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Alcohol Blackout

Acute Tolerance and the Mellanby Effect

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Snap Shot

  • The question: Is a person less impaired at a given blood alcohol concentration (BAC) when BAC is falling than when it is rising, and what does that mean for self-assessment, observers’ impressions, driving, and memory?
  • What the research shows: People consistently feel less intoxicated on the falling (descending) limb of the BAC curve than at the same BAC on the rising limb, and they are more willing to drive. This is the Mellanby effect, a form of acute tolerance. Objective skills such as inhibitory control and simulated driving are generally as bad or worse on the falling limb, and in the one controlled laboratory study reviewed here (64 men, moderate doses), alcohol’s impairment of memory encoding persisted on both limbs.
  • What it does not show: The research does not show that a person on the falling limb is less impaired in judgment, memory, or driving, that feeling sober means being sober, or how strong the effect is at the very high BACs seen in many cases. It cannot show where a particular person was on the curve or how impaired that person was.
  • The law: Expert testimony on acute tolerance is governed by Rule 702 (as amended in 2023), Daubert, Kumho, Mil. R. Evid. 702, Houser, and Ariz. R. Evid. 702. It may bear on impaired-driving charges (Article 113, UCMJ; A.R.S. § 28-1381) and on what an accused knew or reasonably should have known about another person’s condition (Article 120(b)(3); A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)).
  • Issues for each side: Both sides can use the research to explain why a person who seemed, or felt, to be sobering up may still have been impaired; both should avoid saying that a person on the rising limb is more impaired overall, or that apparent recovery shows capacity or reliable memory.

Late in a night of drinking, people often say they felt themselves sobering up, and witnesses often describe someone who “seemed better” or “was coming down.” Those impressions matter in court. They bear on whether a person chose to drive, on what an accused perceived about another person’s condition, and on how much weight to give a witness’s description of someone’s state.

Pharmacologists have long known that the effects of alcohol at a given BAC can differ depending on whether BAC is rising or falling. The phenomenon is named for Edward Mellanby, who described it in the First World War era, and is usually called acute tolerance: tolerance that develops within a single drinking episode. The research shows that this tolerance is selective. It is strongest for how intoxicated people feel and weakest, or absent, for some of the skills that matter most. This paper describes the Mellanby effect, what a systematic review and later studies show, how it relates to memory and blackouts, what it implies for self-assessment and observers, and the governing law. When Do Blackouts Occur? The Ascending Limb discusses the rising and falling limbs from the standpoint of memory.

What the Mellanby Effect Is

Mellanby studied four fasted dogs given alcohol by tube, measured their blood alcohol over time, and judged intoxication by gross motor signs such as stumbling and a rolling gait. He observed that obvious intoxication appeared on the rising limb, while at the same BAC on the falling limb the dogs appeared relatively normal (Holland & Ferner, 2017, p. 546). His dogs reached far higher BACs than modern human studies use, and his only measure was visible motor impairment.

The modern definition is the proposition that the impairment associated with a given BAC is greater while BAC is rising than while it is falling; the impairment may be objective, observed by others or measured by tests, or subjective, experienced by the drinker (Holland & Ferner, 2017, pp. 545–546). How tolerance develops so quickly is not settled. One explanation is that breath and blood measurements lag the concentration at the brain sites where alcohol acts; another is that the nervous system adapts during the episode. The review noted that the first explanation appears unlikely to account for the effect, at least in rats, and that tolerance has been observed in some measures even when BAC is held steady (Holland & Ferner, 2017).

What the Research Shows

The most comprehensive review is a 2017 systematic review that screened 386 articles and analyzed 26 studies comparing effects at the same BAC on the rising and falling limbs (Holland & Ferner, 2017). The studies were small, with groups of a median of 10 people, and used many different measures at moderate doses. Two patterns recurred. Of the 13 trials with statistically significant results on self-rated intoxication, 12 found lower ratings on the falling limb (on average about 29% lower, an average across different measures), and people were more willing to drive. By contrast, the three studies of simulated driving found worse performance on the falling limb, and studies of inhibitory control, the ability to stop an action that has been started, found performance about 30% worse on average. The authors concluded that people who are beginning to sober up may believe they are less intoxicated while their driving skills continue to decline (Holland & Ferner, 2017, p. 555).

Individual studies show the same split. In social drinkers given a moderate dose, motor coordination and subjective intoxication recovered on the falling limb, but simulated driving and inhibitory control did not, and poorer inhibitory control was associated with greater willingness to drive (Weafer & Fillmore, 2012). Among college students, binge drinkers showed acute tolerance to subjective intoxication on the falling limb, accompanied by greater willingness to drive, while non-binge drinkers did not (Marczinski & Fillmore, 2009). A review of computerized cognitive tasks found that the speed of performance usually recovered as BAC declined while alcohol-induced errors did not diminish (Schweizer & Vogel-Sprott, 2008). In a study that held BAC steady by intravenous infusion, inhibitory control in young heavy drinkers continued to worsen during a plateau at about 0.08 (Hendershot et al., 2015).

The speed of drinking may matter. In 29 young adult social drinkers, a faster rise in breath alcohol on the rising limb was associated with greater acute tolerance in subjective intoxication, meaning a larger drop in how drunk participants felt by the time they reached the same level on the falling limb (Morris et al., 2017).

Sex differences have been examined directly in one recent study. Among 25 women and 25 men given comparable moderate doses, all showed acute tolerance in both motor impairment and subjective intoxication as BAC fell, but women’s subjective intoxication recovered significantly faster than men’s; the authors suggested that, for driving, this may increase risk as BAC falls (Griffith & Fillmore, 2025). This is a single laboratory study of 25 women and 25 men at moderate doses; the finding is a group average for subjective recovery, the study did not test sexual or other decisions, and it is not applied to any particular person in any role in a case.

The Mellanby Effect and Memory

The Mellanby effect concerns how impaired people are at a given BAC, while blackouts concern whether new experiences are stored. The controlled evidence suggests that memory formation does not share the subjective recovery. In one controlled laboratory study of 64 men (32 given alcohol, 32 placebo) at moderate doses, with word-type and picture materials, alcohol impaired the encoding of new material in free recall, cued recall, and recognition of completed word fragments regardless of whether BAC was rising or falling; it impaired retrieval in a word-recognition task only while BAC was rising (Söderlund et al., 2005). Blackouts themselves have been linked to a rapid rise in BAC, and memory loss in the early studies usually began on the rising limb (White, 2003, p. 189), but the persistence of encoding deficits on the falling limb suggests, but does not establish, that a person who feels or looks more sober later in the night may still be encoding information less well than when sober. The study did not test blackout-level BACs and cannot show how well any particular person was forming memories on a particular night; the same applies to a complainant, an accused, or another witness.

Self-Assessment, Observers, and Driving

The practical consequences follow from the pattern. A person’s own sense of sobering up is a poor guide to impairment on the falling limb, which is why the review’s authors emphasized the risk of driving at that stage (Holland & Ferner, 2017). Some outward signs, such as motor coordination, show acute tolerance (Weafer & Fillmore, 2012), so a person may also look steadier to others while inhibitory control and driving skill remain impaired. An observer’s impression that someone “seemed better” late in the night may therefore reflect real change in appearance and feeling without corresponding recovery in judgment or memory formation. Appearance is an imperfect guide to intoxication. At the group level, multiple visible signs track alcohol concentration, but experienced drinkers can appear sober at high levels (for example, Urso et al., 1981, a single-site emergency department study of patients who reported recent drinking), so a person’s appearance does not establish a low or a high BAC, and none of it measures memory. Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout? addresses the broader limits of observers’ impressions.

The pattern does not support the opposite claim, sometimes made, that a person on the rising limb is more impaired overall. Some effects are greater on the rising limb, particularly subjective intoxication and certain motor signs, while others are equal or greater on the falling limb. Which limb produces more impairment depends on what is being measured.

Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical case in which a person who had been drinking heavily stopped around midnight, said at about 2:00 a.m. that he or she felt fine, and was described by a friend as “much more sober than earlier.” The person then drove and was involved in a collision. The Mellanby research would explain how the person’s feeling of sobriety and the friend’s impression could both be sincere while driving skills remained impaired at that BAC. It would not establish the person’s BAC at 2:00 a.m., whether BAC was still falling, or how impaired this person was; those questions depend on testing, timing, and the evidence of the person’s conduct. The same reasoning would apply to a witness’s description of how any other person in the case appeared late in the night.

Limits of the Evidence

The studies in the systematic review were small, heterogeneous, and often conducted with young white men, frequently college students, at target peak BACs near 0.08 for safety reasons (Holland & Ferner, 2017, p. 554). Whether the effect is larger, smaller, or different at the much higher BACs common in forensic cases is unknown, and no experiments have tested it. The measures varied widely, and some studies reported results only as graphs. Simulated driving and laboratory tasks may not reflect real driving or real-world decisions. Mellanby’s original observations were in dogs. Only one recent study compared women and men directly, finding faster subjective recovery in women (Griffith & Fillmore, 2025); most earlier studies did not analyze sex. And the research describes average effects in groups; it cannot establish where a particular person was on the curve or how that person’s impairment changed.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When an expert says that a person on the falling limb was less impaired, counsel can ask what exactly was measured: the review found reduced subjective intoxication but equal or worse objective performance on several measures (Holland & Ferner, 2017). When the review’s figures are cited, counsel can ask how much evidence they rest on: small groups, a median of 10 people, mostly young men, at BACs near 0.08. When a single study is cited for a sex difference (Griffith & Fillmore, 2025), counsel can ask whether the result has been replicated and whether a moderate laboratory dose applies to the BAC in the case. When an observer’s impression of sobering up is offered as evidence of recovery, counsel can ask whether the research shows that the functions at issue (judgment, inhibitory control, memory) recover with the outward signs (Weafer & Fillmore, 2012; Söderlund et al., 2005). And when an expert places a person on the falling limb, counsel can ask what measurements support that placement. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Acute Tolerance and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony about acute tolerance is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, which requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, reflects reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of them to the case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) makes the court a gatekeeper, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extends that obligation to all expert testimony. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2023 amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. Military judges also apply the factors of United States v. Houser (1993). Article 113, UCMJ, prohibits operating or physically controlling a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel while drunk or when the alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath equals or exceeds the applicable limit (Art. 113(a)(2), (b)); the research bears on why a person may have felt fit to drive while impaired, not on whether the limit was exceeded.

In sexual assault cases, Article 120(b)(3)(A) reaches a sexual act upon a person incapable of consenting due to impairment by an intoxicant, where that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the accused, and United States v. Pease (2016) approved definitions of incapacity centered on the ability to appreciate the conduct and to make or communicate a decision about it. Acute tolerance research may help explain why a person who had been visibly intoxicated earlier appeared steadier later, and why that appearance is an imperfect guide to the person’s condition; it does not establish capacity or incapacity. A person can be in a blackout and capable of consenting, or incapable of consenting without being in a blackout, and later non-recall alone does not establish either.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the federal formulation in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to track the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). General educational testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403 is permitted (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), but experts may not opine on whether a particular witness is truthful (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986). Arizona’s DUI statute prohibits driving while under the influence if the person is impaired to the slightest degree, and separately prohibits driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of driving (A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1)–(2)); a driver’s sense of having sobered up is not a defense to either. Sexual assault “without consent” includes a victim incapable of consent by reason of drugs, alcohol, sleep, or similar impairment of cognition, where the condition is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)); the Mellanby research bears on how a person’s condition may have appeared, which is relevant to that element but does not decide it. Temporary intoxication from voluntary use of alcohol is not a defense to any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. A driver’s or accused’s feeling of having sobered up is a poor guide to impairment, because subjective intoxication recovers on the falling limb while inhibitory control and driving skill do not. A complainant or an accused who seemed steadier late in the night may still have been impaired in judgment and memory formation, and the research cannot show how well either was forming memories, so a witness’s impression of recovery does not by itself establish or rule out a later memory gap; the same applies to any other witness who was drinking.

The research also counsels caution. The studies used moderate doses and small samples, and their application to a particular person’s BAC and timing is uncertain. The research does not establish that a complainant who seemed to be sobering up was incapable of consenting, and the same reasoning that discounts an accused’s sense of sobriety applies to a complainant’s or a witness’s own sense of having been clear-headed.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. Outward signs of intoxication, including motor coordination, can ease on the falling limb, so a person may have appeared less impaired later in the night than earlier, which may bear on what others perceived about that person’s condition. The effect depends on where a person was on the BAC curve, and placing a person on a particular limb usually rests on estimates that can be examined.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. Appearing or feeling more sober does not show that a person’s judgment, inhibitory control, or memory had recovered, and the research does not show that a person who seemed steadier was capable of consenting. An accused’s own sense of having sobered up does not show that he or she was unimpaired, and voluntary intoxication is not a defense under A.R.S. § 13-503 or, outside the specified mental elements, R.C.M. 916(l)(2).

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Griffith, A. K., & Fillmore, M. T. (2025). Sex differences in acute tolerance to the objective and subjective effects of alcohol. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 257, Article 174111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pbb.2025.174111

Hendershot, C. S., Wardell, J. D., Strang, N. M., Markovich, M. S., Claus, E. D., & Ramchandani, V. A. (2015). Application of an alcohol clamp paradigm to examine inhibitory control, subjective responses, and acute tolerance in late adolescence. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 23(3), 147–158. https://doi.org/10.1037/pha0000017

Holland, M. G., & Ferner, R. E. (2017). A systematic review of the evidence for acute tolerance to alcohol – the “Mellanby effect.” Clinical Toxicology, 55(6), 545–556. https://doi.org/10.1080/15563650.2017.1296576

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Marczinski, C. A., & Fillmore, M. T. (2009). Acute alcohol tolerance on subjective intoxication and simulated driving performance in binge drinkers. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 23(2), 238–247. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014633

Morris, D. H., Amlung, M. T., Tsai, C.-L., & McCarthy, D. M. (2017). Association between overall rate of change in rising breath alcohol concentration and the magnitude of acute tolerance of subjective intoxication via the Mellanby method. Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and Experimental, 32(1), Article e2565. https://doi.org/10.1002/hup.2565

Schweizer, T. A., & Vogel-Sprott, M. (2008). Alcohol-impaired speed and accuracy of cognitive functions: A review of acute tolerance and recovery of cognitive performance. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 16(3), 240–250. https://doi.org/10.1037/1064-1297.16.3.240

Söderlund, H., Parker, E. S., Schwartz, B. L., & Tulving, E. (2005). Memory encoding and retrieval on the ascending and descending limbs of the blood alcohol concentration curve. Psychopharmacology, 182(2), 305–317. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-005-0096-2

Urso, T., Gavaler, J. S., & Van Thiel, D. H. (1981). Blood ethanol levels in sober alcohol users seen in an emergency room. Life Sciences, 28(9), 1053–1056. https://doi.org/10.1016/0024-3205(81)90752-9

Weafer, J., & Fillmore, M. T. (2012). Acute tolerance to alcohol impairment of behavioral and cognitive mechanisms related to driving: Drinking and driving on the descending limb. Psychopharmacology, 220(4), 697–706. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-011-2519-6

White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

10 U.S.C. § 913 (Article 113, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-503.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1381.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Rule for Courts-Martial 916(l)(2).

Related topic papers: When Do Blackouts Occur? The Ascending Limb · Blackouts and Blood Alcohol Concentration · Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout? · Alcohol Toxicology for Attorneys: Absorption, Distribution, Elimination, and Stages of Intoxication · Sex Differences in Alcohol Effects and Blackouts

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony: Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases · Memory in the Courtroom: Alcohol and Memory