is decided largely at charging and plea negotiation, as discussed in “Charging, Diversion, and Plea Options in Autism Cases” in this resource.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They describe how each side commonly uses this research and where its limits lie, for orientation only; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research and the case law support a prosecutor’s insistence that a sentence address every purpose of § 3553(a). Prosecutors can legitimately argue the harm to the children depicted (Paroline), the need for general deterrence and just punishment, the Guidelines range, and the disparity a large variance would create, and they can test an autism evaluation against the digital evidence: CSAM-specific searches, content sought and kept, participation in offender communities, chats with minors, and concealment applied selectively to CSAM. The Commission’s finding that aggravating sexual conduct and community involvement mark more culpable offenders gives a principled basis for distinguishing cases. A sentence that addresses each § 3553(a) factor, including reasonable accommodations, and states concrete supervision conditions and treatment is easier for a reviewing court to evaluate.

The research also counsels caution. Zuk and Crosby hold that autism cannot carry a sentence alone, not that it is irrelevant; Welshans and Morais show courts weighing it. Arguing that the diagnosis is a pretext, that autistic defendants are more dangerous, or that the co-occurrence of autism with sexual interest in children shows such interest in a particular defendant overstates the evidence. The Commission’s own data show that the § 2G2.2 enhancements apply in most cases and do not distinguish among offenders, so arguments resting solely on the calculated range are open to reasoned policy disagreement.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports presenting autism as relevant to culpability, specific deterrence, treatment needs, and the conditions of supervision, through an evaluation that establishes the diagnosis by accepted methods and addresses the digital evidence directly. Defense counsel are often best positioned to build a record that addresses the points on which Zuk and Crosby vacated sentences: one that acknowledges the harm to the children depicted, addresses just punishment and general deterrence rather than leaving them to the court, explains the requested sentence relative to the Guidelines range and to sentences of similar defendants, supports any policy disagreement with § 2G2.2 with the Commission’s own findings, and presents a specific treatment and supervision plan. A sentence that the record explains on every factor gives a reviewing court more to evaluate than one that rests on the diagnosis.

The research also counsels caution. I am not aware of evidence that autistic defendants are lower risk than other CSAM offenders, and an evaluation that says so, or that explains away concealment, CSAM-specific searches, or evidence of sexual interest in children, is not supported by the research and may weaken the variance it is offered to support. The same research does not show that autistic defendants are higher risk. In Morais, the defense expert agreed on cross-examination that autism did not necessarily dictate what was collected, and the within-Guidelines sentence was affirmed. Arguments that prison is categorically unsuitable for autistic people outrun the qualitative research, which supports specific accommodation and treatment needs rather than a general rule. An evaluation that states what it cannot establish is more reliable, whichever side offers it.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Allely, C. S., & Dubin, L. (2018). The contributory role of autism symptomology in child pornography offending: Why there is an urgent need for empirical research in this area. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities and Offending Behaviour, 9(4), 129–152. https://doi.org/10.1108/JIDOB-06-2018-0008

Baskurt, S., Babchishin, K. M., Hilkes, G., & Seto, M. C. (2025). A meta-analysis of recidivism rates among individuals who commit child sexual exploitation material (CSEM) offending. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 85, Article 102080. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2025.102080

Davy, D., Brown, S., Vinter, L. P., Allely, C., Mann, N., Orofino, E., & Lundrigan, S. (2025). Understanding vulnerabilities and “pathways” in the commission of sexual offences by autistic individuals: Perspectives from UK-based practitioners. Psychology, Crime & Law. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2025.2526604

Farris, M. S., & Chien, J. (2018). Greatly reduced sentence due to mild autism spectrum disorder deemed unreasonable. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 46(3), 388–390. https://doi.org/10.29158/JAAPL.3773L7-18

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Murphy, G. H., Sinclair, N., Melvin, C., & Langdon, P. E. (2023). Group CBT for men with intellectual disabilities and/or autism who have harmful sexual behaviour. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62(3), 592–604. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjc.12427

Steel, C. (2016). The Asperger’s defence in digital child pornography investigations. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 23(3), 473–482. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2015.1080150

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2012). Report to the Congress: Federal child pornography offenses. https://www.ussc.gov/research/congressional-reports/2012-report-congress-federal-child-pornography-offenses

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2021). Federal sentencing of child pornography: Non-production offenses. https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-reports/federal-sentencing-child-pornography-non-production-offenses

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2025a). Amendments in brief: Simplification [Amendment effective November 1, 2025]. https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/amendments-in-brief/AIB_2025-simplification.pdf

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2025b). Guidelines manual (Chapter One). https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2025/CHAPTER_1.pdf

Vinter, L. P., Dillon, G., & Winder, B. (2023). “People don’t like you when you’re different”: Exploring the prison experiences of autistic individuals. Psychology, Crime & Law, 29(3), 243–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2020.1781119

Vinter, L. P., Dillon, G., Winder, B., & Harper, C. A. (2025). A multi-perspective qualitative study about working with autistic individuals in prison-based interventions to address sexual offending. Sexual Abuse, 37(1), 30–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/10790632231216701

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014).

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011).

State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 134 P.3d 378 (2006).

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2019).

United States v. Hecht, 470 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2006).

United States v. Crosby, 119 F.4th 1239 (10th Cir. 2024).

United States v. Morais, 670 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).

United States v. Welshans, No. 19-2880 (3d Cir. May 11, 2020) (not precedential).

United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398 (4th Cir. 2017).

10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. § 2252.

18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2).

18 U.S.C. § 3553.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-701(E).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553.

Exec. Order No. 14103, 88 Fed. Reg. 50535 (July 28, 2023).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Rule for Courts-Martial 1001.

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 1B1.1, 1B1.4, 2G2.2, 6A1.3, app. B, and app. C, amend. 836 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2025).

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 5H1.3, 5K2.13 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2024).

Related topic papers: Charging, Diversion, and Plea Options in Autism Cases · Autism and Sentencing: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Australia · Treatment, Supervision, and Custody for Autistic Offenders · Risk Assessment for Autistic Men Charged with CSAM Offenses · Distinguishing Autism-Related Conduct from Sexual Interest in Children

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Online Sex Offense · Psychosexual Risk Evaluations