Snap Shot
- The question: How often do developmental, cognitive, and psychiatric conditions occur together in people in the justice system, and how can evaluators and courts avoid attributing everything to the one condition already known?
- What the research shows: Intellectual disability, ADHD, fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, brain injury, language disorders, substance use disorders, and PTSD are each more common in custody than in the community, and they cluster: in one assessment of 99 young people sentenced to detention in Western Australia (93% male, 74% Aboriginal), 89% had a severe impairment in at least one neurodevelopmental domain, most previously unidentified; the rates cannot be generalized to adults or other settings. In vignette experiments (the first in 1982; a 2001 review of 12 studies), clinicians told that a person had an intellectual disability were less likely to recognize the same signs of mental illness.
- What it does not show: Prevalence studies cannot say whether a particular defendant has a condition or which condition, if any, explains a particular act. Overshadowing research rests mainly on vignette studies, and none has measured it in sex offense evaluations.
- The law: The federal, military, and Arizona rules reviewed here do not limit an evaluation to one diagnosis or treat a diagnosis as answering a legal question. Moore v. Texas (2017) faulted a court for treating trauma and a personality disorder as excluding intellectual disability. Arizona’s insanity statute excludes disorders caused by acute voluntary intoxication.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can ask whether each condition was established on its own evidence and whether conduct is better explained by substance use, attitudes, or sexual interest; defense counsel can ask whether an evaluation stopped at the first diagnosis. Both should expect an evaluator to say what each condition does and does not explain.
People who come before the courts often have more than one condition. A defendant charged with a sexual offense may have an intellectual disability and depression, ADHD and a substance use disorder, a brain injury and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or a fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD) recorded in school files only as a learning problem.
When one condition is known, it tends to absorb the explanation for everything else. Clinicians call this diagnostic overshadowing, and it runs in two directions. A known condition can hide another (withdrawal is read as part of an intellectual disability when the person is depressed), or it can be credited with conduct it does not explain (an offense is attributed to ADHD impulsivity when the evidence shows planning, concealment, or persistent sexual interest in children).
Two premises frame this paper. First, no condition, alone or in combination, is a defense to a sexual offense or lessens the harm to the person victimized; each raises questions about knowledge, capacity, culpability, and risk without answering them. Second, the remedy for overshadowing is better evidence, not more diagnoses. Autism with ADHD or intellectual disability in online cases is addressed in the Autism and Online Sexual Offense hub’s paper “Co-Occurring ADHD and Intellectual Disability in Online Offense Cases,” and single-condition evaluation standards in “Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods.”
How Often Conditions Co-Occur in Justice Populations
Prisoner studies find these conditions at rates above community levels, with wide variation by country, sample, and method. A meta-analysis of 42 studies estimated that 25.5% of incarcerated people had ADHD when diagnostic interviews were used, with no significant difference by gender (Young et al., 2015a); this is a base rate for incarcerated people and does not establish a diagnosis in an individual. Systematic reviews of prison studies found that typically 0.5% to 1.5% of prisoners had a diagnosed intellectual disability in interview-based psychiatric surveys (Fazel et al., 2008) and 7% to 10% across international studies that used varied screening measures (Hellenbach et al., 2017); the gap most likely reflects how intellectual disability was identified. The later review found anxiety, personality, and conduct disorders among the most frequent co-occurring problems. Across 33 studies, the average reported rate of a history of traumatic brain injury (TBI) in prisoners was 46%, ranging from under 10% to 100%; most studies used questionnaires, the reviewers rated the level of evidence as poor, and 12 studies noted co-occurring mental health and alcohol problems (Durand et al., 2017).
Psychiatric conditions show documented sex differences. Among 33,588 prisoners in 24 countries, pooled prevalence of psychosis was 3.6% in men and 3.9% in women, and of major depression 10.2% and 14.1% (Fazel & Seewald, 2012). About a quarter of newly incarcerated men and women had an alcohol use disorder, and drug use disorders affected about 30% of men and 51% of women (Fazel et al., 2017). Pooled PTSD prevalence was 6.2% in male and 21.1% in female prisoners (Baranyi et al., 2018). These findings concern prisoners generally, not people convicted of sexual offenses.
The conditions cluster. In 18 prison studies, adults with ADHD had higher odds of every co-occurring disorder examined; in young people the only significant association was with mood disorder (Young et al., 2015b). About 23% of patients treated for substance use disorders met criteria for ADHD (van Emmerik-van Oortmerssen et al., 2012), and most clinic-referred adults with ADHD have at least one other psychiatric disorder (Barkley, 2015, Chapter 13). Among 1,023 adults with intellectual disability in a Scottish population study, 40.9% had mental ill-health by clinical diagnosis but only about 16% under standard ICD-10 or DSM-IV-TR criteria, which the authors concluded undercount it; female gender was among the associated factors (Cooper et al., 2007).
The most direct evidence comes from a multidisciplinary assessment of 99 young people sentenced to detention in Western Australia: 36% met criteria for FASD and 89% had a severe impairment in at least one neurodevelopmental domain, such as memory, language, executive function, or attention, most of it previously unidentified (Bower et al., 2018). The sample was 93% male and 74% Aboriginal, and its rates cannot be generalized to adults or other populations. In an English young offender institution, 47% of 93 young people had a language skill significantly below average, and only one in four of those with an impairment had received speech and language services (Hughes et al., 2017). Condition-specific research is in “Intellectual Disability and Sexual Offending: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Pathways,” “ADHD and Sexual Offending: What the Research Shows,” “Traumatic Brain Injury and Sexual Offending,” and “Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder in Sex Offense Cases.”
Diagnostic Overshadowing in Both Directions
The term comes from experiments in which psychologists read identical case descriptions differing only in whether the person was described as having an intellectual disability. When it was, the same phobia, and in a second experiment the same schizophrenia or personality disorder, was less often recognized as a separate emotional disturbance (Reiss et al., 1982). A review of 12 studies found the bias robust but shown almost entirely with one vignette method (Jopp & Keys, 2001).
In forensic services for people with intellectual disability, staff may read symptoms of mental illness as part of the disability or, where aggression is involved, as antisocial behavior (Oxnam & Gardner, 2020). Communication limits, acquiescence, and efforts to appear more capable can mask a psychiatric disorder, and because inattention and impulsivity are common in intellectual disability, ADHD may go unrecognized; collateral information from caregivers is described as essential (Richards et al., 2020). The pattern extends beyond intellectual disability. Among 547 foster and adopted children evaluated at a mental health center, 80% of those meeting criteria for FASD had never been diagnosed, and intellectual, learning, and communication disorders often went unrecognized (Chasnoff et al., 2015). In one clinic sample, not representative of the general population, 70 of 430 adults (16%) at their first visit to a Japanese clinic for depression were autistic (Takara & Kondo, 2014). These studies show that one diagnosis can hide another; they do not measure how often this happens in criminal cases.
Case Example: In Moore v. Texas (2017), a man sentenced to death for murder claimed intellectual disability. The state habeas court found that he had it; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, reasoning in part that his academic failure and childhood abuse detracted from linking his deficits to intellectual disability and requiring him to show that his adaptive deficits were not related to a personality disorder. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment. It noted that traumatic experiences count in the medical community as risk factors for intellectual disability, that many people with intellectual disability have other mental or physical impairments, and that a personality disorder or mental-health problem is not evidence that a person does not also have intellectual disability. The case illustrates overshadowing in a legal decision; it does not show that any defendant with trauma or a personality disorder has an intellectual disability.
The reverse error also occurs. Once a condition is established, an evaluator, attorney, or court may attribute offense conduct to it without testing the attribution. Because ADHD in adult prisoners travels with conduct, substance use, and personality disorders (Young et al., 2015b), impulsive or rule-breaking behavior in a person with ADHD may reflect any of them. A person with intellectual disability may have limited sexual knowledge and also sexual interest in children. The question is not whether the person has a condition but whether that condition, rather than something else, accounts for the specific behavior. The attribution is a hypothesis to be tested against the history, the offense facts, and any digital evidence.
Hypothetical Example: Consider a hypothetical defendant with well-documented childhood ADHD who is charged with possessing child sexual abuse material, and a report that attributes the offense to impulsivity. The digital record shows targeted searches over two years, files sorted into named folders, and deletion software run after each session. Impulsivity may bear on poor judgment about detection, but sustained, organized collection and concealment are not well explained by ADHD alone, and the report does not weigh sexual interest or co-occurring substance use. The diagnosis may be accurate while the attribution is not.
How Co-Occurrence Affects Evaluation, Competency, and Interviews
Inattention, depression, intoxication or withdrawal, and language impairment can each lower scores on tests of intelligence and memory, so a low score may not show which condition produced it. An evaluator should report when testing occurred relative to substance use, medication, and custody.
A consensus statement of the American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology holds that clinical and forensic evaluations should address whether test results are valid (Sweet et al., 2021). In a person with several conditions, a failed validity measure may reflect feigning or genuine impairment the cutoffs were not built for; validity testing in people of low ability is discussed in “Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods” and “Diagnosing ADHD in Adult Defendants: Records, Rating Scales, and Feigning.”
For competency, conditions can combine in ways a single diagnosis would not predict. A defendant with borderline intellectual functioning may follow a plain explanation of the charges, but not when also depressed or unmedicated for ADHD; a defendant with a language disorder may give answers that sound adequate without understanding them. The legal question is present functional ability, not the number of diagnoses. An evaluation of one condition may miss why a defendant cannot assist counsel, or overstate impairment by attributing to a disability difficulties that resolve once depression is treated. Standards and accommodations are discussed in “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations.”
Language impairment, intellectual disability, ADHD, and intoxication can each affect comprehension of warnings and questions, attention across a long interview, and the tendency to agree. These are reasons to examine the interview record, not conclusions that a statement is unreliable; a recorded statement that is detailed, consistent with independent evidence, and given to open questions is more informative than a statement the person was led to, as is detail that was not public and was not supplied by the interviewer; it does not by itself show that a statement is true. See “ADHD in Police Interviews, Court, and Sentencing” and, on suggestibility and interrogation, the False Confessions pages.
Risk Assessment and Mitigation
Risk tools were developed in samples that included people with unrecorded conditions and generally were not normed separately for people with several. Co-occurrence cuts both ways. Dynamic items rating impulsivity, problem-solving, or emotional regulation may be elevated by ADHD, intellectual disability, or brain injury rather than the criminogenic need the item targets; but the substance use and conduct problems that travel with these conditions are themselves associated with offending, and an impairment that raises an item score may still bear on risk and supervision. An evaluator should score each tool by its manual and then explain which elevations may reflect a condition and which conditions add risk or need treatment (see “Risk Assessment Tools Outside Their Normative Samples”).
Mitigation based on several conditions is only as strong as the link between each and the offense, and must still be weighed against the harm done and every other sentencing purpose. Treatable co-occurring conditions, such as depression, substance use, or untreated ADHD, matter to both sides: they may help explain the offense, and their treatment may be a supervision condition (see “Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation”).
Methods That Reduce Attribution Errors
Several practices, recommended in professional literature rather than tested in studies of forensic outcomes, are meant to reduce overshadowing in either direction. The first is multi-source history: school and special-education records, prior testing, medical and birth records (including documented prenatal alcohol exposure), head-injury records, treatment and medication history, and informants who knew the person before the charges (Richards et al., 2020). The second is establishing each condition on its own criteria and evidence rather than inferring one from another. The third is functional assessment: what the person can and cannot do in the settings that matter, such as reading a probation agreement or following an interview. The fourth is an explicit differential: for each important behavior, the evaluator weighs which conditions, which non-clinical explanations (attitudes, sexual interest, circumstances), or which combination best accounts for it, and states the evidence for and against each.
Limits of the Evidence
The prevalence figures come from prisoners and detained youth generally, rarely from people charged with sexual offenses, and vary with country, era, sampling, and method (interview, questionnaire, or records). The strongest clustering study involved 99 mostly Aboriginal young people in one Australian center, and TBI rates rest largely on self-report. Overshadowing research rests mostly on decades-old vignette experiments about intellectual disability; no study has measured how often evaluators in sex offense cases miss a co-occurring condition or over-attribute conduct to one. Several prevalence studies reported sex differences (women had higher rates of depression, drug use disorders, and PTSD; ADHD showed no gender difference), but the overshadowing studies did not test it, and most samples of people who sexually offend are men. Group findings cannot establish whether a particular defendant has a condition, which condition explains an act, or what he or she will do.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a prison figure such as 25.5% for ADHD (Young et al., 2015a) or 46% for TBI history (Durand et al., 2017) is offered to suggest that a defendant probably has the condition, ask who was studied and how: prisoners in general, sometimes by questionnaire, not this person. When the 89% figure for neurodevelopmental impairment (Bower et al., 2018) is cited, ask whether detained Australian adolescents resemble an adult in an American court. When a condition is offered to explain the offense, ask whether any study or case evidence links that condition to that behavior rather than simply showing that both are present. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Co-Occurring Conditions and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Expert testimony is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023, to require the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the opinion rests on sufficient facts or data and reliably applies reliable methods; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extend gatekeeping to all expert testimony. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(c), a court-ordered report must include history and present symptoms, tests and results, findings, and opinions on diagnosis and prognosis; nothing limits it to one diagnosis. Competency under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 and Dusky v. United States (1960) is a functional question. Moore v. Texas (2017) held that intellectual disability determinations must be informed by current medical standards, which recognize frequent co-occurring conditions; with Atkins v. Virginia (2002) and Hall v. Florida (2014), it governs capital eligibility. Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025) moved most departures, including the Chapter 5H specific-offender-characteristic policy statements, to Appendix B; the Commission described the change as outcome neutral, and the same facts may be considered for a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
In courts-martial, an R.C.M. 706 board of physicians or clinical psychologists must make separate findings on whether the accused had a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the conduct, the clinical psychiatric diagnosis, whether he or she could appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of the conduct, and present capacity; the rule adds that other appropriate questions may be included. The diagnosis question is phrased in the singular, and the rule neither requires nor bars multiple diagnoses. In this paper’s reading, not the rule’s text, the provision for other questions would permit an order to ask about each condition at issue. “Severe mental disease or defect” excludes abnormalities manifested only by repeated criminal or antisocial conduct and minor disorders such as nonpsychotic behavior disorders and personality defects. Military Rule of Evidence 702 incorporated the 2023 federal amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). The R.C.M. 706 text is from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; Executive Order 14130 (Dec. 20, 2024; 89 Fed. Reg. 105343), which postdates it, did not amend R.C.M. 706 or Military Rule of Evidence 702, as checked against the order’s annex; amendments after that order, including proposed amendments published for comment in October 2025, should be checked against the current Manual.
Arizona
Arizona’s competency statute defines a mental illness, defect, or disability as a psychiatric or neurological disorder evidenced by behavioral or emotional symptoms, including congenital conditions, conditions resulting from injury or disease, and developmental disabilities as defined in A.R.S. § 36-551; such a condition alone is not grounds for a finding of incompetence (A.R.S. § 13-4501). Proceedings are governed by Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11 and A.R.S. §§ 13-4501 to 13-4517.
The insanity statute excludes from “mental disease or defect” disorders resulting from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal, character defects, psychosexual disorders, and impulse control disorders (A.R.S. § 13-502(A)), so where a qualifying condition and substance use coexist an evaluator must distinguish their effects at the time of the offense. Arizona generally does not permit expert evidence of a mental condition short of insanity to negate the mental state element of an offense (State v. Mott, 1997; Clark v. Arizona, 2006, left room for observation evidence); how those decisions apply to a particular case is a question for counsel and the court and should be verified before testimony. At sentencing, A.R.S. § 13-701(E) requires the court to consider whether capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or conform conduct to the law was significantly impaired but not so impaired as to constitute a defense. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended, effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports asking whether each claimed condition was established on its own evidence (records predating the charges, informants, valid testing) rather than inferred from another diagnosis or post-arrest self-report, and whether conduct attributed to a condition is better explained by co-occurring substance use, conduct or personality problems, or sexual interest, since these cluster in justice populations and some are themselves associated with offending. Prosecutors are often well placed to compare a claimed impairment with the offense facts, the digital evidence, and daily functioning.
The research also counsels caution. Moore shows that treating trauma, a personality disorder, or substance use as excluding a developmental condition is itself a recognized error. A failed validity measure in a person with several genuine impairments may not mean feigning, and a condition is not fabricated merely because it was never diagnosed; the detention and clinic studies show that many go unrecognized for years.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports asking whether an evaluation stopped at the first diagnosis. Co-occurring conditions are common in justice populations and often missed, and a language disorder, FASD, depression, or brain injury may bear on competency, understanding of warnings, testing, and treatment in ways the known diagnosis does not. Defense counsel are often well placed to gather the school, medical, birth, and treatment records and informants that allow each condition to be established independently, and to ask an evaluator what each does and does not explain.
The research also counsels caution. Prisoner prevalence figures are not evidence that a client has a condition, and a growing list of diagnoses without supporting records may be challenged under Rule 702 and can weaken the condition that is well established. Attributing offense conduct to a condition without evidence that it, rather than sexual interest, attitudes, or substance use, accounts for the behavior is the reverse form of overshadowing. Mitigation built on several conditions is strongest when it explains how they bear on this conduct and on a concrete treatment and supervision plan, while acknowledging the harm to the person victimized.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Baranyi, G., Cassidy, M., Fazel, S., Priebe, S., & Mundt, A. P. (2018). Prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder in prisoners. Epidemiologic Reviews, 40(1), 134–145. https://doi.org/10.1093/epirev/mxx015
Barkley, R. A. (Ed.). (2015). Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder: A handbook for diagnosis and treatment (4th ed.). Guilford Press.
Bower, C., Watkins, R. E., Mutch, R. C., Marriott, R., Freeman, J., Kippin, N. R., Safe, B., Pestell, C., Cheung, C. S. C., Shield, H., Tarratt, L., Springall, A., Taylor, J., Walker, N., Argiro, E., Leitão, S., Hamilton, S., Condon, C., Passmore, H. M., & Giglia, R. (2018). Fetal alcohol spectrum disorder and youth justice: A prevalence study among young people sentenced to detention in Western Australia. BMJ Open, 8(2), Article e019605. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2017-019605
Chasnoff, I. J., Wells, A. M., & King, L. (2015). Misdiagnosis and missed diagnoses in foster and adopted children with prenatal alcohol exposure. Pediatrics, 135(2), 264–270. https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2014-2171
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Durand, E., Chevignard, M., Ruet, A., Dereix, A., Jourdan, C., & Pradat-Diehl, P. (2017). History of traumatic brain injury in prison populations: A systematic review. Annals of Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine, 60(2), 95–101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rehab.2017.02.003
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Hellenbach, M., Karatzias, T., & Brown, M. (2017). Intellectual disabilities among prisoners: Prevalence and mental and physical health comorbidities. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 30(2), 230–241. https://doi.org/10.1111/jar.12234
Hughes, N., Chitsabesan, P., Bryan, K., Borschmann, R., Swain, N., Lennox, C., & Shaw, J. (2017). Language impairment and comorbid vulnerabilities among young people in custody. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 58(10), 1106–1113. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcpp.12791
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
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Legal Authorities
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4247(c).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-502(A), 13-701(E), 13-4501, 36-551.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Rule for Courts-Martial 706.
Exec. Order No. 14130, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. B (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2025) (Amendment 836).
Related topic papers: Evaluating Defendants With Developmental and Cognitive Conditions: Standards and Methods · Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Intellectual Disability and Sexual Offending: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Pathways · Diagnosing ADHD in Adult Defendants: Records, Rating Scales, and Feigning · Traumatic Brain Injury and Sexual Offending · Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder in Sex Offense Cases
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · False Confessions · Courts-Martial