Snap Shot
- The question: What is counterintuitive behavior testimony, and what can expert education about how people respond to sexual assault legitimately do in an adult case?
- What the research shows: Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported; the national victimization survey estimated that about one in four rape and sexual assault victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (23.6%), an estimate that varies considerably from year to year (46.0% in 2023). Responses vary widely, and freezing, delayed disclosure, continued contact, calm demeanor, and inconsistent accounts occur in many cases in which an assault took place.
- What it does not show: These behaviors are non-specific: some of them may also occur in mistaken and false reports and in people who have had other stressful experiences, although research rarely measures this directly, and most studies describe self-identified victims without comparison groups. A common behavior can remove a mistaken inference against the complainant but cannot by itself show that an assault occurred, and the critique does not show that complainants are generally untruthful.
- The law: Rule 702 (amended 2023, and in courts-martial since 2025) and Houser govern admissibility. Courts permit educational “cold” testimony (Rynning [child complainant], Salazar-Mercado) but bar vouching and credibility statistics (Brooks, Mullins, Lindsey); Haskie cautions against categorical claims about what is “common” without empirical support.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should use experts qualified by research and training rather than job title, and keep testimony tied to the behaviors at issue with frequencies sourced to identified studies; defense counsel should test whether frequency claims trace to studies that fit the case, without arguing that the behaviors signal fabrication.
Many adult sexual assault cases turn on how a complainant behaved before, during, and after the alleged assault. A complainant may not have fought back or screamed, may have waited weeks or months to tell anyone, may have kept texting or seeing the accused, may have given accounts that differ in detail, or may have later tried to withdraw the allegation. Jurors and court-martial members often bring firm expectations about how a person who has been assaulted “should” act, and behavior that departs from those expectations can weigh heavily in their assessment of credibility. To address that risk, prosecutors frequently call an expert to explain that such behavior is common among people who have been sexually assaulted. This paper uses the term counterintuitive behavior testimony to describe that evidence: expert testimony offered to explain behaviors of sexual assault complainants that laypersons may find surprising or may misread as signs that no assault occurred.
The testimony rests on two propositions that the research supports. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported, and people respond to it in widely varying ways. The behaviors the testimony addresses genuinely occur in many cases in which an assault took place. At the same time, the testimony raises a recurring inferential problem. A behavior that is common among people who have been assaulted is not, for that reason alone, evidence that a particular person was assaulted, and testimony that slides from education toward corroboration can exceed both what the science shows and what the law permits.
This paper introduces the hub. It describes what counterintuitive behavior testimony is and where it appears, the behaviors it typically covers, the data on prevalence and reporting, the legitimate purpose the testimony serves and the limits on that purpose, and the core inferential issue that later papers examine in detail. It closes with a brief orientation to the governing law and a description of how the remaining papers are organized.
What Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony Is
The term “counterintuitive” describes the observer’s expectation, not the complainant’s behavior. Behavior such as delayed reporting is not unusual among people who have been assaulted; it is counterintuitive only in the sense that many laypersons do not expect it. Prosecutor-oriented guidance published by the National District Attorneys Association’s American Prosecutors Research Institute makes this point and frames many such responses as adaptive reactions shaped by the person’s circumstances, the severity of the assault, and the relationship to the assailant (Fanflik, 2007, pp. 2, 5, 21).
In its most common form, the testimony is given by an educational, or “cold,” expert. The expert typically has not met the complainant, has not evaluated anyone in the case, and may not have reviewed the case file. The expert describes research and professional experience concerning how people respond to sexual assault and leaves it to the factfinder to decide what, if anything, that information means for the evidence in the case. A companion monograph from the same prosecutor-research organization recommended exactly this structure: an expert who educates jurors about general patterns, who does not examine or treat the victim, who does not offer an opinion about whether the victim was assaulted or is truthful, and who does not describe the victim’s behavior as fitting a syndrome or disorder (Long, 2007). That monograph also recommended against syndrome labels such as rape trauma syndrome, noting among other things that the syndrome’s original findings had not been supported by later research and that the labels invite reliability challenges.
Counterintuitive behavior testimony should be distinguished from two other kinds of evidence. It is not a diagnosis; an educational expert does not say that the complainant has posttraumatic stress disorder or any other condition. And it is not case-specific clinical testimony from a treating provider or an evaluator who has examined the complainant, which raises different questions of foundation, privilege, and vouching. The papers in this hub focus on the educational form because it is the form most often offered and the form courts have most often addressed.
Where the Testimony Appears
Counterintuitive behavior testimony appears in state and federal prosecutions across the country. Many state courts that have addressed the question permit some form of it. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, held in State v. Obeta (2011) that trial courts have discretion to admit expert testimony about delayed reporting, lack of physical injury, and submissive conduct by adult sexual assault victims when the testimony is relevant, helpful, and reliable, while reaffirming its earlier bar on rape trauma syndrome testimony and on opinions about a complainant’s credibility. Pennsylvania, which had been an outlier, enacted a statute in 2012 permitting qualified experts to testify about specific types of victim responses and behaviors while prohibiting any opinion on the credibility of a witness, including the complainant (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5920).
The testimony is especially common in courts-martial. Military appellate courts have long permitted expert testimony to explain behavior that might otherwise be taken as inconsistent with an assault (United States v. Rynning, 1998 [child complainant]), while setting limits on who may give it and how it may be used (United States v. Flesher, 2014), and many sexual assault prosecutions under Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice include an educational expert. Since December 27, 2023, sexual assault and other “covered offenses” committed after that date fall under the exclusive authority of the services’ Offices of Special Trial Counsel, which decide whether to prefer and refer charges and prosecute the resulting cases. The change moved prosecutorial decisions from commanders to specialized prosecutors; it did not change the evidentiary rules that govern expert testimony.
The Behaviors Typically Addressed
The behaviors covered by the testimony fall into a handful of recurring categories. The first is the response during the assault: not resisting, not screaming, or freezing. Research on tonic immobility, an involuntary state of motor inhibition in the face of extreme fear, is the most developed body of work here. In a Swedish emergency-clinic sample of women seen within a month of a rape (of 1,047 eligible women, 317 were enrolled and 298 completed the assessment), about 70% reported significant tonic immobility on a retrospective self-report scale and about 48% reported extreme tonic immobility; at six months, tonic immobility was associated with posttraumatic stress disorder and severe depression among the 189 women reassessed. The study had no comparison group and does not show that any particular person experienced tonic immobility (Möller et al., 2017). Two later studies did not find an association between tonic immobility and PTSD severity, and whether it predicts later PTSD has not been established.
The second category is post-assault demeanor and functioning: appearing calm, going to work or school, or socializing in the days afterward. The third is delayed or incremental disclosure. In a Dutch sample of 323 help-seeking adolescent and young adult women, about 41% disclosed the rape more than one week after it occurred, and younger age, penetration, and a closer relationship with the assailant predicted delay (Bicanic et al., 2015). The fourth is continued contact with the accused. In a U.S. sample of 254 college women assaulted by a friend, a casual dating partner, or a steady dating partner, about three-quarters of the relationships continued in some form after the assault (Edwards et al., 2012). The fifth is inconsistency or incompleteness in the complainant’s accounts, and the sixth is recantation. Each category has its own paper in this hub. These findings support the proposition that the behaviors occur among people who have been assaulted, often at substantial rates; each study’s sample, setting, and method also limit how far its findings extend.
Prevalence and Underreporting
Sexual assault is common, and most of it never reaches police. The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), a household survey conducted for the Bureau of Justice Statistics, estimated 560,890 rape or sexual assault victimizations of persons age 12 or older in 2024, a rate of 2.0 per 1,000 persons, and estimated that 23.6% were reported to police (Tapp & Coen, 2025). By comparison, the survey estimated that 47.9% of all violent victimizations, 73.4% of robberies, and 69.1% of aggravated assaults were reported. The reporting estimate for rape and sexual assault varies considerably from year to year: the same report estimated 46.0% for 2023, and the difference between the two years was statistically significant. Rape and sexual assault estimates rest on comparatively few survey cases, and the Bureau noted reduced precision in 2024 during a transition between survey instruments. The stable conclusion across years is that a majority of rape and sexual assault victimizations measured by the survey are not reported to police, and that reporting is lower than for most other violent crimes.
Military data show the same pattern. The Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2025 annual report recorded 7,998 reports of sexual assault involving service members as victims or subjects (5,022 Unrestricted and 2,976 Restricted), compared with 8,195 in Fiscal Year 2024 (U.S. Department of War, 2026, pp. 3, 17). The Department’s 2025 Workplace Experiences Survey, the successor to its earlier workplace and gender relations surveys, estimated that 4.3% of active-duty women and 1.0% of active-duty men experienced unwanted sexual contact in the prior year, about 20,492 members in all, down from an estimated 29,061 in the 2023 survey. Because the military is predominantly male, the estimated number of men affected (10,632) was slightly larger than the estimated number of women (9,860) (U.S. Department of War, 2026, pp. 4, 9). The Department compared the number of reports made by active-duty members for incidents during service (6,843) with the survey estimate and described the result as a 33% reporting rate, up from 25% in Fiscal Year 2023 (U.S. Department of War, 2026, p. 18).
These figures require care. The survey measures “unwanted sexual contact,” a behaviorally defined survey construct that does not map precisely onto the elements of any offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The reporting rate is a ratio of two different measures, administrative report counts and a survey estimate, not a count of identified individuals who did or did not report. Neither the NCVS nor the Department of Defense data say anything about whether a particular report is accurate, and a report itself, as the Department notes, is not a finding of guilt or innocence (U.S. Department of War, 2026, p. 4 n.3). What the data establish is the point most relevant here: underreporting is pervasive, delayed disclosure is common among people who were assaulted (see the paper on delayed and incremental disclosure in this hub), and a factfinder who assumes that genuine victims always report promptly would be mistaken.
The Legitimate Purpose of the Testimony
The core justification for the testimony is that some jurors hold mistaken beliefs about how people respond to sexual assault and that those beliefs can affect verdicts. Studies find that some jurors hold mistaken expectations, most consistently about demeanor and delay; the extent to which this affects verdicts, and whether any particular panel holds them, is less well established. In mock-trial studies using community volunteers who watched reconstructed rape trials and deliberated in groups, assumptions about physical resistance, prompt reporting, and visible emotion shaped deliberations and, in many cases, verdicts (Ellison & Munro, 2009). A review of quantitative and qualitative studies concluded that mock jurors’ scores on scales measuring such beliefs predict their judgments of blame and their verdicts, and that even participants who reject such beliefs in the abstract sometimes voice them when deliberating about a specific case (Leverick, 2020).
Other evidence suggests the problem may be narrower than often assumed. A survey of 771 serving jurors in England and Wales found low agreement with several such beliefs; for example, only 3% agreed that a person who does not physically fight back cannot really have been raped, and 7% agreed that allegations not reported immediately are hard to believe, although substantial minorities answered “unsure,” and agreement was higher on items concerning intoxication and the expectation that a complainant will be visibly emotional when testifying (Thomas, 2020). A commentary by other researchers has questioned the survey’s design and its reliance on abstract statements rather than case-specific reasoning (Daly et al., 2023), and the disagreement remains active. For practitioners, the reasonable reading is that some jurors hold some of these beliefs, that beliefs about demeanor and intoxication appear more persistent than beliefs about resistance or delay, and that voir dire can reveal what panel members say they believe; no study shows it reduces biased verdicts, and members’ assurances do not show that misconceptions are absent. A separate paper in this hub examines this research in detail.
Where such misconceptions exist, educational testimony serves a legitimate function: it removes an inference the evidence does not support, namely that a behavior shows no assault occurred. That function has a natural limit. Testimony that a behavior is common among people who have been assaulted can neutralize a mistaken inference against the complainant; it cannot, by itself, supply an affirmative inference that the complainant was assaulted. Courts have drawn the same line in legal terms, permitting experts to educate while prohibiting them from corroborating, vouching, or opining that an assault occurred.
The Central Inferential Issue
The scientific question that runs through this hub is non-specificity. The behaviors the testimony addresses, such as delay, continued contact, calm demeanor, and inconsistency, occur in true reports. Some of them may also occur in reports that are mistaken and in the small proportion of reports shown to be deliberately false, and in people who have experienced other stressful events, although research rarely measures this directly. A behavior has diagnostic value only to the extent that it is more common when an assault occurred than when it did not. Most studies in this area describe people who identify themselves as victims; they were not designed to compare those groups with people whose reports were inaccurate, and they generally cannot, because the true state of affairs in each case is unknown.
This point limits what the testimony can prove, but it applies evenly. It does not show that complainants are generally untruthful, and it does not show that the behaviors are suspicious. The research has not shown that the presence or absence of these behaviors distinguishes accurate from inaccurate reports, because few studies measure the same behaviors in both groups; a behavior that did discriminate would do so in both directions. An argument that a complainant’s behavior is “consistent with” a motive to fabricate fails the same test as an argument that it is “consistent with” assault. The paper on behavioral indicators and base rates develops this analysis with a worked example.
How This Hub Is Organized
The hub is arranged in eight groups: a brief history, including this paper and a paper tracing the testimony from rape trauma syndrome to its current form; general scientific questions (diagnosticity and base rates, fit, variability and confounds, and juror beliefs); specific behaviors (freezing, post-assault demeanor, delayed disclosure, continued contact, inconsistent accounts, and recantation); memory, including alcohol and contamination; admissibility, vouching, and preparation for examining an expert; Department of Defense data; research on false, unfounded, and unresolved reports; and key readings.
Limits of the Evidence
Most research on responses to sexual assault comes from samples of women, often college students, help-seeking clients, or patients seen at specialized clinics. Men are underrepresented, even though in the military the estimated number of male victims is comparable to the number of female victims. Studies vary in how they define assault, how long after the event they measure responses, and whether participants were assaulted by strangers, acquaintances, or partners. Most rely on retrospective self-report, which is the appropriate way to learn about victims’ experiences but cannot independently establish what occurred. Mock-jury research uses simulated trials and cannot capture all the features of real deliberation, while surveys of actual jurors measure abstract attitudes rather than case-specific reasoning. Above all, no study or expert can tell a factfinder whether a particular complainant was assaulted. Research describes groups; the question in court concerns one person and one event, and that question belongs to the factfinder.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the 23.6% reporting estimate for 2024 (Tapp & Coen, 2025) is offered, counsel should ask whether it has held up: the same report estimated 46.0% for 2023, the estimates rest on comparatively few survey cases, and the stable finding is that most go unreported. The Department of Defense’s 33% reporting rate (U.S. Department of War, 2026, p. 18) raises the question of what exactly was counted, because it divides administrative report counts by a survey estimate. When frequencies such as about 70% reporting significant tonic immobility (Möller et al., 2017) or about three-quarters of relationships continuing after an assault (Edwards et al., 2012) are cited, counsel should ask who was studied and compared with whom: these samples describe self-identified victims without comparison to inaccurate reports, so they show that a behavior occurs, not that it distinguishes. When the Thomas (2020) finding that only 3% of jurors agreed a person who does not fight back cannot have been raped is cited to argue that testimony is unnecessary, counsel should ask whether abstract survey answers apply to this panel’s reasoning in a concrete case. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Admissibility is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and its military counterpart. Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), the trial judge must ensure that all expert testimony, including testimony based on experience, is relevant and reliable. Rule 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to state that the proponent must establish each requirement by a preponderance of the evidence and that each opinion must reflect a reliable application of the expert’s principles and methods to the facts. Under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, amendments to the Federal Rules generally apply in courts-martial eighteen months after their effective date unless the President directs otherwise. The December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 accordingly became part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025: the proponent of expert testimony in a court-martial must now show the military judge that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met, so gaps in an expert’s basis or in the application of the method are questions of admissibility rather than of weight for the members (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). Courts-martial also apply the six-factor framework of United States v. Houser (1993), which asks about the expert’s qualifications, the subject matter, the basis for the testimony, its legal relevance, its reliability, and whether its probative value outweighs the dangers listed in Rule 403.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that expert testimony about counterintuitive behavior may be admitted to help members set aside common misconceptions, but that it may not be used merely to bolster a complainant by mirroring her account. In United States v. Flesher (2014), the court held that the military judge abused his discretion in admitting testimony from a former sexual assault response coordinator whose qualification as an expert appeared to rest largely on her job title, who exceeded the agreed scope of her testimony, and whose reliability the judge did not address on the record; the court set aside the sexual assault finding and the sentence. The court’s “human lie detector” decisions bar any witness from opining that another is or is not telling the truth, including by quantifying how rarely allegations like the complainant’s prove false (United States v. Brooks, 2007); they permit experts to describe behaviors associated with abuse but not to testify about a complainant’s credibility or an accused’s guilt (United States v. Mullins, 2010), and they apply the same prohibition to lay witnesses (United States v. Kasper, 2003). The admissibility and vouching papers in this hub address these decisions in detail.
Arizona
Arizona amended Rule 702 in 2012 to adopt the federal standard and amended it again, effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment. In State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), the Arizona Supreme Court held that “cold” expert testimony educating the factfinder about general behavioral patterns is not barred because the expert does not apply the principles to the facts, provided the testimony otherwise satisfies Rule 702 and Rule 403. State v. Haskie (2017) extended that reasoning to adult domestic violence victims and cautioned trial courts not to permit experts to speak in broad, categorical terms about what is “common” or “usual” without empirical support. Arizona’s anti-vouching rule, set out in State v. Lindsey (1986), prohibits experts from opining on the truthfulness of a particular witness or of witnesses of that type and from quantifying the proportion of such witnesses who tell the truth.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports educational testimony that sexual assault is substantially underreported, that responses during and after an assault vary widely, and that behaviors such as freezing, delayed disclosure, and continued contact occur in many cases in which an assault took place. Many state courts that have addressed the question, and the military and Arizona courts, permit such testimony when the expert is genuinely qualified and the testimony is reliable and confined. Prosecutors can keep the testimony within that supported scope: an expert whose qualifications rest on research and training rather than job title alone, testimony tied to the particular behaviors actually at issue, statements of frequency drawn from identified studies rather than general impressions, and no comparison between the complainant’s account and the research that amounts to endorsement. Flesher, Brooks, and Haskie identify the most common sources of appellate risk.
The research also counsels caution about what the testimony proves. That a behavior is common among people who have been assaulted shows that the behavior does not undermine the complainant’s account; it does not show that the account is true, because some of the same behaviors may also occur when reports are inaccurate. Argument that treats the expert’s testimony as corroboration invites reversal and overstates the science. Testimony framed as education, with that limit acknowledged, is more accurate and more consistent with the case law.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports a focused challenge to overstatement. Most studies describe self-identified victims without comparison groups, so the testimony can establish that a behavior is not inconsistent with assault but cannot, on the current research, establish that it is evidence of assault. Defense counsel can test whether an expert’s frequency statements trace to specific studies, whether those studies fit the population and circumstances of the case, and whether the testimony drifts from education into corroboration or implicit vouching. Requesting the expert’s sources in advance and reading them is the foundation for each of these inquiries.
The research also counsels caution about overclaiming in the other direction. The behaviors at issue genuinely occur in many true cases, underreporting is well documented, and nothing in the non-specificity critique implies that complainants generally are untruthful or that the behaviors are signs of fabrication. Arguments that a behavior is “consistent with” fabrication fail the same diagnostic test as arguments that it is “consistent with” assault, and the anti-vouching rules bar statistical or categorical credibility evidence offered by either side. A challenge confined to what the research can and cannot show is the most defensible use of the science.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Bicanic, I. A. E., Hehenkamp, L. M., van de Putte, E. M., van Wijk, A. J., & de Jongh, A. (2015). Predictors of delayed disclosure of rape in female adolescents and young adults. European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 6, Article 25883. https://doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v6.25883
Daly, E., Smith, O., Bows, H., Brown, J., Chalmers, J., Cowan, S., Horvath, M., Leverick, F., Lovett, J., Munro, V., & Willmott, D. (2023). Myths about myths? A commentary on Thomas (2020) and the question of jury rape myth acceptance. Journal of Gender-Based Violence, 7.
Edwards, K. M., Kearns, M. C., Gidycz, C. A., & Calhoun, K. S. (2012). Predictors of victim-perpetrator relationship stability following a sexual assault: A brief report. Violence and Victims, 27(1), 25–32. https://doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.27.1.25
Ellison, L., & Munro, V. E. (2009). Reacting to rape: Exploring mock jurors’ assessments of complainant credibility. British Journal of Criminology, 49(2), 202–219. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azn077
Fanflik, P. L. (2007). Victim responses to sexual assault: Counterintuitive or simply adaptive? (NCJ 226201). National District Attorneys Association, American Prosecutors Research Institute.
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Leverick, F. (2020). What do we know about rape myths and juror decision making? International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 24(3), 255–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712720923157
Long, J. G. (2007). Introducing expert testimony to explain victim behavior in sexual and domestic violence prosecutions. National District Attorneys Association, American Prosecutors Research Institute.
Möller, A., Söndergaard, H. P., & Helström, L. (2017). Tonic immobility during sexual assault – a common reaction predicting post-traumatic stress disorder and severe depression. Acta Obstetricia et Gynecologica Scandinavica, 96(8), 932–938. https://doi.org/10.1111/aogs.13174
Tapp, S. N., & Coen, E. J. (2025). Criminal victimization, 2024 (NCJ 310547). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Thomas, C. (2020). The 21st century jury: Contempt, bias and the impact of jury service. Criminal Law Review, 2020(11), 987–1011.
U.S. Department of War. (2026). Department of War annual report on sexual assault in the military: Fiscal year 2025. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office.
Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 2011).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
United States v. Rynning, 47 M.J. 420 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5920.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 403.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Related topic papers: From Rape Trauma Syndrome to Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony · Behavioral Indicators, Base Rates, and the Limits of Inference · Fit and Generalizability: Matching the Research to the Case · Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows · Admissibility of Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony · What Department of Defense Sexual Assault Data Can and Cannot Show
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom