Snap Shot
- The question: How often do attentive, honest observers miss an unexpected event or a change in plain view, and what does that mean for a witness, an officer, or a factfinder watching video?
- What the research shows: People often miss fully visible but unexpected events when their attention is engaged elsewhere (inattentional blindness) and often fail to notice changes, even to the person they are talking with (change blindness). Misses are more likely under heavy task demands and when the event does not fit what the observer is looking for, and most people believe they would notice far more than they do.
- What it does not show: Failing to notice is common and is not, by itself, a sign of lying or poor memory. The research cannot show what a particular witness or officer did or did not see, and no stable trait reliably predicts who will miss an unexpected event.
- The law: Force is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene (Graham v. Connor), and a witness’s degree of attention is an identification reliability factor (Neil v. Biggers; Mil. R. Evid. 321). Expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 and Houser, and in Arizona by Rule 702, Chapple, and Nordstrom.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can explain that missing a detail does not discredit the rest of an account, without treating a confident report of seeing something as proof it was seen; defense counsel can show that attention was occupied and that misses occur, without claiming the research shows what a particular person saw.
People generally assume that a large or striking event in plain view would be noticed. Research on attention shows otherwise. Inattentional blindness refers to not perceiving an unexpected object or event that is plainly in view because attention is engaged by something else. Change blindness refers to not detecting that some part of a scene, including a person in it, has been altered. Both are normal features of perception in healthy, attentive people: the visual system represents in detail only a small part of what reaches the eyes, and memory preserves the general sense of a scene, not an exhaustive record of it (Lane & Houston, 2021, p. 16; Simons & Rensink, 2005).
These findings reach court when a witness does not report an event a few feet away and a party argues that the witness must have seen it; when an officer says he or she did not see a weapon or a colleague’s use of force and body-worn camera video shows the event clearly; when a witness does not notice that the offender was not the person seen moments before; and when factfinders, who know what happened, assume that anyone present would have noticed. This paper reviews the classic and recent research, officers’ perception and body-worn camera footage, and the relevant law.
Inattentional Blindness: Missing the Unexpected
Mack and Rock (1998) introduced the term after finding that observers engaged in a demanding visual judgment often failed to report a simple, unexpected shape on the screen, even when it appeared where they were looking.
Simons and Chabris (1999) extended the finding to ongoing events. Viewers counted the passes made by one of two basketball teams; partway through, a person in a gorilla costume, or in another version a woman with an umbrella, walked through the game. Nearly half of viewers did not notice. Noticing depended on how difficult the counting task was and on how similar the unexpected figure was to the objects being tracked. What people notice depends in part on their “attentional set,” the features they are looking for (Most et al., 2005).
The effect is not confined to screens or students. Pedestrians talking on a cell phone were less likely than other walkers to notice a unicycling clown on their route (Hyman et al., 2010). Of 24 radiologists searching chest scans for lung nodules, 83% did not notice an image of a gorilla 48 times the size of an average nodule, and eye tracking showed that most of those who missed it had looked directly at its location (Drew et al., 2013).
The most directly relevant study was modeled on a Boston case in which a police officer chasing a suspect ran past a brutal assault and was prosecuted for perjury after stating that he had not seen it. Chabris et al. (2011) had participants run behind a research assistant while three people staged a fight near the route. At night 35% of the runners noticed the fight and in daylight 56% did, and increasing the runners’ attentional load (a harder count of the assistant’s head touches) significantly reduced noticing. The study shows that a person in pursuit can genuinely miss a nearby assault. It does not show that the officer in that case, or anyone else, did.
Change Blindness: Missing What Changed
In the “flicker” paradigm, an original photograph and a modified version alternate, separated by a brief blank. Observers had great difficulty finding even large, repeated changes, and changes to objects judged important in the scene were found faster than others (Rensink et al., 1997). Observers keep far less detail from one view to the next than they believe, though they keep the gist (Simons & Rensink, 2005).
In research films, many viewers did not notice when the actor playing a character was replaced across a camera cut (Levin & Simons, 1997). In the “door study” (Simons & Levin, 1998), an experimenter asked pedestrians for directions; midway through the conversation, workers carrying a door walked between the two, and a second experimenter replaced the first behind it. Many of the pedestrians did not notice the substitution, though others did.
Task Demands, Expectation, and Individual Differences
Heavier task demands and divided attention reduce noticing (Chabris et al., 2011; Hyman et al., 2010; Simons & Chabris, 1999), while similarity to what the observer is seeking and centrality to the scene increase it (Most et al., 2005; Rensink et al., 1997).
Expectation helps only for what is expected. Viewers who knew the gorilla video consistently spotted the gorilla in a new version, but were slightly less likely than others to notice two other unexpected events in the same video, a curtain changing color and a player leaving (Simons, 2010).
Whether some people reliably notice more than others has been studied extensively, with largely negative results. In an early study, cognitive measures did not predict noticing in three of four tasks, working memory capacity predicted it only weakly in the fourth, and noticing in one task was only weakly associated with noticing in another (Kreitz et al., 2015). A 2024 series of meta-analyses found relatively little evidence that cognitive abilities or personality predict noticing, noting that many studies were small (Simons et al., 2024). In the two largest studies to date, a registered report with 1,000 participants for cognitive measures and 1,000 for personality, some cognitive abilities predicted noticing only weakly and inconsistently, and personality showed little or no relationship (Simons et al., 2026).
Officers, Use of Force, and Body-Worn Cameras
Use-of-force encounters combine demanding tasks, high stress, and rapid change. In a simulated traffic stop, 58% of 100 police academy trainees and 33% of 75 experienced officers did not notice a handgun in full view on the passenger-side dashboard, whether the driver was cooperative or hostile (Simons & Schlosser, 2017). Experience was associated with better noticing, but a sizable minority of trained officers still missed a potential threat. In a realistic lethal-force scenario with 122 active-duty officers, heart rates reached about 150 beats per minute, officers reported distortions such as tunnel vision, 27% made at least one lethal-force error, and greater stress reactivity predicted poorer performance (Baldwin et al., 2022).
A body-worn camera records whatever falls within its frame, from its mounting position, without regard to attention. An officer attends selectively, may see things outside the frame, and may not perceive things the camera captured clearly (Bennell et al., 2024; Blaskovits & Bennell, 2020). Neither the footage nor the officer’s account is a complete record of what the officer perceived.
Officers who believed their camera was recording a use-of-force simulation did not recall less than those who did not (Blaskovits et al., 2022). Officers allowed to view their footage before giving a statement reported more details about the subject, and among those who could not, higher stress was associated with more errors (Blaskovits, 2020). In a qualitative study, 112 recruits who reviewed their footage after a lethal-force training scenario mostly regarded it as more accurate than their memory; the authors noted that if a statement is meant to capture what the officer perceived at the time, viewing footage first may reshape it to fit the video (Deck et al., 2025). Repeated viewing can also change how footage is judged. In two preregistered online experiments (about 300 participants each) using footage of four actual police shootings, each viewed three times, agreement that the officer had reason to believe there was an immediate danger rose across viewings when the suspect was armed but not when the suspect was unarmed; slow-motion viewing sometimes amplified the increase, though inconsistently (Dunn et al., 2026). Viewers’ judgments also depend on vantage point and attitudes: the same encounter seen from the officer’s camera and from a third-party camera produced different judgments of the officer’s conduct (Boivin et al., 2017), and prior attitudes toward police influenced what viewers reported seeing in body-worn camera footage (Jones et al., 2017). This literature is young and does not settle whether officers should view footage before giving a statement, but it supports documenting whether and when footage was viewed.
Witnesses Who Did Not Notice
A witness absorbed in a conversation, a task, a phone, or a threat may genuinely miss a nearby event, and failing to mention it is not, by itself, evidence that it did not happen or that the witness is concealing it. Equally, the research cannot establish that a witness who denies seeing something did not see it; a false denial and a genuine miss produce the same testimony.
Change blindness can also contribute to identification error. In a staged burglary video in which a different actor took over the role of the burglar halfway through, 61% of 80 viewers did not notice; viewers told in advance to remember the film detected the change more often, and detecting it was related to better recall and identification (Davies & Hine, 2007). Among 717 participants, those shown videos designed to induce change blindness were more likely to identify as the perpetrator an innocent person who had appeared earlier (Nelson et al., 2011). A later study qualified that finding: 64% of viewers missed the change and their accuracy was lower, but most of their errors were choices of known-innocent lineup fillers rather than the innocent person from the video, and viewers who detected the change were more confident without being more accurate (Fitzgerald et al., 2016).
The Illusion of Attention
People substantially overestimate their ability to notice. Participants who read descriptions of change blindness studies greatly overestimated their own ability to detect the changes, an error the authors termed “change blindness blindness” (Levin et al., 2000). In a representative U.S. telephone survey, 78% of respondents agreed with a statement that unexpected objects generally grab people’s attention (Simons & Chabris, 2011). Survey answers depend on wording and may overstate lay misunderstanding (Brewin et al., 2019). Factfinders who know what happened and watch video repeatedly may find obvious an event that was not obvious to someone whose attention was occupied. See “Hindsight Bias.”
Limits of the Evidence
Most of this research uses laboratory tasks and staged events with volunteers who have no stake in the outcome. Noticing rates vary widely with the task, the display, and the question asked, so a figure from one study describes its conditions, not a general rate. The field studies are small, police research uses simulations without real stakes, and the body-worn camera studies are few, include a dissertation and a preprint, and in the viewing studies use online participants.
Group research shows how often misses occur under certain conditions; it cannot show whether a particular person saw a particular thing. When half of observers miss an event, half see it, no trait identifies who will miss, and the research cannot verify a report of not having seen something. An expert can explain the conditions that make a miss more or less likely; the factfinder decides what this witness perceived.
Questions to Ask About This Research
Where Chabris et al. (2011) is used to account for an officer’s or bystander’s failure to see an assault, counsel should ask which condition (day, night, heavier load) resembles the case and whether the witness was doing a comparable task; the study shows that a miss is possible, not that it happened. When Simons and Schlosser (2017) or Baldwin et al. (2022) is cited, counsel should ask whether the figure relied on is for trainees or experienced officers and how closely the scenario resembled the encounter. When Dunn et al. (2026) is cited, counsel should ask whether the factfinder’s viewing conditions, such as the number of viewings and slow motion, resemble those tested. For other body-worn camera research, counsel should ask whether it was peer reviewed and whether it measured accuracy or only detail or opinions (Blaskovits, 2020; Deck et al., 2025). When change blindness is offered to explain a misidentification, counsel should ask whether the conditions in Nelson et al. (2011) and Fitzgerald et al. (2016), such as an innocent person seen shortly before the offense, were present. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Change Blindness, Inattentional Blindness, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Excessive-force claims arising from an arrest are judged under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than with hindsight, allowing for split-second judgments in tense, rapidly evolving circumstances (Graham v. Connor, 1989); the inquiry considers the totality of the circumstances, not only the final moment of threat (Barnes v. Felix, 2025), a decision that left open whether an officer’s own creation of danger bears on reasonableness. Courts may rely on video that plainly contradicts a party’s account (Scott v. Harris, 2007), but a recording shows what the camera captured, which may differ from what any participant saw. For identifications following suggestive police procedures, the witness’s degree of attention is a reliability factor (Neil v. Biggers, 1972; Manson v. Brathwaite, 1977). Expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023 (proponent must show each requirement is more likely than not met), and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended gatekeeping to all expert testimony, including non-scientific specialized knowledge.
In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 321 makes an identification process unlawful if it is so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of misidentification, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces applies the Biggers factors, including degree of attention, in deciding whether an identification is nonetheless reliable (United States v. Criswell, 2018). Expert testimony is admitted under Military Rule of Evidence 702 and United States v. Houser (1993). Under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, the 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 became part of the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert framework in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024 to track the 2023 federal amendment. State v. Chapple (1983), Arizona’s leading case on eyewitness expert testimony, held exclusion of a qualified expert an abuse of discretion on its facts, and State v. Nordstrom (2001) confirmed that admission otherwise rests in the trial court’s discretion. The identification instruction directs jurors to consider the witness’s degree of attention (RAJI (Criminal) Standard Criminal 45). A.R.S. § 13-410 permits a peace officer to use deadly physical force in specified situations when the officer reasonably believes it necessary; the jury instruction committee has noted that the statute is unclear whether that belief is measured subjectively or objectively (RAJI (Criminal) Statutory Criminal 4.10(3a), comment; State v. Grannis, 1995). Attention research may inform, but cannot answer, what a particular officer perceived.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
Failing to notice or mention a peripheral event or detail is common in honest, attentive observers and does not by itself discredit the rest of an account, particularly the parts on which the witness’s attention was focused. A complainant or witness who missed a change, a second person, or an object is not shown by that fact to be lying, and an officer-witness’s honest miss does not impeach the officer’s account of what he or she was attending to. Prosecutors are well positioned to obtain early, recorded accounts of what each witness was doing and attending to, and to document whether and when any witness viewed video before giving a statement. In officer-involved cases, prosecutors can also note that experienced officers noticed a visible weapon more often than trainees (Simons & Schlosser, 2017), and that repeated or slowed viewing can shift viewers’ judgments of whether an officer’s belief in danger was reasonable (Dunn et al., 2026), so viewing conditions at trial deserve attention.
The research also counsels caution. A witness’s confident claim to have observed a detail does not establish that it was perceived when attention was demonstrably elsewhere, and a witness who saw an innocent person shortly before the offense may sincerely misidentify that person. Testimony that an officer or witness must have seen an event because it is plain on video goes beyond what the research supports, just as testimony that a particular person did not see it would.
Special Issues for Defense
Large, visible events and changes, including the substitution of one person for another, are often missed when attention is occupied, under heavy task demands, and under stress, and individual traits do little to predict who will miss them. An identification by a witness who was occupied with a task, a phone, or a threat may rest on less information than a confident account implies, and change blindness has been linked to misidentification of a person seen before the offense. For an officer, the research supports the propositions that a camera and an officer perceive differently and that factfinders viewing footage with hindsight may overestimate what was noticeable.
The research also counsels caution. These effects do not establish that a particular witness missed a particular thing, and roughly half of observers in the classic studies did notice. The research cannot verify a client’s claim not to have seen something, and that claim can be rebutted by evidence of where the client was looking or what the client did. When the client is an officer, the same limits apply: the research shows that a trained officer can miss a visible threat or event, not that this officer did, and it does not establish that any particular perception or belief was reasonable. Arguments should rest on what the witness was doing and attending to in this case, not a general claim that people do not see what is in front of them.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Baldwin, S., Bennell, C., Blaskovits, B., Brown, A., Jenkins, B., Lawrence, C., McGale, H., Semple, T., & Andersen, J. P. (2022). A reasonable officer: Examining the relationships among stress, training, and performance in a highly realistic lethal force scenario. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, Article 759132. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.759132
Bennell, C., Baldwin, S., Brown, A., & Khanizadeh, A. (2024). Using body-worn camera footage to remember use-of-force incidents. In The impact of technology on the criminal justice system (pp. 253–271). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003323112-13
Blaskovits, B. (2020). Examining the impact of body worn cameras on police officer memory following a critical incident [Doctoral dissertation, Carleton University]. https://doi.org/10.22215/etd/2020-14716
Blaskovits, B., & Bennell, C. (2020). Exploring the potential impact of body worn cameras on memory in officer-involved critical incidents: A literature review. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 35(3), 251–262. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-019-09354-1
Blaskovits, B., Jenkins, B., Brown, A., Baldwin, S., & Bennell, C. (2022). Misplacing memory: Examining the phenomenon of cognitive offloading during an officer-involved use-of-force scenario. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 37(1), 49–67. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-021-09439-w
Boivin, R., Gendron, A., Faubert, C., & Poulin, B. (2017). The body-worn camera perspective bias. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 13(1), 125–142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11292-016-9270-2
Brewin, C. R., Li, H., Ntarantana, V., Unsworth, C., & McNeilis, J. (2019). Is the public understanding of memory prone to widespread “myths”? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 148(12), 2245–2257. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000610
Chabris, C. F., Weinberger, A., Fontaine, M., & Simons, D. J. (2011). You do not talk about Fight Club if you do not notice Fight Club: Inattentional blindness for a simulated real-world assault. i-Perception, 2(2), 150–153. https://doi.org/10.1068/i0436
Davies, G., & Hine, S. (2007). Change blindness and eyewitness testimony. The Journal of Psychology, 141(4), 423–434. https://doi.org/10.3200/JRLP.141.4.423-434
Deck, S. L., Porter, L. E., Powell, M., & Alpert, G. P. (2025). Police recruits’ perceptions of the utility of viewing body-worn camera footage following use-of-force incidents [Preprint]. CrimRxiv. https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.71749138
Drew, T., Võ, M. L.-H., & Wolfe, J. M. (2013). The invisible gorilla strikes again: Sustained inattentional blindness in expert observers. Psychological Science, 24(9), 1848–1853. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613479386
Dunn, G. P., Reisberg, D., & Pezdek, K. (2026). Viewing police body-worn camera video of use-of-force incidents: Does repeated or slow-motion viewing matter? Law and Human Behavior. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000672
Fitzgerald, R. J., Oriet, C., & Price, H. L. (2016). Change blindness and eyewitness identification: Effects on accuracy and confidence. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 21(1), 189–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12044
Hyman, I. E., Jr., Boss, S. M., Wise, B. M., McKenzie, K. E., & Caggiano, J. M. (2010). Did you see the unicycling clown? Inattentional blindness while walking and talking on a cell phone. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24(5), 597–607. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1638
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Jones, K. A., Crozier, W. E., & Strange, D. (2017). Believing is seeing: Biased viewing of body-worn camera footage. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 6(4), 460–474. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.07.007
Kreitz, C., Furley, P., Memmert, D., & Simons, D. J. (2015). Inattentional blindness and individual differences in cognitive abilities. PLOS ONE, 10(8), Article e0134675. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0134675
Lane, S. M., & Houston, K. A. (2021). Understanding eyewitness memory: Theory and applications. New York University Press.
Levin, D. T., Momen, N., Drivdahl, S. B., & Simons, D. J. (2000). Change blindness blindness: The metacognitive error of overestimating change-detection ability. Visual Cognition, 7(1–3), 397–412. https://doi.org/10.1080/135062800394865
Levin, D. T., & Simons, D. J. (1997). Failure to detect changes to attended objects in motion pictures. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4(4), 501–506. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03214339
Mack, A., & Rock, I. (1998). Inattentional blindness. MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3707.001.0001
Most, S. B., Scholl, B. J., Clifford, E. R., & Simons, D. J. (2005). What you see is what you set: Sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness. Psychological Review, 112(1), 217–242. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.112.1.217
Nelson, K. J., Laney, C., Bowman Fowler, N., Knowles, E. D., Davis, D., & Loftus, E. F. (2011). Change blindness can cause mistaken eyewitness identification. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 16(1), 62–74. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532509X482625
Rensink, R. A., O’Regan, J. K., & Clark, J. J. (1997). To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes. Psychological Science, 8(5), 368–373. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00427.x
Simons, D. J. (2010). Monkeying around with the gorillas in our midst: Familiarity with an inattentional-blindness task does not improve the detection of unexpected events. i-Perception, 1(1), 3–6. https://doi.org/10.1068/i0386
Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1999). Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception, 28(9), 1059–1074. https://doi.org/10.1068/p281059
Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (2011). What people believe about how memory works: A representative survey of the U.S. population. PLoS ONE, 6(8), Article e22757. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0022757
Simons, D. J., Ding, Y., Hults, C. M., & Roberts, B. W. (2026). Do individual differences in cognitive ability or personality predict noticing in inattentional blindness tasks? Royal Society Open Science, 13(6), Article 260708. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.260708
Simons, D. J., Hults, C. M., & Ding, Y. (2024). Individual differences in inattentional blindness. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 31(4), 1471–1502. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-023-02431-x
Simons, D. J., & Levin, D. T. (1998). Failure to detect changes to people during a real-world interaction. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5(4), 644–649. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03208840
Simons, D. J., & Rensink, R. A. (2005). Change blindness: Past, present, and future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(1), 16–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.11.006
Simons, D. J., & Schlosser, M. D. (2017). Inattentional blindness for a gun during a simulated police vehicle stop. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, 2, Article 37. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-017-0074-3
Legal Authorities
Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 900 P.2d 1 (1995).
State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 25 P.3d 717 (2001).
United States v. Criswell, 78 M.J. 136 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-410.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 321.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 45 (Identification) and Statutory Criminal 4.10(3a) (6th ed. 2022).
Related topic papers: Memory for Violence and Weapon Focus · Unconscious Transference · Hindsight Bias · Working Memory · Observation Evidence and Mental State · Eyewitness Memory
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial