Snap Shot
- The question: Why do people lose memories, and what does a gap, an omission, or a detail that surfaces later say about the accuracy of an account?
- What the research shows: Forgetting is rapid at first and then slows, and central, well-encoded information lasts longest. Much of it reflects failed encoding, interference, or failure to retrieve information that is still stored. Retrieving some details can briefly impair related ones, sleep generally aids retention, and people can modestly reduce recall of unwanted material.
- What it does not show: A gap in memory does not show that an event did not happen, and a detail recalled later is not by itself false or true. The laboratory work on intentional suppression does not establish that whole traumatic experiences are routinely blocked and later recovered intact, and no forgetting function can say how much a particular witness has lost.
- The law: Imperfect memory generally goes to weight, not competence, and is tested through refreshing recollection and prior inconsistent statements (Fed. R. Evid. 601, 612, 613). Expert testimony on forgetting is governed by Rule 702 and Houser, and in Arizona by Rule 702, Chapple, and Nordstrom; it may explain mechanisms but may not opine on a witness’s credibility (Lindsey).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can explain that omissions and lost peripheral detail are normal and that newly recalled details can be genuine, without treating them as corroboration; defense counsel can show how encoding limits, interference, selective questioning, and outside information bear on specific details, without treating forgetting as a sign of fabrication.
Every account of a past event is incomplete. A witness, a complainant, an accused, and an officer will each remember some things and not others, and what each remembers changes over time. Forgetting is the ordinary loss of the ability to report information that was once experienced. It occurs in truthful and untruthful accounts alike, and it is not the same as lying.
Forgetting reaches court whenever gaps and omissions are used to impeach a witness, or a detail that first appears in a later interview is attacked as invented or defended as genuinely remembered. Each argument rests on an assumption about how forgetting works that the research can test.
This paper covers the mechanisms of forgetting, from the forgetting curve through retrieval failure, retrieval-induced and motivated forgetting, and sleep, and closes with what forgetting implies about details recalled later. The forensic consequences of long delays, including repeated interviews, delayed identification, and delayed disclosure, are treated in the companion paper, Delayed Recall.
The Forgetting Curve
The first systematic study of forgetting was Hermann Ebbinghaus’s work in the 1880s. Ebbinghaus memorized lists of nonsense syllables and measured how much less time he needed to relearn them after delays of minutes to a month. Most of the loss occurred within the first hours and days, and the rate of loss then slowed (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913). A modern replication in which one participant spent about 70 hours learning and relearning lists produced a similar curve, though not a perfectly smooth one, with an apparent upward step at the 24-hour point (Murre & Dros, 2015).
An analysis of more than 200 published data sets found the same steep-then-slowing shape (Rubin & Wenzel, 1996), and Wixted and Ebbesen (1991) found that a power function, in which the rate of loss keeps decreasing, described forgetting better than a constant-rate exponential function. Under a related regularity, Jost’s law, memories that survive the early period become more resistant to later loss (Wixted, 2004). Reviewing the eyewitness literature, Read and Connolly (2007) concluded that short delays are unlikely to affect well-encoded events dramatically, that losses grow as encoding is weaker and delays longer, and that gist outlasts peripheral detail.
A single smooth curve is a simplification: a 2022 review argued that forgetting rates differ across phases, from the first minute to the first day, the following week, and beyond, and that memory for complex events can decline more nearly linearly (Radvansky et al., 2022). For once-seen faces, a meta-analysis of 53 studies found a reliable association between longer retention intervals and poorer face memory (r = .18, d = 0.37), equally strong in face-recognition and eyewitness identification studies (Deffenbacher et al., 2008). Neither curve can say how much a particular person has forgotten, because loss depends on encoding and on what happened afterward.
Encoding Failure, Decay, and Interference
Much apparent forgetting is a failure of encoding. Information that was not attended to is generally not stored, and questioning cannot retrieve what was not stored. A witness who was frightened, distracted, intoxicated, or focused on escape may never have registered details that later seem important, and a detail that meant little at the time, such as a stranger’s clothing, may become critical to the case later (Read & Connolly, 2007).
Decay, the weakening of a memory with the mere passage of time, is hard to isolate because time is filled with other experiences. A classic study found that two participants retained more nonsense syllables after sleeping than after an equal period awake (Jenkins & Dallenbach, 1924), suggesting that what happens during an interval matters more than its length. Interference is the better-documented cause. In proactive interference, earlier learning impairs memory for later material; Underwood (1957) traced much list-learning forgetting to the number of similar lists learned before. In retroactive interference, later learning impairs memory for earlier material. Wixted (2004) argued that new mental activity interferes most with memories still being consolidated, which helps explain why forgetting is fastest soon after an event.
Interference has a direct forensic counterpart. When a person experiences many similar events, such as repeated abuse or many similar transactions, memory for the series becomes general and script-like, individual occasions become harder to separate and date, and this generalization grows with time (Read & Connolly, 2007). A person may be accurate about the pattern while uncertain or mistaken about which details belonged to which occasion.
Availability, Accessibility, and Retrieval Failure
A central distinction in forgetting research separates information that is no longer stored (unavailable) from information that is stored but cannot be reached at a given moment (inaccessible). In a classic experiment, participants who studied categorized word lists recalled many more words when they were given the category names as cues than when they were simply asked to recall, showing that much of what they had failed to recall was still stored (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Lane and Houston (2021, p. 16) summarize the general principle: retrieval depends on cues, recall is better when cues resemble the original experience, and a failure to recall something does not show that it was never stored.
Context can serve as a cue: divers who learned words underwater or on land recalled more when tested in the same environment (Godden & Baddeley, 1975), and mental reinstatement of context is part of the cognitive interview (see Context Effects). Some neuroscientists propose that many forms of natural forgetting reflect a memory trace becoming inaccessible rather than erased (Ryan & Frankland, 2022); that hypothesis rests largely on rodent studies and does not show that any particular human memory is intact.
The distinction cuts both ways. It explains why a person can fail to recall something at one interview and recall it accurately at another, when different questions provide different cues. But a cue that supplies new content, such as a suggestive question or another person’s account, can lead a person to report information that was never part of the original memory (Read & Connolly, 2007).
Retrieval-Induced Forgetting
Remembering can itself cause forgetting. When people repeatedly retrieve some items from a set, related items that were not practiced become harder to recall than items from sets that were not practiced at all (Anderson et al., 1994). A meta-analysis found this retrieval-induced forgetting across many procedures, with results largely, though not uniformly, supporting the view that retrieval suppresses competing items (Murayama et al., 2014). Conversation can produce the same result: after one person retells part of a shared experience, those who listened have more trouble recalling related details the speaker left out (Cuc et al., 2007). Lane and Houston (2021, pp. 133–134) note the implication that conversations before an interview may suppress details that no one discussed.
The effect should not be overstated. Retrieval-induced forgetting has faded quickly in some studies: a 2026 study with a single retrieval session found it robust within minutes or hours of the selective retrieval but absent after a day and a week, because the unpracticed items were then forgotten more slowly (Meixensperger & Bäuml, 2026), whereas a 2025 study found socially shared forgetting persisted up to three weeks after repeated selective recounting spaced over time (Sozer et al., 2025), and most of this research uses word lists rather than witnessed events. The practical lesson is that narrow questioning or selective retelling can shape what is reported soon afterward, one reason to obtain a complete, open-ended account early.
Directed and Motivated Forgetting
People can, to a degree, forget on purpose. In directed forgetting studies, items participants are told to forget are later remembered less well than items they are told to remember; a meta-analysis found the effect smaller for emotional than for neutral items, by about 4 percentage points on average, with wide variation across studies (Hall et al., 2021). In the think/no-think procedure, participants who repeatedly try to keep a learned response out of mind later recall it less well (Anderson & Green, 2001), a process imaging studies associate with prefrontal control and reduced hippocampal activity (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). A focused meta-analysis of 25 studies found a small-to-moderate forgetting effect in healthy participants (0.28), possibly inflated by publication bias, and little or no such forgetting in more anxious or depressed participants (Stramaccia et al., 2021). See Memory Inhibition.
This literature is sometimes cited in the debate over repressed and recovered memories. One group of researchers argues that the evidence does not support a mechanism by which people block whole traumatic experiences from awareness for years and later recover them intact, and that belief in such a mechanism remains widespread (Otgaar et al., 2019, 2021). Others argue that critics have attacked a theory few researchers hold, and that recovered memories of trauma may be genuine, false, or a mixture (Brewin, 2021). Lane and Houston (2021, pp. 70–71) describe general agreement that recovered memories are sometimes accurate and sometimes the product of suggestion. What the laboratory studies demonstrate is a modest drop in recall of everyday material; they neither establish nor rule out wholesale repression of trauma, a debate addressed in Recovered and Repressed Memory.
Sleep and Consolidation
New memories are fragile for a period after they are formed and become more stable through consolidation; recalling a memory may make it modifiable again, although how much that changes the original is debated (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 15–16). Sleep appears to contribute, with reactivation of recent memories during sleep, shown largely in animal work, as one proposed mechanism (Rasch & Born, 2013). A meta-analysis of 823 effect sizes from 177 articles found that people recall more after sleep than after an equal period awake (g = 0.44), an advantage that remained significant but smaller (g = 0.28) after correction for possible selective reporting (Berres & Erdfelder, 2021).
Sleep does not simply preserve a faithful copy. In a 2024 study of memory for a story, sleep and retrieval practice each improved accuracy and each increased plausible inferences that had not been presented (Denis et al., 2024). In one series of experiments, 24 hours of sleep deprivation increased acceptance of misleading information when participants were deprived during the original event, but not afterward (Frenda et al., 2014), and in a 2025 study a nap before testing reduced false identifications from culprit-absent lineups without changing correct identifications (Bonilla et al., 2025). These single laboratory studies show that sleep and fatigue are relevant variables, not how they affected a particular witness.
What Forgetting Does and Does Not Imply
The absence of a memory is not evidence that an event did not occur; the information may never have been encoded or may be stored but not accessible to the questions asked. Omissions are expected in any account: an omission in one account of a detail reported in another is a weak indicator that the detail is wrong, while direct contradictions warrant closer attention (Fisher et al., 2009).
The same principles apply to details that surface later. Because inaccessible information can become accessible with different cues, a detail first reported in a later interview may be genuinely remembered, and Delayed Recall reviews evidence that, in non-suggestive mock-crime studies, such details were often accurate. But Read and Connolly (2007) caution that peripheral details that received little attention at the time are less likely to have been stored, so one first reported after a long delay, repeated questioning, or exposure requires attention to how it emerged; it may reflect reconstruction or outside information, though it can also be genuine. Forgetting research therefore supports neither a presumption that later details are invented nor one that they are recovered; it supports asking what the person reported first, what the person encountered in between, and whether the person was in a position to encode the detail.
Limits of the Evidence
Most forgetting research uses word lists, pictures, or filmed events, studied by university students over minutes to weeks, with no personal stakes; Ebbinghaus and the modern replication each tested one person. Forgetting functions describe averages; they cannot estimate how much a particular witness has forgotten, and loss for a personally significant event may differ from loss for a word list. Many effects, including retrieval-induced forgetting, directed forgetting, and suppression-induced forgetting, are modest in size, vary with procedure, and in some cases may be inflated by publication bias. Neuroscience findings on consolidation and accessibility come largely from animal research and group imaging studies.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the forgetting curve is offered to show that a witness has lost most of what was seen, counsel should ask who was studied and what was counted: Ebbinghaus measured one person’s relearning of nonsense syllables, and Radvansky et al. (2022) argued that memory for complex events can follow a more linear pattern. When Deffenbacher et al. (2008) is cited, counsel should ask how large the effect was (r = .18) and whether a group-level function can measure this witness’s memory. When retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson et al., 1994; Cuc et al., 2007) is offered to explain why a witness omitted a detail, counsel should ask whether the effect applies at the delays involved, since Meixensperger and Bäuml (2026) found it absent after a day and a week with a single retrieval session, while Sozer et al. (2025) found socially shared forgetting up to three weeks after repeated selective recounting spaced over time. When suppression research (Anderson & Green, 2001; Stramaccia et al., 2021) is cited for or against a claim of recovered memory, counsel should ask what that research can bear, since a modest laboratory effect on ordinary material does not settle the repression debate. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Forgetting and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Ordinary forgetting generally goes to weight rather than competence (Fed. R. Evid. 601). A witness may refresh memory with a writing, which an adverse party may inspect and use in cross-examination (Fed. R. Evid. 612); the research suggests attention to what the material contains, since it can supply content as well as cue it. A witness may be examined about a prior inconsistent statement (Fed. R. Evid. 613), and the research on omissions and contradictions bears on what such inconsistencies show. The Military Rules of Evidence correspond (Mil. R. Evid. 601, 612, 613).
Expert testimony on forgetting is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, under which the proponent must show that it is more likely than not that the rule’s requirements are met, including a reliable application of reliable methods. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) made the judge a gatekeeper, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended that obligation to all expert testimony, including technical or other specialized knowledge. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and under Military Rule of Evidence 1102 the Joint Service Committee’s 2025 compilation reflects the 2023 amendment (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. Military judges also apply the six factors of United States v. Houser (1993).
Arizona
Arizona’s rules on competence, refreshing recollection, and prior statements follow the federal numbering (Ariz. R. Evid. 601, 612, 613). Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the federal formulation and the Daubert standard effective January 1, 2012, and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). State v. Chapple (1983) recognized that memory expert testimony can assist jurors, and State v. Nordstrom (2001) upheld limiting such an expert to general factors. Experts may not opine on whether a particular witness is truthful (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. Gaps, omissions, and lost peripheral detail are normal and do not, by themselves, indicate fabrication. Failure to recall does not show that information was never stored, so a detail recalled later with different cues can be genuine. Gist and central features of a well-encoded event outlast particulars, and a person who experienced repeated similar events may remember the pattern accurately while struggling to separate occasions. Prosecutors are well positioned to reduce avoidable forgetting by obtaining and recording a complete, open-ended account early and asking witnesses what conversations and information they encountered.
The research also counsels caution. A late detail is not corroborated by being detailed or confidently reported, and peripheral details that received little attention are less likely to have been stored. Selective questioning, conversations, and refreshing materials can shape what is reported. Testimony that presents suppression research as establishing that traumatic experiences are routinely blocked and later recovered intact goes beyond what the laboratory studies show.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. Details that were never attended to generally cannot be retrieved later, and stress, distraction, and brief exposure limit encoding. Similar experiences blend together, retrieving some details can make others harder to recall soon afterward, and information encountered after an event can be reported as if remembered. Expert testimony on these mechanisms, combined with evidence of when a detail first appeared and what the witness encountered before reporting it, is a legitimate way to help the factfinder.
The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. Forgetting occurs in truthful accounts; gaps do not by themselves show that an account is unreliable, and details recalled later are often genuine. Group-level forgetting functions cannot establish how much a particular witness has forgotten, an expert may not tell the factfinder that a particular memory is false, and suppression research no more shows that a recovered memory is false than that it is true. The same mechanisms apply to the accused’s own account of events.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 25 P.3d 717 (2001).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
Fed. R. Evid. 601.
Fed. R. Evid. 612.
Fed. R. Evid. 613.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 601, 612, 613.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (2023).
Mil. R. Evid. 601, 612, 613.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Related topic papers: Delayed Recall · Memory Inhibition · Context Effects · Recovered and Repressed Memory · Remembering Changes Memory · The Testing Effect
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