The Self-Reference Effect – Arizona Forensic Services, LLC

Snap Shot

The question: Do people remember information better when it relates to themselves, and does that make the self-involved parts of a witness’s, complainant’s, or defendant’s account more accurate?

What the research shows: Information considered in relation to the self is generally remembered better than the same information processed for meaning alone or in relation to another person, and actions a person performs are remembered much better than actions the person only read about. Self-relevance improves memory largely because the self is a rich, well-organized body of knowledge that promotes elaboration and organization.

What it does not show: Better memory is not the same as error-free memory. Self-referential encoding has also raised false memories in laboratory studies, people can come to remember actions they only watched or imagined as their own, and memory for self-threatening information can be selectively weaker. Most of the research uses word lists and trait adjectives, and it cannot show whether a particular self-relevant memory is accurate.

The law: Rule 702 and Houser govern this testimony in federal and military courts, and Ariz. R. Evid. 702, Chapple, and Nordstrom in Arizona; an expert may explain how self-relevance affects memory but may not opine on whether a witness is truthful (Lindsey).

Issues for each side: Prosecutors can explain why a person may remember well what was done to him or her and what he or she did; defense counsel can examine whether self-relevant details were exposed to suggestion and whether a party’s memory of his or her own role reflects self-relevant bias, recognizing that the same principles apply to complainants and accused persons alike.

The self-reference effect is the finding that relating information to oneself generally improves later memory for it. A person asked whether the word “generous” describes him or her is, on average, more likely to recall the word later than a person asked what the word means or whether it rhymes with another word. The effect has been replicated many times, appears in children and adults, and occurs spontaneously in everyday memory as well as under laboratory instructions.

The effect reaches court because most witnesses in criminal cases are not detached observers. A complainant is describing what was done to him or her; a defendant is describing his or her own conduct; a witness may be describing an event in which he or she had a stake. The research helps explain why the self-relevant parts of such accounts are often remembered in detail. It also identifies conditions under which self-involvement can increase, rather than reduce, certain kinds of error, and it bears on why two people can sincerely remember their own roles in a shared event differently.

This paper reviews the foundational study and the meta-analysis that established the effect, the leading explanations, memory for one’s own actions compared with others’ actions, and research on self-relevance and false memory. It then addresses self-relevance in the memories of complainants and defendants, egocentric biases in recall, the limits of the evidence, the governing law, and issues for each side.

The Foundational Studies

Rogers et al. (1977) asked participants to make one of four judgments about each of a series of trait adjectives: its appearance (printed in large letters or not), its sound (rhyming with a given word), its meaning (synonymous with a given word), or its fit to the participant (self-descriptive or not). On a recall test the participants had not been told to expect, words judged for self-description were recalled best, outperforming even meaning judgments, which earlier research had shown to be an effective way to encode. The study placed self-reference at the top of the levels-of-processing hierarchy described in a separate paper in this hub.

Symons and Johnson (1997) combined the experimental literature in a meta-analysis and confirmed a reliable self-reference effect. Self-referent encoding produced better memory than both semantic encoding and encoding in relation to another person. The advantage was smaller when the comparison was another person rather than a meaning judgment, and smaller when the comparison task itself promoted both organization and elaboration. The authors concluded that the effect arises mainly because the self is a well-developed, frequently used body of knowledge.

The effect is not limited to laboratory instructions. In three studies of memory for birthdays, people recalled birthdays closer to their own more often than chance would predict and were more likely to remember a friend’s birthday when it fell near their own, showing that self-reference can occur spontaneously when material happens to connect to the self (Kesebir & Oishi, 2010). The advantage also appears early in development; five-year-old children showed it in a trait-judgment task (Sui & Zhu, 2005). A related line of research shows that mere ownership produces a memory advantage. When participants sorted pictures of everyday items into a basket belonging to themselves or to another person, they later remembered their own items better (Cunningham et al., 2008), and a study across age groups from adolescence to older adulthood found the ownership advantage in source memory throughout, although it narrowed with age because older adults remembered other-owned items relatively better (Clarkson et al., 2025).

Why Self-Reference Helps Memory

The leading account holds that self-referent encoding recruits two processes together. Elaboration links a new item to existing knowledge, creating many potential routes for later retrieval. Organization groups items into a coherent structure, which helps a person retrieve one item from another. In a test of these processes, Klein and Loftus (1988) found that self-referent encoding drew on both, which helps explain why it tends to outperform tasks that engage only one. The meta-analytic pattern, in which the advantage shrinks when the comparison task also produces both kinds of processing, is consistent with this account (Symons & Johnson, 1997).

It remains debated whether the self is special in kind or is simply an unusually rich example of well-organized knowledge. A critical review of behavioral and neuroscience evidence questioned whether self-related processing reflects a distinct system and noted that many self-reference findings can be explained by ordinary memory processes applied to highly familiar material (Gillihan & Farah, 2005). In court, the theoretical question matters less than the common ground: whatever its ultimate explanation, relating information to oneself generally strengthens memory for it.

Memory for One’s Own Actions

A closely related finding concerns actions. In the enactment effect, people who perform a simple action, such as “break the toothpick,” remember it better than people who only read or hear the instruction. A systematic review and meta-analysis of 145 behavioral studies found an average enactment advantage of g = 1.23, a large effect, when performing actions was compared with reading them, watching an experimenter perform them, or imagining them (Roberts et al., 2022). The authors attributed the benefit mainly to the mental planning of the action and secondarily to the physical movement itself, and patients with memory or motor impairments still benefited from enactment.

The boundary between one’s own actions and others’ actions is not perfectly preserved, however. Repeatedly imagining simple actions led participants to remember performing actions they had only heard described or had never encountered, a form of imagination inflation (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In three experiments, merely watching another person perform simple actions led participants to remember having performed those actions themselves, an effect called observation inflation that persisted despite warnings given just before the test (Lindner et al., 2010). These are laboratory studies of simple actions tested over relatively short delays, but they show that memory for “who did it” can be confused even when memory for the action itself is good. The Imagination Inflation and Source Monitoring papers in this hub discuss the underlying processes.

Self-Relevance and False Memory

The same processes that strengthen self-relevant memory can also strengthen errors that are related in meaning. In two experiments with European and East Asian samples, participants studied word lists designed to produce false recall of a related but unpresented word. Lists paired with the participant’s own name produced higher rates of both true and false memory than lists paired with another person’s name, and self-reference did not improve net accuracy (Wang et al., 2019). A later study with children, younger adults, and older adults found the self-enhanced false memory effect in every age group, with different underlying processes in younger and older participants (Wang et al., 2022).

The most directly forensic study used a misinformation procedure. Participants viewed a slideshow of a nonviolent crime; for half of them, their own photograph had been edited into the slides so that they saw themselves as the victim, and the others viewed the same crime as bystanders. After receiving misleading information, the self-as-victim participants reported more false details than the bystander participants, in both a Dutch and a Chinese sample (Wang et al., 2024). The authors described self-reference as a possible new risk factor when misinformation has been introduced. The study involved a staged, nonviolent event, modest samples of 68 and 122 participants, and photographs rather than personal experience, and it has not yet been widely replicated. It does not show that victims’ memories are generally less accurate than bystanders’; the effect depended on misleading information, which is a condition that interviewing practice can limit.

Self-Relevance in the Memories of Complainants and Defendants

The research generates predictions for both parties. For a complainant, what was done to him or her, what was said to him or her, and what he or she did in response are self-relevant, and the self-reference and enactment research predicts that these elements will generally be better encoded than details centered on other people or on the surroundings. The research has not directly compared the accuracy of victims and bystanders for real crimes, and the prediction concerns averages, not any particular account. The false memory findings add that the self-relevant core is not immune to suggestion; its strength does not substitute for attention to what the person was told or shown after the event.

For a defendant, the enactment research predicts that a person’s memory for his or her own actions will generally be well encoded, which bears on the weight of a detailed account of one’s own conduct, whether that account is an admission or a denial. Two lines of research qualify that prediction. Observation and imagination inflation show that people can come to remember others’ actions, or imagined actions, as their own. Research on mnemic neglect shows that people tend to recall less of negative feedback about their own important traits than of the same feedback about another person, a pattern the authors interpret as self-protection operating in memory (Sedikides et al., 2016). These findings apply to every person who describes his or her own conduct, complainants and witnesses as well as defendants, and none of them shows that a particular account is inaccurate or that a forgotten detail was suppressed.

Egocentric Biases in Recall

Self-relevance also shapes how people remember their share of joint activities. In a classic set of studies, married partners each estimated their own share of responsibility for common household and relationship activities; their combined estimates generally exceeded 100 percent, and the authors attributed part of the pattern to the greater availability in memory of one’s own contributions (Ross & Sicoly, 1979). People notice, rehearse, and therefore recall their own actions more readily than another person’s, which can produce sincere disagreement about who said or did what in a shared event. The Egocentric Bias and Self-Serving Bias papers in this hub review that research. These biases are not lying; they are common consequences of how memory is built around the self.

Limits of the Evidence

Most self-reference research uses lists of words or trait adjectives studied by university students and tested within minutes or days. The meta-analytic advantage concerns that kind of material; it has not been measured for memory of a complex criminal event, and its size varies with the comparison task. The enactment research uses simple actions, not emotionally significant conduct. The false memory studies use word lists, edited photographs, and staged nonviolent events, and the most forensically relevant of them is a single recent paper. Laboratory studies cannot reproduce the personal stakes, emotion, and consequences of a real assault or arrest, which may strengthen some memories and weaken others. Above all, group findings describe tendencies across many people. They cannot show whether a particular self-relevant memory of a particular complainant, defendant, or witness is accurate.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the self-reference effect is cited to support a complainant’s or defendant’s detailed memory of his or her own experience, counsel can ask who was studied and what was remembered: Rogers et al. (1977) and most of the studies summarized by Symons and Johnson (1997) used trait adjectives, not events. When the enactment effect is cited, counsel can ask how large the effect is and for what material, since the large average in Roberts et al. (2022) concerns simple performed actions compared with reading or watching them. When Wang et al. (2024) is used to suggest that a person’s account was distorted, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows for this witness, because the effect appeared only after misleading information, so the question is whether the record shows such information was supplied, and whether the finding has been replicated. When observation inflation (Lindner et al., 2010) is raised, counsel can ask whether the person had an opportunity to watch or imagine the disputed action. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

The Self-Reference Effect and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony about memory is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, under which the proponent must show the court that it is more likely than not that the rule’s requirements are met, including that the opinion reflects a reliable application of reliable principles and methods to the facts. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) assigned the trial judge a gatekeeping role, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended that obligation to all expert testimony, including testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge. In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2023 amendment became part of the military rule in 2025 through Military Rule of Evidence 1102 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm the current text. Military judges evaluate proffered expert testimony under the six factors of United States v. Houser (1993). Testimony on the self-reference effect is ordinarily general and educational, explaining why self-relevant information tends to be remembered and where self-relevance can introduce error.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the federal formulation and the Daubert standard effective January 1, 2012, and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). State v. Chapple (1983) is Arizona’s leading case on expert testimony concerning the reliability of memory and eyewitness accounts; excluding the expert was an abuse of discretion on its facts, while admission generally remains within the trial court’s discretion, and State v. Nordstrom (2001) approved limiting such an expert to general factors without opinions on the accuracy of a particular witness. Experts may not opine on whether a particular witness is telling the truth (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475), so testimony about self-relevance should describe tendencies in memory rather than vouch for or against a complainant’s or defendant’s account.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. Information that relates to the self, including what was done to a person and what the person did, is generally better encoded than peripheral or other-centered detail, so a complainant may remember the self-relevant core of an event well while recalling surrounding details poorly; that pattern is consistent with how memory works and is not itself a sign of unreliability. In laboratory studies, simple performed actions are remembered much better than actions only read about or watched, a finding that concerns simple laboratory actions, cannot show whether a particular account of one’s own conduct is accurate, and applies equally to an accused’s denial. Prosecutors are well positioned to protect the self-relevant core of a complainant’s memory by obtaining an early, recorded, open-ended account and limiting exposure to others’ versions of events.

The research also counsels caution. Self-relevance strengthens memory but does not guarantee its accuracy; self-referential encoding has increased meaning-related false memories, and in one study people who saw themselves as victims were more susceptible to misinformation than bystanders. Testimony suggesting that a complainant’s personal involvement makes his or her memory immune to suggestion goes beyond the research. Admissions about one’s own conduct carry particular weight only when the details were not supplied, imagined, or observed in another person, since people can come to remember others’ actions as their own.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. Self-relevance increases false as well as true memory for related information in laboratory studies, and exposure to misinformation produced more false memories in people who saw themselves as victims of a staged crime. Memory for who performed an action can be confused after watching or imagining it, and people’s memories of their own contributions to shared events tend to be egocentric. Expert testimony explaining these principles, combined with evidence of what a person was told, shown, or asked to imagine, is a legitimate way to help the factfinder evaluate an account.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. On balance, self-reference improves memory in laboratory studies using word lists, trait adjectives, and simple actions; this has not been established for complex criminal events. The self-enhanced suggestibility result arose only after misinformation and rests largely on one recent study with a nonviolent staged event. An expert cannot tell the factfinder that a complainant’s memory is false or that a detail was suggested. The same principles apply to the accused, whose account of his or her own role may reflect egocentric recall, mnemic neglect of self-threatening details, or confusion between observed and performed actions.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Clarkson, T. R., Paff, H. A., Cunningham, S. J., Ross, J., Haslam, C., & Kritikos, A. (2025). Mine for life: Charting ownership effects in memory from adolescence to old age. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 78(4), 766–780. https://doi.org/10.1177/17470218241254119

Cunningham, S. J., Turk, D. J., Macdonald, L. M., & Macrae, C. N. (2008). Yours or mine? Ownership and memory. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 312–318. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.003

Gillihan, S. J., & Farah, M. J. (2005). Is self special? A critical review of evidence from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Psychological Bulletin, 131(1), 76–97. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.76

Goff, L. M., & Roediger, H. L., III. (1998). Imagination inflation for action events: Repeated imaginings lead to illusory recollections. Memory & Cognition, 26(1), 20–33. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03211367

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Kesebir, S., & Oishi, S. (2010). A spontaneous self-reference effect in memory: Why some birthdays are harder to remember than others. Psychological Science, 21(10), 1525–1531. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610383436

Klein, S. B., & Loftus, J. (1988). The nature of self-referent encoding: The contributions of elaborative and organizational processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(1), 5–11. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.1.5

Lindner, I., Echterhoff, G., Davidson, P. S. R., & Brand, M. (2010). Observation inflation: Your actions become mine. Psychological Science, 21(9), 1291–1299. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610379860

Roberts, B. R. T., MacLeod, C. M., & Fernandes, M. A. (2022). The enactment effect: A systematic review and meta-analysis of behavioral, neuroimaging, and patient studies. Psychological Bulletin, 148(5–6), 397–434. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000360

Rogers, T. B., Kuiper, N. A., & Kirker, W. S. (1977). Self-reference and the encoding of personal information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(9), 677–688. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.9.677

Ross, M., & Sicoly, F. (1979). Egocentric biases in availability and attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(3), 322–336. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.37.3.322

Sedikides, C., Green, J. D., Saunders, J., Skowronski, J. J., & Zengel, B. (2016). Mnemic neglect: Selective amnesia of one’s faults. European Review of Social Psychology, 27(1), 1–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2016.1183913

Sui, J., & Zhu, Y. (2005). Five-year-olds can show the self-reference advantage. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 29(5), 382–387. https://doi.org/10.1080/01650250500172673

Symons, C. S., & Johnson, B. T. (1997). The self-reference effect in memory: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 121(3), 371–394. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.121.3.371

Wang, J., Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., Dong, Q., & Zhou, C. (2022). Self-enhanced false memory across the life span. The Journals of Gerontology, Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 77(9), 1645–1653. https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbac020

Wang, J., Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., & Zhou, C. (2019). A self-reference false memory effect in the DRM paradigm: Evidence from Eastern and Western samples. Memory & Cognition, 47(1), 76–86. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0851-3

Wang, J., Wang, B., Otgaar, H., Patihis, L., & Sauerland, M. (2024). Self-relevance enhances susceptibility to false memory. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 42(2), 79–95. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2644

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 25 P.3d 717 (2001).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 1102.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).