Snap Shot
- The question: How do the rules and conditions of a court-martial shape the evaluation of an accused who may be autistic?
- What the paper shows: Because DoD treats autism as disqualifying for accession, the diagnosis may first be raised after charges, which calls for a full evaluation with childhood informants and records rather than a quick screen. An R.C.M. 706 board addresses severe mental disease or defect and competence, standards autism alone rarely meets, and a board that did not screen for autism may record no autism diagnosis because none was considered. Remote methods suit history interviews and record review; telehealth autism research is promising but mostly involves children.
- What it does not show: Almost no research addresses autism in military populations, and none addresses autistic service members charged with CSAM offenses. No test determines whether an accused knew what he possessed, intended to distribute it, or will reoffend.
- The law: Expert assistance requires a showing of necessity (Gonzalez, Bresnahan, Lloyd); protection depends on the consultant joining the defense team (Toledo, Paaluhi). Ellis v. Jacob permits specific-intent evidence short of Article 50a, unlike Arizona under Mott. For offenses after December 27, 2023, covered offenses are sentenced by a military judge under sentencing parameters.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should ensure boards and government experts have the qualifications and records to address autism and test diagnoses resting on screens or self-report; defense counsel should make specific, documented expert requests and settle the expert’s role and privilege structure before any examination.
Autism questions arise in courts-martial for the same reasons they arise in civilian courts: an accused’s social communication, literal thinking, intense interests, or atypical demeanor may bear on what he understood, how he behaved in an interrogation, whether he can participate in his defense, what risk he presents, and what sentence and treatment are appropriate. They arise most often in prosecutions involving child sexual abuse material (CSAM) under Article 134 and in online offenses charged under Articles 120b and 80. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual for Courts-Martial use the term “child pornography”; this paper uses CSAM except when discussing the law. Many autistic adults prefer identity-first language (“autistic service member”), and many clinicians use person-first language (“service member with autism”); this paper uses both.
The military justice system shapes how autism evidence is developed in ways that have no exact civilian parallel. Mental capacity and responsibility are examined through a sanity board under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 706, whose report is divided between the parties under specific rules. Defense experts are usually obtained by request to the convening authority and the military judge, and whether an expert’s work is privileged depends on how the expert was brought onto the defense team. The accused, his family, counsel, and the expert are often in different states or countries, which makes remote evaluation common. And since December 27, 2023, covered offenses, including child pornography offenses, are controlled by the Offices of Special Trial Counsel and sentenced by a military judge under sentencing parameters.
This paper describes those features and the evaluation practices they call for. Throughout, two premises apply. CSAM offenses involve real harm to the children depicted, and an autism diagnosis is not a defense. The diagnosis opens questions about understanding, intent, risk, and accommodation; it does not answer them, and research does not show that autistic people are more or less likely than others to offend. Autism and sexual interest in children can co-occur.
Why Autism May Be Unrecognized in a Service Member
The Department of Defense lists autism spectrum disorders among the conditions that are disqualifying for appointment, enlistment, or induction (Department of Defense, 2018, § 6.28). Autistic service members therefore usually fall into one of three groups: those whose autism was never identified, those who were evaluated in childhood but whose history was not disclosed or not documented at accession, and those who received a waiver. In each case the diagnosis may first be raised after charges are preferred. A first diagnosis after charges does not by itself show opportunism, but it requires the evaluator to reconstruct childhood from records and informants that predate the charges; where such records do not exist, the evaluator should say so and say how confident the diagnosis can be. The timing may draw questions from the government and creates pressure on the defense, and both are reasons to insist on a thorough evaluation rather than a quick screen.
Several features of adult autism complicate a military evaluation. Intellectually able adults may have developed compensatory strategies, sometimes called masking or camouflaging, that conceal difficulties in brief encounters. The structure of military life, with explicit rules, routines, and defined roles, may support functioning that deteriorates in less structured settings, such as online social and sexual life. The differential diagnosis includes social anxiety, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression, trauma-related conditions, and personality traits that can resemble autism. Because autism is a developmental condition, the diagnosis depends on evidence of early childhood characteristics, which usually requires interviews with parents or others who knew the service member as a child and a review of school and medical records. Those informants are rarely near the installation where the case is tried.
A diagnosis made during a court-martial can also have consequences beyond the case, including medical and administrative review of fitness for continued service. Counsel and evaluators should understand those potential consequences before an evaluation begins and explain them to the accused in terms he can follow.
The R.C.M. 706 Inquiry
When there is reason to believe that the accused lacked mental responsibility for an offense or lacks the capacity to stand trial, the convening authority before referral, or the military judge after referral, may order an inquiry by a board of one or more physicians or clinical psychologists. The board is ordered to make findings on whether the accused had a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, his clinical psychiatric diagnosis, whether as a result of a severe mental disease or defect he was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct, and whether he presently has sufficient mental capacity to understand the proceedings and to conduct or cooperate intelligently in his defense. The board’s report has two parts. Its ultimate conclusions are provided to both parties and the military judge, while the full report is released only to defense counsel and medical personnel, with a copy available to the accused’s commanding officer on request; disclosure to trial counsel of the accused’s statements to the board is generally prohibited (United States v. English, 1997). Military Rule of Evidence 302 limits the use of the accused’s statements to the board and evidence derived from them.
The R.C.M. 706 process has strengths and limits for autism questions. Its strength is that the board’s ultimate conclusions carry institutional weight and its examination is protected by Rule 302. Its limits follow from its design. The board’s questions are framed around severe mental disease or defect and competence, standards that autism alone rarely meets, so a board may answer each question in a way unfavorable to the accused without addressing whether autism affected his understanding of the offense or bears on risk and sentencing. Board members may have limited experience diagnosing autism in adults, and if they did not screen for it, the limited report may record no autism diagnosis because none was considered. Counsel may ask the ordering authority to add questions to the order, and a request that specifies the autism questions to be addressed, the records and informants to be consulted, and the qualifications needed is more likely to produce a useful result than a standard order.
Defense Expert Consultants and the Defense Team
An accused is entitled to expert assistance at government expense on a showing of necessity. Under United States v. Gonzalez (1994), the defense must show why the expert is needed, what the expert would accomplish, and why defense counsel cannot develop the evidence themselves; later decisions require a reasonable probability that the expert would assist the defense and that denial would result in a fundamentally unfair trial (United States v. Bresnahan, 2005; United States v. Lloyd, 2010). A request to the convening authority, and if denied to the military judge, proceeds under R.C.M. 703(d). A general statement that the accused may be autistic is unlikely to meet that standard; a request supported by specific history, school or medical records, observations by counsel, and the issues the expert would address is more likely to.
Confidentiality depends on structure. Communications between the accused and a consultant who has been made part of the defense team can be protected as communications through a representative of the lawyer under Military Rule of Evidence 502. In United States v. Toledo (1987), the Court of Military Appeals held that no attorney-client privilege attached to communications with a government psychiatrist whom the defense had approached without a proper appointment, and it stated that communications with an expert the defense had retained at its own expense would have fallen within the attorney-client relationship, at least absent a mental-responsibility defense. The psychotherapist–patient privilege of Military Rule of Evidence 513 protects communications made for diagnosis or treatment and is subject to enumerated exceptions, including one that applies when the accused offers evidence of his mental condition; it is not designed to protect a forensic evaluation conducted for litigation. The consequences of getting the structure wrong are illustrated by United States v. Paaluhi (2000). Defense counsel arranged for the accused to speak with a Navy psychologist who had not been assigned to the defense team, the psychologist later testified for the government about the accused’s admissions, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that counsel’s mistaken belief about privilege was deficient performance, found prejudice, and set aside the findings and sentence.
Two roles should also be kept distinct. A consultant who reviews the evidence, advises counsel, and helps prepare cross-examination performs a different function from an evaluator who examines the accused and testifies. Gottlieb and Younggren (2019) addressed the role conflicts that arise when one psychologist is asked to both consult and evaluate. Under R.C.M. 701(b)(4), once the defense has requested and received discovery, reports of mental examinations that the defense intends to introduce, or that were prepared by a witness the defense intends to call and relate to that witness’s testimony, must be disclosed, and an expert who testifies can be cross-examined about the basis of the opinions offered. Counsel and the expert should decide before any examination which role the expert will play and how the work will be documented.
Tele-Forensic Evaluation
Remote evaluation by secure videoconference is now an established part of forensic practice, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic but no longer tied to it. The telepsychology guidelines adopted by the American Psychological Association (Joint Task Force for the Development of Telepsychology Guidelines for Psychologists, 2013) and the specialty guidelines for forensic psychology (American Psychological Association, 2013) apply to remote forensic work, and the American Psychology-Law Society issued recommendations addressing assessment in forensic and correctional settings (Batastini et al., 2023). Commentators have proposed criteria for deciding which tests and measures can reasonably be administered remotely in forensic evaluations, emphasizing whether a measure has been studied in remote administration and whether the conditions of administration can be controlled and documented (Heilbrun, 2022).
Autism assessment raises particular issues. Research on telehealth diagnosis of autism has been promising but mostly involves children: a scoping review found ten studies, with agreement between telehealth and in-person diagnosis between 80% and 91% in the studies reporting it, and called for larger multisite studies (Stavropoulos et al., 2022). A later systematic review of 18 studies (1,593 children) found diagnostic agreement of 80% to 88.2% between telehealth and in-person assessment, but noted that for almost one in five children a diagnosis was either given incorrectly or missed (Katakis et al., 2025). For adults, a 2026 study of a structured telehealth assessment protocol in 100 adults found 86% agreement between the original clinicians and a blinded expert reviewer; the authors noted that the reviewer relied on largely the same information and that the study did not establish diagnostic accuracy (Crehan et al., 2026). The standard observational measure, the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Second Edition, was developed for in-person administration, and remote adaptations should be described as such.
In a court-martial, remote methods are best suited to developmental-history interviews with distant family members and to record review, and less suited to observation-dependent tasks unless their limits are acknowledged. The examinee’s location matters: a remote interview should take place in a private room on the installation or at defense counsel’s office, without command personnel present, with the identity of everyone present documented. Interview adaptations for autistic examinees, such as concrete questions, breaks, and checks for understanding, are harder to manage remotely and should be planned. An evaluator should also confirm the professional licensing requirements that apply where the examinee is located. A report should state which components were conducted remotely and how that affects confidence in the findings.
Sentencing After December 27, 2023
For offenses committed after December 27, 2023, the Offices of Special Trial Counsel have exclusive authority over the disposition of covered offenses, which include the Article 134 child pornography offense, and the military judge determines the sentence in non-capital cases using sentencing parameters established by Executive Order 14103. In practice this means that autism evidence offered in mitigation is now presented to a military judge, who must consider the parameter for each offense and explain a sentence outside it, rather than to members. The Article 134 offense carries maximum confinement of 10 years for possessing, receiving, or viewing; 15 years for possessing with intent to distribute; 20 years for distributing; and 30 years for producing.
Presentencing evidence under R.C.M. 1001 may address mitigation and rehabilitative potential, and the rules of evidence may be relaxed for defense mitigation evidence. Risk evidence for autistic accused is subject to the same limits discussed in “Risk Assessment for Autistic Men Charged with CSAM Offenses” in this resource: no recidivism data exist for autistic CSAM offenders, several items on standard instruments overlap with autistic traits, and favorable risk findings cannot by themselves justify a sentence that does not account for the seriousness of the offense. The civilian appellate decisions in United States v. Zuk (4th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Crosby (10th Cir. 2024), both vacating sentences that rested almost entirely on autism, are not binding in courts-martial but illustrate how reviewing courts evaluate such records.
What a Useful Evaluation Addresses
Whether conducted by a board, a defense expert, or a government expert, a useful evaluation addresses the questions the case actually presents. It establishes or rules out the diagnosis using informant history, records, structured observation, and testing by an evaluator experienced with autistic adults. It examines how, if at all, autistic traits relate to the charged conduct, using the digital evidence: what was searched for, kept, organized, shared, concealed, or deleted, and whether there is evidence of sexual interest in children apart from the charged files. Steel (2016), a practitioner framework rather than an empirical test, argued that selective concealment, such as encrypting, privately browsing for, or renaming only the illicit material, bears on awareness that the conduct is wrong, though it is not decisive alone (Digital Forensics section). It considers whether the accused’s statements to investigators were affected by literal interpretation, a wish to end an uncomfortable encounter, or difficulty with the interview format. It identifies accommodations that would allow him to participate effectively at trial. And, where sentencing is at issue, it addresses risk, treatment needs, and supervision with the cautions described above.
Limits of the Evidence
Almost no research addresses autism in military populations or in courts-martial specifically, and none addresses autistic service members charged with CSAM offenses. The general literature on autism and online sexual offending consists of reviews, case analyses, and small qualitative studies. Research on remote autism diagnosis is promising but limited, involves mostly children, and has not been tested in forensic settings. Group findings cannot by themselves establish anything about an individual accused. No test determines whether a particular service member knew what he possessed, intended to distribute it, or will reoffend; those questions turn on the evidence in the case and the evaluation of the individual.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When telehealth agreement figures of 80% to 91% (Stavropoulos et al., 2022) are offered to support a remote evaluation of a service member, ask who was studied, since most participants were children, and what the figures mean in absolute terms: a later review of 18 studies found that for almost one in five children a diagnosis was given incorrectly or missed (Katakis et al., 2025). When 86% agreement in 100 adults (Crehan et al., 2026) is cited, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since the reviewer relied on largely the same information and the study did not establish diagnostic accuracy. When an R.C.M. 706 board’s report that records no autism diagnosis is offered to show that the accused is not autistic, ask what exactly was counted, since a board that did not screen for autism may record none because none was considered. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Autism Evaluations and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and under Military Rule of Evidence 1102 the December 1, 2023 federal amendment became part of the military rule in 2025: the proponent of expert testimony must show the military judge that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met, so gaps in the basis of an autism opinion are questions of admissibility rather than weight (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) apply to clinical and behavioral expertise. Lack of mental responsibility under Article 50a requires a severe mental disease or defect that made the accused unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts, a standard autism alone rarely meets. Under R.C.M. 916(k)(2), a mental condition short of lack of mental responsibility is not an affirmative defense, but Ellis v. Jacob (1988) held that Article 50a does not bar evidence that the accused lacked a specific intent required for the offense, and the Discussion to R.C.M. 916(k)(2) states that such evidence may be admissible as to whether the accused entertained a state of mind necessary to be proven as an element of the offense. Whether and how such evidence may address the knowledge elements of the Article 134 offense, which the Manual explains may be proved by circumstantial evidence such as file names and search terms, is a question for the military judge in each case.
The rules governing evaluations are R.C.M. 706 (sanity boards), Military Rule of Evidence 302 (protection of statements to the board), Military Rule of Evidence 502 (lawyer–client privilege, including representatives of the lawyer), Military Rule of Evidence 513 (psychotherapist–patient privilege and its exceptions), R.C.M. 703(d) (expert assistance), R.C.M. 701(b)(2) (defense notice before trial of intended expert testimony on the accused’s mental condition, paralleling Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(b)), and R.C.M. 701(b)(4) (defense disclosure of examination reports). Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) supplies the constitutional backdrop for expert assistance when an accused’s mental condition is a significant factor. Executive Order 14103 implemented the Offices of Special Trial Counsel and the sentencing parameters for offenses committed after December 27, 2023.
Arizona
Arizona hosts Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps installations, and service members stationed there may face prosecution in state court as well as by court-martial for off-installation conduct. In state court, Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004), competency is governed by Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and sexual exploitation of a minor under A.R.S. § 13-3553 is sentenced under the dangerous-crimes-against-children provisions of A.R.S. § 13-705. Arizona law differs from military law on mental-state evidence: under State v. Mott (1997) and Clark v. Arizona (2006), Arizona does not allow expert evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the mental-state element, and the scope of evidence about behavioral tendencies is for counsel and the court, whereas Ellis v. Jacob permits evidence of a mental condition in courts-martial on specific intent. An evaluation prepared for one forum may therefore be usable for different purposes, or not at all, in the other.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research and the rules support testing a late-raised autism diagnosis through the methods that establish it: developmental history from informants, records, structured observation, and an evaluator experienced with adults. Special trial counsel are often best positioned to ensure that a government expert or an R.C.M. 706 board has the qualifications and the records needed to address autism, that a defense diagnosis based on a screening measure or self-report alone is examined, and that the digital evidence of search terms, organization, concealment, and selective deletion is before any evaluator who offers an opinion about awareness or intent. Supporting reasonable accommodations at trial and sentencing, and making a record of them, protects a conviction and sentence on appeal.
The research also counsels caution. A board’s finding of no severe mental disease or defect does not mean the accused is not autistic or that autism is irrelevant to sentencing, and a limited report that records no autism diagnosis may reflect that none was considered. Remote components of a defense evaluation are a proper subject of cross-examination but are not by themselves a reason to discount it, since remote methods are an accepted part of forensic practice when their limits are stated. Atypical demeanor, flat affect, or literal answers should not be presented as evidence of callousness or deception without an evaluator’s explanation of how they relate to autism.
Special Issues for Defense
The research and the rules support early, well-documented requests for expert assistance that identify the specific history suggesting autism and the issues an expert would address, and careful attention to how the expert joins the defense team so that the accused’s communications are protected. Defense counsel are often best positioned to tailor an R.C.M. 706 request to autism questions, to obtain informant history from family members wherever they live, and to decide early whether an expert will consult, evaluate, testify, or some combination, with the disclosure consequences of each understood in advance. Paaluhi shows that a mistake in structure can expose the accused’s own statements to the government.
The research also counsels caution. Autism evidence rarely supports a lack of mental responsibility, and opinions that the accused could not have known what he possessed are vulnerable where the digital evidence shows searching, organization, or concealment. Remote evaluation is acceptable, but a report that does not state which components were remote, and why the findings remain reliable, invites challenge under the amended Rule 702. At sentencing before a military judge, autism evidence should acknowledge the harm to the children depicted, present risk findings with their limits, and be tied to a concrete plan for treatment and supervision rather than resting on the diagnosis alone.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
American Psychological Association. (2013). Specialty guidelines for forensic psychology. American Psychologist, 68(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029889
Batastini, A. B., Guyton, M. R., Bernhard, P. A., Folk, J. B., Knuth, S. B., Kohutis, E. A., Lugo, A., Stanfill, M. L., & Tussey, C. M. (2023). Recommendations for the use of telepsychology in psychology-law practice and research: A statement by American Psychology-Law Society (APA Division 41). Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 29(3), 255–271. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000394
Crehan, E., Whaling, K., Jones, H., Shinall, J., & Loftin, R. (2026). Diagnostic agreement of a structured telehealth adult autism assessment. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-026-07571-2
Department of Defense. (2018). Medical standards for military service: Appointment, enlistment, or induction (DoD Instruction 6130.03, Vol. 1; incorporating Change 6, February 3, 2026). https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/613003_vol1.pdf
Gottlieb, M. C., & Younggren, J. N. (2019). Addressing potential role conflicts in military courts-martial. In C. T. Stein & J. N. Younggren (Eds.), Forensic psychology in military courts (pp. 91–102). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0000141-006
Heilbrun, K. (2022). Psychological testing in forensic contexts conducted remotely. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 50(4), 529–532. https://doi.org/10.29158/JAAPL.220083-22
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Joint Task Force for the Development of Telepsychology Guidelines for Psychologists. (2013). Guidelines for the practice of telepsychology. American Psychologist, 68(9), 791–800. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035001
Katakis, P., Lockwood Estrin, G., Wolstencroft, J., Sayani, S., Buckley, E., Mirzaei, V., Heys, M., & Skuse, D. (2025). Diagnostic assessment of autism in children using telehealth in a global context: A systematic review. Review Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 12, 566–581. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40489-023-00408-z
Stavropoulos, K. K., Bolourian, Y., & Blacher, J. (2022). A scoping review of telehealth diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder. PLOS ONE, 17(2), Article e0263062. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0263062
Steel, C. (2016). The Asperger’s defence in digital child pornography investigations. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 23(3), 473–482. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2015.1080150
Stein, C. T., & Younggren, J. N. (Eds.). (2019). Forensic psychology in military courts. American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/0000141-000
Legal Authorities
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90 (C.M.A. 1988).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
United States v. Bresnahan, 62 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
United States v. Crosby, 119 F.4th 1239 (10th Cir. 2024).
United States v. English, 47 M.J. 215 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
United States v. Gonzalez, 39 M.J. 459 (C.M.A. 1994).
United States v. Lloyd, 69 M.J. 95 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
United States v. Paaluhi, 54 M.J. 181 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
United States v. Toledo, 25 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1987), aff’d on reconsideration, 26 M.J. 104 (C.M.A. 1988).
United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398 (4th Cir. 2017).
10 U.S.C. § 850a (Article 50a, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 880 (Article 80, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 934 (Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3553.
Exec. Order No. 14103, 88 Fed. Reg. 50535 (July 28, 2023).
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 302.
Mil. R. Evid. 502.
Mil. R. Evid. 513.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Rule for Courts-Martial 701(b)(2), (b)(4).
Rule for Courts-Martial 703(d).
Rule for Courts-Martial 706.
Rule for Courts-Martial 916(k).
Rule for Courts-Martial 1001.
Related topic papers: Screening and Diagnosing Autism in an Adult Defendant · Risk Assessment for Autistic Men Charged with CSAM Offenses · Police Interviews, Miranda, Compliance, and Suggestibility in Autism · Competency, Effective Participation, and Accommodations · Knowledge and Intent in Online Cases Involving Autistic Defendants
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · False Confessions: Suggestibility