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Women Who Co-Offend With Male Partners

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  • The question: How often do women commit sexual offenses together with a man, how do co-offending women differ from women who offend alone, and how should coercion and intimate partner violence be weighed?
  • What the research shows: About a third of police-reported incidents involving a female sexual offender in the United States include a male co-offender, compared with about 2% of incidents involving men. Co-offending women more often abuse related children and children of both sexes, and they frequently report violent or controlling partners. Coercion is documented for some co-offending women, but a substantial share in some samples took part without coercion, and some offended alone before or after offending with a partner; the samples are small and these are group findings.
  • What it does not show: Research cannot tell from group data whether a particular woman was coerced, how much she contributed, or whether she will reoffend. Co-offending status did not predict sexual recidivism in the one large study that tested it, and samples differ sharply in how common co-offending appears.
  • The law: Duress is narrow everywhere: the military rule requires a reasonable apprehension of immediate death or serious bodily injury, Arizona’s statute requires a threat or use of immediate physical force, and in federal court the defendant must prove duress by a preponderance (Dixon v. United States, 2006). Arizona allows a continuing threat to satisfy immediacy (State v. Richter, 2018, ¶ 20). Coercion short of a defense can still matter in extenuation, mitigation, and role adjustments at sentencing.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors may properly point to the research showing that many co-offending women participated actively and that coercion claims can be tested against the evidence, but not to treat a history of partner abuse as irrelevant. Defense counsel may properly present documented abuse, isolation, and control by a partner, but not to suggest that co-offending implies coercion or that leaving the partner eliminates risk.

A distinctive feature of sexual offending by women is how often it involves another person, usually a man and often an intimate partner. Co-offending raises questions that rarely arise when a man offends alone: whether the woman was coerced, whether she was an equal or leading participant, whether partner violence explains her conduct, and whether her risk depends on the relationship. They surface in charging, duress claims, plea negotiations, sentencing, and treatment planning.

Two premises frame the paper. First, children abused by a mother and her partner, or by a couple acting together, are harmed regardless of how responsibility is divided between the adults. Nothing in the research on coercion diminishes that harm. Second, the research documents two realities that must be held together: some women are coerced into abuse by violent partners, sometimes under threat of death, and some women who offend with a partner participate willingly, initiate abuse, or offend alone as well. Neither reality is the rule, and a claim in either direction requires evidence about the particular case.

This paper covers how common co-offending is, how co-offending women differ from solo offenders, the evidence on coercion and active participation, intimate partner violence as context, and how co-offending bears on culpability, duress, and risk. Typologies and pathways, prevalence, and recidivism are addressed in companion papers in this resource.

How Common Co-Offending Is

Estimates depend on the source. In national incident data covering 802,150 police-reported sexual offense incidents in 37 U.S. states from 1991 to 2011, 61.9% of the 43,018 incidents involving a female offender involved a woman acting alone, 32.5% involved a male co-offender, and 5.6% involved groups of women only; a male co-offender appeared in about 2% of incidents involving male offenders (Williams & Bierie, 2015). In the Netherlands, almost two thirds of all 111 adult women known to criminal justice authorities from 1994 to 2005 had offended with a male co-offender (Wijkman et al., 2010), and half of the 22 women in the English study that produced the descriptive offense-process model had offended in the presence of a man (Gannon et al., 2008).

Other sources point lower. In a U.S. community sample of 138 adults who reported sexual abuse or assault by a woman, incidents in which the woman co-offended with a man accounted for only 5.5% to 8.5% of events (Munroe & Shumway, 2022). That sample was self-selected, but the contrast suggests that official, clinical, and prison samples may overrepresent co-offending, perhaps because family abuse involving two adults is more likely to reach child protection and the courts. Both figures can be accurate for the populations they describe. Typology schemes built on clinical and registry samples have likewise tended to find co-offenders to be the largest group (see the companion paper on typologies), whereas police-incident data show most women (61.9%) offended alone.

How Co-Offending Women Differ From Solo Offenders

Studies comparing the two groups agree on some differences. In an earlier analysis of the national incident data comparing 123 solo and 104 co-offending women, co-offending women were more likely than solo offenders to have more than one victim, to have both male and female victims, to be related to the victim, and to have a nonsexual offense recorded alongside the sexual offense; the groups did not differ in age, race, time, or location of the offense (Vandiver, 2006). In a sample of 225 incarcerated women in the United States, solo offenders were more likely to have male, unrelated victims, scored higher on measures of dominance and aggression, and were more likely to commit a new offense of any kind; solo or co-offending status did not significantly predict sexual recidivism (Miller & Marshall, 2019; one sample, and because sexual recidivism among women is rare, comparisons of this kind rest on few events). An analysis of national incident data found that incidents involving a man and a woman resembled larger mixed-sex groups and differed from incidents involving women alone or groups of women (Budd et al., 2017).

Clinical comparisons add detail. In a United Kingdom study of 20 solo and 20 co-offending women referred to a specialist service, the two groups reported similar developmental experiences and similar psychological dispositions, including offense-supportive beliefs (Gillespie et al., 2015). Solo offenders showed more personal vulnerabilities, such as depression, substance misuse, and sexual dissatisfaction, and more personal factors before the offense, including negative mood, a need for intimacy or for power, and planning. Co-offenders showed more environmental factors, notably a current partner who was a known sex offender and involvement with other offenders, and they had fewer supports for treatment, such as a partner and family accepting of intervention. According to case files, 45% of the co-offending women had been psychologically or physically coerced by the co-offender. The authors noted that some differences were partly built into the measures, because women offending with a partner automatically met some environmental criteria, and that the small groups may have missed real differences.

Coercion, Accompaniment, and Active Participation

Clinical typologies have long distinguished male-coerced women, who are thought to abuse only in the presence of a coercive partner out of fear or extreme dependency, from male-accompanied women, who take part more actively and may come to initiate abuse on their own (Harris, 2010). The distinction is central to legal questions, and the research shows both forms.

In the descriptive model, 5 of the 22 women were classified as male-coerced and 6 as male-accompanied (Gannon et al., 2008). Some women offended out of fear for their lives, with no goal of their own; one reported being told she would leave the house in a coffin if she did not comply. For coerced women, the model documented a recurring sequence: domestic abuse, slow isolation from friends and family orchestrated by the partner, grooming that desensitized the woman to sexual behavior with children, and a first instance of abuse orchestrated by the man, who then praised her participation. The same study found that some coerced women, seeking to please their partners, later initiated offending themselves, for example by taking indecent photographs of children to give to the partner. The authors also described a group of women who wished to avoid offending but did so under extreme coercion, with strong distress and little sexual arousal.

Other evidence shows that apparent coercion may not tell the whole story. In a Colorado program in which women in treatment underwent polygraph examinations about their sexual histories, 17 incarcerated women reported both solo and co-offending, and 65% of them (11 of 17) admitted committing sexual offenses alone before offending with a co-offender; all three women whose records indicated that a man had coerced them admitted solo offending before the co-offending (Heil et al., 2010). The authors concluded that it should not be assumed that a woman whose offenses appear coerced has not offended alone, and that after polygraph testing the co-offenses were seldom described as coercive. These were small numbers from a single program, and polygraph-elicited admissions have their own reliability questions, but the finding cautions against inferring coercion from the presence of a male partner. A national Israeli study of 28 women similarly found fewer women than expected who reported being coerced by a male partner (Abulafia & Epstein, 2022).

Coercion is also not always tied to a co-offender’s presence, and it can be measured in different ways. In a self-report study of 60 incarcerated women in a Midwestern state, the authors distinguished co-offending, in which another person was present, from coerced offending, in which the woman felt pressured by someone else to commit the offense, and found that both childhood and adult trauma histories were related to both (Comartin et al., 2018). Whether a woman “felt pressured” is a different question from whether she faced a threat that would meet a legal definition of duress.

Intimate Partner Violence as Context

Partner violence appears throughout this literature. In the descriptive model, 20 of 22 women (91%) had experienced domestic abuse before their offending, and the authors noted that this link had not been emphasized in models of male sexual offending (Gannon et al., 2008). Some men with sexual interest in children appeared to seek out women who had previously been in violent relationships. In the United Kingdom clinical sample of 43 women, possessive or violent partners were reported by all 5 male-coerced women and 15 of 18 male-associated women (Elliott et al., 2010).

The same study, however, found possessive or violent partners among 6 of 11 and 6 of 9 women who offended alone (Elliott et al., 2010). A history of partner violence therefore does not distinguish co-offenders from solo offenders, and it does not by itself show that the abuse caused the offense or that the woman was coerced on the occasions charged. What the research supports is that partner violence, isolation, and dependency are relevant to understanding how many co-offending women came to offend and are legitimate subjects of evaluation, and that the evaluator must link them to the offense through evidence rather than assume the link.

How Co-Offending Bears on Culpability, Duress, and Risk

Culpability and role

Co-offending women occupy a range of roles: some acted under threats to themselves or their children, some facilitated abuse by procuring victims or failing to intervene, some participated as equals, and some initiated the abuse. Typologies cannot place a woman on that range; the case evidence can, including communications between the partners, what the victims describe each adult doing, the sequence of events, any solo offending, prior reports of partner violence, and opportunities to seek help. An evaluator can describe how a documented history of abuse and control may have affected her perceptions and choices, but whether her conduct meets a legal standard is a question for the fact-finder.

Duress

The psychological concept of coercion is broader than the legal defense of duress. The research describes pressure, dependency, fear, and grooming over months or years; duress statutes generally require a threat of immediate serious harm that a reasonable person could not resist and no reasonable opportunity to escape. Evidence of a pattern of partner violence may be relevant to whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have felt compelled, but the inquiry remains objective and does not turn on whether a particular defendant was unusually susceptible (State v. Richter, 2018, ¶¶ 29-30). In Richter, the Arizona Supreme Court also concluded that the expert testimony, as proffered on that limited record, would not have been admissible as observation evidence, that such evidence is likely not admissible to support duress, and left any renewed proffer to the trial court on remand (¶¶ 36-37). Coercion that does not establish a defense remains relevant to sentencing.

Risk

Sexual recidivism rates for women are low, as discussed in the companion paper on recidivism and risk assessment. In the one large comparison that tested it, co-offending status did not predict sexual recidivism, and solo offenders were more likely to reoffend generally (Miller & Marshall, 2019; 225 women in one sample, with few sexual recidivism events). An argument that a co-offending woman poses no risk once separated from her partner is not supported by group data alone: some women offend alone as well as with partners, and the clinical research emphasizes relationship patterns, dependency, and the choice of future partners as treatment targets (Gillespie et al., 2015). Conversely, an argument that co-offending marks a woman as more dangerous than a solo offender is not supported either.

Limits of the Evidence

Most data come from police incidents, registries, prisons, and specialist clinics, which may overrepresent co-offending, and the one community sample was self-selected. Coercion is usually established from case files or the women’s own accounts, and the polygraph findings that cut the other way come from a small treatment sample. Clinical comparison groups are small, typically 20 or fewer women per group. Definitions vary: some studies count any co-offender, others only a male partner, and “coerced” ranges from a threat of death to feeling pressured. The studies examined women; research on men who co-offend with women is scarce, so the men’s role is described mostly through the women’s accounts. Group findings cannot by themselves establish anything about an individual defendant.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the figure of about one third of incidents involving a male co-offender (Williams & Bierie, 2015) is offered, ask what was counted: police-reported incidents, not all offending, and a community sample of survivors put co-offending far lower (Munroe & Shumway, 2022). When an evaluator concludes that a woman was coerced, ask how coercion was established and whether the source was her own account, and ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since coercion rates in the studies came from files or self-report. When the finding that 65% (11 of 17) of co-offending women admitted earlier solo offending (Heil et al., 2010) is cited, ask who was studied: 17 women in one treatment program, with admissions obtained under polygraph examination. When Gannon et al. (2008) is cited for the 91% rate of domestic abuse, ask whether it applies to this woman and whether solo offenders in other samples reported similar rates. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Co-Offending and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

A woman who aids, abets, or causes another’s offense is punishable as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2, and the Supreme Court has required that an aider and abettor intend to facilitate the offense, with advance knowledge of the circumstances that constitute the charged crime (Rosemond v. United States, 2014). Some federal offenses reach co-offending parents directly; 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b) applies to a parent or guardian who knowingly permits a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction. Duress at common law requires a threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury, and the Supreme Court has emphasized that the defense fails if the defendant had a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law (United States v. Bailey, 1980). In Dixon v. United States (2006), in which the defendant claimed that her boyfriend’s threats compelled her to commit firearms offenses, the Court held that the defendant bears the burden of proving duress by a preponderance of the evidence. Expert testimony on partner violence is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, amended December 1, 2023, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), under which the court’s gatekeeping extends to all expert testimony (Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 1999), and Rule 704(b) bars an opinion on whether the defendant had the required mental state.

At federal sentencing, the mitigating-role adjustment in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 reduces the offense level for a minimal or minor participant who is substantially less culpable than the average participant. Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025) moved most departures, including the Chapter 5H specific-offender-characteristic policy statements, to Appendix B; the Commission described the change as outcome neutral, and the same facts may be considered for a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (the former § 5K2.12 policy statement on coercion and duress was among the moved provisions), so coercion short of a defense is now presented as a ground for a variance.

In courts-martial, Article 77 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes a principal of anyone who aids, abets, counsels, commands, or procures an offense. Under Rule for Courts-Martial 916(h), coercion or duress is a defense to any offense except killing an innocent person when the accused’s participation was caused by a reasonable apprehension that the accused or another innocent person would immediately be killed or suffer serious bodily injury; the apprehension must continue throughout the act, and the defense is unavailable if the accused had any reasonable opportunity to avoid the act without exposing anyone to the threatened harm. At sentencing, Rule for Courts-Martial 1001(d) allows the defense to present matters in extenuation, which explain the circumstances of the offense, including reasons that do not amount to a legal justification or excuse. Military Rule of Evidence 702 incorporated the 2023 federal amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text.

Arizona

Under A.R.S. § 13-412, conduct is justified by duress if a reasonable person would believe that he or she was compelled to engage in it by the threat or use of immediate physical force that resulted or could result in serious physical injury, which a reasonable person in the situation would not have resisted. The defense is unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed himself or herself in a situation in which duress was probable, and it is unavailable for offenses involving homicide or serious physical injury. In State v. Richter (2018), a mother convicted with her husband of kidnapping and child abuse of their daughters sought to present duress based on his ongoing threats and violence. The Arizona Supreme Court held that only the slightest evidence is required to raise the defense, after which the State must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt (¶¶ 14, 24); that continuing threats can satisfy the immediacy requirement, although vague threats and generalized fear do not (¶¶ 20-21); and that evidence of specific abuse and its pattern is relevant to what a reasonable person in her situation would have believed, but not to whether she was unusually susceptible (¶¶ 29-30). It reversed her convictions and remanded for a new trial (¶ 38); three justices dissented in part, concluding that the immediacy requirement had not been met (¶ 39).

Arizona does not permit evidence of a mental condition short of insanity to negate the mental state element of an offense (State v. Mott, 1997), a case in which a mother sought to use battered woman syndrome to negate the mental state for child abuse; Richter distinguished duress, a justification defense, from that prohibition (¶¶ 14-15). Accomplice liability is defined in A.R.S. § 13-303, and the child abuse statute, A.R.S. § 13-3623, reaches a person with care or custody of a child who permits the child to be injured. At sentencing, A.R.S. § 13-701(E) lists as mitigating circumstances unusual or substantial duress not amounting to a defense and participation in the offense that was minor although not so minor as to constitute a defense. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended, effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Order R-23-0004).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports the propositions that a substantial share of women who offend with a partner, in some samples, participate without coercion, that some initiate abuse or offend alone before or after co-offending, and that coercion reported after arrest should be tested against communications, victim accounts, and the sequence of events. Victims in co-offending cases are more often the woman’s own or related children, and the harm to the children does not depend on how responsibility is divided between the adults. Prosecutors are often best positioned to obtain the evidence that distinguishes a coerced role from an active one and to keep expert testimony on partner violence tied to the legal standard.

The research also counsels caution. Severe partner violence, isolation, and grooming of the woman by the man are well documented in co-offending cases, and some women offended out of fear for their lives; disregarding such evidence risks error at charging and sentencing. Under Richter, only slight evidence is needed to raise duress in Arizona, and the State then bears the burden, so a well-supported duress claim should be addressed on its merits. Polygraph-based findings that cut against coercion come from a single small program and should not be presented as general proof that coercion claims are false.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports presenting a detailed, documented account of a partner’s violence and control, the woman’s isolation, any grooming by the partner, and the sequence by which abuse began, and it supports an evaluation that addresses dependency and relationship patterns as treatment targets. Defense counsel are often best positioned to gather police reports, medical records, protective orders, and witnesses to the relationship, and to use them in a duress defense where the legal elements may be met, and in extenuation, mitigation, and role arguments where they are not.

The research also counsels caution. The presence of a male co-offender does not establish coercion: many co-offending women were not coerced, and some offended alone as well. A coercion account that rests only on the defendant’s statements after arrest is open to challenge, and a history of partner abuse is common among women who offended alone too. Arguments that a woman poses no risk once separated from her partner go beyond the evidence, and minimizing the harm to the children, who were often her own, is not supported by the research.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Abulafia, J., & Epstein, R. (2022). Motivational and cognitive factors in pathways to offending amongst women who have sexually offended. Sexual Abuse, 34(5), 620–637. https://doi.org/10.1177/10790632211051688

Budd, K. M., Bierie, D. M., & Williams, K. (2017). Deconstructing incidents of female perpetrated sex crimes: Comparing female sexual offender groupings. Sexual Abuse, 29(3), 267–290. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063215594376

Comartin, E. B., Burgess-Proctor, A., Kubiak, S., & Kernsmith, P. (2018). Factors related to co-offending and coerced offending among female sex offenders: The role of childhood and adult trauma histories. Violence and Victims, 33(1), 53–74. https://doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.33.1.53

Elliott, I. A., Eldridge, H. J., Ashfield, S., & Beech, A. R. (2010). Exploring risk: Potential static, dynamic, protective and treatment factors in the clinical histories of female sex offenders. Journal of Family Violence, 25(6), 595–602. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10896-010-9322-8

Gannon, T. A., Rose, M. R., & Ward, T. (2008). A descriptive model of the offense process for female sexual offenders. Sexual Abuse, 20(3), 352–374. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063208322495

Gillespie, S. M., Williams, R., Elliott, I. A., Eldridge, H. J., Ashfield, S., & Beech, A. R. (2015). Characteristics of females who sexually offend: A comparison of solo and co-offenders. Sexual Abuse, 27(3), 284–301. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063214556358

Harris, D. A. (2010). Theories of female sexual offending. In T. A. Gannon & F. Cortoni (Eds.), Female sexual offenders: Theory, assessment and treatment (pp. 31–51). Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470666715.ch3

Heil, P., Simons, D., & Burton, D. (2010). Using the polygraph with female sexual offenders. In T. A. Gannon & F. Cortoni (Eds.), Female sexual offenders: Theory, assessment and treatment (pp. 143–160). Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470666715.ch9

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Miller, H. A., & Marshall, E. A. (2019). Comparing solo- and co-offending female sex offenders on variables of pathology, offense characteristics, and recidivism. Sexual Abuse, 31(8), 972–990. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063218791179

Munroe, C., & Shumway, M. (2022). Female-perpetrated sexual violence: A survey of survivors of female-perpetrated childhood sexual abuse and adult sexual assault. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 37(9–10), NP6655–NP6675. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260520967137

Vandiver, D. M. (2006). Female sex offenders: A comparison of solo offenders and co-offenders. Violence and Victims, 21(3), 339–354. https://doi.org/10.1891/vivi.21.3.339

Wijkman, M., Bijleveld, C., & Hendriks, J. (2010). Women don’t do such things! Characteristics of female sex offenders and offender types. Sexual Abuse, 22(2), 135–156. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063210363826

Williams, K. S., & Bierie, D. M. (2015). An incident-based comparison of female and male sexual offenders. Sexual Abuse, 27(3), 235–257. https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063214544333

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014).

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).

State v. Richter, 245 Ariz. 1, 424 P.3d 402 (2018).

United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).

10 U.S.C. § 877 (Article 77, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2251(b), 3553(a).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-303, 13-412, 13-701(E), 13-3623.

Fed. R. Evid. 702, 704(b).

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Rule for Courts-Martial 916(h), 1001(d).

U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Amendment 836 (effective Nov. 1, 2025).

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2025).

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.12 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2024) (now in Appendix B).

Related topic papers: Typologies and Offense Pathways of Women Who Sexually Offend · Women Who Sexually Offend: Prevalence and Underreporting · Recidivism and Risk Assessment for Women Who Sexually Offend · Gender and the Justice System’s Response to Women Who Sexually Offend · Culpability and Sentencing Mitigation

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Child Abuse Allegations · Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial