Snap Shot
- The question: What does research show about the sexual knowledge of people with intellectual disability, and how do courts decide whether such a person could consent to sexual activity?
- What the research shows: In the most frequently cited comparison (60 adults with intellectual disability and 60 young people presumed in law able to consent; Murphy & O’Callaghan, 2004), the adults with intellectual disability knew less about nearly every area of sex, although some scored as well as their peers, particularly after sex education. A meta-analysis of 25 studies estimated sexual abuse during adulthood at 32.9%, with wide variation by setting and informant. In three small studies of men only, men with intellectual disability who offended sexually showed equal or greater sexual knowledge than comparison men with intellectual disability; prior treatment or education may account for that in some samples, and limited knowledge may still contribute to some less serious behavior.
- What it does not show: No instrument measures legal capacity to consent, and no test score settles it. Group findings cannot show that a particular complainant could or could not consent, or that a particular defendant’s limited knowledge explains his conduct.
- The law: Arizona treats sexual activity as without consent when a mental defect leaves the person unable to understand the distinctively sexual nature of the conduct or to understand or exercise the right to refuse, and the condition was known or reasonably should have been known. Federal law and Article 120, UCMJ, ask whether the person could appraise the nature of the conduct.
- Issues for each side: For prosecutors, the central issue is evidence of the complainant’s actual understanding rather than a diagnosis or IQ score. For defense counsel, it is whether that evidence meets the statutory standard, and whether a defendant’s knowledge deficits are supported by the history rather than offered in place of evidence about intent or interest.
People with intellectual disability have the same range of sexual interests and relationships as other adults, but many have had little or no sex education, and they are sexually abused at rates well above those of the general population. When a case reaches court, the same questions recur whether the person with intellectual disability is the complainant or the accused: what did this person know about sex, could he or she understand and refuse what happened, and what does the research allow an expert to say about either.
Two premises frame this paper. First, sexual abuse of people with intellectual disability causes real harm and is underreported, and a complainant’s disability does not by itself show that an allegation is more or less likely to be accurate; that depends on the evidence about the account. Second, the law in most jurisdictions recognizes that many people with intellectual disability can consent to sexual activity; a protective rule applied too broadly would deny them a right other adults have.
Interviewing is addressed in “Complainants and Witnesses With Intellectual Disability,” pathways to offending in “Intellectual Disability and Sexual Offending: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Pathways,” and autistic people’s sexual knowledge in the Autism and Online Sexual Offense hub. Older statutes and opinions use the term “mental retardation”; it appears here only when describing those sources.
Sexual Knowledge and Sex Education
The most frequently cited comparison tested 60 adults with intellectual disability and 60 young people presumed in law to be able to consent (Murphy & O’Callaghan, 2004). As a group, the adults with intellectual disability knew less about nearly every area of sex, appeared more vulnerable to abuse, and sometimes could not tell an abusive relationship from a consenting one. Yet some scored well on every measure, particularly those with higher IQs who had been given sex education. The pattern recurs in the literature: a real group difference, wide individual variation, and education as one source of that variation.
More recent work is consistent. Among 142 Spanish adults with moderate intellectual disability, sexual intercourse was uncommon, only 30.5% reported using condoms, and misconceptions about the risks of intercourse and about contraception were common (Estruch-García et al., 2024). Women in that sample reported sexual abuse far more often than men (27.3% vs. 6%), and men reported masturbation more often. Sex education programs can teach knowledge and some skills, but in a systematic review skills often did not generalize to real situations and maintenance was uncertain (Schaafsma et al., 2015); a later review of 42 studies found that none of the outcome instruments used had established psychometric properties with students with intellectual disability (Paulauskaite et al., 2022).
Knowledge is also changeable at the level of the individual. In a single-case study of four adults with moderate intellectual disability, ten weeks of individually tailored sex education improved scores on measures of sexual knowledge and safety practices, with safety practices maintained at six months and some decline in knowledge (Dukes & McGuire, 2009). The sample was very small, but knowledge at the time of an evaluation may differ, in either direction, from knowledge at the time of the events.
How Sexual Knowledge Is Assessed
Several instruments have been developed for people with intellectual disability. They include the Socio-Sexual Knowledge and Attitudes Assessment Tool–Revised (SSKAAT-R), a picture-supported instrument with normative data from people with intellectual disability (Lunsky et al., 2007); the General Sexual Knowledge Questionnaire, a revision of an earlier short measure (Talbot & Langdon, 2006); the SexKen-ID, with parallel versions for people with physical disabilities and the general population (McCabe et al., 1999); the picture-based Sexual Attitudes and Knowledge assessment (as described in Lindsay et al., 2020, p. 119); and the Sexual Consent and Education Assessment, which has separate knowledge and safety-practice scales (Dukes & McGuire, 2009). This paper does not reproduce their content.
These tools have limits for forensic use. A 2025 systematic review applying standard criteria for measurement quality found nine self-report sexual-knowledge tools for people with intellectual disability; most of their psychometric properties were indeterminate or unreported, the evidence was of moderate quality at best, and most of the underlying studies were about a decade old (Estruch-García et al., 2025). The two most promising had been studied mainly in Spanish samples. No instrument was designed to measure legal capacity to consent, and none has norms for people charged with or alleging sexual offenses. A knowledge score shows what a person could answer on the day of testing, not what he or she understood during a specific encounter, and it does not measure the ability to refuse, which depends on assertiveness, dependence, and circumstances.
Capacity to Consent: Clinical Frameworks
Clinicians and lawyers usually describe capacity to consent to sexual activity in terms of knowledge, understanding, and voluntariness. When 305 randomly selected doctoral-level psychologists rated possible criteria, their ratings grouped into five factors; basic sexual knowledge, knowledge of the consequences of sexual behavior, and self-protection abilities emerged as central (Kennedy & Niederbuhl, 2001). The study measured professional opinion, not validity. A systematic review of approaches for people with cognitive disabilities found few qualifying studies and cautioned that evaluators’ own attitudes can tilt determinations toward protection or toward rights (Esmail & Concannon, 2022).
Two features of capacity matter in court. Capacity is decision-specific and can change: a person may understand sexual activity in general but not the risks of a particular encounter, and education may build capacity that was absent before (Dukes & McGuire, 2009). Capacity is also distinct from consent. A person with capacity may not have consented, and a person whose capacity is limited may have expressed clear unwillingness. A clinical opinion about capacity therefore answers only part of the legal question.
People With Intellectual Disability as Complainants
People with intellectual disability are sexually abused at high rates. A meta-analysis of 25 studies estimated the prevalence of sexual abuse during adulthood among adults with intellectual disability at 32.9%, with higher rates in institutional settings and when the person with intellectual disability, rather than another informant, reported (Tomsa et al., 2021). In that meta-analysis the pooled prevalence was higher for men (39.9%) than for women (31.8%), which differs from the Spanish study above and from much of the general-population literature, and the most common perpetrator profile was a peer with intellectual disability. Narrative reviews reach the same conclusion for children and adults, while finding evidence on specific risk factors inconsistent (Byrne, 2018; Wissink et al., 2015). A review of victimization of adults with intellectual disability more broadly, summarized in a recent handbook, found perpetrators more often male and usually known to the victim, most often residential staff or acquaintances, with wide variation (Lindsay et al., 2020, p. 76).
In the U.S. National Crime Victimization Survey for 2017–2019, the age-adjusted rate of rape or sexual assault was 4.1 per 1,000 persons with disabilities aged 12 and older, compared with 0.9 per 1,000 persons without disabilities, and persons with cognitive disabilities had the highest rate of violent victimization of any disability type (Harrell, 2021). Only about 19% of rapes and sexual assaults against persons with disabilities were reported to police, compared with about 36% for persons without disabilities. These household-survey estimates exclude people living in institutions, where risk appears highest. Meta-analyses found elevated odds of recent violence for adults with intellectual impairments (odds ratio 1.60; Hughes et al., 2012) and nearly three times the odds of sexual violence for children with disabilities (Jones et al., 2012), with wide variation across studies.
These findings explain why consent capacity is questioned so often. The knowledge deficits that increase vulnerability are the same deficits a prosecution may rely on to show incapacity, and the same deficits a defense may point to in arguing that a complainant misunderstood an encounter. Neither inference follows from the group data. Whether a complainant could and did consent is a question about that person and that encounter, and it is answered with evidence of the person’s understanding and functioning. Questioning methods that support accurate accounts are addressed in “Complainants and Witnesses With Intellectual Disability.”
Case Example: In People v. Cratsley (1995), New York’s highest court reviewed a third-degree rape conviction under a statute that, in the language of the time, made a “mentally defective” person incapable of consent. The complainant, 33, had a steady boyfriend and had been taught at her sheltered workshop to recognize and refuse sexual abuse; she knew birth-control pills prevented pregnancy but not what pregnancy was, and her counselor testified that she did not grasp the connection between intercourse and pregnancy. The court held that incapacity cannot be presumed from the diagnosis, that the prosecution’s burden is high and must be met case by case, that expert testimony is not required because people who observe the complainant daily can describe her functioning, and that the evidence was sufficient. It also held that the psychologist’s report recording her IQ score was properly received as a business record on the foundation testimony in that case, and affirmed. The legal question turned on the complainant’s specific understanding, not on her IQ.
People With Intellectual Disability as Defendants
For defendants, the main research question has been whether limited sexual knowledge helps explain offending. The counterfeit-deviance hypothesis proposed that some sexual behavior by men with intellectual disability reflects naivety, limited social learning, and restricted opportunity rather than deviant sexual interest (Hingsburger et al., 1991). Direct tests have not supported it as a general explanation. In two cohorts, men with intellectual disability who had offended sexually showed equal or greater sexual knowledge than controls with intellectual disability (Michie et al., 2006). Men with intellectual disability who had committed more serious offenses knew more than matched non-offenders, men whose behavior was limited to inappropriate acts such as public masturbation did not differ from non-offenders, and differences disappeared when only those who had received sex education were compared (Lunsky et al., 2007). In a smaller study, treated offenders outscored non-offending peers on several sections of a knowledge questionnaire, and the authors concluded that the assumed link between low knowledge and offending was possibly mistaken (Talbot & Langdon, 2006). All three studied only men, in small clinical samples. In the first, knowledge was assessed before any sex education or treatment (Michie et al., 2006); in the others, prior treatment or education may account for some of the offenders’ knowledge.
Knowledge is not irrelevant: limited knowledge may contribute to some less serious, often public behaviors, though the studies above do not support it as a general explanation for more serious contact offending. Sex education is a standard part of adapted treatment, and in an uncontrolled study of group treatment for men with intellectual disability, autism, or both, sexual knowledge improved (Murphy et al., 2023). A defendant’s knowledge deficit is best treated as a hypothesis to be tested against the history and conduct, not as a conclusion; the Autism and Online Sexual Offense hub discusses the origin and limits of counterfeit deviance. Because peers with intellectual disability are frequent perpetrators (Tomsa et al., 2021), some cases raise questions of knowledge and capacity about both people at once.
Hypothetical Example: Consider a hypothetical 24-year-old man with mild intellectual disability, living in a supported apartment, who is charged after touching a coworker over her clothing at a sheltered workshop. He received no sex education in school, and an evaluator finds substantial gaps in his sexual knowledge, including about privacy and consent. The evaluator also reviews incident reports, interviews staff, and asks whether the conduct was concealed or repeated after correction. The knowledge findings bear on treatment needs and supervision; whether they bear on intent, and whether the conduct also reflects sexual interest or disregard of the coworker, depends on that other evidence, not on the knowledge score.
Limits of the Evidence
Most sexual-knowledge studies are small, cross-sectional, and drawn from service settings outside the United States, and the instruments lack forensic norms. The counterfeit-deviance tests involved only men, often at different stages of treatment. Victimization estimates vary widely with definitions, informants, settings, and countries. Sex differences are inconsistent: one meta-analysis found higher prevalence among men, and one large study found far higher self-reported abuse among women. The consent-capacity literature consists largely of professional opinion, reviews, and case studies; no assessment method has been validated against legal outcomes. Above all, group findings cannot establish whether a particular complainant could consent or whether a particular defendant’s limited knowledge explains his conduct.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the Murphy and O’Callaghan (2004) comparison is offered to suggest that a complainant could not understand sex, ask whether the evidence shows this person’s knowledge, or only that of a group in which some members scored well. When a score on the SSKAAT-R, the General Sexual Knowledge Questionnaire, or a similar tool is offered, ask what norms were used, when the person was tested relative to the events, and what education or treatment came between. When counterfeit deviance is offered to explain a defendant’s conduct, ask whether the studies cited support it for that kind of conduct, given that in three small studies of men, offenders with intellectual disability showed equal or greater knowledge than comparison men. When prevalence figures such as 32.9% (Tomsa et al., 2021) are offered, ask which countries, settings, and definitions produced them. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Consent Capacity and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2242, it is a federal crime within federal jurisdiction knowingly to engage in a sexual act with a person who is incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct or physically incapable of declining participation or communicating unwillingness, or without the person’s consent. Expert testimony about either person’s functioning is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, and by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999).
Article 120(b)(3)(B), UCMJ, makes it sexual assault to commit a sexual act on a person incapable of consenting because of a mental disease or defect or physical disability, when that condition is known or reasonably should be known. Article 120(g)(8) defines “incapable of consenting” as being unable to appraise the nature of the conduct at issue or physically unable to decline participation or communicate unwillingness. Before that definition was added, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, in an alcohol-impairment case, approved a definition of the term as lacking the cognitive ability to appreciate the sexual conduct, or lacking the physical or mental ability to make or to communicate a decision about it (United States v. Pease, 2016). Military Rule of Evidence 702 incorporated the 2023 federal amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025).
Arizona
Under A.R.S. § 13-1406, sexual assault is intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with a person without consent. A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b) provides that “without consent” includes cases in which the victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep, or a similar impairment of cognition, and the condition is known or reasonably should have been known to the defendant. For that subdivision, “mental defect” means the victim cannot comprehend the distinctively sexual nature of the conduct or cannot understand or exercise the right to refuse to engage in it. The test therefore has a knowledge prong and a refusal prong, and evidence addressing only one prong does not answer the other. The State must also prove the defendant’s knowledge, actual or constructive, of the condition.
The definition applies to complainants. When the defendant has an intellectual disability, Arizona generally does not permit expert evidence of a mental condition short of insanity to negate the mental state element of an offense (State v. Mott, 1997; Clark v. Arizona, 2006, left room for observation evidence); how those decisions apply to a particular case is a question for counsel and the court and should be verified before testimony. Evidence about a defendant’s knowledge deficits is therefore more often presented in competency proceedings, at sentencing under A.R.S. § 13-701(E), or in treatment planning, discussed in “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations” and “Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation.” Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended, effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).
Other Jurisdictions
State definitions differ in what the person must understand. New Jersey’s highest court construed its “mentally defective” provision to require proof that the person could not comprehend the distinctively sexual nature of the conduct or could not understand or exercise the right to refuse (State v. Olivio, 1991), language closely matching Arizona’s. New York requires case-by-case proof that the person could not appraise the nature of the conduct, judged from evidence of functioning (People v. Cratsley, 1995). In England and Wales, the Supreme Court held in a civil protection case that the information a person must be able to understand includes that a partner must be able to consent and must in fact consent before and throughout sexual activity (A Local Authority v JB, 2021). An expert should know which legal test applies before an evaluation is framed.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports recognizing that people with intellectual disability are sexually abused at high rates, often by people they know and depend on, and that these offenses are seldom reported. It supports evidence of a complainant’s limited sexual knowledge when that evidence is specific to the person: education records, informants who know his or her daily functioning, and concrete examples of what he or she did and did not understand. Under Arizona’s definition, prosecutors are best positioned to gather evidence on both prongs, including dependence on the defendant, and on what the defendant knew or reasonably should have known about the condition. When the defendant has an intellectual disability, in three small studies of men, men with intellectual disability who offended sexually showed equal or greater knowledge than comparison men with intellectual disability, which supports testing any claim that ignorance explains the conduct.
The research also counsels caution. Many people with intellectual disability can consent, and a diagnosis or IQ score alone does not establish incapacity, as Cratsley holds. Sexual-knowledge instruments have limited psychometric support and were not designed to measure legal capacity, so a low score should not be presented as a finding of incapacity. A complainant tested after the events may know more, or less, than at the time. Group prevalence figures support the importance of these cases but are not evidence that a particular allegation is true.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports asking whether evidence of incapacity addresses the controlling legal test rather than the diagnosis, whether it covers both the knowledge and refusal prongs where Arizona law applies, and whether the State can prove what the defendant knew or should have known about the complainant’s condition. Defense counsel are often best positioned to ask how a knowledge assessment was conducted, what norms it used, and whether it reflects the complainant’s understanding at the time of the events. For a defendant with intellectual disability, documented gaps in sexual knowledge, a history without sex education, and the nature of the behavior are relevant to competency, treatment needs, supervision planning, and sentencing, and an evaluation can show which gaps adapted treatment can address.
The research also counsels caution. The counterfeit-deviance hypothesis has not been supported as a general explanation, and in three small studies of men, men with intellectual disability who offended sexually showed equal or greater knowledge than comparison men, so limited knowledge should be offered as one hypothesis supported by the history rather than as a substitute for evidence about intent or sexual interest. In Arizona, Mott generally limits the use of mental-condition evidence on intent, with room under Clark for observation evidence. Arguments that a complainant with intellectual disability misunderstood an encounter rest on the same group findings that show heightened vulnerability, and they require evidence about that person. The high rates of sexual abuse of people with intellectual disability, and the harm involved, are well documented and should be acknowledged.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Byrne, G. (2018). Prevalence and psychological sequelae of sexual abuse among individuals with an intellectual disability: A review of the recent literature. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities, 22(3), 294–310. https://doi.org/10.1177/1744629517698844
Dukes, E., & McGuire, B. E. (2009). Enhancing capacity to make sexuality-related decisions in people with an intellectual disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 53(8), 727–734. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2788.2009.01186.x
Esmail, S., & Concannon, B. (2022). Approaches to determine and manage sexual consent abilities for people with cognitive disabilities: Systematic review. Interactive Journal of Medical Research, 11(1), Article e28137. https://doi.org/10.2196/28137
Estruch-García, V., Gil-Llario, M. D., & Fernández-García, O. (2024). Sexual experiences and knowledge of people with moderate intellectual disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 68(5), 512–523. https://doi.org/10.1111/jir.13125
Estruch-García, V., Gil-Llario, M. D., Fernández-García, O., Morell-Mengual, V., & Ballester-Arnal, R. (2025). COSMIN review about assessment tools for sexuality knowledge in people with intellectual disability. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 54(10), 4023–4038. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-025-03260-w
Harrell, E. (2021). Crime against persons with disabilities, 2009–2019 – Statistical tables (NCJ 301367). Bureau of Justice Statistics. https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/crime-against-persons-disabilities-2009-2019-statistical-tables
Hingsburger, D., Griffiths, D., & Quinsey, V. (1991). Detecting counterfeit deviance: Differentiating sexual deviance from sexual inappropriateness. Habilitative Mental Healthcare Newsletter, 10(9), 51–54.
Hughes, K., Bellis, M. A., Jones, L., Wood, S., Bates, G., Eckley, L., McCoy, E., Mikton, C., Shakespeare, T., & Officer, A. (2012). Prevalence and risk of violence against adults with disabilities: A systematic review and meta-analysis of observational studies. The Lancet, 379(9826), 1621–1629. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(11)61851-5
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Jones, L., Bellis, M. A., Wood, S., Hughes, K., McCoy, E., Eckley, L., Bates, G., Mikton, C., Shakespeare, T., & Officer, A. (2012). Prevalence and risk of violence against children with disabilities: A systematic review and meta-analysis of observational studies. The Lancet, 380(9845), 899–907. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60692-8
Kennedy, C. H., & Niederbuhl, J. (2001). Establishing criteria for sexual consent capacity. American Journal on Mental Retardation, 106(6), 503–510. https://doi.org/10.1352/0895-8017(2001)106<0503:ECFSCC>2.0.CO;2
Lindsay, W. R., Craig, L. A., & Griffiths, D. (Eds.). (2020). The Wiley handbook on what works for offenders with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119316268
Lunsky, Y., Frijters, J., Griffiths, D. M., Watson, S. L., & Williston, S. (2007). Sexual knowledge and attitudes of men with intellectual disability who sexually offend. Journal of Intellectual & Developmental Disability, 32(2), 74–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/13668250701408004
McCabe, M. P., Cummins, R. A., & Deeks, A. A. (1999). Construction and psychometric properties of sexuality scales: Sex knowledge, experience, and needs scales for people with intellectual disabilities (SexKen-ID), people with physical disabilities (SexKen-PD), and the general population (SexKen-GP). Research in Developmental Disabilities, 20(4), 241–254. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0891-4222(99)00007-4
Michie, A. M., Lindsay, W. R., Martin, V., & Grieve, A. (2006). A test of counterfeit deviance: A comparison of sexual knowledge in groups of sex offenders with intellectual disability and controls. Sexual Abuse, 18(3), 271–278. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11194-006-9019-y
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Legal Authorities
A Local Authority v JB [2021] UKSC 52.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
People v. Cratsley, 86 N.Y.2d 81, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 629 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1995).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
State v. Olivio, 123 N.J. 550, 589 A.2d 597 (1991).
United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice), subsections (b)(3) and (g)(8).
18 U.S.C. § 2242.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-701(E), 13-1401(A)(7)(b), 13-1406.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Related topic papers: Intellectual Disability and Sexual Offending: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Pathways · Complainants and Witnesses With Intellectual Disability · Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods · Treatment and Community Supervision for Offenders With Intellectual Disability · Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Child Abuse Allegations · Courts-Martial