Snap Shot
- The question: How do people remember to carry out intended actions, why do they sometimes forget, and what can the research say when a case turns on a forgotten duty, medication, or child?
- What the research shows: Remembering an intention depends on noticing a cue or monitoring for the right time; failures become more likely with competing demands, interruptions, changed routines, and habitual actions, and they occur in careful, motivated people. Older adults generally do worse on laboratory prospective memory tasks but often do as well or better in everyday settings.
- What it does not show: The research cannot show whether a particular omission was a memory failure, a deliberate choice, or something else, and it does not show that a memory failure was or was not careless by legal standards. Accounts of how a parent can forget a child in a vehicle draw on laboratory and neurobiological research and have not been tested in those cases themselves.
- The law: The research may bear on the line between conscious disregard of a risk (recklessness) and failure to perceive it (criminal negligence) under A.R.S. § 13-105(10) and Model Penal Code concepts, and on willful versus negligent dereliction under Article 92, UCMJ; whether a lapse is criminal is a legal judgment for the factfinder. Expert testimony is governed by Rule 702, Houser, and in Arizona Chapple, Nordstrom, and Mott.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can show that the research describes how forgetting happens without deciding whether it was culpable, and that facts may show awareness; defense counsel can show that forgetting an intention is common and compatible with genuine care, without claiming that the research proves a particular omission was a memory failure.
Retrospective memory, the subject of most memory research, is memory for past events. Prospective memory is memory for what one intends to do: remembering to take a medication, pass on a message, complete a safety check, or drop a child at day care. It differs from retrospective memory in an important way. The person usually knows perfectly well what to do; the failure is in remembering to do it at the right moment, without anyone asking.
Prospective memory reaches court when a case turns on an omission. Examples include a caregiver who forgot a child in a vehicle, a patient or caregiver who missed a dose, a professional who omitted a required step, and a service member charged with failing to perform a duty. In each, the question is less whether the person’s account of the past is accurate than what the omission says about the person’s mental state.
This paper describes the main kinds of prospective memory and the leading theory of how intentions are retrieved, the conditions under which intentions fail, the effects of aging and stress, applied research on medication and workplace lapses, and the research on children forgotten in vehicles. It then addresses the limits of that research and the law on culpable mental states and expert testimony.
Event-Based and Time-Based Intentions
Researchers distinguish event-based intentions, which are to be carried out when a cue appears (giving a message to a colleague on seeing that colleague), from time-based intentions, which are to be carried out at a time or after an interval (making a call at three o’clock) (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). Time-based tasks are generally more demanding because the person must initiate monitoring of the clock without an external prompt. Event-based tasks are easier when the cue is distinctive and closely tied to the intended action, and harder when the cue is peripheral to what the person is doing.
The multiprocess framework holds that intentions can be retrieved in two ways (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). Sometimes a salient cue brings the intention to mind spontaneously, with little effort. At other times the person must keep the intention active and monitor for the right moment, which draws on limited attention and competes with whatever else the person is doing. Which route operates depends on the cue, the task, and the person. A 2023 review of current theories described the multiprocess view and the alternative view that some monitoring is always required, and urged more theory about how intentions are formed and retrieved in everyday life, where most prospective memory occurs (Rummel & Kvavilashvili, 2023).
Why Intentions Are Forgotten
Under demanding conditions, intentions can be forgotten within seconds. In one set of experiments, participants who had to delay a simple intended action briefly while performing another task often failed to carry it out, even though they fully intended to and the delay was short (Einstein et al., 2003). Interruptions are a particular hazard: an interruption creates a new, implicit intention to return to the original task, and that intention is itself subject to forgetting, especially when the interruption is engaging and the cue to resume is weak (Dodhia & Dismukes, 2009).
Routine and habit add a further risk. When an action is usually performed on a familiar route or in a fixed sequence, a change in routine can mean that the habitual sequence runs without the cue that would normally trigger the new intention. Studies of aviation and other demanding workplaces describe errors of exactly this kind, in which skilled, motivated professionals omit a step after an interruption or a change in the usual order of tasks (Dismukes, 2012). Studies of skilled, motivated professionals (Dismukes, 2012) find that motivation reduces but does not eliminate such failures; the research cannot distinguish a lapse in a caring person from a lapse in an indifferent one.
Aging and Stress
A meta-analysis found that in laboratory studies younger adults outperformed older adults on both time-based and event-based prospective memory tasks, with larger age differences for tasks requiring effortful monitoring than for tasks supported by salient cues (Henry et al., 2004). The same analysis found that older adults did substantially better than younger adults in naturalistic studies conducted in everyday life, a pattern sometimes called the age-prospective memory paradox, which may reflect greater use of reminders, more structured routines, or higher motivation (Rendell & Craik, 2000). A 2023 meta-analysis of laboratory time-based tasks confirmed consistent age differences, with older adults checking the clock less often, especially over short intervals (Laera et al., 2023). Laboratory differences therefore do not translate directly into predictions about an older person’s daily functioning.
The effects of acute stress are less clear. In one experiment with 80 participants, a standardized laboratory stressor did not change prospective memory performance; under high monitoring demands, stress substantially reduced the cost of monitoring without impairing performance, which the authors interpreted as a shift toward resource-saving processing (Möschl et al., 2017). Research on stress and prospective memory is limited and mixed, and it does not support a general statement that stress makes people forget intentions.
Medication, Duty, and Safety Lapses
Failure to take medication as prescribed is partly a prospective memory problem. A review found that prospective memory measures predicted medication nonadherence beyond other cognitive measures, and that reminders and other interventions directed at prospective memory may improve adherence (Zogg et al., 2012). Workplace studies show that safeguards such as checklists, reminders, and procedures that make cues salient reduce omissions, which means that the presence or absence of such safeguards is often relevant to how an omission occurred (Dismukes, 2012).
Forgetting a Child in a Vehicle
Some of the most serious prospective memory cases involve children who die of heatstroke after a parent or caregiver leaves them in a vehicle. Diamond (2019) reported a count of more than 400 children over the previous 20 years who had suffered heatstroke after being unknowingly left in cars; this is a 2019 count of cases, not a rate, and it has not been updated here. He argued that a driver’s loss of awareness of a child in the back seat is a failure of prospective memory, and he described factors that make such a failure more likely, such as a habitual route, a change in routine, and the absence of a salient cue. Drawing on neurobiological research, he proposed that competition between brain systems, in which habit-based systems can override those that keep a plan in mind, contributes to such failures, and he discussed whether such a lapse should be treated as a crime.
That account is a review and argument by one researcher, not a study of the cases themselves. It applies to situations in which the caregiver was unaware that the child was in the vehicle; deaths also occur in other circumstances, such as when a child is knowingly left or gets into a vehicle unobserved, which raise different questions. Whether a caregiver was unaware, and whether any lack of awareness was culpable, depends on the evidence in the particular case, including the caregiver’s routine, what happened during the drive, any cues present, and statements and conduct afterward. The research can explain how such a lapse can occur in an attentive caregiver; it cannot establish that one occurred in a given case, and it does not address cases in which a child was knowingly left.
Limits of the Evidence
Most prospective memory research uses simple laboratory tasks, such as pressing a key when a word appears, with student participants, short delays, and no real consequences. Workplace and medication studies are closer to real life but often rely on self-report or correlations. The research on children forgotten in vehicles is largely a theoretical extrapolation from laboratory and neurobiological work, and the cases themselves cannot be studied experimentally. Effect sizes vary with the cue, the task, and the population, and the age findings reverse between laboratory and everyday settings. Above all, the research describes how often and under what conditions intentions fail across groups; it cannot determine whether a particular omission was a memory failure, a decision, or something else, and it cannot answer the normative question whether a failure fell below a legal standard of care.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When Einstein et al. (2003) is offered for the proposition that intentions can be lost within seconds, counsel should ask whether the conclusion follows from a laboratory design with simple tasks and short delays, and whether the demands and interruptions in the study resemble those present in the case. When Henry et al. (2004) or Laera et al. (2023) is cited for age differences, counsel should ask who was studied and in what setting, since older adults often do better than younger adults in everyday studies. When Diamond (2019) is offered to explain how a caregiver forgot a child, counsel should ask how much evidence supports the specific mechanism, how much of it rests on laboratory or neurobiological research rather than study of such cases, and whether the facts show a change in routine, absent cues, or other conditions the account assumes. When it is argued that a careful person simply would not have forgotten, counsel should ask what the studies of motivated professionals actually show (Dismukes, 2012). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Prospective Memory and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Prospective memory research bears most directly on culpable mental states. Under the Model Penal Code, a person acts recklessly by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and negligently when the person should be aware of such a risk but is not, in a way that grossly deviates from a reasonable person’s standard of care (Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c)–(d)). Research on forgetting intentions may help a factfinder understand how a person can be unaware of a risk the person knew about earlier, which is relevant to whether the person was aware and disregarded it; it does not decide whether a lack of awareness was a gross deviation. Expert testimony must satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). Federal Rule 704(b) bars an expert in a criminal case from stating an opinion on whether the defendant had the required mental state; Diaz v. United States (2024) held that it reaches opinions about the defendant, not general testimony about a group.
In courts-martial, Article 92(3), UCMJ, punishes dereliction in the performance of duties. The Manual for Courts-Martial (2024) requires that the accused knew or reasonably should have known of the duties and was derelict willfully or through neglect or culpable inefficiency; it defines “willfully” as intentionally, and negligence as a lack of the care a reasonably prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances, and it states that failure caused by ineptitude rather than willfulness, negligence, or culpable inefficiency is not dereliction (Part IV, ¶ 18.b.(3), 18.c.(3)). Maximum punishments are higher for willful than for negligent dereliction (¶ 18.d.(3)). Child endangerment under Article 119b requires design or culpable negligence, which the Manual describes as carelessness greater than simple negligence, accompanied by culpable disregard for foreseeable consequences (¶ 59.c.(2)). Prospective memory evidence may bear on willfulness and on how a lapse occurred; whether it was negligent or culpably negligent is for the members. Expert testimony is assessed under Military Rule of Evidence 702, which tracks the federal rule (the Joint Service Committee’s 2025 compilation reflects the 2023 amendment; Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025; practitioners should confirm current text), and United States v. Houser (1993). Military Rule of Evidence 704 has no counterpart to Federal Rule 704(b).
Arizona
Arizona defines “recklessly” as being aware of and consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and “criminal negligence” as failing to perceive such a risk, in either case where the disregard or failure is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do or observe (A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(c)–(d)); the recklessness definition also treats a person who creates such a risk but is unaware of it solely because of voluntary intoxication as acting recklessly (§ 13-105(10)(c)). Some offenses, including child abuse under A.R.S. § 13-3623, are graded by mental state, so the difference between awareness and failure to perceive can determine the class of the offense, and negligent homicide (A.R.S. § 13-1102) rests on criminal negligence. Expert testimony must satisfy Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, amended effective January 1, 2012, to adopt the Daubert standard and effective January 1, 2024, to track the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). State v. Chapple (1983), Arizona’s leading case on eyewitness expert testimony, held that excluding such testimony was an abuse of discretion on its facts; admission is otherwise discretionary, and State v. Nordstrom (2001) upheld limiting an expert to general factors. Under State v. Mott (1997), expert evidence of a mental disorder short of insanity is not admissible to negate mens rea; this paper did not locate an Arizona appellate decision deciding whether general testimony about normal prospective memory, which does not concern a disorder, falls within that rule, and practitioners should research the question in the particular case. Experts may not opine on whether a particular witness is truthful (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately use. It describes how intentions fail, not whether a particular failure was excusable; criminal negligence is defined by a failure to perceive a risk, so evidence that a lapse was a memory failure is not inconsistent with negligence and leaves the standard-of-care judgment to the factfinder. The research also identifies conditions that make failures more or less likely, such as salient cues, reminders, routines, and safeguards, and whether those conditions were present is a fair subject of evidence. Facts showing awareness at the relevant time, such as statements, phone activity, or returning to the vehicle, are evidence the research does not displace.
The research also counsels caution. Forgetting an intention is common and occurs in careful, motivated people, so an omission alone is weak evidence of indifference or conscious disregard, and an argument that a caring parent or diligent professional would not have forgotten unless indifferent goes beyond what the research supports. Where recklessness or willfulness is charged, the State must prove awareness, and the research supports scrutiny of whether the evidence shows awareness at the critical time rather than only knowledge of the duty at some earlier point.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately use. Intentions can be forgotten quickly under competing demands, interruptions, and changes in routine, and studies of skilled, motivated professionals find that such failures reduce but do not disappear with motivation (Dismukes, 2012); the research cannot tell a lapse in a caring person from one in an indifferent person. Expert testimony explaining these findings can help a factfinder understand how a person who knew of a duty or of a child’s presence could lose awareness of it, which bears on recklessness, willfulness, and the distinction between knowing and negligent conduct.
The research also counsels caution. It does not show that a particular omission was a memory failure rather than a choice, and an account of how a lapse can occur, including the account of children forgotten in vehicles, rests on laboratory and neurobiological research that has not been tested in the cases themselves. Showing that a failure was a memory lapse does not by itself answer a negligence charge, because the legal question is whether the failure to perceive the risk was a gross deviation from a reasonable person’s care. In Arizona, testimony that strays toward a disorder or capacity opinion may meet the Mott rule, and federal testimony must stay general under Rule 704(b).
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Diamond, D. M. (2019). When a child dies of heatstroke after a parent or caretaker unknowingly leaves the child in a car: How does it happen and is it a crime? Medicine, Science and the Law, 59(2), 115–126. https://doi.org/10.1177/0025802419831529
Dismukes, R. K. (2012). Prospective memory in workplace and everyday situations. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(4), 215–220. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721412447621
Dodhia, R. M., & Dismukes, R. K. (2009). Interruptions create prospective memory tasks. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23(1), 73–89. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1441
Einstein, G. O., & McDaniel, M. A. (1990). Normal aging and prospective memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 16(4), 717–726. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.16.4.717
Einstein, G. O., McDaniel, M. A., Williford, C. L., Pagan, J. L., & Dismukes, R. K. (2003). Forgetting of intentions in demanding situations is rapid. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 9(3), 147–162. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.9.3.147
Henry, J. D., MacLeod, M. S., Phillips, L. H., & Crawford, J. R. (2004). A meta-analytic review of prospective memory and aging. Psychology and Aging, 19(1), 27–39. https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.19.1.27
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Laera, G., Borghese, F., Hering, A., Kliegel, M., & Mioni, G. (2023). Aging and time-based prospective memory in the laboratory: A meta-analysis on age-related differences and possible explanatory factors. Memory, 31(5), 747–766. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2023.2191901
McDaniel, M. A., & Einstein, G. O. (2000). Strategic and automatic processes in prospective memory retrieval: A multiprocess framework. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 14(7), S127–S144. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.775
Möschl, M., Walser, M., Plessow, F., Goschke, T., & Fischer, R. (2017). Acute stress shifts the balance between controlled and automatic processes in prospective memory. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 144, 53–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2017.06.002
Rendell, P. G., & Craik, F. I. M. (2000). Virtual week and actual week: Age-related differences in prospective memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 14(7), S43–S62. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.770
Rummel, J., & Kvavilashvili, L. (2023). Current theories of prospective memory and new directions for theory development. Nature Reviews Psychology, 2(1), 40–54. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-022-00121-4
Zogg, J. B., Woods, S. P., Sauceda, J. A., Wiebe, J. S., & Simoni, J. M. (2012). The role of prospective memory in medication adherence: A review of an emerging literature. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 35(1), 47–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10865-011-9341-9
Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 25 P.3d 717 (2001).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
10 U.S.C. § 892 (Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 919b (Article 119b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-105(10).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1102.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3623.
Model Penal Code § 2.02 (Am. L. Inst., Official Draft 1962).
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, ¶¶ 18, 59 (2024 ed.).
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 704.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (2023).
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 704.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Related topic papers: The Zeigarnik Effect · Working Memory · Aging and Memory · Forgetting · Observation Evidence and Mental State · Memory Expert Testimony
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial