Snap Shot
- The question: What does an autism diagnosis in an adult mean under current criteria, and what does it not mean?
- What the research shows: DSM-5-TR requires all three social-communication features plus at least two restricted or repetitive features, present from early development; “Asperger’s” is no longer a separate diagnosis. Many adults, especially women and those who mask, reach adulthood undiagnosed, and co-occurring conditions such as ADHD, anxiety, and depression are common and can mimic or obscure autism.
- What it does not show: Research has not shown autistic people to be more or less likely to commit sexual offenses. Claims that autistic people lack empathy, do not want relationships, or are “children inside” are not supported. No diagnosis tells a court what a person knew or intended, and group findings cannot decide an individual case.
- The law: Amended Rule 702 puts the burden on the proponent; Rule 704(b) reserves the mental-state inference for the fact-finder. Ellis v. Jacob permits mental-condition evidence on specific intent in courts-martial, while Mott and Clark bar such expert evidence to negate mens rea in Arizona. Zuk and Crosby limit reliance on autism at sentencing.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors may challenge diagnoses that skip criteria, rest on self-report, or ignore co-occurring conditions, but should not treat apparent social fluency or a late diagnosis by itself as a sign of feigning, or flat affect as evasiveness; defense counsel should build the diagnosis on independent developmental history and avoid overclaiming what it shows about knowledge or intent.
Autism reaches the courtroom most often through adults who were never diagnosed as children, or whose diagnosis surfaces only after an arrest. An autism diagnosis may be raised to explain a defendant’s statements to police, demeanor in court, understanding of the law, or conduct online; it may bear on competency, accommodations, and sentencing; and it may describe a complainant or witness whose way of communicating differs from what investigators and jurors expect. In each setting the parties need an accurate picture of what the diagnosis means and does not mean.
Much of what lawyers have read about autism is out of date. Older materials treat “Asperger’s syndrome” as a current diagnosis, rely on superseded criteria, and repeat generalizations (that autistic people lack empathy, do not want relationships, or are “children inside”) that current research does not support. Others treat the diagnosis as if it settled questions of intent or risk.
This paper is the starting point for the hub. It summarizes the current diagnostic frameworks, the history of the Asperger’s category, adult prevalence, late diagnosis and masking, co-occurring conditions, and the terminology used on these pages; addresses common misunderstandings; states the principles that govern every paper in the hub; and outlines how a diagnosis enters federal, military, and Arizona proceedings.
Current Diagnostic Criteria
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2022), defines autism spectrum disorder (ASD) by two groups of features. The first is persistent difficulty with social communication and social interaction across settings, shown in three areas: the back-and-forth of social and emotional exchange; the nonverbal behavior used in communication, such as eye contact, gesture, and facial expression; and developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships. The second is restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities, shown in at least two of four ways: repetitive movements, use of objects, or speech; insistence on sameness and inflexible routines; intensely focused interests that are unusual in strength or focus; and unusually high or low reactivity to sensory input. The features must be present from the early developmental period, although they may not become fully apparent until social demands exceed the person’s capacities, or may be obscured later in life by learned strategies. They must cause clinically significant impairment and must not be better explained by intellectual disability alone.
The 2022 text revision clarified the wording of the social-communication criterion so that all three social-communication features are required (American Psychiatric Association, 2022); evaluators should document each. A report that finds only some of the social-communication features may not support the diagnosis under the current standard. The diagnosis is coded F84.0 (ICD-10-CM), replacing the older code 299.00.
Instead of subtypes, the DSM-5-TR uses specifiers, including whether the condition occurs with or without intellectual impairment and with or without language impairment, and whether it is associated with a known genetic or medical condition or with another neurodevelopmental, mental, or behavioral condition. Clinicians also rate current support needs at one of three levels, separately for each of the two domains. The levels describe present support needs, not intelligence; they can change over time, and the manual cautions against using them to determine eligibility for services.
The World Health Organization’s ICD-11, in effect since January 2022, uses code 6A02. Its description parallels the DSM-5-TR, and its subcategories turn on whether a disorder of intellectual development is present and the degree of impairment in functional language (World Health Organization, 2022). Neither manual permits diagnosis from a test score or checklist alone; diagnosis rests on clinical judgment integrating developmental history, current presentation, and, ideally, information from people who knew the person as a child. Methods for adult defendants are addressed in the hub paper on screening and diagnosis.
From Asperger’s Disorder to Autism Spectrum Disorder
The Austrian pediatrician Hans Asperger described children with marked social difficulties and intense interests in the late 1930s and 1940s. His work was little known in English until Lorna Wing’s 1981 clinical account introduced the label “Asperger’s syndrome” (Wing, 1981), and the DSM-IV (1994) listed Asperger’s disorder as a separate diagnosis. In 2013 the DSM-5 merged autistic disorder, Asperger’s disorder, and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified into autism spectrum disorder, reflecting evidence that the subtypes could not be reliably distinguished. The DSM-5 and DSM-5-TR direct that a person with a well-established DSM-IV diagnosis of Asperger’s disorder be given the ASD diagnosis, and ICD-11 has no separate Asperger category.
Archival research has documented that Asperger accommodated himself to the National Socialist regime in Vienna and cooperated with its child “euthanasia” program, and the author of that research urged that any future use of the eponym reflect that history (Czech, 2018). The term persists in older case law and practice materials, and some adults diagnosed before 2013 still identify with it. When an older record uses it, it describes what is now autism without accompanying intellectual or language impairment. The informal labels “high-functioning” and “low-functioning” have no diagnostic status; a person with strong verbal or academic skills may still have substantial difficulty with daily living, employment, or social judgment.
How Common Is Autism in Adults?
The standard U.S. adult estimate comes from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Using simulation and statistical modeling, Dietz et al. (2020) estimated that about 2.21% of U.S. adults aged 18 and older, roughly 5.4 million people in 2017, had ASD, whether diagnosed or not, with state estimates ranging from about 2.0% to 2.4%. The estimate is a model projection, not a count of diagnosed adults.
Childhood surveillance figures are higher and have risen over time. The CDC’s Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring Network reported that among 8-year-olds at 16 U.S. sites in 2022, about 32 per 1,000, or 1 in 31, had been identified with ASD; boys were identified about 3.4 times as often as girls, and about 40% of children with cognitive data available had an intellectual disability (Shaw et al., 2025). Broader diagnostic criteria, the spectrum concept, and increased awareness account for much of the rise (Lai & Baron-Cohen, 2015); whether any true increase has also occurred remains debated.
A meta-analysis of 54 prevalence studies found that the commonly cited 4:1 male-to-female ratio narrows to about 3:1 in high-quality studies that screen whole populations, and concluded that girls who meet criteria are at disproportionate risk of not being diagnosed (Loomes et al., 2017). A substantial number of adults of both sexes, and especially women, reach adulthood without a diagnosis.
Late Diagnosis, Masking, and Differential Diagnosis
Many adults now receiving a first diagnosis grew up before the spectrum concept was recognized or were given other diagnoses. Reviews describe practical, developmental, and clinical obstacles to diagnosing this “lost generation”: no parent may be available to give a developmental history; the adult may have learned compensating strategies; and co-occurring conditions such as anxiety, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and personality disorders can both mimic and obscure autism (Lai & Baron-Cohen, 2015). A scoping review found that the pathway to adult assessment is inconsistent and that research comparing early- and late-diagnosed adults is sparse (Huang et al., 2020).
“Camouflaging” or “masking” refers to strategies some autistic people use to hide or compensate for autistic characteristics in social settings. In a qualitative study of 92 autistic adults, participants described masking and compensation techniques motivated by wanting to fit in, with exhaustion and strain on self-perception as consequences (Hull et al., 2017). Masking can explain why an adult was never identified and presents better in a brief interview than in daily life; it also means that a short observation is not a reliable basis for ruling the condition in or out.
Late diagnosis also raises the opposite problem. Social anxiety disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), schizoid or schizotypal personality traits, social (pragmatic) communication disorder, the effects of trauma or neglect, and intellectual disability can each produce features that overlap with autism. A first diagnosis made after an arrest does not by itself show opportunism, but it requires the evaluator to reconstruct childhood from records and informants that predate the charges, with attention to alternative explanations; where such records do not exist, the evaluator should say so and say how confident the diagnosis can be.
Co-occurring Conditions
Autism frequently occurs alongside other conditions. A meta-analysis of 96 studies using confirmed clinical diagnoses estimated pooled prevalences in autistic people of about 28% for ADHD, 20% for anxiety disorders, 11% to 12% for depressive disorders, 9% for obsessive-compulsive disorder, 5% for bipolar disorders, and 4% for schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, with higher estimates in clinical samples and very large variation across studies (Lai et al., 2019). A meta-analysis limited to adults put current prevalence at about 27% for anxiety disorders and 23% for depression, and lifetime prevalence at 42% and 37% (Hollocks et al., 2019).
A co-occurring condition may account for conduct attributed to autism, or vice versa. In a Swedish population cohort of nearly 296,000 people followed from age 15 to 27, people with autism initially appeared to have a modestly higher rate of violent-crime convictions, but after co-occurring ADHD and conduct disorder were taken into account the rate was no longer elevated and was slightly lower than in the comparison population; better school performance and intellectual disability appeared protective (Heeramun et al., 2017). An evaluation that addresses autism without screening for co-occurring conditions is incomplete.
Terminology Used in This Hub
There is no consensus on how to describe autism. In a survey of 3,470 members of the U.K. autism community, the terms “autism” and “on the autism spectrum” were broadly accepted, but autistic adults and families more often endorsed “autistic,” while professionals more often used “person with autism” (Kenny et al., 2016). Many autistic adults prefer identity-first language because they regard autism as integral to who they are, and researchers have urged the field to avoid terms that frame autistic traits only as deficits (Bottema-Beutel et al., 2021). Statutes, opinions, and the diagnostic manuals use “autism spectrum disorder” and person-first phrasing.
This hub uses “autistic person” and “person with autism” interchangeably, “autism spectrum disorder” for the diagnosis as defined in the manuals, and “Asperger’s” only historically, and it avoids “high-functioning,” “mind-blindness,” and similar shorthand. It uses “child sexual abuse material (CSAM)” in describing research, and the statutory term “child pornography” when discussing statutes and cases that use it.
Common Misunderstandings
Several generalizations recur in older practice materials and courtroom argument. Each contains a partial truth that misleads when applied to an individual.
The first is that autistic people “lack empathy.” Research distinguishes recognizing what another person thinks or feels from caring about another person’s distress. Reviewers have concluded that difficulty with the first is common in autism but is not indifference, and that difficulty identifying one’s own emotions (alexithymia), present in some but not all autistic people, may account for much of the supposed empathy deficit (Fletcher-Watson & Bird, 2020). Researchers have also proposed that misunderstanding between autistic and non-autistic people runs in both directions, a view described as the “double empathy problem” (Milton, 2012). A flat or unusual emotional presentation is therefore weak evidence of callousness, but autism does not exclude genuine indifference in a particular person.
The second is that autistic people do not want social or romantic relationships. Research does not support this as a generalization. Most autistic adolescents and adults report sexual interest, and in a study of 675 autistic adolescents and adults about half were in a relationship (Dewinter et al., 2017), although many have less opportunity and less social learning than their peers.
The third is that an autistic adult is emotionally or socially “a child.” Autistic adults may have uneven profiles, and some relate more easily to younger people, but an uneven profile is not a child’s mind. The generalization misleads in both directions: it can minimize conduct, and it can invite assumptions about sexual interest in children that the evidence in a case does not support.
The fourth is that research shows autistic people either are or are not more likely to offend. A systematic review concluded that people with autism do not appear to be disproportionately over-represented in the criminal justice system, while noting varied methods and unrepresentative samples (King & Murphy, 2014). Reviews specific to sexual offending have found that the studies are few and that the evidence of over-representation is inconclusive (Allely & Creaby-Attwood, 2016); a 2024 systematic review located only 19 relevant publications, 12 of them case reports, and called for more rigorous designs (Margari et al., 2024). The accurate statement is that research has not shown autistic people to be more or less likely to commit sexual offenses.
Core Principles for This Hub
Three principles govern every paper in this hub. First, a diagnosis opens questions; it does not answer them. Autism may bear on what a person understood, intended, or could do, and on what response will be effective, but each of those questions must be examined in the individual case through history, informants, testing, and the evidence itself. Second, group research cannot decide an individual case. Studies describe average differences between groups, often in small or unrepresentative samples, and they cannot establish that a particular defendant did or did not know, intend, or present a risk. Third, the harm at issue is real. Sexual abuse of children, including the abuse recorded in CSAM, causes serious and lasting harm to the children involved; autism and sexual interest in children can co-occur; and an autism diagnosis is not a defense to a criminal charge.
Limits of the Evidence
The research summarized here has important limitations. Adult prevalence estimates are modeled from childhood data rather than counted directly. Research samples are skewed: a review of all original research published in 2016 in leading autism journals estimated that about 94% of autistic participants did not have intellectual disability, although global estimates suggest that about half of autistic people do (Russell et al., 2019). Studies of camouflaging and late diagnosis rely heavily on self-report from people who sought a diagnosis, co-occurrence estimates vary widely with sample source, and adults diagnosed in childhood may differ from adults first identified after arrest.
No study can tell a court whether a particular person has autism without a competent individual evaluation, and no diagnosis can tell a court what that person knew or intended on a particular occasion. The weight of a post-charge diagnosis depends on how much the evaluator relied on the defendant’s own account, the independent history available, and attention to differential diagnosis. Conversely, the absence of a childhood diagnosis is weak evidence against autism in an adult who grew up before current criteria or who masked effectively.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a witness cites the estimate that about 2.21% of U.S. adults have autism (Dietz et al., 2020), counsel can ask what exactly was counted: the figure is a model projection, not a count of diagnosed adults. When the Swedish cohort finding on violent-crime convictions (Heeramun et al., 2017) is offered by either side, the question is who was compared with whom, since the initial difference disappeared once co-occurring ADHD and conduct disorder were taken into account. When masking is offered to explain why a defendant presents well in a brief interview, it is fair to ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, because the study of 92 adults (Hull et al., 2017) was qualitative. When a party argues either that the absence of a childhood diagnosis shows the condition is feigned or that a diagnosis explains what the defendant knew, the question is whether group research applies to this person, given that adults first identified after arrest may differ from those diagnosed in childhood and that samples are skewed toward participants without intellectual disability (Russell et al., 2019). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Autism and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), the trial court must determine that expert testimony on autism, like other clinical testimony, is relevant and reliable. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data and that the opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts. In autism cases, the amendment focuses attention on whether the evaluator obtained developmental history, used appropriate instruments, and considered alternative explanations, and on whether opinions linking the diagnosis to specific conduct rest on case data rather than general literature. Rule 704(b) bars an expert from stating whether the defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the offense; an expert may describe the condition and its typical effects, but the inference about knowledge or intent belongs to the trier of fact. The Military Rules of Evidence have no counterpart to Rule 704(b); in courts-martial, comparable limits come from the prohibition on “human lie detector” testimony and from Military Rules of Evidence 401–403. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2025 amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence incorporated the 2023 federal amendment (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, amendments to the Federal Rules generally apply in courts-martial after eighteen months unless the President directs otherwise.
In courts-martial, a mental condition short of lack of mental responsibility is not an affirmative defense (R.C.M. 916(k)(2)), but Ellis v. Jacob (1988) held that Article 50a, UCMJ, does not bar evidence of a mental condition relevant to specific intent, and the Discussion to R.C.M. 916(k)(2) states that such evidence may be admissible as to any state of mind necessary to be proven as an element of the offense; federal courts generally permit such evidence on specific-intent elements as well. Competency is governed by Dusky v. United States (1960), which asks whether the accused can consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings; military inquiries proceed under R.C.M. 706 and 909. At sentencing in federal court, autism is now considered principally under the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Zuk (2017) and United States v. Crosby (2024) vacated sentences that relied heavily on autism; Crosby accepted a finding that the offense was related to the defendant’s untreated autism but held that the court also had to address just punishment, deterrence, disparities, and the Guidelines range. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, bars public entities from excluding qualified individuals with disabilities from their programs, and Tennessee v. Lane (2004) upheld its application to access to the courts; these provisions underlie the accommodation requests discussed in the hub paper on competency.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024 (Order R-23-0004) to conform to the 2023 federal amendment. Arizona differs from federal and military practice on mental-state evidence. Under State v. Mott (1997) and Clark v. Arizona (2006), Arizona does not allow expert evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity to negate the mental-state element; the scope of evidence about behavioral tendencies is for counsel and the court. In Clark, the United States Supreme Court upheld that approach, distinguishing expert evidence of mental disease and capacity, which Arizona may channel to the insanity defense, from “observation evidence” of the defendant’s behavior, which may bear on mens rea. An Arizona defendant therefore generally cannot offer expert testimony that autism prevented the formation of knowledge or intent, although autism evidence remains relevant to competency under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the voluntariness of statements, and sentencing. At sentencing, A.R.S. § 13-701(E)(2) lists as a mitigating circumstance that the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform it to the law was significantly impaired but not so impaired as to constitute a defense; mandatory sentencing for dangerous crimes against children narrows that discretion considerably.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several points prosecutors can use. A diagnosis that does not document all three social-communication features, rests mainly on the defendant’s self-report, or ignores co-occurring conditions such as ADHD and conduct disorder is open to challenge under the amended Rule 702. Research does not show that autistic people are more or less likely to offend, and the appellate decisions in Zuk and Crosby confirm that a diagnosis, even one linked to the offense, does not displace the other purposes of sentencing. In Arizona, Mott and Clark limit expert testimony offered to negate mens rea. Prosecutors are also well positioned to see that genuine needs are addressed early, through competency screening and reasonable accommodations, which protects statements, pleas, and verdicts on appeal.
The research also counsels caution. Masking and late diagnosis are well documented, so a defendant’s apparent social fluency, the absence of a childhood diagnosis, or a diagnosis first made after arrest does not by itself show that the condition is feigned or irrelevant. Flat affect, unusual eye contact, and literal answers are features of the condition and are weak evidence of evasiveness or lack of remorse. Arguments framed around stereotypes, whether that autistic people are uncaring or that they are childlike, are not supported by current research and invite error.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports presenting autism as a well-characterized neurodevelopmental condition that can affect communication and social understanding and is frequently missed in adults, particularly women and people who mask. Defense counsel are often best positioned to obtain the history that makes a diagnosis reliable: school, medical, and employment records predating the charges, and interviews with family members and others who knew the client as a child. An evaluation that documents each criterion, addresses co-occurring conditions and alternatives, and describes which specific autism-related features, if any, are consistent with the conduct, without asserting that they explain it, is better supported under Rule 702 than a general description of autism.
The research also counsels caution about overclaiming. Group findings cannot establish what a particular client knew or intended, Rule 704(b) and, in Arizona, Mott and Clark limit how far an expert may go, and Zuk and Crosby show that a sentencing presentation built on the diagnosis alone is vulnerable on appeal. Older materials that describe autistic adults as lacking empathy, uninterested in relationships, or “children inside” are inaccurate and can be turned against the client. The most durable presentation treats the diagnosis as the start of an individualized inquiry rather than its conclusion.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Allely, C. S., & Creaby-Attwood, A. (2016). Sexual offending and autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities and Offending Behaviour, 7(1), 35–51. https://doi.org/10.1108/JIDOB-09-2015-0029
American Psychiatric Association. (2022). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed., text rev.). https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425787
Bottema-Beutel, K., Kapp, S. K., Lester, J. N., Sasson, N. J., & Hand, B. N. (2021). Avoiding ableist language: Suggestions for autism researchers. Autism in Adulthood, 3(1), 18–29. https://doi.org/10.1089/aut.2020.0014
Czech, H. (2018). Hans Asperger, National Socialism, and “race hygiene” in Nazi-era Vienna. Molecular Autism, 9, Article 29. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13229-018-0208-6
Dewinter, J., De Graaf, H., & Begeer, S. (2017). Sexual orientation, gender identity, and romantic relationships in adolescents and adults with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 47(9), 2927–2934. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-017-3199-9
Dietz, P. M., Rose, C. E., McArthur, D., & Maenner, M. (2020). National and state estimates of adults with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 50(12), 4258–4266. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-020-04494-4
Fletcher-Watson, S., & Bird, G. (2020). Autism and empathy: What are the real links? Autism, 24(1), 3–6. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361319883506
Heeramun, R., Magnusson, C., Gumpert, C. H., Granath, S., Lundberg, M., Dalman, C., & Rai, D. (2017). Autism and convictions for violent crimes: Population-based cohort study in Sweden. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 56(6), 491–497.e2. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2017.03.011
Hollocks, M. J., Lerh, J. W., Magiati, I., Meiser-Stedman, R., & Brugha, T. S. (2019). Anxiety and depression in adults with autism spectrum disorder: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Psychological Medicine, 49(4), 559–572. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291718002283
Huang, Y., Arnold, S. R. C., Foley, K.-R., & Trollor, J. N. (2020). Diagnosis of autism in adulthood: A scoping review. Autism, 24(6), 1311–1327. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361320903128
Hull, L., Petrides, K. V., Allison, C., Smith, P., Baron-Cohen, S., Lai, M.-C., & Mandy, W. (2017). “Putting on my best normal”: Social camouflaging in adults with autism spectrum conditions. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 47(8), 2519–2534. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-017-3166-5
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Kenny, L., Hattersley, C., Molins, B., Buckley, C., Povey, C., & Pellicano, E. (2016). Which terms should be used to describe autism? Perspectives from the UK autism community. Autism, 20(4), 442–462. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361315588200
King, C., & Murphy, G. H. (2014). A systematic review of people with autism spectrum disorder and the criminal justice system. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 44(11), 2717–2733. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-014-2046-5
Lai, M.-C., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2015). Identifying the lost generation of adults with autism spectrum conditions. The Lancet Psychiatry, 2(11), 1013–1027. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(15)00277-1
Lai, M.-C., Kassee, C., Besney, R., Bonato, S., Hull, L., Mandy, W., Szatmari, P., & Ameis, S. H. (2019). Prevalence of co-occurring mental health diagnoses in the autism population: A systematic review and meta-analysis. The Lancet Psychiatry, 6(10), 819–829. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(19)30289-5
Loomes, R., Hull, L., & Mandy, W. P. L. (2017). What is the male-to-female ratio in autism spectrum disorder? A systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 56(6), 466–474. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2017.03.013
Margari, A., De Agazio, G., Marzulli, L., Piarulli, F. M., Mandarelli, G., Catanesi, R., Carabellese, F. F., & Cortese, S. (2024). Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and sexual offending: A systematic review. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 162, Article 105687. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105687
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Russell, G., Mandy, W., Elliott, D., White, R., Pittwood, T., & Ford, T. (2019). Selection bias on intellectual ability in autism research: A cross-sectional review and meta-analysis. Molecular Autism, 10, Article 9. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13229-019-0260-x
Shaw, K. A., Williams, S., Patrick, M. E., Valencia-Prado, M., Durkin, M. S., Howerton, E. M., Ladd-Acosta, C. M., Pas, E. T., Bakian, A. V., Bartholomew, P., Nieves-Muñoz, N., Sidwell, K., Alford, A., Bilder, D. A., DiRienzo, M., Fitzgerald, R. T., Furnier, S. M., Hudson, A. E., Pokoski, O. M., . . . Maenner, M. J. (2025). Prevalence and early identification of autism spectrum disorder among children aged 4 and 8 years — Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring Network, 16 sites, United States, 2022. MMWR Surveillance Summaries, 74(2), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.ss7402a1
Wing, L. (1981). Asperger’s syndrome: A clinical account. Psychological Medicine, 11(1), 115–129. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291700053332
World Health Organization. (2022). International classification of diseases for mortality and morbidity statistics (11th rev.), 6A02 Autism spectrum disorder. https://icd.who.int/
Legal Authorities
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90 (C.M.A. 1988).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
United States v. Crosby, 119 F.4th 1239 (10th Cir. 2024).
United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398 (4th Cir. 2017).
10 U.S.C. § 850a (Article 50a, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-701(E).
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).
Ariz. R. Evid. 702 (as amended by Order No. R-23-0004, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
R.C.M. 706.
R.C.M. 909.
R.C.M. 916(k).
Related topic papers: Sexual Development, Sexual Knowledge, and Victimization in Autism · Autism and Online Sexual Offending: What the Research Does and Does Not Show · Screening and Diagnosing Autism in an Adult Defendant · Competency, Effective Participation, and Accommodations · Demeanor, Voir Dire, and Educating the Fact-Finder · Federal Sentencing of Autistic Defendants After the 2025 Guidelines Amendments
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Online Sex Offense · False Confessions: Suggestibility