Snap Shot
- The question: How common is stalking by intimate partners, how is technology used to monitor and harass a partner, how is stalking risk assessed, and what can the research tell a court about a particular course of conduct?
- What the research shows: In national CDC data, 31.2% of women and 16.1% of men reported lifetime stalking, and 43.4% of female and 32.4% of male victims were stalked by a current or former partner. In samples drawn from criminal-justice, police, and clinical sources, stalkers who had been sexually intimate with the victim were the most likely to threaten and use violence (Mohandie et al., 2006; Rosenfeld, 2004); these are group findings from cases that came to official attention and do not predict any one person. Technology-facilitated abuse includes monitoring of phones and accounts, location tracking, and threats to share intimate images; in one study of 703 high school students, girls and boys reported similar frequencies of most digital dating abuse behaviors, but not sexual coercion, and girls reported more distress. Such counts do not measure injury, fear, control, or self-defense, and national surveys, including NISVS 2023/2024, find that injury, fear, sexual violence, and lethal violence fall disproportionately on women.
- What it does not show: Group-level risk markers do not establish that a particular respondent will become violent or that a particular message was intended as a threat. Stalking risk instruments discriminate only moderately, and most technology-abuse research uses advocate reports, qualitative interviews, or convenience samples.
- The law: A.R.S. § 13-2923 reaches electronic and GPS surveillance and repeated unauthorized electronic communication; § 13-2916 and § 13-1425 address electronic harassment and nonconsensual intimate images, and each can be a domestic violence offense under § 13-3601. Federal law (18 U.S.C. § 2261A) and UCMJ Article 130 also reach cyberstalking; Counterman v. Colorado (2023) requires at least recklessness for a true-threat prosecution.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can use the research to explain why a pattern matters more than any single act, but must authenticate digital evidence and prove its source. Defense counsel can test attribution, authorization, and context, but evidence that a device was shared does not by itself account for a course of conduct.
Stalking is a pattern of unwanted pursuit that causes fear or distress. Most stalking is committed by someone the victim knows, and a current or former intimate partner is one of the most common categories of stalker. Stalking by a partner can begin during the relationship as monitoring and control and can continue or escalate after separation. Because ordinary phones, accounts, and household devices make monitoring easy, much partner stalking now has a technological component, and the evidence of it is digital: call and message logs, location data, account access records, and recovered images.
This paper reviews the prevalence and characteristics of partner stalking, its association with violence and homicide, the research on technology-facilitated abuse, stalking risk assessment, and the evidentiary questions that arise when the alleged conduct is digital. It then summarizes Arizona, federal, and military law. Stalking by and against men is addressed throughout; most complainants in prosecuted partner-stalking cases are women, but national data show that a substantial minority of victims are men.
Definitions and Scope
Legal definitions of stalking share three elements: a course of conduct (more than one act), directed at a specific person, that causes or would cause a reasonable person fear or emotional distress. Research definitions vary more. Some surveys require that the victim felt fear; others count repeated unwanted contact without asking about fear, which produces higher estimates. “Technology-facilitated abuse” is a broader term for the use of digital tools to monitor, control, threaten, harass, or humiliate a partner, whether or not the conduct meets a statutory definition of stalking. It includes reading a partner’s messages, installing monitoring software, tracking location through phone settings or hidden devices, controlling or impersonating accounts, flooding a partner with messages, and sharing or threatening to share intimate images. “Digital dating abuse” is the corresponding term in adolescent research.
How Common Is It?
National estimates
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS) defines stalking as a pattern of unwanted contact that made the victim very fearful or concerned for their own or another’s safety. In 2016/2017 data, 31.2% of women and 16.1% of men reported lifetime stalking. Among victims, 43.4% of women and 32.4% of men had been stalked by a current or former intimate partner. Female victims reported male perpetrators only in 83.6% of cases; male victims reported male perpetrators only in 44.2% and female perpetrators only in 38.3%. The most common tactics for both sexes were unwanted calls and unwanted texts, photos, emails, or social media messages; 16.7% of female and 20.5% of male victims reported being tracked with a GPS device or app. Most female victims (90.7%) and 70.0% of male victims reported feeling fearful, threatened, or concerned for their safety (Smith et al., 2022).
Characteristics and duration
A meta-analytic review of 175 studies found that stalking episodes lasted an average of about 22 months, that about 70% of victims were acquainted with their pursuer, and that, across the studies reporting violence, 32% of cases involved physical violence and 12% sexual violence (Spitzberg & Cupach, 2007). A review of partner stalking examined how it differs from stalking by people who were never partners and concluded that it needs to be studied as a distinct form of intimate violence (Logan & Walker, 2009). A former partner may know the victim’s routines, passwords, family, and fears, which can make monitoring easier and its effect more frightening.
Stalking, Violence, and Homicide
A prior intimate relationship is among the most consistent markers of violence across the samples studied, but it is a group-level marker, not a prediction about one respondent. In a sample of 1,005 North American stalkers drawn from prosecutors, police, and other sources, threats and violence were most frequent among stalkers who had been sexually intimate with the victim and least frequent among stalkers of public figures, and stalkers with psychosis were less likely to be violent (Mohandie et al., 2006). A meta-analytic review likewise found that a prior intimate relationship, threats, and substance abuse were associated with stalking violence (Rosenfeld, 2004). In 143 female stalkers from the same North American sample, women were less often violent and threatening than men overall, but women who stalked a prior sexual partner were the most dangerous subgroup, with a majority both threatening and physically violent (Meloy et al., 2011).
Stalking is also associated with intimate partner homicide. In an 11-city study of 141 women killed and 65 women nearly killed by partners, proxy informants and survivors reported stalking in the 12 months before the attack for 76% and 85%, respectively (McFarlane et al., 1999), and stalking was a significant bivariate risk factor in the companion case-control study of intimate partner femicide (Campbell et al., 2003). The 76% and 85% figures describe how common stalking was among women killed or nearly killed and are reported without a comparison rate here; they show a strong association, not the chance that any particular person will be harmed, and they do not make a person who was not stalked safe. These studies sampled female victims of male partners; comparable homicide research on male victims of stalking is sparse.
Recidivism was common in one long follow-up. Among 78 stalkers from one Canadian site, followed for an average of nearly nine years, 77% committed new offenses, 56% were charged with new stalking-related offenses, and 33% with violent offenses; violent recidivism was predicted by ordinary criminal-history factors (Eke et al., 2011).
Technology-Facilitated Abuse
Tactics
In surveys of 152 domestic violence advocates and 46 victims, respondents described technology as a common part of partner stalking, used to make victims feel the abuser was always present and to cut them off from others, punish them, and shame them, including by threatening to post sexual images (Woodlock, 2017). Researchers have described the result as technology-facilitated coercive control, in which digital platforms extend the reach of abuse beyond physical proximity (Dragiewicz et al., 2018). A qualitative study of 39 survivors and 50 professionals found that many of the tactics described required little technical skill: abusers relied on knowing or guessing passwords, owning or having physical access to the victim’s devices, and using ordinary features of apps and accounts rather than advanced hacking (Freed et al., 2018). A scoping review of 22 studies found that technology-facilitated abuse maps onto the same domains of power and control described in offline abuse and that its reported impacts include social isolation, mental health effects, financial harm, and a sense of the abuser’s omnipresence (Rogers et al., 2023).
Sex and gender findings
Technology-facilitated abuse research often finds smaller sex differences in rates than in impact. Among 703 high school students, girls and boys reported similar frequencies of digital dating abuse, except for sexual coercion, but girls reported being more upset and had more negative emotional responses (Reed et al., 2017). In an online survey of 2,956 Australian adults, lifetime technology-facilitated sexual violence did not differ significantly between men and women; women more often reported digital sexual harassment, and men more often reported distribution of nonconsensual images and gender- or sexuality-based harassment (Powell & Henry, 2019). In a quota sample of 3,044 U.S. adults recruited online, women more often reported victimization by nonconsensual sharing of sexual images (9.2% versus 6.6%) and men more often reported perpetration (7.3% versus 3.3%) (Ruvalcaba & Eaton, 2020). These are group-level patterns from survey samples and do not indicate how any particular person experienced or intended particular conduct. Digital-abuse counts, like other act counts, do not measure injury, fear, control, or self-defense; national surveys, including NISVS 2023/2024, find higher rates of physical and severe violence among women, and injury, fear, sexual violence, and lethal violence fall disproportionately on women (Zhang Kudon et al., 2026; see Intimate Partner Violence Against Men).
Measurement problems
Measures of digital dating abuse vary in what they count, and a critical review of these instruments identified inconsistencies in how the behavior is defined and measured (Brown & Hegarty, 2018). Some behaviors that measures count, such as checking a partner’s phone or sharing locations, can also occur by mutual agreement, so a count that does not ask about context, consent, and effect may not distinguish coercive monitoring from accepted practice. For that reason, pattern, purpose, and effect are more informative than any single behavior, whether the question is whether abuse occurred or whether it did not.
Stalking Risk Assessment
Two structured professional judgment tools were developed specifically for stalking. The Stalking Risk Profile (SRP) was evaluated in 241 adult stalkers (91% male) referred to an Australian community forensic mental health service; interrater reliability was moderate to high, and discrimination between recidivists and nonrecidivists over the full follow-up was moderate (area under the curve, AUC, 0.66–0.68), with better discrimination for stalking of new victims at six months (McEwan et al., 2018). The Guidelines for Stalking Assessment and Management (SAM) were scored retrospectively from file review for 146 stalkers (90.4% male) referred to the same service; interrater reliability was initially poor and improved after scoring rules were clarified, and risk judgments discriminated moderately (AUC .69–.76), and the authors reported ratios of about 5 to 9 comparing high-risk with low-risk judgments for reoffending by stalking the original victim (the abstract does not state whether these are odds ratios or relative risks, or give confidence intervals); in a small, mostly male clinical sample this indicates discrimination between groups, not the probability that any stalker will reoffend (Shea et al., 2018). Both validation samples were clinical referrals, mostly male, from one service, so their accuracy in U.S. court populations, with female stalkers, or in technology-only cases is not established. General intimate partner violence instruments include stalking items but were not designed to assess stalking itself (see IPV Risk Assessment Instruments).
Limits of the Evidence
Prevalence estimates depend on whether fear is required, on recall periods, and on how technology use is counted. Much of the violence and homicide research relies on police, prosecution, or clinical samples, or on proxy interviews of female homicide victims’ families, and so describes cases that came to official attention. Technology-abuse research is newer and relies heavily on advocate surveys, qualitative interviews, and convenience samples. The stalking risk tools have modest validation samples, mostly male, from a single country. The research supports the conclusions that partner stalking is common, often prolonged, associated with violence and homicide, and increasingly carried out through ordinary technology. It does not support inferring from a single behavior, or from the existence of a monitoring app or shared account, that stalking occurred, and it does not identify which particular respondents will become violent.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the national figures of 31.2% of women and 16.1% of men (Smith et al., 2022) are cited, ask how stalking was defined, because the survey required fear or safety concern and its figures cannot be applied to conduct that did not produce those reactions. When the homicide findings (McFarlane et al., 1999) are offered to show that a respondent is dangerous, ask whether that conclusion follows from the design: the study looked backward from homicides to find stalking, and it cannot say what proportion of stalked partners are later attacked. When a stalking risk rating is presented, ask about its accuracy and its sample, since the SRP and SAM discriminated only moderately (AUCs of about .66 to .76) in mostly male clinical referrals from one Australian service (McEwan et al., 2018; Shea et al., 2018). When the finding that girls and boys report similar rates of most digital dating abuse behaviors (Reed et al., 2017) is offered to suggest that monitoring was mutual or harmless, ask whether it applies to this person, since the same study found that girls were more upset by it, and group rates cannot show who did what in a given relationship. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Stalking, Technology-Facilitated Abuse, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The federal stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, reaches interstate travel and the use of the mail, an interactive computer service, an electronic communication service, or any other facility of interstate commerce to engage in a course of conduct, with intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance with such intent, that places a person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury or causes, or would reasonably be expected to cause, substantial emotional distress. Related provisions address interstate domestic violence (§ 2261) and interstate violation of a protection order (§ 2262). When a prosecution rests on threatening communications, Counterman v. Colorado (2023) holds that the First Amendment requires proof that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening character, and that recklessness is sufficient.
In the military, Article 130 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. § 930) prohibits a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear death or bodily harm, including sexual assault, to the person, an immediate family member, or an intimate partner, when the accused knew or should have known the person would be placed in that fear and the conduct induced it. The statute defines “conduct” to include surveillance and the use of interactive computer and electronic communication services; the 2018 amendment extended the offense to cyberstalking and aligned it with § 2261A. Article 117a addresses wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images, and Article 128b reaches certain offenses committed with intent to threaten or intimidate a spouse, intimate partner, or immediate family member.
Expert testimony on stalking dynamics or technology-facilitated abuse is evaluated under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which was amended December 1, 2023, to clarify that the proponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony meets the rule’s reliability requirements, and under Military Rule of Evidence 702; the 2023 federal amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and practitioners should confirm current text. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extends gatekeeping to all expert testimony, including testimony by digital forensic examiners.
Arizona
Under A.R.S. § 13-2923, a person commits stalking by intentionally or knowingly engaging in a course of conduct directed toward another person that causes the person emotional distress or reasonable fear of property damage or physical injury to the person or specified others (a class 5 felony), or reasonable fear of death or the death of specified others (a class 3 felony). “Course of conduct” includes maintaining visual or physical proximity or conveying threats on two or more occasions; using any electronic, digital, or global positioning system device to surveil a person or the person’s internet or wireless activity without authorization, continuously for twelve hours or more or on two or more occasions; and communicating through electronic means directed at a specific person, without authorization and without legitimate purpose, on more than one occasion. Course of conduct does not include constitutionally protected activity or activity authorized by law or by the person (RAJI Crim. 29.23). Section 13-2916 makes it a class 1 misdemeanor to use an electronic communication to terrify, intimidate, threaten, or harass a specific person through obscene or threatening messages, repeated unwanted anonymous messages, or posting personal identifying information intending to cause unwanted contact or harassment by others. Section 13-1425 prohibits disclosing intimate images of an identifiable person with intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce, with an enhanced classification when the disclosure is electronic and a misdemeanor for threatening disclosure. Each of these offenses, together with harassment and aggravated harassment, is a domestic violence offense under § 13-3601(A) when the parties have a qualifying relationship. Civil relief is available through an Order of Protection under § 13-3602 or an Injunction Against Harassment under § 12-1809 (see Protective Orders and Custody).
Digital evidence must be authenticated under Arizona Rule of Evidence 901 by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what its proponent claims, which for messages and posts usually means evidence connecting the account or device to the person alleged to have used it. Expert testimony is governed by Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, which was amended in 2012 to follow the federal Daubert standard (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993; State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014) and again effective January 1, 2024 (Order R-23-0004) to conform to the 2023 federal amendment. Under State v. Haskie (2017), general testimony explaining victim behavior is not categorically inadmissible but must be screened under Rules 401–403 and 702 and must not operate as profile evidence, and State v. Lindsey (1986) forbids expert opinion on a particular witness’s truthfulness.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
Stalking cases are pattern cases, and the research helps explain how a series of acts that each seem minor — a message, an appearance, a location check — can produce fear when they come from a former partner with intimate knowledge of the victim; whether that occurred here, and whether any fear was reasonable, is for the factfinder. General testimony about partner stalking, its association with violence, and the sense of omnipresence that victims describe can help jurors understand that pattern, provided it remains general education and does not suggest that the defendant fits a profile. Risk ratings used in bail or charging decisions should be described with their moderate accuracy and limited normative samples.
Digital evidence carries its own burdens. The State must connect accounts, devices, and messages to the defendant, and must distinguish authorized from unauthorized access where the statute requires it. Screenshots, exported messages, and app data can be incomplete or edited, and forensic extraction and a clear chain of custody strengthen authentication. Where the complainant also monitored or messaged the defendant, the record should address context and effect rather than assume the conduct was one-sided.
Special Issues for Defense
Defense counsel encounter this research when the alleged course of conduct consists largely of messages, location data, or account activity. Counsel may ask who controlled the device or account, whether access was authorized or shared, whether location sharing or message frequency was mutual and accepted in the relationship, and whether the communications, read in context, conveyed a threat; whether the evidence establishes the elements is for the factfinder. Counterman requires proof of at least reckless disregard of a statement’s threatening character in true-threat prosecutions, and the measurement problems described above mean that a single monitoring behavior, without context, does not by itself establish coercion. The statute itself excludes activity authorized by the other person, so evidence of agreed location sharing or account access is relevant.
The same research sets limits. Evidence that a phone or account was shared does not by itself account for a sustained pattern of contact the complainant did not want, and because many of these tactics require little technical skill, a person’s lack of technical expertise does not make them implausible. Agreement to share access at one point in a relationship also does not establish that access remained authorized after it was withdrawn. Group findings about female stalkers or about reciprocal digital monitoring do not show that a particular client’s conduct was harmless. Any expert should confine testimony to general education, technical findings, and their limits, rather than an opinion on either party’s credibility.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Brown, C., & Hegarty, K. (2018). Digital dating abuse measures: A critical review. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 40, 44–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2018.03.003
Campbell, J. C., Webster, D., Koziol-McLain, J., Block, C., Campbell, D., Curry, M. A., Gary, F., Glass, N., McFarlane, J., Sachs, C., Sharps, P., Ulrich, Y., Wilt, S. A., Manganello, J., Xu, X., Schollenberger, J., Frye, V., & Laughon, K. (2003). Risk factors for femicide in abusive relationships: Results from a multisite case control study. American Journal of Public Health, 93(7), 1089–1097. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.93.7.1089
Dragiewicz, M., Burgess, J., Matamoros-Fernández, A., Salter, M., Suzor, N. P., Woodlock, D., & Harris, B. (2018). Technology facilitated coercive control: Domestic violence and the competing roles of digital media platforms. Feminist Media Studies, 18(4), 609–625. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2018.1447341
Eke, A. W., Hilton, N. Z., Meloy, J. R., Mohandie, K., & Williams, J. (2011). Predictors of recidivism by stalkers: A nine-year follow-up of police contacts. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 29(2), 271–283. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.975
Freed, D., Palmer, J., Minchala, D., Levy, K., Ristenpart, T., & Dell, N. (2018). “A stalker’s paradise”: How intimate partner abusers exploit technology. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 1–13). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3174241
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Logan, T., & Walker, R. (2009). Partner stalking: Psychological dominance or “business as usual”? Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 10(3), 247–270. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838009334461
McEwan, T. E., Shea, D. E., Daffern, M., MacKenzie, R. D., Ogloff, J. R. P., & Mullen, P. E. (2018). The reliability and predictive validity of the Stalking Risk Profile. Assessment, 25(2), 259–276. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191116653470
McFarlane, J. M., Campbell, J. C., Wilt, S., Sachs, C. J., Ulrich, Y., & Xu, X. (1999). Stalking and intimate partner femicide. Homicide Studies, 3(4), 300–316. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088767999003004003
Meloy, J. R., Mohandie, K., & Green, M. (2011). The female stalker. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 29(2), 240–254. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.976
Mohandie, K., Meloy, J. R., McGowan, M. G., & Williams, J. (2006). The RECON typology of stalking: Reliability and validity based upon a large sample of North American stalkers. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 51(1), 147–155. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2005.00030.x
Powell, A., & Henry, N. (2019). Technology-facilitated sexual violence victimization: Results from an online survey of Australian adults. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 34(17), 3637–3665. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260516672055
Reed, L. A., Tolman, R. M., & Ward, L. M. (2017). Gender matters: Experiences and consequences of digital dating abuse victimization in adolescent dating relationships. Journal of Adolescence, 59, 79–89. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2017.05.015
Rogers, M. M., Fisher, C., Ali, P., Allmark, P., & Fontes, L. (2023). Technology-facilitated abuse in intimate relationships: A scoping review. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 24(4), 2210–2226. https://doi.org/10.1177/15248380221090218
Rosenfeld, B. (2004). Violence risk factors in stalking and obsessional harassment: A review and preliminary meta-analysis. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 31(1), 9–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854803259241
Ruvalcaba, Y., & Eaton, A. A. (2020). Nonconsensual pornography among U.S. adults: A sexual scripts framework on victimization, perpetration, and health correlates for women and men. Psychology of Violence, 10(1), 68–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/vio0000233
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Smith, S. G., Basile, K. C., & Kresnow, M. (2022). The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2016/2017 report on stalking — Updated release. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Spitzberg, B. H., & Cupach, W. R. (2007). The state of the art of stalking: Taking stock of the emerging literature. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 12(1), 64–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2006.05.001
Woodlock, D. (2017). The abuse of technology in domestic violence and stalking. Violence Against Women, 23(5), 584–602. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801216646277
Zhang Kudon, H., Zhu, S., Chen, B., Breiding, M. J., Leemis, R. W., Zhang, X., Schwank, A., & Basile, K. C. (2026). The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2023/2024 intimate partner violence data brief. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://cdc.gov/nisvs/media/pdfs/intimatepartnerviolence-brief.pdf
Legal Authorities
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
10 U.S.C. § 917a (Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 117a).
10 U.S.C. § 928b (Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 128b, Domestic Violence).
10 U.S.C. § 930 (Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 130, Stalking).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2261, 2261A, 2262.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1809.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1425.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2916.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2923.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3602.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (2023) (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) 29.23 (6th ed. 2022).
Fed. R. Evid. 702; Mil. R. Evid. 702; Ariz. R. Evid. 702; Ariz. R. Evid. 901.
Related topic papers: Protective Orders and Custody · IPV Risk Assessment Instruments · Intimate Partner Violence Against Men · Firearms Consequences of Domestic Violence Across Systems
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