Snap Shot
- The question: What does Alzheimer’s disease do to memory, and what does that mean when a person with mild cognitive impairment or dementia is a witness, a complainant, or the source of an out-of-court statement?
- What the research shows: Alzheimer’s disease typically impairs the learning and retention of new episodic memories first, while older autobiographical memories, well-learned skills, and some emotional and musical memory are comparatively spared, especially early. People with Alzheimer’s disease make distinctive memory errors, including misattributions and confabulations that blend habitual or familiar information into accounts of specific events; they are also at elevated risk of abuse and exploitation.
- What it does not show: A diagnosis does not establish that a particular memory or allegation is false, or that it is true. Impairment varies widely with stage and from person to person, research on testimony by people with dementia is limited, and diagnosis, testimonial competency, and legal capacity are different questions.
- The law: Competency is presumed (Rules 601 and 602), and dementia ordinarily goes to weight; testimony may be preserved by deposition, and a declarant’s infirmity bears on unavailability and, with Crawford, on out-of-court statements. Expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 and Houser, and in Arizona by Rule 702 and Chapple; no expert may opine on a particular witness’s credibility (Lindsey). Arizona addresses vulnerable-adult abuse in A.R.S. § 13-3623, and the Adult Protective Services statutes (A.R.S. §§ 46-451 to 46-456) include definitions (§ 46-451), limits on privilege (§ 46-453), and reporting duties (§ 46-454).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can preserve an early, recorded, non-leading account and corroborate it independently, without treating fluent or confident reporting as proof; defense counsel can develop disease stage, delay, and the conditions under which an account was obtained, without implying that a person with dementia cannot be a reliable source or that allegations by people with dementia are generally unfounded.
Alzheimer’s disease, a progressive neurodegenerative disease, accounts for more cases of dementia than any other cause. An estimated 7.2 million Americans aged 65 and older were living with Alzheimer’s dementia in 2025 (Alzheimer’s Association, 2025). Its earliest and most characteristic symptom is difficulty learning and retaining new information about events, which is the kind of memory a witness is asked to report.
A person with Alzheimer’s disease may witness a crime, may be the complainant in an allegation of physical, sexual, psychological, or financial abuse, may have made statements that a party seeks to introduce, or may be the person whose capacity to make a will or manage money is disputed. The parties may draw opposite inferences from the same diagnosis: that the account cannot be trusted, or that the person’s vulnerability explains why abuse occurred and was hard to report.
This paper covers mild cognitive impairment and dementia, what the disease impairs and spares, its characteristic memory errors, testimony from people with dementia, and elder abuse allegations. It then addresses the limits of the evidence and the governing law. Normal age-related change is covered in the companion paper, Aging and Memory.
Mild Cognitive Impairment, Dementia, and Diagnosis
Mild cognitive impairment (MCI) describes cognitive decline greater than expected for a person’s age and education that does not substantially interfere with independence in daily activities; dementia describes impairment severe enough to interfere with that independence. The systematic review behind a 2018 American Academy of Neurology guideline estimated MCI prevalence at 6.7% for ages 60 to 64 and 25.2% for ages 80 to 84, and a two-year cumulative dementia incidence of 14.9% among people with MCI older than 65 (Petersen et al., 2018). The Academy has since retired that guideline, and the journal now labels it “retired,” so it should not be cited as current clinical guidance; its figures are cited here only as published estimates from that review. For legal purposes, the point is that MCI is common in late life and does not inevitably progress to dementia within a few years.
The term “Alzheimer’s disease” is also used in two different ways. Revised criteria published by an Alzheimer’s Association workgroup in 2024 define the disease biologically, by the presence of characteristic brain pathology detectable with biomarkers such as amyloid imaging or certain blood tests, and stage that biology separately from a person’s clinical symptoms (Jack et al., 2024). Under that framework, a person may have Alzheimer’s disease biology while still cognitively unimpaired, and the workgroup stated that its criteria are not step-by-step clinical practice guidelines. In legal proceedings, the relevant question is rarely whether a diagnostic label applies; it is what the person’s memory and other abilities were at the time of the event and at the time the account was given.
What Is Impaired and What Is Preserved
Alzheimer’s pathology typically affects the brain networks that support episodic memory before those supporting language, attention, executive functions, and visuospatial abilities (Weintraub et al., 2012). The earliest difficulty is usually in forming durable new memories: a person may attend to and briefly retain an experience but lose much of it over the following minutes or hours. As the disease progresses, semantic knowledge, word finding, reasoning, and orientation are increasingly affected; in atypical presentations, language, visual, or executive problems appear first.
Not all memory is affected equally or at once. Reviews of autobiographical memory in Alzheimer’s disease describe a decline that tends to affect recent memories more than remote ones, so that memories from earlier decades may be better retained than memories from recent years, although remote memories also become less specific as the disease advances (El Haj et al., 2015). Memory for long-familiar music is often robust, and one study found that brain regions associated with long-known music were relatively spared in people with Alzheimer’s disease (Jacobsen et al., 2015). Whether emotion enhances memory in Alzheimer’s disease as it does in healthy adults is mixed; a review concluded that the emotional enhancement effect can be preserved under some testing conditions despite early damage to the structures involved (Klein-Koerkamp et al., 2012). These preserved abilities do not show that a person with Alzheimer’s disease accurately remembers a recent event, but they caution against assuming that the diagnosis has erased all memory or that every account is unreliable.
False Memory, Misattribution, and Confabulation
The memory errors associated with Alzheimer’s disease are more specific than a general increase in mistakes. In a study of false recognition of words related to studied lists, people with Alzheimer’s disease falsely recognized related words less often than healthy older adults after a single exposure, apparently because they had retained less of the list’s general meaning; across five repetitions, however, their false recognition increased while young adults’ decreased, apparently because healthy participants used growing recollection of specific items to reject related lures while participants with Alzheimer’s disease accumulated gist (Budson et al., 2000). A later study found that healthy older adults could partly use recollection of a deeper encoding task to avoid false recognition, whereas false recognition in people with Alzheimer’s disease increased after the same task (Pierce et al., 2005). In the illusory truth paradigm, people with mild Alzheimer’s disease made fewer misattribution errors than controls when the effect depended on familiarity but more when it depended on recollection of context (Mitchell et al., 2006).
The 2026 meta-analysis of 150 articles found that people with MCI or Alzheimer’s disease showed higher levels of spontaneous false memory than healthy older adults; for suggestion-induced false memory, the estimated difference was not statistically reliable, and its confidence interval was wide enough to include no difference at all (Huan et al., 2026). The meta-analytic evidence that dementia increases susceptibility to misleading questions is therefore less settled than often assumed; this is a comparison with healthy older adults, and the same meta-analysis found that healthy older adults showed more suggestion-induced false memory than younger adults (see “Aging and Memory” and “Source Monitoring”). A related clinical study of older adults with subjective cognitive complaints found that poorer verbal memory predicted greater interrogative suggestibility, independent of global cognitive status (Zangrossi et al., 2020).
Confabulation is the production of false memories without intent to deceive. In an experimental study, confabulations by people with Alzheimer’s disease were most frequent when material conflicted with well-known information and when encoding was weakened by a divided-attention task; confabulations about modified fairy tales consisted of elements of the familiar original version (Attali et al., 2009). The authors concluded that poor encoding and intrusion of over-learned information are involved, so habits, routines, and familiar scripts may be reported as specific events. Confabulation is distinct from delusion. A review of 55 studies reported psychotic symptoms in 41% of people with Alzheimer’s disease, including delusions in 36% (Ropacki & Jeste, 2005). Neither confabulation nor delusion is lying, and neither can be inferred from the content of an account alone.
Testimony by Persons With Dementia
A diagnosis of dementia does not by itself make a person incompetent to testify. The legal threshold concerns whether the person can perceive, remember, and communicate about the matter and understands the duty to tell the truth, and that question is decided for the individual witness, often at a hearing. Stage of disease, the nature of the memory at issue, the time between the event and the account, and the person’s alertness and orientation when questioned all bear on what a particular person can provide.
Research testing investigative interview methods with witnesses who have dementia is limited, and most of the guidance is extrapolated from research with healthy older adults, in which structured, non-leading interviews increased correct detail in adults up to age 95 without increasing errors (Wright & Holliday, 2007). Because new memories are lost rapidly, the earliest account is likely to be the most complete, though completeness is not accuracy, and the first account can also reflect confabulation or earlier questioning; recording it preserves both its content and the questions that produced it. Because people with Alzheimer’s disease have difficulty using recollection to reject familiar but false information, leading or repeated questions and exposure to others’ accounts carry particular risk. Short sessions, simple open questions, minimal distraction, and attention to hearing and vision are consistent with that research. A cognitive evaluation close in time to the interview may assist the court on competency and the factfinder on weight.
Corroboration is especially important. Physical findings, medical records, financial records, video, the observations of independent witnesses, and the timing and circumstances of a first disclosure can confirm or contradict what a person with dementia reports, and they do not depend on the person’s memory.
Elder Abuse Allegations and Capacity
Abuse of older adults is common and underrecognized. A meta-analysis of 52 community studies from 28 countries estimated past-year prevalence of elder abuse at 15.7%, most often psychological abuse, followed by financial abuse, neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse (Yon et al., 2017). People with dementia are at higher risk: a 2025 meta-analysis of 30 community studies from eight countries (6,789 care dyads) estimated overall abuse prevalence at 42.6% (95% CI 34%–51%); the form-specific rates were pooled separately and are not parts of that overall figure: psychological abuse was the most common form (44.8%), followed by financial abuse (28.3%), neglect (19.8%), and physical abuse (10%), with wide confidence intervals for some forms (Shen et al., 2025). An earlier review found that many older adults with dementia experienced more than one form of abuse at once (Dong et al., 2014).
These findings cut in two directions, and both must be kept in view. A person with dementia may be the victim of real abuse that is discounted because of the diagnosis, and the cognitive impairment that makes the person vulnerable may also make the account incomplete or inconsistent in its details. Conversely, an allegation may arise from a memory error, such as a misplaced item later believed stolen, from a confabulation that blends an ordinary caregiving routine with a false event, or from a delusion. The research does not allow anyone to determine from the diagnosis, or from the account alone, which of these is true in a given case. It supports careful documentation of the first report, attention to who spoke with the person before that report, and investigation that does not depend solely on the person’s memory.
Financial exploitation raises related questions. In a community study of 730 older adults without dementia, MCI was associated with greater self-reported susceptibility to scams, and lower episodic memory and perceptual speed were associated with susceptibility among those with MCI (Han et al., 2016); a 2025 scoping review described financial exploitation of people living with dementia as common but understudied (Wei & Balser, 2025). Disputes over wills, contracts, powers of attorney, and gifts often turn on legal capacity, which is decision-specific and defined by law, not by diagnosis. A diagnosis of MCI or dementia is relevant evidence but does not by itself establish incapacity for a particular decision at a particular time, and the absence of a diagnosis does not establish capacity.
Limits of the Evidence
Much of the experimental research on memory errors in Alzheimer’s disease uses word lists, pictures, and short stories studied in a laboratory, with small samples of people with mild disease who are well enough to participate. They identify mechanisms but not memory for a significant real event, and advanced disease is rarely studied. Diagnostic groupings vary across studies and have changed over time, and the biological criteria published in 2024 mean that older and newer studies may define “Alzheimer’s disease” differently. The meta-analytic estimate for suggestion-induced false memory in MCI and Alzheimer’s disease is imprecise. Prevalence estimates for elder abuse depend heavily on definitions and data collection methods. And, as with all group research, findings about people with Alzheimer’s disease cannot establish whether a particular person’s account of a particular event is accurate.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When Budson et al. (2000) is cited to suggest that a person with Alzheimer’s disease is less prone to false memories, counsel should ask what exactly was counted: the lower false recognition occurred after a single exposure to word lists, it reversed with repetition, and true recognition was also impaired. When Huan et al. (2026) is cited to show that people with dementia are more suggestible, counsel should ask how much evidence supports that particular claim, because the difference for suggestion-induced false memory was not statistically reliable and its estimate was imprecise. When Attali et al. (2009) or Ropacki and Jeste (2005) is offered to explain an allegation as confabulation or delusion, counsel should ask whether the conclusion follows for this person: what independent evidence bears on the event, whether the account was elicited with leading questions, and whether the person has a documented history of such symptoms. When prevalence figures such as those of Shen et al. (2025) are cited to support an allegation, counsel should ask the same question, because a high base rate does not show that abuse occurred in a given case. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Alzheimer’s Disease and Memory and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Every person is competent to be a witness unless the rules provide otherwise (Fed. R. Evid. 601; Mil. R. Evid. 601); a witness must have personal knowledge of the matter, which the witness’s own testimony may establish (Fed. R. Evid. 602; Mil. R. Evid. 602), and must take an oath or affirmation in a form designed to impress the duty to testify truthfully (Fed. R. Evid. 603; Mil. R. Evid. 603). Dementia is not itself a disqualification, and questions about the quality of a witness’s memory ordinarily go to weight. When a witness is likely to become unavailable, a deposition may be ordered to preserve testimony in exceptional circumstances (Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a)(1); R.C.M. 702(a)). A declarant who cannot testify because of a then-existing infirmity or mental illness is unavailable for purposes of the hearsay exceptions that require unavailability (Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(4); Mil. R. Evid. 804(a)(4)), but testimonial statements of an absent declarant are admissible against an accused only if the declarant is unavailable and the accused had a prior opportunity for cross-examination (Crawford v. Washington, 2004).
Expert testimony on dementia and memory is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, which requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of them to the case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) makes the trial judge a gatekeeper, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extends that obligation to all expert testimony, including non-scientific technical or other specialized knowledge. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule; the 2023 amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 through Military Rule of Evidence 1102 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025; practitioners should confirm current text), and United States v. Houser (1993) sets out six admissibility factors. A clinician may describe a person’s cognitive functioning; testimony that a particular account is true or false goes beyond the research.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 601 provides that every person is competent to be a witness unless the rules or an applicable statute provide otherwise, and Rule 602 requires personal knowledge. On motion of a party or a witness, a court may order the oral deposition of any person other than the defendant in three situations: the person’s testimony is material and there is a substantial likelihood the person will not be available at trial; the person’s testimony is material or necessary to prepare a defense or investigate the offense, the person was not a witness at the preliminary hearing or the probable cause phase of a juvenile transfer hearing, and the person will not cooperate in granting a personal interview; or a witness is incarcerated for failing to give satisfactory security to appear and testify (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.3(a)). Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard effective January 1, 2012, and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to track the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). State v. Chapple (1983), Arizona’s leading case on expert testimony about memory, held that exclusion of eyewitness memory testimony was an abuse of discretion on its facts, and State v. Nordstrom (2001) confirmed that admission otherwise lies within the trial court’s discretion. Under State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986), no expert may opine, directly or indirectly, on whether a particular witness is truthful.
Arizona criminalizes abuse of a vulnerable adult, defined as a person eighteen or older who cannot protect himself or herself from abuse, neglect, or exploitation because of a mental or physical impairment (A.R.S. § 13-3623(F)(6)). The grade of the offense depends on whether the circumstances were likely to produce death or serious physical injury and on whether the conduct was intentional or knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent, and intentional or knowing emotional abuse of a vulnerable adult by a caregiver or in a care setting is a separate felony (§ 13-3623(A), (B), (D)). The Adult Protective Services statutes define abuse to include emotional abuse, and exploitation as the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable adult or the adult’s resources for another’s profit or advantage; their definition of a vulnerable adult also includes an incapacitated person under the guardianship statutes (A.R.S. § 46-451(A)). Two features matter for memory evidence. Protective services workers receive and evaluate reports and may obtain related law enforcement records (§ 46-452), so an older adult’s account may be taken several times by different interviewers before trial. And in civil or criminal litigation in which a vulnerable adult’s abuse, exploitation, or neglect is at issue, most professional privileges, other than the attorney-client privilege and a clergy confession privilege, do not apply (§ 46-453), which can bring clinical and care records bearing on the adult’s memory before the court. Health professionals, caregivers, and others responsible for a vulnerable adult must report a reasonable basis to believe abuse, neglect, or exploitation has occurred immediately to a peace officer or to Adult Protective Services, and custodians of the adult’s medical and financial records must make them available to investigators on written request (§ 46-454(A), (F)). The statutes also create civil actions for neglect, abuse, or exploitation by caregivers (§ 46-455) and require a person in a position of trust and confidence to use the adult’s assets solely for the adult’s benefit (§ 46-456(A)). Under § 46-456, an act is for the adult’s benefit if it is consistent with the adult’s clearly stated wishes found by the court to be made without coercion and while of sound mind (§ 46-456(J)(3)), so what the adult said, when, and in what cognitive state can become central evidence, and the research on memory in dementia bears on how both the adult’s account and others’ recollections of those wishes are weighed. The memory research bears not on those legal elements but on how the evidence offered to prove them is evaluated.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. A diagnosis of MCI or dementia does not make a person incompetent or establish that an account is false; impairment varies with stage and person, and some forms of memory are comparatively preserved. People with dementia are at substantially elevated risk of abuse and exploitation (Shen et al., 2025; Yon et al., 2017), and the same impairments that create vulnerability can make an account incomplete, and incompleteness alone does not show that the account is untrue. Prosecutors are well positioned to protect such an account by recording the first report promptly with short, open questions, documenting who spoke with the person beforehand, seeking a deposition where decline is likely, and building independent corroboration.
The research also counsels caution. Rapid loss of new memories, misattribution, and confabulation of familiar routines into specific events are characteristic of Alzheimer’s disease, and fluent or confident reporting by a person with dementia is not evidence of accuracy. Accounts that emerged after repeated questioning or after others shared their suspicions with the person deserve particular scrutiny. Delusions occur in a meaningful proportion of people with Alzheimer’s disease, so an allegation that is not corroborated warrants investigation of alternative explanations. Prevalence statistics describe risk across a population; they do not corroborate a particular allegation.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. Alzheimer’s disease impairs the formation and retention of new episodic memories, increases spontaneous false memories, and impairs the use of recollection to reject familiar but false information (Budson et al., 2000; Huan et al., 2026; Pierce et al., 2005). Confabulation can produce sincere, detailed accounts of events that did not occur, often built from habitual or familiar material (Attali et al., 2009). Disease stage at the event and at each account, the delay between them, the questions asked, and what others told the person are legitimate subjects of inquiry and expert explanation, as are confrontation questions when an account is offered through others.
The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. A diagnosis does not establish that an account is false, that the person lacks testimonial competency, or that the person could not have been abused; people with dementia are abused at high rates, and their impairments make abuse harder to report. The meta-analytic evidence that dementia specifically increases susceptibility to suggested information is not yet statistically reliable, and remote, emotional, and well-learned memories may be comparatively spared. An expert cannot tell the factfinder that a particular allegation is a confabulation or a delusion; that is a credibility judgment, and it should be tied to specific evidence about the person and the circumstances of the account rather than to the diagnosis.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Alzheimer’s Association. (2025). 2025 Alzheimer’s disease facts and figures. Alzheimer’s & Dementia, 21(4), Article e70235. https://doi.org/10.1002/alz.70235
Attali, E., De Anna, F., Dubois, B., & Dalla Barba, G. (2009). Confabulation in Alzheimer’s disease: Poor encoding and retrieval of over-learned information. Brain, 132(1), 204–212. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awn241
Budson, A. E., Daffner, K. R., Desikan, R., & Schacter, D. L. (2000). When false recognition is unopposed by true recognition: Gist-based memory distortion in Alzheimer’s disease. Neuropsychology, 14(2), 277–287. https://doi.org/10.1037/0894-4105.14.2.277
Dong, X., Chen, R., & Simon, M. A. (2014). Elder abuse and dementia: A review of the research and health policy. Health Affairs, 33(4), 642–649. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2013.1261
El Haj, M., Antoine, P., Nandrino, J. L., & Kapogiannis, D. (2015). Autobiographical memory decline in Alzheimer’s disease, a theoretical and clinical overview. Ageing Research Reviews, 23, 183–192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.arr.2015.07.001
Han, S. D., Boyle, P. A., James, B. D., Yu, L., & Bennett, D. A. (2016). Mild cognitive impairment and susceptibility to scams in old age. Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, 49(3), 845–851. https://doi.org/10.3233/JAD-150442
Huan, S.-Y., Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., Liu, Y.-R., Xu, H.-Z., Wang, J., & Yu, J. (2026). A meta-analysis of false memory in healthy and pathological cognitive aging. Psychology and Aging, 41(4), 497–524. https://doi.org/10.1037/pag0000966
Jack, C. R., Jr., Andrews, J. S., Beach, T. G., Buracchio, T., Dunn, B., Graf, A., Hansson, O., Ho, C., Jagust, W., McDade, E., Molinuevo, J. L., Okonkwo, O. C., Pani, L., Rafii, M. S., Scheltens, P., Siemers, E., Snyder, H. M., Sperling, R., Teunissen, C. E., & Carrillo, M. C. (2024). Revised criteria for diagnosis and staging of Alzheimer’s disease: Alzheimer’s Association Workgroup. Alzheimer’s & Dementia, 20(8), 5143–5169. https://doi.org/10.1002/alz.13859
Jacobsen, J.-H., Stelzer, J., Fritz, T. H., Chételat, G., La Joie, R., & Turner, R. (2015). Why musical memory can be preserved in advanced Alzheimer’s disease. Brain, 138(8), 2438–2450. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awv135
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Klein-Koerkamp, Y., Baciu, M., & Hot, P. (2012). Preserved and impaired emotional memory in Alzheimer’s disease. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, Article 331. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00331
Mitchell, J. P., Sullivan, A. L., Schacter, D. L., & Budson, A. E. (2006). Misattribution errors in Alzheimer’s disease: The illusory truth effect. Neuropsychology, 20(2), 185–192. https://doi.org/10.1037/0894-4105.20.2.185
Petersen, R. C., Lopez, O., Armstrong, M. J., Getchius, T. S. D., Ganguli, M., Gloss, D., Gronseth, G. S., Marson, D., Pringsheim, T., Day, G. S., Sager, M., Stevens, J., & Rae-Grant, A. (2018). Practice guideline update summary: Mild cognitive impairment [Retired]: Report of the Guideline Development, Dissemination, and Implementation Subcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology. Neurology, 90(3), 126–135. https://doi.org/10.1212/WNL.0000000000004826
Pierce, B. H., Sullivan, A. L., Schacter, D. L., & Budson, A. E. (2005). Comparing source-based and gist-based false recognition in aging and Alzheimer’s disease. Neuropsychology, 19(4), 411–419. https://doi.org/10.1037/0894-4105.19.4.411
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Legal Authorities
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 25 P.3d 717 (2001).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3623.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 46-451 to 46-456.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 15.
Fed. R. Evid. 601.
Fed. R. Evid. 602.
Fed. R. Evid. 603.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 804.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.3.
Ariz. R. Evid. 601.
Ariz. R. Evid. 602.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Mil. R. Evid. 601.
Mil. R. Evid. 602.
Mil. R. Evid. 603.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 804.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Rule for Courts-Martial 702.
Related topic papers: Aging and Memory · Source Monitoring · Gist Memory · Memory in Special Populations · False Memory · Episodic Memory
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: False Confessions: Suggestibility