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ADHD in Police Interviews, Court, and Sentencing

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How does attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) bear on a suspect’s police interview and rights waiver, on a defendant’s participation in court, and on sentencing in a sexual offense case?
  • What the research shows: About one in four incarcerated adults is diagnosed positive for ADHD by clinical interview (25.5%; Young et al., 2015), a base rate that does not establish a diagnosis in an individual. In small prisoner samples (for example, 90 male prisoners), ADHD symptoms were associated with higher scores on a compliance measure (though not suggestibility). In four studies reviewed by Gudjonsson (2018), two of prisoners and two of community youth, people screening positive for ADHD were two to three times as likely to report having falsely confessed (self-report; none verified a confession as false); in one Scottish prison sample hyperactivity-impulsivity accounted for the association after adjustment for conduct disorder, and conduct problems explained part of it. Adolescent defendants with attention problems scored lower on measures of Miranda comprehension and trial competence. Judges and mock jurors respond to mental-condition evidence inconsistently; it can lower or raise perceived blame.
  • What it does not show: No study shows that a particular confession by a person with ADHD is false, or that ADHD makes a defendant incompetent, less culpable, or more dangerous. Most findings rest on self-reported false confessions, screening measures, and samples of men, and no published experiment located has tested how judges or jurors respond to ADHD evidence specifically.
  • The law: ADHD is weighed within the totality of the circumstances for a waiver or confession. At federal sentencing it is argued under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) since Guidelines Amendment 836 moved most departures, including the Chapter 5H policy statements, to Appendix B; Arizona weighs it under A.R.S. § 13-701(E); in courts-martial it may be offered under R.C.M. 1001.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should ask whether ADHD was established by records predating the charges and whether the interview record shows understanding, without dismissing documented vulnerabilities; defense counsel should connect the condition to specific interview, courtroom, or offense behavior and to a treatment plan, without implying that ADHD explains away the offense or the harm to the victim.

ADHD is common among people who come into contact with the criminal justice system, and it raises questions at three points in a sexual offense case. In the interview room, impulsivity, poor tolerance of confinement, and a tendency to go along with pressure may affect what a suspect says and whether a waiver of rights was knowing and intelligent. In court, problems sustaining attention, restlessness, and emotional reactivity may affect how a defendant follows testimony, assists counsel, testifies, and is perceived. At sentencing, ADHD may be heard as an explanation, as a sign of continuing risk, or as both.

Two premises frame the paper. First, sexual offenses cause real harm to victims, and ADHD is not a defense to them; it can bear on how evidence was obtained, how a defendant participates, and what sentence fits, but it does not answer whether the offense occurred or excuse it. Second, research on groups cannot establish anything about an individual defendant.

This paper summarizes the research briefly. Interrogation and false confessions are treated in depth in the False Confessions resource, including its paper “Mental Illness, ADHD, and Other Personal Vulnerabilities,” which this paper does not repeat; competency standards, Miranda waiver law, and accommodations in “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations”; the general law of mitigation in “Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation”; and diagnosis and feigning in “Diagnosing ADHD in Adult Defendants: Records, Rating Scales, and Feigning.”

ADHD in the Police Interview

How Often Suspects Have ADHD

A meta-analysis of 42 studies estimated that 25.5% of incarcerated people met criteria for ADHD on diagnostic interview, with no significant differences by gender or age (Young et al., 2015); a later meta-analysis of 102 studies, using different methods, estimated 26.2% in adult detention (Baggio et al., 2018), consistent with about one in four. Among 200 detainees at a London police station, 23.5% screened positive for current ADHD, and an “appropriate adult,” a safeguard English law provides for vulnerable suspects, was present in only 4.2% of interviews (Young et al., 2013). Gudjonsson (2018) notes that suspects with ADHD find confinement harder than others to tolerate; that this weakens resistance during long detention is a reasonable inference that has not been tested directly.

Suggestibility, Compliance, and Reported False Confessions

Gudjonsson and colleagues distinguish interrogative suggestibility, the tendency to accept leading information or shift answers under negative feedback, from compliance, the tendency to go along with requests to avoid conflict while privately disagreeing. ADHD appears to bear more on the second. Gudjonsson’s review reports that adults diagnosed with ADHD did not appear unduly suggestible on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale but gave a disproportionate number of “don’t know” answers, a response style he links to a risk of distrusting one’s own memory under interrogation (Gudjonsson et al., 2007, as described in Gudjonsson, 2018). In 90 male prisoners, ADHD symptoms were associated with compliance but not suggestibility, more strongly for current than childhood symptoms, and symptomatic prisoners were more likely to report a past false confession (Gudjonsson et al., 2008).

Larger studies point the same way. Among 386 male Scottish prisoners, 33.4% reported a lifetime false confession, most often to protect someone else; conduct disorder and ADHD were the two strongest predictors, hyperactivity-impulsivity drove the ADHD association after adjustment for conduct disorder, and conduct disorder mediated part of it (Gudjonsson et al., 2021). In an anonymous national survey of 22,226 young people in Iceland, more severe ADHD increased the risk of both police interrogation and reported false confession, and males were at greater risk of both than females (Gudjonsson et al., 2016). Summarizing four such studies, two of prisoners and two of young people in the community, Gudjonsson (2018) reports that people screening positive for ADHD were two to three times as likely as their peers to report a false confession.

These findings identify a vulnerability; they do not measure how often confessions by people with ADHD are false. “False confession” here is the participant’s own report, often about minor matters or protecting a peer, the samples are mostly men, and conduct problems, which make police contact more likely, explain part of the association. Suggestibility and compliance are reviewed in the False Confessions: Suggestibility resource.

Hypothetical Example: Consider a hypothetical 20-year-old with a documented childhood ADHD diagnosis who is questioned for several hours about an allegation of sexual contact with a younger relative. Early in the recording he answers “I don’t know” to many questions and asks repeatedly how long he must stay; late in the interview he agrees with the detective’s account. The research would support examining compliance, the length of detention, and whether his later statements added details the questioner had not supplied. It would not support an opinion that the admission is false, and the same recording might show accurate details he volunteered that were neither public nor supplied by the questioner. Reliability turns on corroboration and on how the information was obtained, not on the diagnosis.

Understanding Rights Warnings

No published study located has measured Miranda comprehension in adults with ADHD as a group. Among 152 male and female defendants aged 11 to 17, legal capacities relevant to interrogation and adjudication increased with age, verbal ability was a particularly strong predictor, and defendants with signs of attention deficits or hyperactivity scored lower on the competency measures, which included Miranda comprehension, as did those with little attorney contact or from low-income backgrounds (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). That study concerns adolescents and symptom ratings, not diagnosed adults.

Warnings themselves vary widely in reading level (Rogers et al., 2007). A suspect whose attention lapses during a long warning, or who signs quickly to end an unpleasant situation, may waive rights he did not fully take in, while an attentive adult with ADHD may understand an ordinary warning without difficulty. The question is what this suspect understood of the warning actually given, which the recording, his own paraphrase, and later testing can help answer.

ADHD in the Courtroom

Attention, Testimony, and Demeanor

A defendant with significant ADHD may miss testimony counsel needs him to follow, react visibly to adverse evidence, interrupt, or answer impulsively on cross-examination. Emotional impulsiveness in adults with ADHD has been associated with higher arrest rates (Barkley, 2015a), and similar dysregulation may surface in court. No study located has measured these effects in defendants at trial, so they are clinical inferences, and many adults with ADHD, particularly with treatment, manage court without difficulty.

Demeanor creates a separate risk. In surveys across 75 countries, the belief that liars avert their gaze was nearly universal (Global Deception Research Team, 2006), yet a meta-analysis of 158 behavioral cues found most weakly related or unrelated to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003), and people judging lies in real time are correct about 54% of the time (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). None of this research studied ADHD, but it suggests that a fidgeting, distractible defendant may be judged evasive or indifferent for reasons unrelated to honesty or remorse. The point applies equally to complainants and witnesses with ADHD. Expert testimony explaining such behavior is subject to Rule 702 and cannot vouch for anyone’s truthfulness.

Competency and Effective Participation

ADHD was not among the diagnostic predictors reported in the largest competency meta-analysis (Pirelli et al., 2011; 68 studies), which suggests that it seldom raises a competence question by itself. In that analysis defendants with a psychotic disorder were about eight times as likely as others to be found incompetent, the most robust diagnostic finding. Effective participation can still be affected by ADHD and is assessed individually. Competency becomes a real question mainly when ADHD occurs with intellectual disability, severe mood or psychotic symptoms, or, in juvenile cases, developmental immaturity. More often the practical issue is effective participation and accommodation, discussed in “Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations.”

ADHD as Mitigation and How It Is Received

Explanation, Excuse, and Risk

Defendants offer ADHD at sentencing to explain impulsive conduct, school failure, substance use, or early adversity, and to show a treatable condition that supervision can address. Clinical opinion about its weight is not uniform. One leading clinician takes the position that ADHD may help explain impulsive acts but should not excuse them or serve as an extenuating factor in guilt or sentencing, while describing the legal question as unsettled (Barkley, 2015b); another chapter of the same handbook lists criminal sentencing among the benefits that can motivate exaggerated symptom reports (Ramsay, 2015). Records predating the charges are what give a mitigation claim weight.

Whether ADHD relates to sexual offending is reviewed in “ADHD and Sexual Offending: What the Research Shows,” and treatment effects in “ADHD Treatment, Medication, and Offending Risk.” ADHD evidence is easier for a court to weigh when tied to specific features of the offense and to a concrete treatment plan than when offered as a label; planned contact offenses or the extended collection of child sexual abuse material may be harder to explain by impulsivity.

The Double-Edged Effect

Mental-condition evidence can cut both ways. In a national experiment, 181 U.S. state trial judges sentencing a hypothetical defendant with psychopathy gave shorter sentences, 12.83 rather than 13.93 years on average, when expert testimony described a biological mechanism; the share listing mitigating factors rose from 29.7% to 47.8%, although 86.7% listed aggravating factors (Aspinwall et al., 2012). Mock-juror research has found that several kinds of psychological mitigation reduced death sentences (Barnett et al., 2004). But a systematic review of 32 experimental studies of mock jurors’ decisions about defendants with mental health conditions found many effects nonsignificant and their direction, toward leniency or harshness, inconsistent even among higher-quality studies (Holmes & Beazley, 2025).

None of these studies tested ADHD. The concern is an inference from its features: emphasis on impulsivity and poor self-control may lead a decision-maker to conclude both that the defendant is less blameworthy and that he is likely to act impulsively again. Whether evidence of effective treatment shifts the balance toward mitigation is a reasonable hypothesis that has not been tested for ADHD.

Case Example: In United States v. Bates (11th Cir. 2025) (unpublished), the defendant received 324 months’ imprisonment for production of child pornography, the low end of his Guidelines range, after asking for 180 months. On appeal he argued that the district court ignored his history and characteristics, including diagnoses of ADHD and borderline intellectual functioning. The court of appeals affirmed: the district court had expressly considered an evaluator’s analysis of his condition, found that his characteristics did not warrant a downward variance, and concluded that the requested sentence would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, and the weight given each § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sentencing court. The case illustrates that ADHD evidence is weighed against the harm of the offense, not instead of it; it does not show how such evidence is received in other cases.

Limits of the Evidence

The interview research comes largely from one research group, relies on self-reported false confessions and screening measures, and draws mostly on men in Iceland and the United Kingdom, where interrogation practices and safeguards differ from those in the United States. The greater risk for males in the Icelandic survey may reflect differences in police contact rather than vulnerability; how women with ADHD fare in interviews has not been studied, and an expert consensus notes that ADHD is likely underrecognized in girls and women (Young et al., 2020). Miranda comprehension has been studied in adolescents with attention problems but not in adults diagnosed with ADHD. No study located measures ADHD’s effect on courtroom participation, and no published experiment has tested responses to ADHD evidence at sentencing. Group findings cannot establish anything about an individual defendant or a particular statement.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a study is cited for the proposition that people with ADHD often confess falsely, ask how false confession was measured (usually self-report), what the confessions concerned, and whether conduct disorder was taken into account (Gudjonsson et al., 2021). When an expert relies on a police-station or prisoner sample, ask about the country, its safeguards, and whether ADHD was diagnosed or merely screened (Young et al., 2013). When adolescent Miranda findings are applied to an adult, ask whether the sample and measures fit (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). When research on reactions to mental-condition evidence is offered, ask whether any of it involved ADHD and whether its effects replicated (Holmes & Beazley, 2025). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

ADHD in Interviews, Court, and Sentencing and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

A Miranda waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). Because coercive police activity is a necessary predicate for finding a confession involuntary under the Due Process Clause (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986), ADHD alone does not make a statement involuntary, but it may bear on whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent and on the weight of the statement. Waivers are assessed under the totality of the circumstances, including age, experience, education, background, and intelligence (Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Expert testimony is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999); Rule 704(b) bars an opinion on whether the defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the offense.

At federal sentencing, the court must impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to serve the purposes in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), considering the defendant’s history and characteristics together with the seriousness of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public, and needed treatment. Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025) moved most departures, including the Chapter 5H specific-offender-characteristic policy statements, to Appendix B; the Commission described the change as outcome neutral, and the same facts may be considered for a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). ADHD arguments are therefore requests for a variance, reviewed for abuse of discretion (Gall v. United States, 2007).

In courts-martial, rights warnings are governed by Article 31(b), UCMJ, and Military Rule of Evidence 305, under which a waiver must be made freely, knowingly, and intelligently. At presentencing, R.C.M. 1001(c) gives a crime victim the right to be reasonably heard, and R.C.M. 1001(d) permits the defense to present matters in extenuation, which explain the circumstances of the offense, and in mitigation, which are offered to lessen the punishment, with relaxed rules of evidence; the rule does not mention ADHD, but the condition may be offered under it. R.C.M. 706 excludes nonpsychotic behavior disorders from “severe mental disease or defect,” a threshold ADHD alone is unlikely to meet. Military Rule of Evidence 702 governs expert testimony; the 2023 federal amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). The other rules come from the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial; later amendments should be checked.

Arizona

Under A.R.S. § 13-3988, the trial judge determines voluntariness outside the jury’s presence, considering all the surrounding circumstances, including whether the defendant knew he need not make a statement and was advised of the right to counsel; no factor is conclusive, and if the confession is admitted the jury may hear evidence on voluntariness and give it the weight it finds appropriate. Arizona generally does not permit expert evidence of a mental condition short of insanity to negate the mental state element of an offense (State v. Mott, 1997; Clark v. Arizona, 2006, left room for observation evidence); how those decisions apply to a particular case is a question for counsel and the court and should be verified before testimony. ADHD evidence is therefore ordinarily directed to the reliability of statements and to sentencing rather than to intent.

At sentencing, A.R.S. § 13-701(E) requires the court to consider mitigating circumstances, including age, a capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform it to the law that was significantly impaired but not so impaired as to constitute a defense, and any other factor relevant to the defendant’s character or background or to the nature or circumstances of the crime. The aggravating circumstances in § 13-701(D) include physical, emotional, or financial harm to the victim, and victims have a constitutional right to be heard at sentencing (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(4)). Many sexual offenses against children are dangerous crimes against children under A.R.S. § 13-705, whose ranges limit how far mitigation can move a sentence. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended, effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports asking whether ADHD was established by records predating the charges rather than a self-report scale completed after arrest, and whether the interview shows understanding: an accurate paraphrase of the warnings, details volunteered rather than supplied, and consistency with independent evidence. Detail that was not public and was not supplied by the interviewer, produced in response to open questions, is more informative than detail the person was led to; it does not by itself show that a statement is true. It supports recognizing that the false-confession findings rest mostly on self-report, that conduct problems explain part of the association, and that ADHD was not among the diagnostic predictors of incompetence reported in the largest competency meta-analysis, though effective participation is assessed individually. At sentencing, persisting impulsivity without treatment, the harm to the victim, and the planned features of many offenses are legitimate considerations, and Bates reflects the discretion courts retain. Recording interviews in full, keeping warnings simple, checking understanding, and limiting detention protect a statement’s reliability and its durability on review.

The research also counsels caution. In small prisoner samples (for example, 90 male prisoners; Gudjonsson et al., 2008), ADHD symptoms were associated with higher scores on a compliance measure; a confession obtained after long detention from any suspect with a documented vulnerability warrants attention to corroboration. Fidgeting, poor eye contact, or an impulsive answer in court does not by itself indicate deceit or lack of remorse. Treating every reference to impulsivity as proof of future dangerousness goes beyond the data, particularly where the defendant is engaged in treatment.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports presenting ADHD where it is documented and relevant: developing childhood records, medication history, and informants; asking an evaluator to examine compliance, tolerance of detention, and understanding of the particular warning given; and requesting courtroom accommodations that let the defendant follow testimony and assist counsel. Explaining how restlessness or impulsive responses may look, without vouching for credibility, can address demeanor misreadings. A mitigation presentation is stronger when it connects the condition to specific features of the offense and to a concrete treatment and supervision plan than when it rests on the diagnosis alone.

The research also counsels caution. No study shows that a particular confession by a person with ADHD is false; the research identifies a vulnerability, not an outcome, and corroborated details may weigh against a reliability challenge. A diagnosis first made after arrest from self-report is open to challenge, and a chapter in a leading clinical handbook takes the position that ADHD should not serve as an extenuating factor. Emphasizing impulsivity without showing treatment may lead a judge or jury to see greater risk rather than less blame, and, as Bates shows, courts weigh ADHD against the seriousness of the offense and the harm to the victim.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Aspinwall, L. G., Brown, T. R., & Tabery, J. (2012). The double-edged sword: Does biomechanism increase or decrease judges’ sentencing of psychopaths? Science, 337(6096), 846–849. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1219569

Baggio, S., Fructuoso, A., Guimaraes, M., Fois, E., Golay, D., Heller, P., Perroud, N., Aubry, C., Young, S., Delessert, D., Gétaz, L., Tran, N. T., & Wolff, H. (2018). Prevalence of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in detention settings: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 9, Article 331. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2018.00331

Barkley, R. A. (2015a). Emotional dysregulation is a core component of ADHD. In R. A. Barkley (Ed.), Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder: A handbook for diagnosis and treatment (4th ed., pp. 81–115). Guilford Press.

Barkley, R. A. (2015b). Psychological assessment of children with ADHD. In R. A. Barkley (Ed.), Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder: A handbook for diagnosis and treatment (4th ed., pp. 408–426). Guilford Press.

Barnett, M. E., Brodsky, S. L., & Davis, C. M. (2004). When mitigation evidence makes a difference: Effects of psychological mitigating evidence on sentencing decisions in capital trials. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 22(6), 751–770. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.591

Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214–234. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2

DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129(1), 74–118. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74

Global Deception Research Team. (2006). A world of lies. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 37(1), 60–74. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022105282295

Gudjonsson, G. H. (2018). The psychology of false confessions: Forty years of science and practice. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119315636

Gudjonsson, G. H., Gonzalez, R. A., & Young, S. (2021). The risk of making false confessions: The role of developmental disorders, conduct disorder, psychiatric symptoms, and compliance. Journal of Attention Disorders, 25(5), 715–723. https://doi.org/10.1177/1087054719833169

Gudjonsson, G. H., Sigurdsson, J. F., Bragason, O. O., Newton, A. K., & Einarsson, E. (2008). Interrogative suggestibility, compliance and false confessions among prisoners and their relationship with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms. Psychological Medicine, 38(7), 1037–1044. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291708002882

Gudjonsson, G. H., Sigurdsson, J. F., Sigfusdottir, I. D., Asgeirsdottir, B. B., González, R. A., & Young, S. (2016). A national epidemiological study investigating risk factors for police interrogation and false confession among juveniles and young persons. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 51(3), 359–367. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00127-015-1145-8

Gudjonsson, G. H., Young, S., & Bramham, J. (2007). Interrogative suggestibility in adults diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD): A potential vulnerability during police questioning. Personality and Individual Differences, 43(4), 737–745. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2007.01.014

Holmes, H. L., & Beazley, P. (2025). Juror decision-making concerning defendants with mental health conditions: A systematic review of experimental studies. Psychology, Crime & Law. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2025.2574904

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Pirelli, G., Gottdiener, W. H., & Zapf, P. A. (2011). A meta-analytic review of competency to stand trial research. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 17(1), 1–53. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021713

Ramsay, J. R. (2015). Psychological assessment of adults with ADHD. In R. A. Barkley (Ed.), Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder: A handbook for diagnosis and treatment (4th ed., pp. 427–450). Guilford Press.

Rogers, R., Harrison, K. S., Shuman, D. W., Sewell, K. W., & Hazelwood, L. L. (2007). An analysis of Miranda warnings and waivers: Comprehension and coverage. Law and Human Behavior, 31(2), 177–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9054-8

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Legal Authorities

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).

United States v. Bates, No. 24-11105 (11th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished).

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(4).

10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (Article 31(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-701(D)–(E), 13-705, 13-3988, 13-4501 to 13-4517.

Fed. R. Evid. 702, 704(b).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 305, 702.

Rule for Courts-Martial 706, 1001.

U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025) (deleting §§ 5H1.1–5H1.12 and 5K2.0–5K2.24); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. B (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2025) (compilation of deleted departure provisions).

Related topic papers: Competency, Miranda Waiver, and Accommodations · Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation · ADHD and Sexual Offending: What the Research Shows · Diagnosing ADHD in Adult Defendants: Records, Rating Scales, and Feigning · ADHD Treatment, Medication, and Offending Risk · Young Adults Aged 18 to 25

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: False Confessions · False Confessions: Suggestibility · Courts-Martial