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Memory in the Courtroom

Hypnosis and Memory

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: Can hypnosis recover accurate memories that a witness, complainant, or accused could not otherwise report, and how should courts treat testimony from a person who was hypnotized?
  • What the research shows: Hypnosis can increase the amount a person reports, but the added material contains errors as well as accurate details, and the gains that do occur are generally matched by repeated recall without hypnosis. Hypnosis raises confidence in what is recalled, and suggestions given during hypnosis can produce pseudomemories, particularly in highly hypnotizable people.
  • What it does not show: The research does not show that every hypnotically influenced memory is false, that hypnosis is uniquely more distorting than ordinary misleading questions, or that an expert can tell which details in a particular account came from hypnosis.
  • The law: Rock v. Arkansas bars a per se rule excluding a criminal defendant’s own hypnotically refreshed testimony. Arizona decisions that predate the state’s 2012 adoption of Daubert exclude hypnotically induced recall but allow a previously hypnotized witness to testify to facts demonstrably recalled and recorded before hypnosis, with a record of that recall and safeguards against contamination (Mena, as modified by Collins, and Lopez); an Army appellate decision admitted hypnotically refreshed testimony only on a showing of reliability and six safeguards, and found the testimony inadmissible on its facts (Harrington).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should document a witness’s pre-hypnosis account and treat hypnotically produced details as leads to be corroborated; defense counsel should establish exactly what was recalled before and after hypnosis, recognizing that the same rules protect a defendant’s own testimony.

Hypnosis has been used by investigators, therapists, and occasionally defense teams in the belief that it can retrieve forgotten details: a license plate, a face, or the sequence of a frightening event. That belief remains widespread among the public. When a person who was hypnotized later testifies, the court must decide whether the testimony reflects the person’s own memory of the event, something supplied or reshaped by the procedure, or a mixture of the two.

The issue reaches court in several ways. A complainant or eyewitness may have been hypnotized during an investigation, sometimes years before trial. A defendant may have undergone hypnosis to recover memory of the events charged. A complainant may have recalled abuse for the first time during therapy that used hypnosis or related techniques. In each case the law depends heavily on what the person reported before hypnosis and on how the session was conducted.

This paper describes what hypnosis is and how people differ in responding to it, reviews the research on claims that hypnosis enhances memory, summarizes the evidence on pseudomemory, suggestibility, and confidence, and describes the current state of investigative hypnosis. It then addresses the limits of the evidence and the federal, military, and Arizona law governing testimony from previously hypnotized persons.

What Hypnosis Is and Who Responds to It

A widely used professional definition describes hypnosis as a state of focused attention and reduced peripheral awareness marked by an enhanced capacity to respond to suggestion, and hypnotizability as a person’s ability to experience suggested changes in sensation, thought, or behavior during hypnosis (Elkins et al., 2015). Researchers disagree about whether hypnosis is a distinct altered state or reflects ordinary processes such as expectation, attention, and imaginative involvement; a review of common misconceptions argued that hypnosis is not a trance in which a person loses control and that many popular beliefs about hypnosis and memory are unsupported (Lynn et al., 2020).

People differ considerably in how readily they respond to hypnotic suggestion, and responsiveness is measured with standardized scales. Dramatic suggested effects, such as suggested forgetting or hallucinations, are generally seen only in highly suggestible individuals, and spontaneous amnesia for a hypnotic session is uncommon (Stein et al., 2023). Expectation also matters: a person who believes that hypnosis will unlock hidden memories may report more, and more confidently, because of that belief (Lynn et al., 1997). Effects reported in studies of highly hypnotizable participants therefore may not apply to a person of low or average responsiveness.

Hypermnesia: The Claim and the Evidence

Hypermnesia is an increase in recall across attempts. People sometimes report more under hypnosis than before, but the research supports a limited conclusion. A review that grouped studies by the kind of material and memory test found that gains in recall appeared mainly with free recall of meaningful material such as pictures or prose, rarely with recognition tests or simple word lists, and that experiments separating the effect of hypnosis from the effect of repeated retrieval found that repeated recall without hypnosis produced about as much improvement as recall with hypnosis (Erdelyi, 1994). In two experiments using repeated forced recall of pictures, the ordinary increase in recall across trials appeared, but hypnosis added nothing to the retrieval of correct items; when hypnosis was introduced after several waking trials, it increased new incorrect recall among hypnotizable participants (Dinges et al., 1992). Related work attributed apparent hypnotic gains, at least in part, to changes in willingness to report and in confidence rather than better access to stored information (Whitehouse et al., 1988).

A meta-analysis of 24 laboratory studies of hypnosis with eyewitness-type materials reached a mixed result. Depending on the delay and type of question, hypnotized participants were sometimes more accurate and sometimes less accurate than controls; across studies they produced more uncued errors and more pseudomemories and expressed greater confidence, and the authors recommended caution in using hypnotically refreshed memory in court (Steblay & Bothwell, 1994). A 2025 narrative review similarly described the evidence for memory enhancement as inconsistent, noted that some positive findings have not replicated, and attributed some apparent hypnotic gains to repeated retrieval effort (Leo et al., 2025).

The research does not show that hypnosis never accompanies accurate new recall. In a study comparing interview methods with participants who viewed films of simulated crimes, both a hypnotic interview and the cognitive interview elicited more correct information than a standard police interview, without a significant increase in incorrect information in that study (Geiselman et al., 1985). The fair reading is that hypnosis can be accompanied by more reporting, some of it correct, but the research has not established that hypnosis itself, rather than repeated focused retrieval, produces the gain, and errors in the added material cannot be identified from the account alone.

Pseudomemory, Suggestibility, and Confidence

Suggestions given during hypnosis can be incorporated into memory. In a well-known study, 27 highly hypnotizable participants were told under hypnosis that they had been awakened by loud noises on a night during the previous week; after hypnosis, 13 of them stated that the suggested event had occurred (Laurence & Perry, 1983). The finding concerns highly hypnotizable volunteers and a minor, plausible event, but it shows that a suggestion delivered in hypnosis can later be reported as memory. Research on hypnotic age regression likewise found that adults regressed to childhood do not show a genuine return to childhood ways of thinking or remembering, although they may experience their reports as vivid and real (Nash, 1987).

Hypnosis is not the only, or necessarily the strongest, source of suggestion. In a study in which participants heard a story and were then questioned in or out of hypnosis with misleading or neutral questions, both hypnosis and misleading questions increased memory errors, misleading questions produced significantly more errors than hypnosis, and the two effects were additive, with misleading questions asked in hypnosis producing the most errors (Scoboria et al., 2002). A later study replicated the harmful effect of misleading questions but did not replicate the negative effect of hypnosis itself (Scoboria et al., 2006). These findings cut both ways: hypnosis is not uniquely corrupting, but the questioning that accompanies it is an important source of error, so the content of the session matters as much as the fact of hypnosis.

The effect most often emphasized by courts is on confidence. Across laboratory studies, hypnotized participants expressed more confidence in their recall (Steblay & Bothwell, 1994), and the Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkansas (1987) described “memory hardening,” in which hypnosis increases confidence in both true and false recollections. The research on cross-examination is more nuanced than the hardening concept sometimes implies. In a mock-trial study, hypnotic interrogation did not improve the accuracy of witnesses’ identifications but did increase their confidence in incorrect ones; hypnotized witnesses still often retracted their testimony under cross-examination, and pretrial preparation designed to build confidence reduced retraction more than hypnosis did, with hypnosis plus preparation producing witnesses who sounded relatively certain (Spanos et al., 1991). Confidence, vividness, and the subjective sense of remembering have not reliably distinguished suggested from experienced details in research on false memory more generally (Pérez-Mata & Diges, 2024).

Concerns about hypnosis are greatest when it is used to search for events a person does not remember at all, as in some forms of therapy aimed at recovering memories of abuse. Reviews have concluded that hypnosis does not improve the accuracy of such recall and can increase confidence in inaccurate recollections, and have recommended against its use to recover memories in psychotherapy (Lynn et al., 1997; Leo et al., 2025). Those conclusions concern the technique, not whether a particular hypnotized person has genuine memory of an event; the broader debate is addressed in the companion paper on recovered and repressed memory.

Investigative Hypnosis Today

During the 1970s and early 1980s some police agencies used hypnosis to interview victims and witnesses, as the facts of the Arizona Collins case illustrate. In 1985 a council of the American Medical Association concluded that hypnotically refreshed recollections were more inaccurate than nonhypnotic memory, while acknowledging that hypnosis might sometimes yield investigative leads, and recommended that its use be limited to investigation with appropriate safeguards (Council on Scientific Affairs, 1985). Safeguards proposed by Orne (1979) became the template for many courts: a qualified professional independent of the parties conducts the session; information given to the hypnotist is recorded; a detailed account is obtained from the subject before hypnosis; the entire session is recorded; and no one else is present. These safeguards document the session and reduce some contamination but cannot control a subject’s expectations or tendency to fill gaps.

The prevailing view in the research literature is that hypnosis does not turn a person into an automaton and that hypnotic procedures for enhancing memory should be used, if at all, with caution (Wagstaff, 2008). The cognitive interview was developed in part as an alternative that draws on established principles of memory retrieval without hypnotic induction (Geiselman et al., 1985), and a meta-analysis of 25 years of research found that it reliably increases correct information with a smaller increase in errors (Memon et al., 2010). Where hypnosis is used, the common recommendation is to treat what it produces as a lead requiring independent corroboration, not evidence in itself.

Limits of the Evidence

Most hypnosis research is decades old and used university students, laboratory materials, and low personal stakes. Many studies did not screen participants for hypnotizability, which may account for some contradictory results (Leo et al., 2025). Effects observed in highly hypnotizable volunteers may not apply to an average person, and laboratory hypnotic procedures may differ from what an investigator or therapist actually did. Recent sources are mostly reviews rather than new forensic experiments. Most importantly, group research can describe the conditions under which hypnosis adds errors or inflates confidence; it cannot establish whether a particular detail in a particular person’s account is accurate. Absent a record of what the person recalled before hypnosis and what was said during the session, an expert has no reliable way to separate hypnotically influenced content from genuine memory.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When Laurence and Perry (1983) is cited to show that hypnosis can create memories, counsel should ask who was studied: 13 of 27 highly hypnotizable volunteers accepted a suggestion about a minor event, which does not show what proportion of people in general, or this person, would do so. When Steblay and Bothwell (1994) is cited, counsel should ask what exactly was measured, because accuracy varied with delay and question type while confidence and pseudomemory rose more consistently. When Scoboria et al. (2002) is used to suggest that hypnosis adds no more risk than ordinary questioning, counsel should ask whether the conclusion follows: the same study found that misleading questions asked in hypnosis produced the most errors, so the questions used in the actual session matter. When memory hardening is offered to explain a witness’s certainty, counsel should ask how much evidence links that concept to this witness, given that Spanos et al. (1991) found that hypnotized witnesses often retracted under cross-examination and that pretrial preparation also raised confidence. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Hypnosis and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

In Rock v. Arkansas (1987), the Supreme Court held, five to four, that Arkansas’s per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony violated a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to testify on her own behalf. The Court acknowledged that hypnosis can produce suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening, but reasoned that procedural safeguards such as recording the session, corroborating evidence, cross-examination, expert testimony, and cautionary instructions could address those concerns case by case. The Court expressly declined to decide the admissibility of testimony by previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants. Federal courts have generally assessed such testimony case by case; the Second Circuit, for example, declined to adopt a per se rule and weighed the totality of the circumstances, including safeguards and corroboration (Borawick v. Shay, 1995). Expert testimony about the effects of hypnosis is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, and by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), which extended the gatekeeping obligation to all expert testimony, including nonscientific technical or specialized knowledge. Such testimony may explain how hypnosis affects memory; it may not tell the factfinder whether a particular witness’s memory is accurate.

In courts-martial, United States v. Harrington (A.C.M.R. 1984) held hypnotically refreshed testimony not inadmissible per se, but placed on its proponent the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence, after expert testimony, that hypnosis was a reasonably reliable means of restoring the witness’s memory in the particular case and that six safeguards were observed: an independent psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in hypnosis; a hypnotist not regularly employed by the prosecution or defense; a record of the information given to the hypnotist; a detailed statement from the witness obtained in advance; a record of all contact between hypnotist and subject; and no one present but the hypnotist and the subject. The court said strict compliance with every safeguard was not an absolute prerequisite, and the military judge also had to assess the testimony’s indicia of reliability. The hypnotized witness there was the government’s only surviving victim-witness, and the court held his testimony should not have been admitted because a CID agent took part in the session and nothing corroborated his identification of the accused (18 M.J. at 802-04; see also Criminal Law Department, 2025). These safeguards closely resemble those Orne (1979) proposed. Harrington is a service-court decision that predates Rock, Houser, and Daubert, and this summary did not locate a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces setting a general rule for hypnotically refreshed testimony, so practitioners should confirm its current weight. Expert testimony is governed by Military Rule of Evidence 702 and United States v. Houser (1993); under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, the December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 became part of the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025; practitioners should confirm current text), and Rock applies to an accused’s own testimony.

Arizona

Arizona restricted hypnotically refreshed testimony early. In State v. La Mountain (1980) the Arizona Supreme Court stated that testimony developed as a result of hypnosis is inadmissible, and in State v. Mena (1981) it reversed an aggravated assault conviction because the victim’s testimony, possibly tainted by hypnosis, should have been excluded on timely objection, a rule that Collins later modified. In State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court (1982), the court, applying the Frye general-acceptance standard then in force, held hypnotically induced recall per se inadmissible but, in a supplemental opinion on rehearing, held that a previously hypnotized witness is not thereby incompetent and may testify to matters demonstrably recalled and related before hypnosis; the court required recordation of the witness’s pre-hypnosis recollection and timely disclosure, said that a record of the hypnosis should be made and retained, and suggested, without imposing, safeguards based on Orne’s (a qualified, independent professional; recording of information given to the hypnotist; a detailed pre-hypnosis account; recording of all contact; no one else present). In State v. Lopez (1994), the court, applying Collins, recognized that safeguards against contamination are needed even when the witness’s pre-hypnosis recall was recorded, observed that Collins had refused to require specific safeguards and had only suggested some, if not all, of the Orne standards, vacated the court of appeals opinion on safeguards as foundational requirements, and affirmed suppression.

Under Rock, Arizona’s per se rule cannot be applied to bar a criminal defendant’s own hypnotically refreshed testimony. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard effective January 1, 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024 to track the 2023 federal amendment; Mena and Collins rested on the Frye standard that the 2012 amendment displaced, and this summary did not locate a published Arizona decision reconsidering the hypnosis rule under the current Rule 702. Whether a court today would apply Collins and Lopez as written, or reexamine them under Rule 702, is therefore unsettled, and practitioners should confirm current authority. As in federal court, expert testimony may explain the effects of hypnosis on memory in general terms but may not opine on whether a particular witness is truthful or accurate.

Other Jurisdictions

States have adopted per se exclusion (usually with an exception for pre-hypnosis recollection), admission subject to procedural safeguards, or case-by-case review. New Jersey adopted the safeguards approach in State v. Hurd (1981) but abandoned it in State v. Moore (2006), finding that the safeguards could not reliably control hypnosis’s effects and holding hypnotically refreshed testimony generally inadmissible, subject to Rock. California, after People v. Shirley (1982), enacted a statute allowing testimony in criminal cases to recorded pre-hypnosis recollections if specified procedures were followed and the proponent shows by clear and convincing evidence that the hypnosis did not make that recollection unreliable or substantially impair cross-examination (Cal. Evid. Code § 795).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. A history of hypnosis does not by itself mean that a witness’s earlier memories are lost or inaccurate, and a witness who was hypnotized may still have accurate recollections that predate the procedure; Arizona law and many other jurisdictions permit testimony to recorded pre-hypnosis recollections. Hypnosis is not uniquely distorting compared with misleading questions, some studies found no added error from it, and hypnotized witnesses remain subject to effective cross-examination. Where hypnosis occurred, prosecutors are well positioned to locate and preserve every pre-hypnosis statement, obtain any recording of the session, and identify independent corroboration of the facts the witness reports.

The research also counsels caution. Across studies, hypnosis has not been consistently shown to improve the accuracy of recall, it can add errors and pseudomemories, and it raises confidence in what is reported, so a witness’s certainty after hypnosis is not evidence that the memory is accurate. Details that first appeared during or after hypnosis are leads, not corroboration, and in Arizona testimony even to recorded pre-hypnosis recollections depends on a record of the pre-hypnosis recollection and timely disclosure (Collins), and Lopez treats safeguards against contamination as a foundation for post-hypnosis testimony without mandating a particular set. Hypnotizing a complainant or witness during an investigation risks the admissibility of that person’s testimony; the cognitive interview is a well-supported alternative.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. Hypnosis can increase the volume of reported detail without improving accuracy, can introduce suggested details that are later reported as memory, and can inflate confidence, and the questioning used during hypnosis is itself a significant source of error. Expert testimony explaining these principles, combined with records showing what a witness reported before and after hypnosis, is a legitimate way to help the court and factfinder evaluate the testimony, and the absence of safeguards is a legitimate basis for an admissibility challenge.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. A history of hypnosis does not show that a witness’s account is false, and much of what a witness reported before hypnosis may be accurate and admissible. An expert cannot determine which details in a particular account were produced by hypnosis, and the research on memory hardening does not show that a hypnotized witness cannot be effectively cross-examined. The same research applies when a defendant has been hypnotized: Rock protects the right to testify, but the prosecution may test that testimony with the same scientific concerns.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Council on Scientific Affairs. (1985). Scientific status of refreshing recollection by the use of hypnosis. JAMA, 253(13), 1918–1923. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1985.03350370114035

Criminal Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. (2025). Expert witnesses. In Criminal law deskbook (August 2025 ed.). U.S. Army.

Dinges, D. F., Whitehouse, W. G., Orne, E. C., Powell, J. W., Orne, M. T., & Erdelyi, M. H. (1992). Evaluating hypnotic memory enhancement (hypermnesia and reminiscence) using multitrial forced recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18(5), 1139–1147. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.18.5.1139

Elkins, G. R., Barabasz, A. F., Council, J. R., & Spiegel, D. (2015). Advancing research and practice: The revised APA Division 30 definition of hypnosis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 63(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207144.2014.961870

Erdelyi, M. H. (1994). Hypnotic hypermnesia: The empty set of hypermnesia. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 42(4), 379–390. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207149408409366

Geiselman, R. E., Fisher, R. P., MacKinnon, D. P., & Holland, H. L. (1985). Eyewitness memory enhancement in the police interview: Cognitive retrieval mnemonics versus hypnosis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70(2), 401–412. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.70.2.401

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Laurence, J.-R., & Perry, C. (1983). Hypnotically created memory among highly hypnotizable subjects. Science, 222(4623), 523–524. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.6623094

Leo, D. G., Bruno, D., & Proietti, R. (2025). Remembering what did not happen: The role of hypnosis in memory recall and false memories formation. Frontiers in Psychology, 16, Article 1433762. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1433762

Lynn, S. J., Kirsch, I., Terhune, D. B., & Green, J. P. (2020). Myths and misconceptions about hypnosis and suggestion: Separating fact and fiction. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 34(6), 1253–1264. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3730

Lynn, S. J., Lock, T. G., Myers, B., & Payne, D. G. (1997). Recalling the unrecallable: Should hypnosis be used to recover memories in psychotherapy? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 6(3), 79–83. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.ep11512662

Memon, A., Meissner, C. A., & Fraser, J. (2010). The cognitive interview: A meta-analytic review and study space analysis of the past 25 years. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 16(4), 340–372. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020518

Nash, M. (1987). What, if anything, is regressed about hypnotic age regression? A review of the empirical literature. Psychological Bulletin, 102(1), 42–52. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.102.1.42

Orne, M. T. (1979). The use and misuse of hypnosis in court. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 27(4), 311–341. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207147908407571

Pérez-Mata, N., & Diges, M. (2024). False memories in forensic psychology: Do cognition and brain activity tell the same story? Frontiers in Psychology, 15, Article 1327196. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1327196

Scoboria, A., Mazzoni, G., & Kirsch, I. (2006). Effects of misleading questions and hypnotic memory suggestion on memory reports: A signal-detection analysis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 54(3), 340–359. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207140600689538

Scoboria, A., Mazzoni, G., Kirsch, I., & Milling, L. S. (2002). Immediate and persisting effects of misleading questions and hypnosis on memory reports. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8(1), 26–32. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.8.1.26

Spanos, N. P., Quigley, C. A., Gwynn, M. I., Glatt, R. L., & Perlini, A. H. (1991). Hypnotic interrogation, pretrial preparation, and witness testimony during direct and cross-examination. Law and Human Behavior, 15(6), 639–653. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01065857

Steblay, N. M., & Bothwell, R. K. (1994). Evidence for hypnotically refreshed testimony: The view from the laboratory. Law and Human Behavior, 18(6), 635–651. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499329

Stein, M. V., Lynn, S. J., & Terhune, D. B. (2023). Reconciling myths and misconceptions about hypnosis with scientific evidence. BJPsych Advances, 29(6), 391–392. https://doi.org/10.1192/bja.2023.30

Wagstaff, G. F. (2008). Hypnosis and the law: Examining the stereotypes. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 35(10), 1277–1294. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854808321669

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Legal Authorities

Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775 (1982).

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).

State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (supplemental opinion on rehearing at 209-10).

State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).

State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 611 P.2d 551 (1980).

State v. Lopez, 181 Ariz. 8, 887 P.2d 538 (1994).

State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981), modified by State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).

State v. Moore, 188 N.J. 182, 902 A.2d 1212 (2006).

United States v. Harrington, 18 M.J. 797 (A.C.M.R. 1984).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV.

Cal. Evid. Code § 795.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 1102.

Related topic papers: False Memory · The Misinformation Effect · Recovered and Repressed Memory · Confidence and Accuracy · Improving Eyewitness Memory · Memory Expert Testimony

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: False Confessions: Suggestibility · Courts-Martial