Snap Shot
- The question: When a person who drinks heavily hears voices, holds false beliefs, or becomes delirious, what alcohol-related conditions might be involved, how are they distinguished from each other and from an alcohol blackout, and how do they bear on mental-state defenses, competency, testimony, and sentencing?
- What the research shows: Alcohol can produce psychotic symptoms during heavy use or withdrawal (alcohol-induced psychotic disorder, including the classic “alcoholic hallucinosis”) and a medical emergency, withdrawal delirium (delirium tremens). These are uncommon, occurring mainly in people with long-standing heavy drinking, and are distinct from Wernicke encephalopathy and Korsakoff syndrome, which are amnestic and encephalopathic conditions caused mainly by thiamine deficiency rather than psychoses. In one meta-analysis, about 10% of people with an alcohol-induced psychosis were later diagnosed with schizophrenia (Murrie et al., 2020); a Danish registry study found a higher figure, 32.2%, for substance-induced psychoses overall, with schizophrenia-spectrum or bipolar diagnoses (Starzer et al., 2018).
- What it does not show: An alcohol blackout is not psychosis, and a history of heavy drinking does not establish that a person was psychotic at a particular time. The research cannot determine from group data whether a particular person’s symptoms were caused by alcohol or by an independent disorder, or whether they affected a particular act.
- The law: Arizona excludes disorders resulting from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from the guilty-except-insane defense (A.R.S. § 13-502) and bars voluntary intoxication as a defense (§ 13-503); the military requires a severe mental disease or defect (R.C.M. 916(k)(1)). Many U.S. jurisdictions recognize “settled insanity” from long-term use. Competency (Dusky; R.C.M. 909; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11) and sentencing mitigation (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); R.C.M. 1001; A.R.S. § 13-701(E)) can also be affected.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can legitimately show the line between intoxication or withdrawal and an independent mental disease; defense counsel can legitimately document a timeline of drinking and symptoms and seek evaluation for competency, responsibility, and mitigation. Both sides depend on records made close to the events.
Heavy drinking can be accompanied by hallucinations, delusions, confusion, and memory loss, and these symptoms can reach court in several ways: an accused who was hallucinating at the time of an offense, a defendant who becomes delirious in custody, a witness or complainant with a history of alcohol-related psychosis, or a person with severe chronic memory impairment from alcohol-related brain injury. Each condition has different causes, a different course, and different legal significance, and they are sometimes confused with one another and with an alcohol blackout.
This paper describes the alcohol-related conditions that involve psychotic symptoms or severe confusion, how common they are and whom they affect, how clinicians distinguish alcohol-induced from independent psychosis, what is known about violence, and how these conditions bear on memory and testimony. It then summarizes the governing military, federal, and Arizona law and the issues each side commonly faces. It does not reproduce diagnostic criteria; the descriptions below are summaries.
Conditions That Can Involve Psychotic Symptoms or Severe Confusion
The current diagnostic manual recognizes alcohol-induced psychotic disorder: prominent hallucinations or delusions that develop during or soon after alcohol intoxication or withdrawal and are not better explained by an independent psychotic disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2022). The classic presentation, historically called alcoholic hallucinosis, involves vivid, often threatening auditory hallucinations, sometimes with persecutory delusions, typically in a person with long-standing heavy drinking, often after drinking is reduced or stopped, and usually with an otherwise clear level of consciousness (Jordaan & Emsley, 2014; Murray et al., 2025). Symptoms usually resolve with abstinence, often within days to weeks, although some cases persist or recur.
Alcohol withdrawal delirium, also called delirium tremens, is a different and more dangerous condition. It typically begins two or more days after heavy, prolonged drinking stops or is sharply reduced, can last several days, and involves a disturbance of attention and awareness that fluctuates over the course of the day, disorientation, often vivid visual or tactile hallucinations, agitation, tremor, and autonomic instability such as rapid heart rate, fever, and sweating. It is a medical emergency that can be fatal without treatment (Schuckit, 2014). The diagnostic manual also recognizes delirium during intoxication. The key clinical difference from alcohol-induced psychotic disorder is the disturbance of attention and awareness: a person in delirium is globally confused, whereas a person with alcoholic hallucinosis is typically oriented (Jordaan & Emsley, 2014).
Wernicke encephalopathy and Korsakoff syndrome are often grouped with these conditions but are not psychoses. Wernicke encephalopathy is an acute brain disorder caused mainly by thiamine (vitamin B1) deficiency, which in developed countries occurs most often in the context of heavy drinking and poor nutrition; it classically involves confusion, abnormal eye movements, and unsteady gait. Korsakoff syndrome is the chronic residual condition that can follow it, characterized above all by severe amnesia for new information and for some past events, along with executive dysfunction, apathy, and, in some people, confabulation, the production of false memories without intent to deceive (Arts et al., 2017). A review concluded that thiamine deficiency is the crucial cause and found no convincing evidence that alcohol’s direct toxicity is essential to it (Arts et al., 2017). The diagnostic manual classifies the chronic condition as an alcohol-induced major neurocognitive disorder of the amnestic-confabulatory type (American Psychiatric Association, 2022). Calling Korsakoff syndrome a “psychosis” is an older usage that is inaccurate today.
None of these conditions is an alcohol blackout. A blackout is a temporary failure to form lasting memories during intoxication in a person who is awake and functioning; it involves no hallucinations or delusions and resolves when the person sobers, leaving only a gap for the intoxicated period (White, 2003). Korsakoff amnesia, by contrast, affects memory in the sober state and persists.
How Common and Who Is Affected
Population data are scarce. In a general-population sample of 8,028 Finnish adults with diagnoses confirmed by interview and records, the lifetime prevalence of alcohol-induced psychotic disorder and delirium combined was 0.5%, highest (1.8%) among men of working age. Risk was greater with earlier onset of alcohol dependence, lower socioeconomic status, a father’s mental health or alcohol problems, and multiple hospital treatments, and 37% of those with a history of the condition died during eight years of follow-up (Perälä et al., 2010). A review described high rates of co-occurring psychiatric disorders, rehospitalization, mortality, and suicidal behavior, noted that the condition may be more common than once recognized depending on the criteria used, and described a prognosis less favorable than once believed but usually good when abstinence can be maintained (Jordaan & Emsley, 2014). These findings concern people with long-standing alcohol dependence; alcohol-induced psychosis is uncommon after a single episode of heavy drinking in a person without that history.
Distinguishing Alcohol-Induced From Independent Psychosis
Whether psychotic symptoms were caused by alcohol or reflect an independent disorder such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or psychotic depression matters both clinically and legally. Clinicians look at the timeline: whether the symptoms began during heavy drinking or withdrawal, whether there is a history of psychotic episodes during periods of sobriety, whether the symptoms persist for a substantial period (on the order of a month) after drinking stops, and whether the symptoms are of a kind and severity expected from the amount of alcohol involved (American Psychiatric Association, 2022). Primary psychiatric illness can also be unmasked or worsened by drinking, so the two explanations can coexist (Murray et al., 2025).
The distinction is not permanent. A meta-analysis of 50 studies of more than 40,000 people found that about 25% of those with a substance-induced psychosis were later diagnosed with schizophrenia, with substantial variation by substance: about 34% after cannabis-induced psychosis, but about 10% after alcohol-induced psychosis; transition rates were not affected by sex (Murrie et al., 2020). A Danish registry study of 6,788 people with a substance-induced psychosis found that 32.2% overall were later diagnosed with schizophrenia-spectrum or bipolar disorder, half of the conversions to schizophrenia within about three years (Starzer et al., 2018). A diagnosis of alcohol-induced psychosis at one time is therefore a working conclusion that later events may revise.
In a forensic setting, the most useful evidence is usually the contemporaneous record: when and how much the person drank in the days before, any blood alcohol measurement, observations of withdrawal signs such as tremor or sweating, jail or hospital medical records, prior psychiatric records, and accounts from family members. Symptoms that first appear one to three days after arrest in a person who had been drinking heavily are consistent with withdrawal; symptoms documented before drinking began or long after abstinence raise the possibility of an independent disorder.
Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical man arrested for assault after a week of daily heavy drinking, who is calm and oriented at booking but on the second day in jail becomes agitated, tremulous, and disoriented, says insects are crawling on the walls, and is transferred to a hospital and treated for withdrawal delirium. He later says he remembers nothing of the arrest. The jail records place the confusion after arrest and fit withdrawal, which bears on any statement taken during that period and on his competency while symptomatic; they do not show that he was psychotic at the time of the assault. His memory gap for the arrest is more consistent with intoxication at that time than with the later delirium. Each question would turn on the records and on clinical evaluation rather than on the diagnosis alone.
Psychosis, Alcohol, and Violence
A meta-analysis of 20 studies involving 18,423 people with schizophrenia and other psychoses found an increased risk of violence compared with the general population, but the increase was much larger in people with co-occurring substance misuse (odds ratio 8.9) than in those without it (odds ratio 2.1), and people with substance abuse but no psychosis had risk estimates similar to those with both conditions, suggesting that substance abuse accounts for part of the excess risk (Fazel et al., 2009). The odds ratios were higher for women than for men, a comparison against women in the general population, whose base rate of violence is lower (Fazel et al., 2009). These findings concern groups; most people with psychosis, with or without alcohol use, are not violent, and the research cannot establish that a particular person’s symptoms caused a particular act. Alcohol’s effects on aggression in people without psychosis are discussed in Alcohol and Aggression.
Relevance to Memory and Testimony
These conditions affect memory and reporting in different ways. A person in withdrawal delirium is globally confused and may later have little or distorted memory of the period. A person with alcoholic hallucinosis may accurately recall what he or she experienced, including hallucinated voices, while being mistaken about whether those experiences were real. A person with Korsakoff syndrome may have severe difficulty learning and retaining new information and may confabulate, filling gaps with plausible but inaccurate details without intent to deceive (Arts et al., 2017), which bears on testimonial capacity and on the reliability of accounts given by a complainant, witness, or accused with the condition. A history of any of these conditions does not show that a particular account is inaccurate; it identifies questions about when the account was formed and what the person’s condition was at that time. The Memory in the Courtroom resource’s paper Alcohol and Memory discusses chronic alcohol effects on memory.
Sex Differences
In the Finnish population study, alcohol-induced psychotic disorder and delirium were most common among men of working age (Perälä et al., 2010), consistent with the higher prevalence of severe alcohol dependence among men. Transition from substance-induced psychosis to schizophrenia did not differ by sex in the meta-analysis (Murrie et al., 2020). In the violence meta-analysis, odds ratios relative to the general population were higher for women than for men, which reflects comparison with women’s lower general-population base rate and does not show that women with psychosis are more often violent than men with psychosis (Fazel et al., 2009). The review of Korsakoff syndrome did not report sex differences in its summary (Arts et al., 2017). These findings bear evenly on men and women as accused persons, complainants, and witnesses and do not show that a particular person was more or less likely to have a condition.
Limits of the Evidence
Prevalence studies of alcohol-induced psychosis are few, estimates depend on the diagnostic criteria used, and the best population estimate comes from one country. Much of the clinical literature is based on hospitalized patients, who represent the more severe cases. Diagnostic distinctions depend on timelines that are often reconstructed after the fact from self-report. The transition studies used registry diagnoses that may be revised for reasons other than illness course. The violence research shows associations, not causes, and combines different psychotic disorders. Korsakoff syndrome lacks consensus diagnostic criteria (Arts et al., 2017). Above all, group research cannot establish whether a particular person was psychotic at a particular moment, what caused the symptoms, or how they affected a particular act.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When an alcohol-induced psychosis is offered to explain conduct, counsel can ask what contemporaneous evidence documents the symptoms at the time of the act, rather than before or after, and whether the person was intoxicated, in withdrawal, or neither at that time. When Perälä et al. (2010) is cited, counsel can ask whether the person resembles the long-term dependent population in which the condition occurs. When transition rates are cited (Murrie et al., 2020; Starzer et al., 2018), counsel can ask whether the evaluation considered an independent disorder and what records were reviewed. When Fazel et al. (2009) is cited, counsel can ask whether a group association says anything about this person and this act. When Korsakoff syndrome or confabulation is raised about a witness, counsel can ask what testing documents the condition and when the account at issue was formed. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Alcohol-Related Psychosis and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
In courts-martial, lack of mental responsibility is an affirmative defense if, at the time of the offense, the accused, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her acts (R.C.M. 916(k)(1)). A mental condition short of that standard is not an affirmative defense, but under the rule’s Discussion evidence of it may be admissible on whether the accused had a mental state that is an element, with notice required for expert testimony (R.C.M. 916(k)(2)). Voluntary intoxication is not a defense but may bear on actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)), and military courts have held that amnesia from alcohol is not in itself a mental disease or defect (United States v. Olvera, 1954). Questions of mental responsibility or capacity may be referred for an examination under R.C.M. 706, and an accused may not be tried while unable, because of mental disease or defect, to understand the proceedings or cooperate intelligently in the defense (R.C.M. 909(a)). In federal court, the insanity defense requires a severe mental disease or defect that left the defendant unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of the acts (18 U.S.C. § 17), and an expert may not state whether the defendant had the mental state that is an element (Fed. R. Evid. 704(b)). Competency is assessed under Dusky v. United States (1960).
Courts have long refused to treat the effects of voluntary intoxication as insanity, but many U.S. jurisdictions that have addressed the question accept that a lasting mental disorder produced by long-term substance use, one that persists apart from any episode of intoxication, can support an insanity defense, a doctrine known as “settled insanity” (Appelbaum, 2022). Whether a particular condition qualifies is a legal question that turns on the jurisdiction’s statute and case law and on evidence of the condition’s persistence. At federal sentencing, mental and emotional conditions and substance problems may be considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025) moved departures, including the Chapter 5H policy statements, to Appendix B, and the same facts may be considered for variances under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the Commission described the change as not limiting the information courts may consider (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2025a, 2025b). In courts-martial, such evidence may be offered in extenuation and mitigation under R.C.M. 1001.
Arizona
A defendant may be found guilty except insane only on clear and convincing proof that, at the time of the offense, the defendant was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that the defendant did not know the criminal act was wrong; mental disease or defect does not include disorders resulting from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from alcohol or drugs (A.R.S. § 13-502; RAJI (Criminal) 5.02-1). Temporary intoxication from voluntary ingestion of alcohol is not insanity and is not a defense for any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503), and Arizona does not permit expert evidence of a mental condition short of insanity to negate mens rea (State v. Mott, 1997; Clark v. Arizona, 2006). Under these provisions, alcohol-induced psychotic symptoms arising during intoxication or withdrawal are excluded. The statute’s text does not say in terms how it treats a persisting mental disease that results from long-term use. Arizona cases addressed that distinction before the current statute: in State v. Valenzuela (App. 1977), a manslaughter appeal, the court affirmed the refusal of a defense instruction that a settled or fixed insanity caused by long-continued alcohol use has the same legal effect as insanity from any other cause. It reasoned that there was no evidence the defendant had an existing mental illness caused by prolonged use at the time of the offense, and that the instruction’s last clause implied that insanity brought on by voluntary intoxication at the time of the crime was a defense, which was not Arizona law (114 Ariz. at 83–84). The court recounted the Arizona Supreme Court’s distinction in State v. Cooper (1974) between an existing state of mental illness, for which the insanity defense remains available even if excessive or prolonged use of liquor or drugs brought it about, and a temporary episode of incapacity caused by voluntary use, for which it is not (Valenzuela, 114 Ariz. at 84). Valenzuela predates the 1993 legislation that repealed the earlier insanity and voluntary-intoxication statutes and enacted the current § 13-502, which one later Court of Appeals opinion described as codifying existing case law in excluding disorders resulting from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal (State v. McKeon, 2002 (Hall, J., concurring)). Because Valenzuela was decided under the former law, it is not a holding about the current statute. A later unpublished decision, citing Cooper, stated that Arizona courts have recognized that insanity can rest on a permanent mental disease caused by chronic long-term drug or alcohol abuse, and found no instructional error on its record because no evidence showed such a disorder of the required severity (State v. Loader, 2015 (mem. decision)); Arizona memorandum decisions may be cited only for persuasive value (Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)). This paper has not identified a published Arizona decision applying § 13-502(A) to a persisting alcohol-related disorder, and practitioners should research current Arizona authority. Competency is governed by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which asks whether a mental illness, defect, or disability leaves the defendant unable to understand the proceedings or assist in the defense. At sentencing, mitigating circumstances include significantly impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform it to the law, and any other factor relevant to the defendant’s character or background (A.R.S. § 13-701(E)(2), (E)(6)).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. Alcohol-induced psychosis and withdrawal delirium are uncommon, occur mainly in people with long-standing heavy drinking, and are tied in time to intoxication or withdrawal; symptoms that began after arrest do not show that the accused was psychotic at the time of the offense. An alcohol blackout is not psychosis, and amnesia is not itself a mental disease or defect. In Arizona, disorders resulting from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal are excluded from the insanity defense, voluntary intoxication cannot negate a required mental state (A.R.S. § 13-503), and diminished-capacity evidence is barred; in courts-martial, voluntary intoxication is not a defense, but evidence of it may be considered on actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)). Counsel should confirm current authority. Contemporaneous observations of the accused’s behavior, speech, and orientation are the best evidence of his or her condition.
The research also counsels caution. Alcohol-induced psychosis is a genuine and serious condition, independent psychotic disorders can be unmasked or worsened by drinking, and in one meta-analysis about 10% of alcohol-induced psychoses were followed by a schizophrenia diagnosis (Murrie et al., 2020), a group figure that does not predict any individual’s course. A persisting disorder from long-term use may qualify as a mental disease under settled-insanity principles in many jurisdictions, and symptoms in custody can affect competency and the validity of statements taken while the person was symptomatic. Withdrawal delirium is a medical emergency; prompt medical evaluation of an accused showing its signs is needed for the person’s safety and also documents the person’s condition at that time.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. Alcohol can produce hallucinations, delusions, and delirium; an independent psychotic disorder may coexist with or emerge after an alcohol-induced episode; and Korsakoff syndrome and withdrawal delirium can profoundly affect memory and understanding. A careful timeline of drinking, withdrawal signs, symptoms, and treatment, drawn from jail, hospital, and prior psychiatric records, can support requests for evaluation of competency and mental responsibility and can inform mitigation, and in courts-martial evidence of a mental condition may bear on specific intent even when it does not establish lack of mental responsibility.
The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. Symptoms that arise during acute intoxication or withdrawal are excluded from Arizona’s insanity defense and generally do not qualify elsewhere, settled-insanity claims require evidence of a lasting disorder independent of intoxication, and a history of heavy drinking does not establish psychosis at the time of the offense. A memory gap does not itself indicate psychosis, since intoxication alone can produce one, and the group association between psychosis, substance use, and violence does not show that symptoms caused a particular act.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
American Psychiatric Association. (2022). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed., text rev.). https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425787
Appelbaum, P. S. (2022). Settled insanity: Substance use meets the insanity defense. Psychiatric Services, 73(1), 105–107. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.202100518
Arts, N. J., Walvoort, S. J., & Kessels, R. P. (2017). Korsakoff’s syndrome: A critical review. Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment, 13, 2875–2890. https://doi.org/10.2147/NDT.S130078
Fazel, S., Gulati, G., Linsell, L., Geddes, J. R., & Grann, M. (2009). Schizophrenia and violence: Systematic review and meta-analysis. PLoS Medicine, 6(8), Article e1000120. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000120
Jordaan, G. P., & Emsley, R. (2014). Alcohol-induced psychotic disorder: A review. Metabolic Brain Disease, 29(2), 231–243. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11011-013-9457-4
Murray, B. P., Richards, J. R., Stankewicz, H. A., Aslam, S. P., & Salen, P. (2025). Alcohol-related psychosis. In StatPearls. StatPearls Publishing. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459134/
Murrie, B., Lappin, J., Large, M., & Sara, G. (2020). Transition of substance-induced, brief, and atypical psychoses to schizophrenia: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 46(3), 505–516. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbz102
Perälä, J., Kuoppasalmi, K., Pirkola, S., Härkänen, T., Saarni, S., Tuulio-Henriksson, A., Viertiö, S., Latvala, A., Koskinen, S., Lönnqvist, J., & Suvisaari, J. (2010). Alcohol-induced psychotic disorder and delirium in the general population. British Journal of Psychiatry, 197(3), 200–206. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.bp.109.070797
Schuckit, M. A. (2014). Recognition and management of withdrawal delirium (delirium tremens). New England Journal of Medicine, 371(22), 2109–2113. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMra1407298
Starzer, M. S. K., Nordentoft, M., & Hjorthøj, C. (2018). Rates and predictors of conversion to schizophrenia or bipolar disorder following substance-induced psychosis. American Journal of Psychiatry, 175(4), 343–350. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2017.17020223
U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2025a). Amendments in brief: Simplification [Amendment effective November 1, 2025]. https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/amendments-in-brief/AIB_2025-simplification.pdf
U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2025b). Guidelines manual (Chapter One). https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2025/CHAPTER_1.pdf
White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.
Legal Authorities
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
State v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 529 P.2d 231 (1974).
State v. Loader, No. 1 CA-CR 14-0561 (Ariz. App. Sept. 1, 2015) (mem. decision).
State v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 38 P.3d 1236 (App. 2002).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
State v. Valenzuela, 114 Ariz. 81, 559 P.2d 201 (App. 1977).
United States v. Olvera, 15 C.M.R. 134 (C.M.A. 1954).
18 U.S.C. §§ 17, 3553(a).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-502, 13-503, 13-701(E).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.
Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).
Rule for Courts-Martial 706, 909, 916(k), (l), 1001.
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) (6th ed. 2022), 5.02-1.
Related topic papers: PTSD and Substance Use Disorders · Bipolar Disorder and Substance Use · Anxiety Disorders and Alcohol · Voluntary Intoxication, Blackout, and Criminal Responsibility · Alcohol and the Brain · Alcohol and Aggression
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom: Alcohol and Memory